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1.         Responding to recurrent disasters and conflict  
 
“Gifts are assumed to be used according to the wishes of the donor,  
not of the recipient. This is a strange form of giving”.  
Vaux, 2001: 55 
 
 
Over the last few decades, the frequency and intensity of disaster events has increased 
alarmingly, which particularly affected the livelihoods of poor people (Kim, 2011). In 
response, policy-makers and practitioners rapidly adopted Community-Based Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CBDRR)1 towards the end of the 1990s as an alternative to top-down approaches 
in disaster management. CBDRR approaches aim to build resilient communities. CBDRR 
refers to a variety of interventions aimed at reducing people’s immediate and long-term 
vulnerability to disasters by strengthening their capacities to better deal with the negative 
impact of disasters. Emphasis is placed on people’s participation and on the recognition of 
people’s existing capacities and local knowledge. A key characteristic of CBDRR is that local 
people produce risk maps of their surroundings. They use their knowledge to identify the 
multiple threats from economic, social, political and environmental angles. These maps 
serve as input to systematize early warning and evacuation, and help in finding appropriate 
risk reduction measures. CBDRR has proven its value and gained policy recognition. In 
Bangladesh, cyclones today only cause a fraction of the formerly experienced deaths, thanks 
to shelters, early warning mechanisms and involvement of community people in evacuation 
planning. Many more examples were collected in Living with Risk, the report prepared for 
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2004). The Hyogo Declaration 
concluding this conference attached central importance to the need of disaster risk 
reduction and community-based approaches. 
 
Though CBDRR is on the rise in international policy circles, there are a number of important 
conceptual and practical questions which have not yet been adequately addressed. Serious 
and critical analysis of how agencies put CBDRR into practice is still lacking. According to 
John Twigg (2004), much of the literature on CBDRR projects is little better than agency 
propaganda. I have been a CBDRR-practitioner myself for about ten years, when I worked at 
the Citizens Disaster Response Centre (CDRC) in the Philippines, and later as consultant in 
Asia. I increasingly felt discomfort when confronted with the discrepancies between CBDRR 
policies of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and their practices at community level. I 
also observed inconsistencies between the general CBDRR models of governments and UN 
organisations and the diversity of CBDRR practices, and noticed the different interpretations 
the various actors attach to CBDRR. I particularly observed a tendency to elude the political 
nature of disaster risk reduction. This discomfort inspired the current research in which I 
aimed to understand the reasons for these discrepancies.   
 
                                               
1
  I use CBDRR here as the most widely applied abbreviation to refer to community-based approaches for disaster risk 
reduction. Aid agencies use other abbreviations as well, like CBDM, CBDRM, or CMDRR. 
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This thesis opens the ‘black box’ of CBDRR, and seeks to understand what different 
interpretations of CBDRR policy exist and how these are operationalized in practice. 
Different actors like government agencies, NGOs and local people interact and negotiate to 
reduce disaster losses, and I am interested in what way these interactions reduce, produce, 
or reproduce people’s vulnerability to disasters. Could CBDRR indeed result in safer and 
resilient communities, as claimed in policy documents? Why does it fail to benefit the most 
vulnerable people? The focus of this interactive research is on localities experiencing 
recurrent small scale disasters and conflicts, and where the impact of disasters and conflict 
does not trigger (inter)national media attention or financial resources. 
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. First, I introduce the central concern of the thesis 
through an experience that emerged during my work at CDRC. The second section briefly 
positions ‘CBDRR’ in the broader historical context of development policy and practice since 
World War II. The third section introduces the aid organizations involved in this research 
with their specific research questions and how this research evolved into an interactive 
research process. Section four defines the aim and scope of the interactive research and 
presents the core questions. Subsequently, I outline the theoretical concepts that are central 
in this thesis. I close this chapter with a brief look at the structure of this book.    
 
1.1 The politics of drought response in the uplands of Panay, the Philippines 
In 1994, the Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre (CDRC) in Manila, the Philippines, asked me 
to assess the effectiveness of its Citizenry-Based Development-Oriented Disaster Response 
(CBDO-DR) approach2. One of the cases was a community seed bank program in response to 
drought in Central Philippines. The NGO field staff encouraged the drought-affected farmers 
to plant, harvest and store traditional rice seeds, while the farmers argued that modern high 
yield variety seeds were a more viable option. I concluded that local farmers interpret their 
circumstances different than outside NGO staff due to different risk perceptions. This led to 
inappropriate interventions (Heijmans, 2004). Later I realized that the ways interventions are 
shaped are as much a function of power dynamics, people’s motivations, values and hidden 
agendas. I decided to re-examine my notes and to review the story. 
 
In the early 1980s upland communities in Maasin District, Iloilo province, Panay started 
experiencing drought periods, which became more frequent during the nineties. To cope 
with drought farmers slowly shifted from ‘slash and burn’ practice to permanent farming 
(traditional rice varieties and corn). In the eighties, they ‘discovered’ that through making 
‘kahon’ (literally meaning ‘box’ and referring to a local version of rain-fed rice terraces) they 
could better cope with drought conditions. Farmers develop these boxes where suitable, and 
grow a combination of traditional rice varieties and high yielding varieties. The advantage of 
growing high yielding varieties is that it yields faster than the traditional ones, and by 
optimizing the available water in ‘kahon’, a second crop is sometimes possible. Farmers 
make risk-taking decisions to optimize usage of their resources: a traditional rice variety 
means less expensive inputs but only one harvest after 6 months. A high yielding variety 
means more expensive inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, but you can 
gamble on two harvests in the same period and therefore producing more food than what is 
likely with traditional rice varieties. Most farmers risk growing high yielding varieties, while 
                                               
2
  CDRC does not use ‘CBDRR’ as abbreviation for several reasons, which I will explain in chapter 3. It used CBDO-DR since its 
founding in 1985, and changed it into Community-Based Disaster Management in 2001 due to a changing political context. 
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on land unsuitable for ‘kahon’ they continue to grow traditional rice varieties and 
increasingly corn. If it does not rain for the second crop of high yielding varieties, they plant 
mung beans and corn. For additional income families are involved in bamboo weaving, and 
charcoal production. During 1990-1992 farmers of these upland communities villages 
experienced a severe drought, causing their coping strategies to fail.  
 
They sought outside assistance, and in 1991, the chairperson of the Community-Based 
Organisation (CBO) in Subog, called Erning, approached the local NGO belonging to the same 
NGO network as CDRC. Erning relayed the drought problem to the NGO as “a lack of seeds”, 
while individual farmers (men and women) articulated their drought problem during my 
interviews as “a lack of food”. This may be a subtle distinction, but had major consequences 
for the kind of intervention that was selected and for its success. Here politics entered the 
arena of defining risk, whose risk, and what should be done to reduce this risk. 
 
The NGO regarded Erning as “the contact”, treating him as the representative of all four 
organized upland communities. He lived close to the place accessible by motorbikes and 
public transportation; he regularly visited Iloilo City, passing by the NGO’s office for a chat. 
Vice versa, he also acted as a messenger on behalf of other CBOs when contacting NGOs or 
officials in Iloilo City. Erning is a prominent figure in the area. He belongs to those few who 
own their own land, and although his land is not enough to produce sufficient food for his 
family, he has alternative sources of livelihood to make ends meet. Seeds are important for 
him to cultivate his land. For the majority of farmers however, reality is different. They 
cultivate land of others through a sharecropping system and have to pay the landowner in 
kind, namely part of their harvest, also for using farm machineries and post-harvest facilities. 
This means that ¼ till ⅓ of their harvest is spent on rents. What is left is used for 
consumption although these sharecroppers face food shortage for several months a year. 
The NGO did not consider consulting all CBOs at this stage, assuming that all farmers were 
affected in the way expressed by Erning. 
 
Since Erning defined the problem as a lack of seeds, the idea of a Community Seed Bank 
Program (CSBP) was born. The selected components of the program were identified by the 
NGO which attached particular value to three principles from its CBDO-DR framework: 
dispersal of traditional seeds since its staff believed in sustainable agriculture practices as 
opposed to the government’s modern agricultural technologies; the construction of a central 
storage-place to keep the seeds for the next planting season as a mechanism to stimulate 
community cooperation; a repayment scheme to sustain availability of seeds, to strengthen 
people’s livelihoods, and to expand dispersal to non-CBO members; and a training on project 
management to strengthen the CBO as an organization.  
 
Shortly after the NGO consulted all CBO members about the Seed Bank Program, discussions 
started about whether traditional or high yield rice varieties should be distributed. The NGO 
did not recognize the farmers’ strategy to drought, planting high yield varieties, as viable: it 
condemned the farmers’ solution as environmentally and economically unsustainable. The 
NGO associated high yield variety seeds with the ‘Green Revolution’ ideology promoted by 
the Marcos regime, and therefore it clashed with the organization’s values. The NGO field 
staff labelled farmers as backward, traditional, and stubborn. The NGO did not appreciate 
how farmers adapted strategies to mitigate effects of drought, despite their rhetoric that 
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interventions should recognize people’s existing coping strategies. The Seed Bank Program 
was implemented in a total of eighteen villages. Only in one village farmers were able to 
store seeds - ironically farmers repaid to the seed bank through mainly high yielding variety 
seeds - but these were used to feed the family before the next planting season. The seed 
banks remained empty because of food shortage.  
 
Despite the rhetoric of participation, partnership, and supporting the most vulnerable 
sectors, the majority of CBO members were excluded during the conceptualization of the 
program. Only chairperson Erning was taken seriously by the NGO. They together defined 
the problem, and controlled the solution to the drought problem. Erning was one of the less 
vulnerable persons in the area, and motivated to serve his private interests first above being 
accountable to the community. He once took five sacks of seeds from the storage without 
informing the CBO or repaying them.  
 
This case illustrates that looking into different risk perceptions among the various actors is 
not sufficient. The NGO imagined the upland villages as traditional, backward, and relatively 
homogeneous communities, and represented by peasant organizations. This image hid the 
diversity in social positions of local farmers and sharecroppers and denied farmers’ creative 
solutions to deal with drought. Additionally, whereas the NGO publicly claimed to consider 
people’s participation as essential to reducing disaster risks, it failed here to listen properly 
to the people’s arguments and to recognize their coping strategies. The NGO stuck to the 
kind of intervention that suited its ideological position, namely promoting traditional crops. 
This case made me realize that apart from focusing on which technical choices and measures 
are most appropriate to reduce risk for a particular disaster, it is equally important to focus 
on the political process that determines how these choices are made (Christoplos et al, 2001: 
195). CBDRR interventions claim to support the most vulnerable groups in the community, 
but as the Seed Bank Program demonstrated, this is not always the case. Therefore I seek to 
investigate the political dimensions of CBDRR which is the central concern of this thesis. 
 
1.2 The rise of ‘community-based’ approaches in response to failing development 
strategies 
The rise of community-based approaches in development policy and practice during the 
1990s3 is actually a response to the errors and failures of development work dominated by 
top-down approaches. This dominance goes back at least to the Marshall Plan4 to support 
the reconstruction in European countries affected by World War II, and to make Europe 
prosperous again. US policy to rebuild Europe became a model to solve problems of ‘under-
development’ around the world (Escobar, 1995; Chambers, 2010). Capital, science and tech-
nology were the main ingredients to replicate the living conditions of the ‘advanced coun-
tries’ to the economically ‘less advanced countries’ (Escobar, 1995:4). The idea was pro-
moted that Third World countries had to catch up through capital investments in industries 
and infrastructure like roads, harbours, dams and irrigation systems, and through new 
technologies in agriculture, like Green Revolution technology. Engineers and economists 
were in charge putting primacy on ‘things’ rather than on ‘people’ (Chambers, 2010: 13).  
                                               
3
  In other disciplines like forestry, natural resource management, coastal resource management and in the health sector, a 
longer tradition of community-based approaches exists than in the field of disaster risk reduction. 
4
  Named after George Marshall, who was Secretary of State during Truman’s presidency of the United States. 
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The view of economic progress and material prosperity became dominant since the 1950s in 
powerful institutions like the UN and the World Bank. Escobar points out that economists 
and politicians were very much aware that economic progress requires painful adjustments, 
and “that large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their 
expectations of a comfortable life frustrated“ as stated in a UN document produced by the 
Department of Social and Economic Affairs in 1951 (1995: 4). These negative outcomes were 
regarded as side-effects of development interventions, aimed to increase production and 
export of goods (Ferguson and Lohman, 1994). 
 
From the 1970s onwards, theorists and politicians increasingly debated about the kind of 
development that could solve social and economic problems in the world, resulting in a shift 
towards the ‘human basic needs approach’. This approach emphasized not only economic 
growth, but included the distribution of the benefits of growth in its view (Escobar, 1995: 5). 
Those who opposed the dominant economic strategies used terms like ‘alternative develop-
ment’, ‘participatory development’ or ‘socialist development’ – but still viewing ‘develop-
ment’ as something that is needed, as a certainty that should happen (ibid: 5). The dominant 
thinking on development constructed an image of Third World countries as backward and 
underdeveloped, and, according to Escobar, many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
started to see themselves as such, and increasingly subjected their societies to western 
interventions.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ were added to the develop-
ment language and integrated in the dominant development thinking on markets and 
human development (Bebbington et al, 2007). People living in poverty, women, children, 
those who were vulnerable and marginalised were given priority in policy documents 
(Chambers, 2010: 13). Bebbington et al attribute the change in language particularly to the 
increased involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations and other civic organizations in 
development programmes of governments and the World Bank (2007: 598). The balance 
between ‘things’ and ‘people’ began to shift towards people. Yet, these people were still 
depicted as having needs and problems, living in conditions of poverty, powerlessness, 
hunger, illiteracy and oppressed by their own lack of initiative and traditions. This image 
universalizes and homogenizes Third World cultures in an ahistorical and apolitical fashion 
(Escobar, 1995: 8). That such an image is constructed and can exist is more a sign of power 
of western institutions over the South than a truth about it (ibid: 9).  
 
During the 1990s development policy of governments, UN and World Bank started to 
promote community-based approaches in various fields like forestry, coastal resource 
management and health. Involving local people was assumed to make interventions more 
efficient, and to ‘empower’ people, mainly in terms of community organization, a type and 
level of empowerment that poses no serious threat to prevailing power relations 
(Bebbington et al, 2007: 598). Furthermore, an emphasis on community-based approaches 
may generate a greater support for governments’ programmes from development activists 
and NGOs from both the West and Southern countries. In many community-based 
programmes promoted by southern governments, ‘participation’ does not mean sharing in 
power, but that community people act as volunteers to do work on behalf of government to 
save resources (White, 1996).   
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In the field of disaster response, the dominant approach to render support to disaster 
affected populations was through top-down, single-event emergency operations, and 
through investment in technology to better forecast hazards, to warn the public and in 
physical infrastructure. Towards the end of the International Decade of Natural Disaster 
Reduction in 1999, much later than the development policy, the UN realised that if it wants 
to make disaster response more effective, it should step away from the technocratic 
approach and give more attention to  local knowledge, traditions, religion, culture and to the 
involvement of local communities. This led to the proliferation of community-based 
approaches in disaster management and disaster risk reduction. Chapter 3 and 4 analyses 
the origins of CBDRR approaches in more detail, particularly how CBDRR approaches are 
shaped and embedded in particular state-society configurations. These chapters elaborate 
on the contested nature of CBDRR in the arena of explaining and responding to disasters.  
 
1.3. Initiating the PhD research in an interactive research setting with aid agencies 
Mid 2004, the Chair Group of Disaster Studies at Wageningen University received inter-
related research requests from three Dutch funding agencies, namely ICCO, Kerkinactie, and 
Oxfam-Novib. These requests came from the respective humanitarian units, and dealt with 
questions to improve their aid practice and local level responses to disasters and conflict.  
 
The humanitarian units of ICCO and Kerkinactie work closely together. Two staff, Evert who 
headed ICCO’s Asia emergency desk and Sjoerd who was responsible for mainstreaming 
emergency response in Kerkinactie’s regular development programme in Asia, got used over 
the years to looking at crisis situations from the perspective of disaster and conflict-affected 
populations. They observed a gap between grassroots realities and aid programming, and 
believed that a community-based approach to disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) would be 
more effective. CBDRR could possibly link relief to development efforts. They realized that 
while it is important to provide timely and appropriate humanitarian assistance, it is equally 
crucial to address underlying causes of vulnerability. They further stressed the importance of 
principles like participation, because in practice, survivors’ active roles, their capacities and 
risk perceptions are hardly acknowledged.  
 
They requested Disaster Studies to facilitate a CBDRR pilot programme and an interactive 
research involving selected local partners in Afghanistan and Indonesia. They wanted to 
learn from past failures, and to improve ICCO’s and Kerkinaktie’s aid practice to better serve 
people at the grassroots. In 2005, Disaster Studies approached me for this task. I had been 
looking for an opportunity to reflect on my experience as CBDRR-practitioner in Asia, and 
wanted to better comprehend the dynamics that produce and reproduce a policy-practice 
gap, preferably together with aid agencies. My research interest matched with the request 
of Evert and Sjoerd, and my experience matched with the researcher’s profile. They explicitly 
asked for a researcher with practical hands-on experience who could act as advisor, 
facilitator, capacity builder and researcher.  Initially, ‘interactive research’ meant here that 
all actors involved contribute their specific situated knowledge and experience, discuss and 
reflect on research findings, and adjust research directions if necessary, while I was made 
responsible for the research methodology. 
 
 
 
25 
 
In 2005, Oxfam-Novib also approached the Chair Group of Disaster Studies with a similar 
request, although its motivation slightly differed from ICCO’s and Kerkinactie’s request.  
Oxfam-Novib intended to strengthen the humanitarian capacities of its local Afghan partners 
to enable them to provide timely and appropriate humanitarian aid to Afghans in case large 
disasters occur in conflict contexts. In January 2006, I conducted a Humanitarian Capacity 
Assessment in Afghanistan involving four local partners. Instead of strengthening their NGO 
capacities in contingency planning and humanitarian assistance, they preferred to learn 
about how to integrate disaster risk reduction and conflict-sensitive programming in their 
regular development programs through piloting CBDRR. Some Afghan partners no longer 
wanted to provide relief since it did not solve people’s livelihood problems, and it was 
believed to have a disempowering impact on aid recipients. After discussions with Oxfam-
Novib’s humanitarian unit staff, the idea to pilot CBDRR with four Afghan partners was 
added to the Humanitarian Capacity Building Programme. In 2009, it accepted CBDRR as an 
approach to promote resilience of communities and to strengthen their capacities for self-
reliance. The arrangement with Oxfam-Novib consisted of short-term contract research in 
which I acted as a consultant who complied with a ‘terms of reference’ for each visit, 
whereas with ICCO and Kerkinactie I engaged in long-term interactive research. Initially I 
treated these requests as separate research activities, but they got linked through joint 
workshops and learning.  
 
The three Dutch aid agencies selected Afghanistan and Indonesia for specific reasons. Within 
the international Oxfam family, Oxfam-Novib got the lead function in Afghanistan, which 
implies that Oxfam-Novib leads the humanitarian operations in this country in case large 
impact disasters happen. Therefore it was interested in strengthening the local humanitarian 
capacity of its Afghan partner NGOs and to explore the interplay of disasters and conflict. 
ICCO and Kerkinactie selected Afghanistan because it experiences natural threats, on-going 
conflicts, major access problems to land, water and health facilities, and its government is 
weak. Staff of ICCO and Kerkinactie got familiar with the local context and their partners 
through relief and recovery programs. Convinced of the idea that continuing providing relief 
would not be a solution, but that more attention should be given to structural solutions, the 
need to formulate a new country program for 2006 -2010 served as an opportunity to 
explore and introduce new approaches like CBDRR.  
 
The choice to select Indonesia – and more specifically Maluku – has a more sensitive 
historical background. Kerkinactie has strong historical ties with Indonesia through the 
protestant churches. The relationships with local churches in Indonesia are quite complex, 
and not always harmonious. Specifically the role of local churches in providing emergency 
relief to communities affected by the communal violence in Maluku in 1999-2000 was 
problematic, due to the perceived involvement of church-related actors in the emergence of 
the violence. Kerkinactie formulated the challenge of the CBDRR-pilot in Indonesia as to 
contribute to improving relationships with local communities and to innovate their 
approaches and practice. Unlike in Afghanistan, ICCO and Kerkinactie each have a different 
history in Indonesia: whereas Kerkinactie historically operated through the institutional 
church relationships - which were closely tied to the governmental elite in Jakarta during the 
colonial past -, ICCO related to partners that challenge the policies and performance of the 
Indonesian government. Since the beginning of 2007, ICCO and Kerkinactie, to be further 
referred to as I&K, merged their worldwide programmes. They jointly selected Afghanistan 
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and Indonesia, and these were in fact political choices that the organizations made with a 
specific agenda. These agendas became explicit during the research, which influenced the 
research process, the encounters and outcomes. 
 
Whereas the countries were selected before I entered the interactive research setting early 
2006, the selection of local partners and CBDRR-pilot areas became part of the discussions, 
debates and negotiations, which went on until 2008. In Indonesia two partners joined, one in 
Central Java and one in Halmahera, Northern Maluku, while three more NGOs operating in 
Central Java joined in 2008. In Afghanistan, four Afghan NGOs joined the interactive research: 
two partner NGOs of Oxfam-Novib, and two of ICCO and Kerkinactie. The process of selec-
tion of local partners and communities will be further discussed in Chapter 2 and 6. The 
CBDRR pilots started with kick-off seminars in Kabul (Afghanistan), Yogyakarta (Central Java) 
and Tobelo (Halmahera) followed by ‘doing CBDRR’ in a total of 44 villages. The pilots 
consisted of testing a new approach to respond to recurrent disasters in conflict settings 
beyond relief, and to reflect on the intervention processes and varying outcomes. 
 
1.4 Sources of research questions – experiences, dilemmas and assumptions 
Staff of ICCO, Kerkinactie and Oxfam-Novib, and their local partners formulated multiple 
questions, triggered by experiences and dilemmas they felt they could not address alone. I 
had my own research interests. To arrive at the aim of this research and its overall research 
question, I made a ‘living document’ to collect and process all ideas in order to better define 
what is part of this PhD thesis, and what is consultancy work. During 2006, I reviewed 
everyone’s expectations and research interests, searched for overlapping interests and 
priorities, and clustered them in three themes presented below. By the end of 2006 I 
presented the research design to the aid agencies and shared it with the selected local 
partners in Indonesia and Afghanistan. 
(1) The policy-practice discrepancy in the aid chain.  
(2) Politicization and de-politicization of CBDRR interventions. 
(3) Potential of CBDRR in conflict contexts. 
 
The policy-practice discrepancy within the aid chain  
The first theme relates to observations of a discrepancy between policy and practice. Evert 
and Sjoerd from I&K had noticed the problematic relationship between the policy models 
and prescriptions at donor level, and the practices they are supposed to generate at 
grassroots level. Through their work experience in crisis contexts, they realized that people’s 
priority in crisis situations is often not emergency relief, but support to strengthen their 
livelihood opportunities. They had come to the belief that continuing providing emergency 
relief to people in need is not the appropriate response; structural solutions should get more 
attention through linking relief to development through disaster risk reduction. However, in 
practice they found this quite a challenge to realize, both in terms of mandate and 
operational structures within I&K.  
 
An additional explanation for the mismatch between policy and practice, according to Evert, 
is that most local partner NGOs are not organized such that they can channel and manage 
large amounts of emergency relief budgets and goods in times of crisis. He therefore 
proposed to mainstream risk reduction into the organization’s regular development 
programmes. Although many of his colleagues in various departments supported his 
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proposal, the higher ranks of the organization argued that ICCO and Kerkinactie are basically 
‘development organizations’ funded through the co-financing system of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Disaster risk reduction is not part of the Ministry’s funding policy, and 
therefore, the directors and boards were not really interested in new policy on disaster risk 
reduction, or linking relief to development.  
 
Evert and Sjoerd emphasized the need to critically reflect on the workings of the aid chain, to 
identify constraints that cause the mismatch between aid programming and local realities. 
Their concerns corresponded with my experience in the Philippines as described above in 
the ‘community seed bank’ case. Our experiences motivated us to look at interventions 
differently, particularly to understand how interventions are embedded in the broader 
institutional context, and how policy is being translated into practice along the aid chain.  
 
Politicization and de-politicization of CBDRR interventions: considering state-society relations 
Together with former CDRC staff, we ‘exported’ the Philippine CBDO-DR framework to Asian 
aid agencies through the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) in Bangkok. As training 
facilitators we used training materials from the Philippines. These materials were originally 
developed for CDRC and its network which view disasters as an opportunity for social change. 
Increasingly, we wondered why the political dimensions of ‘CBDRM’5 and its social change 
perspective were negated by the majority of the participants and, later, why it disappeared 
from ADPC’s CBDRM course handbook. Participants of the CBDRM courses interpreted con-
cepts like ’vulnerability‘, ‘risk assessment’, or ‘community organizing’ as technical properties 
and systems without a political agenda like CDRC has. Subsequent visits to Bangladesh, India 
and Vietnam to facilitate tailor-made CBDRM courses locally, revealed how INGOs, local 
NGOs and government officials interpret and do CBDRM in varying ways, and I increasingly 
felt the need to better understand the origins of the various political perspectives on CBDRM.  
 
I further wanted to know why the concept of ‘vulnerability’ appears everywhere with its 
material, physical, economic and social dimensions, while often omitting its political 
qualification. Also Evert and Sjoerd stressed the importance to not ignore the broader 
political context in CBDRR interventions, and to be aware of local power dynamics which 
shape CBDRR outcomes within and beyond villages. Inspired by the Philippine experience 
and practice of CDRC (Heijmans and Victoria, 2001), Evert and Sjoerd wanted to explore 
what the CBDRR approach could add to survivors’ agency, to enter the broader political 
context to negotiate for risk reduction measures that address the structural causes of their 
vulnerability, specifically in its political dimension.  
 
Potential of CBDRR in conflict contexts  
ICCO, Kerkinactie and Oxfam-Novib are concerned with addressing disaster risk reduction in 
situations of conflict or chronic instability6. Dynamics of conflict, the interplay with disasters 
and their specific impact on people’s livelihoods are poorly understood by aid practitioners 
and their donors. Most humanitarian aid agencies treat disasters and conflicts as distinctive 
fields of operation which simplifies reality and makes aid programming less effective. There 
                                               
5
  The Asian Disaster preparedness Centre (ADPC) uses the term Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM). 
6
  Conflict refers here to the use of violence to kill people, burn properties and destroy livelihoods. Conflict can entail 
communal violence, but also conflict between armed groups involving government army and rebels or international 
troops. 
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is a lack of empirical research on the potential of community-based risk reduction 
approaches in environments where communities are divided, disintegrated or displaced. It is 
a challenge to implement disaster risk reduction measures in a way that they also address 
divisions and grievances leading to violent conflict (Wisner, 2003). 
 
The three aid agencies would like to explore whether community-based approaches are 
appropriate in environments where communities are divided, disintegrated or displaced. 
Staff further expressed their interest in how local people and aid agencies respond to the 
issue of governance, particularly in situations of chronic conflict, when states are seriously 
weakened, contested or non-existent. Does CBDRR fill gaps where the government is absent 
or dysfunctional? Or how to engage the government in the process when it is possible and 
desirable? 
 
As stated earlier this research focused on localities experiencing recurrent small scale 
disasters and conflict, and where the impact of disasters and conflict does not trigger (inter)-
national media attention. As a consequence, generating financial resources at the national 
level or internationally fail to occur. Affected people then largely rely on their own resources 
to cope with or survive adversity. The occurrence of recurrent small scale disasters forms a 
gap in policy-action, according to the head of UNISDR, Margareta Wahlstrӧm7. This research 
pays attention to recurrent small scale disasters and conflict in situations where govern-
ment’s attention at the various political sub-systems is minimal, absent or antagonistic 
towards disaster and conflict affected populations. Antagonistic refers here to a sense of 
negligence or repression, like pursuing development projects causing people’s displacement 
and increased disaster risks.  
 
The CBDRR approach is believed to be a promising approach in such contexts and fits the 
idea of ‘strengthening local capacities’, recurrently promoted by researchers and evaluation 
exercises to reduce the amount and scale of ineffective humanitarian relief aid (Cosgrave, 
2007; IFRC, 2004; Anderson and Woodrow, 1989). The purpose of the pilots was to find out 
whether this belief has sufficient ground. A logical consequence of the idea of ’strengthening 
local capacities’ is the research choice to focus on local NGOs and not on INGOs. Local NGOs 
are often overlooked in humanitarian aid literature and research which is mostly written and 
conducted from the perspective of INGOs. 
 
A strategic research choice to manage security issues and institutional dynamics 
Initially I intended to focus my research on one CBDRR pilot area through an in-depth case 
study, and to treat the other localities as satellite-cases. I increasingly realised however, that 
both security dynamics in particularly Afghanistan and the reorganization that I&K started in 
2007, which coincided with my research period, could become a threat to my project. 
 
Towards mid-2007, I wasn’t completely sure if I could continue visiting all communities in 
Afghanistan when I&K management temporarily put all travel to Afghanistan on hold due to 
the kidnapping of Korean aid workers. I was allowed to travel to Afghanistan only after a 
security policy was formulated and approved by the management, which took about a year. 
Meanwhile I could visit Oxfam-Novib partners in Afghanistan, who had a different security 
                                               
7
  She made this remark in her presentation during the Global Conference of the Global Network of Civil Society 
Organisations for Disaster Reduction in London, January 25th-27
th
, 2010 
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policy. However, regular visits and systematic data gathering in the various localities could 
not be guaranteed. 
 
In 2007, the reorganization within I&K started with a complete overhaul of all departments 
and staff, resulting in a shift from geographically organized units, towards thematic ones. 
Staff changed positions and portfolios of local partners. The reorganization further aimed to 
change the nature of relationships with local partners. Instead of bilateral relationships 
around project funding, I&K started to promote a programmatic approach, encouraging 
partners to work and apply for funds together around a thematic programme for increased 
effectiveness through joint action. Soon after, the first steps were taken to decentralize 
offices from Utrecht, the Netherlands, to the regions. This reorganization required a lot of 
energy, focus and time of staff and partners away from the CBDRR pilot. In some cases, local 
partners received the change towards themes and the new financial relations with suspicion 
or anger. In Afghanistan new local partners were selected, excluding some partners that 
were selected for the CBDRR pilots in 2006. We started from scratch again.  
 
I therefore shifted from a geographical case-study approach to an empirically-inspired 
exploration of CBDRR policy and practice in various contexts taking a historical perspective. I 
reviewed the CBDO-DR approach of CDRC in the Philippines (Chapter 3), and analysed how 
locally emerged CBDRR-traditions elsewhere relate to the community-based approaches to 
disaster risk reduction promoted by the international community (Chapter 4). Central in the 
analysis is how governments and local NGOs attach meaning to CBDRR – and to all the 
concepts that make-up CBDRR - and why they differ. I decided to research and document the 
CBDRR pilots according to their process and outcomes viewed through the eyes of local 
people dealing with adversities (Chapter 5) and local NGO field staff (Chapter 6 and 7). The 
CBDRR-pilots resulted in a re-examination of the current definitions of CBDRR concepts and 
the implications for aid agencies. In this way I could still study the policy-practice discrepancy, 
the de-politicization of CBDRR and its potentials, and I could manage the many uncertainties 
surrounding area selection, security risks, and the dynamics between villages, NGOs and the 
donor. Even if the research would shift to other villages or another country, I could still use 
the data collected so far, analyse them and search for patterns and differences. 
 
1.5. Aim of the PhD research and research questions 
An interactive research allows different bodies of knowledge to interact, with the aim to 
produce, translate or transform knowledge to address problems that no longer could be 
solved through routine practices (Bersselaar, 2006). Usually, interactive research has a dual 
aim: theory building and raising the competencies of practitioners (Boog et al, 1996). 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to theorize and re-examine what CBDRR is, and secondly, to 
generate solutions for the aid practitioners’ questions and dilemmas. The theorizing part of 
the research aim seeks to review the current definitions of the various concepts that make 
up CBDRR like ‘disaster’, ‘community’, ‘community-based’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘risk’, ‘vulnera-
bility’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘resilience’ and what these mean in various 
disaster and conflict affected contexts. This thesis concerns 44 CBDRR pilot areas in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia together, and considers CDRC’s CBDO-DR practices in the 
Philippines. Although these CBDRR pilots and practices follow a seemingly similar process of 
entering the village, conducting risk assessments, organizing the community, identification 
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of risk reduction measures and implementing them, the CBDRR outcomes varied substan-
tially in terms of reducing risk and people’s vulnerability. From the previous section on the 
sources of research questions, I arrived at the following overall research question and sub-
questions: 
 
“What are the reasons for the differing outcomes of CBDRR interventions in disaster and 
conflict affected contexts in Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines?” 
 
1) How is CBDRR defined by different actors and operationalized in practice?  
This sub-question investigates how the various actors like local people, religious leaders, 
government agencies, military, and other actors conceive, negotiate, and implement 
CBDRR policy, and determine which choices for risk reduction are made. This question 
deals with the CBDRR process. 
 
2) How do the various actors perform their different forms of power to shape CBDRR 
interventions?  This sub-question investigates the power dynamics among the various 
actors to maintain the status quo, to take advantage of the intervention or to rework 
power relations in favour of marginalized groups to create safe and resilient communi-
ties. This question deals with CBDRR outcomes in terms of whose risk and vulnerability is 
reduced. 
 
3) How does CBDRR enable disaster and conflict affected people to influence and change 
institutions that constrained them in reducing their vulnerability? This research question 
deals with CBDRR potential and implications for aid programming. 
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Aim of the CBDRR pilot programme 
Oxfam-Novib, ICCO and Kerkinactie and their local partners wished to learn from local 
realities, to reflect on their routines, to become more conscious about local perspectives on 
risk and vulnerability, and to improve their aid programming. ICCO and Kerkinactie expected 
additionally to enhance downward accountability through CBDRR interventions, and to 
reveal the institutional constraints that cause the discrepancy between policy and practice 
(ICCO-Kerkinactie, 2006).  
 
The expected outcomes of the CBDRR pilot are multi-fold and were supposed to manifest 
themselves at the various levels of the aid delivery chain. ICCO and Kerkinactie formulated 
the expected outcomes in a funding proposal for PSO8 as follows: 
 ICCO, Kerkinactie and the partners gained knowledge and experience on CBDRR. 
 Local communities in Afghanistan and Indonesia actively participate in CBDRR. Together 
with the partner organisations they became aware of their risks and are capable to 
address their vulnerability to disasters and chronic conflict. 
 The partner organisations adopted the CBDRR approach to reduce risk and include the 
concepts of risk reduction in their policies and programming within two to three years. 
 This pilot programme achieved a noteworthy change in the policies and programming of 
both ICCO and Kerkinactie and their partner organisations.  
 In time, the partner organisations who are involved in CBDRR will share their knowledge 
about CBDRR at a national level. Although the organisations operate in different contexts, 
their experience and knowledge gained through the CBDRR pilot is relevant to share with 
other partners that were not part of the pilot (ibid: 8). 
 
These expected outcomes do not tell much about what CBDRR means, what it is, or does. 
Evert and Sjoerd assumed that CBDRR inherently is a good approach with positive outcomes 
referring to experiences in Bangladesh and the Philippines (ibid: 1). They initially had a dif-
ferent view of CBDRR. Whereas Evert viewed the pilots as an emerging research process, 
Sjoerd considered CBDRR as ‘a medicine to cure the aid chain’, a bottom-up methodology to 
enhance people’s participation. In the course of the CBDRR-pilot programme, Sjoerd realized 
that the CBDRR pilots have to emerge and evolve in a specific context, and that they do not 
follow a planned predictable path from conception to results. The original research aim, 
formulated as “changing the institutional arrangements within the aid chain”, shifted to 
“studying aid practices”, assuming that concrete findings and cases could influence policy 
makers and managers. I&K wished to assess the outcomes of the CBDRR pilots according to 
criteria that were considered essential to improve I&K’s accountability to local communities: 
needs-based interventions, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘resilient communities’. I 
assessed CBDRR outcomes in terms of whose risk and vulnerability is being reduced, with 
special attention for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups in the village.  
 
The next section sets out the theoretical framework starting with the prevailing definitions 
of the various concepts that make up CBDRR. Then I discuss the actor-orientation to explain 
how I conceptualize the policy – practice discrepancy using the notions of ‘agency’, ‘institu-
tions’, and ‘political arenas’, distinguishing between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. I continue 
                                               
8
  PSO approved the funding proposal for the CBDRR-pilot programme and supported the programme from 2006 till the end 
of 2011. 
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with a framework to study the political arena of disaster risk reduction, how actors use 
different forms of power, and the conceptual link between disaster and conflict theories.  
 
1.6. Theoretical concepts 
 
Concepts that make up CBDRR – prevailing definitions 
I aim to explore the meaning that actors attach to concepts that make up the CBDRR 
approach like ‘disaster’, ‘community’, ‘community-based’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘risk’, 
‘vulnerability’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘resilience’. Many of these concepts have 
a multifaceted nature and the research aims to elicit these facets as they appear in a specific 
cultural and political historical context. There does not exist one definition of these concepts 
that are considered correct for everybody. People define concepts in such a way that they 
become meaningful to them. 
 
I used ‘prevailing definitions’ to start with, which I took from ADPC’s Field Practitioners’ 
Handbook on Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004). 
ADPC is a prominent training centre on CBDRR throughout Asia, and consequently many 
CBDRR practitioners use this handbook as a reference. Concepts that are not part of ADPC’s 
Handbook, I took from UNISDR publications ‘Living with Risk’ (2004) and ‘Indigenous 
Knowledge for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2008) which are other prominent reference sources. 
Many INGOs and local NGOs copy these definitions into their CBDRR policies. 
 
‘Disaster’: The serious disruption of the functioning of society causing widespread human, 
material or environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected communities to 
cope with using their own resources. Disasters occur when the negative effects of the 
hazards are not well managed (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6).   
 
‘Community’: People living in one geographical area, who are exposed to common hazards 
due to their location. They may have common experience in responding to hazards and 
disasters. However, they may have different perceptions and exposure of risk. Groups within 
the locality will have a stake in risk reduction measures – either in favour or against (ibid: 8). 
 
‘Community-based’: at risk communities are actively engaged in the identification, analysis, 
treatment, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks. People are at the heart of decision-
making and implementation of disaster risk reduction activities. The involvement of the most 
vulnerable is paramount and the support of the less vulnerable is necessary. In CBDRR, local 
and national governments are involved and supportive (ibid: 9). 
 
‘Local knowledge’: Practices developed by a group of people from an advanced under-
standing of the local environment, which has been formed over numerous generations of 
habitation (UNISDR, 2008: vii). The UNISDR distinguishes local knowledge from other types 
of knowledge in that it originates from the community, that it is disseminated through 
informal means, it is collectively owned, subject to adaptation, and embedded in a 
community’s way of life as a means of survival. 
 
‘Risk’: The probability that negative consequences may arise when hazards interact with 
vulnerable areas, people, property and environment (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6) 
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‘Vulnerability’: A concept which describes factors or constraints of an economic, social, 
physical or geographic nature, which reduce the ability of a community to prepare for and 
cope with risks (ibid: 6). 
 
‘Participation’: ADPC’s Handbook does not provide a separate definition of ‘participation’ 
but uses ‘participation’ and ‘involvement’ interchangeably which means that the community 
takes responsibility for all stages of the program – from risk assessments, analysis, action-
planning and decision-making (ibid: 12-13). 
 
‘Empowerment’ is no longer part of ADPC’s Handbook, and also the UNISDR publications 
make no reference to empowerment or to the transformative nature of CBDRR. For Evert 
and Sjoerd it was important to include ‘empowerment’ as a concept for the CBDRR 
approach, because this concept belongs to the key-values of their organizations. 
‘Empowerment’ refers to changing power relations in favour of marginalized, excluded 
groups in society (ICCO Alliantie, 2006: 16).  
 
‘Resilience’: the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach or maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is 
capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better 
future protection and to improve risk reduction measures (UNISDR, 2004: 6 volume II). 
 
In the CBDRR pilots, local people, NGO field staff, government officials and donor staff use 
these concepts, and interpret them in different ways. Through on-going and conscious 
reflection on these concepts, this interactive research intends to understand how definitions 
alter and are embedded in a specific cultural and political historical context.    
 
An actor orientation 
An actor orientation is chosen because it offers an analytical framework for studying policy-
implementation-outcome discrepancies. This research involved very different actors, and 
studied the interactions between local people, local NGOs, and their donors, among others, 
through aid interventions. Additionally, the actor-orientation offers a framework to study 
both the specificities of particular local settings, and the broader forces and processes of 
institutional and societal change (Booth, 1994: 10).  
 
An actor orientation helps to clarify how policies and interventions are shaped by the various 
actors involved in the CBDRR pilots. The actor-oriented approach starts from the premise 
that each actor has ‘agency’: this means that people are able to reflect upon their 
experiences and what happens around them, and use their knowledge and capabilities to 
interpret and respond to their environment (Long, 1992: 22). People devise ways of coping 
with life, “even under the most extreme forms of coercion” (ibid). They use their knowledge, 
skills, influence, aspirations, and organizing capacities in their problem-solving, survival and 
development strategies. Although people have alternative options to shape their coping 
strategies and to formulate their objectives, these strategies are culturally embedded in 
different perceptions, interests and power relations. The case of the Community Seed Bank 
Program in Panay illustrates how local farmers perceived and acted upon drought differently 
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from how the aid agency interpreted the situation and responded. Even Erning defined his 
risk problem differently from the majority of farmers, and was able to articulate his per-
spective to the NGO, while the view of the other farmers was ignored. This implies that 
people’s options are favoured or constrained by their social position in society. This is what 
Long (1992) refers to as that people are social actors, meaning that they draw their strate-
gies from their individual rationality, but equally from their structural position in society. 
People’s agency and consequently their chosen coping strategies are related to their 
position in society and prevailing cultural norms. Local people’s perspectives on risk 
therefore vary greatly across countries, within villages, and between men and women, 
among others. This results in competing risk and knowledge claims.  
 
‘Effective agency’ or social action 
In the light of affecting change towards safer communities, I am interested in what CBDRR 
interventions can add to people’s agency to enable them to realize safety and protection by 
entering the broader institutional and political context. Long (1992) elaborates on ‘effective 
agency’- which gets recognized when specific actions make a difference to pre-existing state 
of affairs or course of events – and which requires organizing and mobilizing capacities. 
Agency operates through social relations and can only become effective through them. This 
requires more than an ability to influence and convince others, charisma, or persuasive 
forms of power. Effective agency has to be organized, mobilized and depends on ‘the actions 
of a chain of agents each of which ‘translates’ or ‘frames’ its goals in accordance to his or her 
own project’ (Latour, 1986: 264). Effective agency rests on the emergence of a network of 
actors who become partly, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the project of 
somebody else or other persons (Long, 1992: 23). Social action therefore, takes place in 
networks, whether formal or informal, through routines or new organizing practices, and is 
bounded by prevailing norms, values and power relations (Long, 2001).  
 
However, structural constraints are not absolute or static but are themselves outcomes of 
people’s interaction as well and therefore changeable. “An actor-oriented approach 
recognizes that people operate within the limitations of structural constraints, but 
emphasizes that such constraints operate through people as well” (Hilhorst, 2003: 5). I like to 
stress here that these structural constraints or enabling conditions occur, among others, 
within households between men and women, within villages, between ethnic groups, and in 
state-society relationships that are embedded in societal history. Taking a local perspective, 
one looks ‘upwards’ for room for manoeuvre in the broader institutional context where 
actors interact with different and changing amounts of knowledge and power (Booth, 1994). 
 
An actor-oriented approach offers clues to understand social and institutional change in 
conflict-affected societies like Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines, where at the same 
time processes of state-building, democratization or decentralization occur. In such contexts 
multiple institutional arrangements get new forms or co-exist, and actors give different 
meaning to institutions, rules and traditions resulting in competing frameworks for action 
like between rebel groups and the Philippine government, between the formal central 
government in Kabul and local power holders, and between Indonesian bureaucrats, 
reformers and civil society groups with their constituents. In these contexts people find 
room for manoeuvre to further their agendas when new governance systems do not 
function properly due to lack of knowledge, understanding of new responsibilities, credibility 
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or legitimacy.  An actor-oriented approach stresses the need for the contextualization of 
actors’ behaviour put into a historical perspective (Long, 1992; Hebinck et al, 2001).  
 
Actors and institutions 
This research is not limited to the local realities of communities, and to the room-for- 
manoeuvre. I equally want to understand the constraints put upon ‘social action’ that may 
emerge, and to understand the larger structures in society, which is needed to put the 
CBDRR-outcomes in the proper context (after Booth, 1994: 18). To analyse the larger 
structures and constraints, I use the concept of ‘institutions’.  
 
The broader institutional context involves many institutions like culture, social norms, 
values and traditions, but also policies, laws and judiciary systems regulating power 
relations which are influenced by historical trajectories (Jütting, 2003). These are 
referred to as “the rules of the game”, whereas “the players of the game” refer to 
structures, authorities and organizations (Bingen, 2000; Jütting, 2003). Field studies 
from Afghanistan, Burundi, Nigeria, Sudan and the Philippines indicate that institu-
tional arrangements largely contribute to differing vulnerability outcomes locally 
(Heijmans et al, 2009). Institutions are crucial in regulating, for the better or the worse, 
the maintenance of social order, the handling of disputes, access to resources, social 
protection, and livelihood security at the local level (Alinovi et al, 2008). Institutions 
include power relations, and it is important to understand who benefits from the 
institutions, who sets the rules, and who is excluded. Disaster and conflict outcomes 
can change these institutions and re-order power relations, the rules and interaction 
between people (Hilhorst, 2007; Bathia et al, 2003). This research focuses on exploring 
multi-level institutions and how these change or not as a result of conflict or disaster, 
and for identifying strategies to build resilient communities (Twigg, 2007).  
 
Institutions are locality specific, influenced by historical trajectories and culture. Con-
sequently, particular institutional arrangements work in one context but fail in another 
(Jütting, 2003). Jütting (2003) argues to pay attention to the hierarchy level of institutions at 
stake, and to how institutions at different levels affect each other. Table 1.1 presents a 
hierarchy of institutions and their time horizon for change.  
 
Table 1.1 Hierarchy of institutions and their time horizons for change (adapted from Jütting, 2003) 
Level Examples Frequency of change Effect 
Institutions related to 
the social structure of 
society 
(level 1) 
 
Institutions related to 
the rules of the game 
(level 2) 
 
Institutions related to 
the players of the game 
(level 3) 
 
Institutions related to 
allocation mechanisms 
(level 4) 
Traditions, social norms, values, 
gender norms, customs. 
 
 
Rules defining access to resources, 
property rights, judiciary system 
 
Rules defining governance 
arrangements, authority, 
contractual relationships 
 
Rules related to resource 
allocation, like social security 
systems, humanitarian aid,  
2 – 3 generations but 
may change faster in 
times of shocks/crisis 
 
10 – 100 years 
 
 
1 – 10 years 
 
 
Short term horizon 
and continuous 
Defines the way a 
society conducts itself 
 
 
Defines the broader 
institutional context  
 
Leads to the 
formation of 
organizations 
 
Adjustments to 
prices, outputs, 
incentives 
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I made some adjustments to Jütting’s framework though: I deleted the distinction between 
formal and informal institutions, since this distinction is not always clear in contexts like 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and Philippines, where, for instance, local government officials blend 
official law with customary law to settle disputes, or shift to traditions when defining land 
access. Further, Jütting’s time horizon for level 1 is quite long (100-1000 years), especially in 
contexts where shocks like disasters and conflict happen regularly. In developing countries 
like Afghanistan and Indonesia level 1 is crucial for local people, where the other levels do 
not function properly. Especially in areas of uncertainty, informal risk sharing institutions 
based on reciprocity (level 1) seem to be most effective, according to Jütting. Traditions, 
norms and values further largely affect the functioning of more formal institutions (level 3). 
 
As said earlier, institutions are not static, but change and evolve continuously. The relation-
ship between institutions and actors is mutual and dynamic. People respond to changing 
contexts and rules. They create, reproduce and adapt institutions, while at the same time 
institutions govern people’s behaviour and perceptions. Institutions act as a point of 
reference for actors and they only become effective in everyday practice. People defend and 
mobilize around practices and institutions that are meaningful to them, or resist institutions 
and practices that convey or embody meanings they find disagreeable (Bebbington, et al, 
2004). Because social actors evoke, negotiate and manipulate the meaning of institutions in 
their everyday life, institutional change happens all the time (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). 
 
The policy – practice discrepancy: what do interventions do? 
Aid agencies and their interventions are part of the institutional context as well. Local NGOs 
and their donors do not operate in isolation, but are embedded in their respective societies.  
To improve the conditions of disaster and conflict affected populations, aid agencies formu-
late policy to express what they want to do and what results they intend to achieve. This 
section aims to provide an understanding of how to look at the discrepancy between policy 
and practice.  
 
What is policy? 
Policy is first of all about ‘objectives’ and the way to achieve them. Usually, aid agencies put 
their interventions in logical frameworks9, translating policy into the implementation of 
activities followed by certain results, assuming a linear relationship between policy and 
results (Long, 1992). Colebatch (1998) notes that policy implies more than an expression of 
what people want to do. Policy is for a large part about ‘framing’: this refers to how people 
use language to give meaning and make sense of events and experiences around them, and 
how they use language as discursive means to shape people’s beliefs, and to convince others 
(Gaventa, 2006). People use ‘frames’ strategically to deal with actors who do not necessarily 
share the same values or views, but with whom it is crucial to maintain relationships. NGOs 
relate to various different actors like donors, government officials, NGO networks, media, 
and local communities, each with their own language, rules, routines and demands (Hilhorst, 
2003: 217). NGO staff use multiple ‘frames’ to find legitimacy and to deal with multiple 
accountabilities (ibid).  
 
Using policy to find legitimacy is crucial in building trusted relationships between local NGOs 
and local community people in the context of the CBDRR pilots, particularly in conflict set-
                                               
9
 Logical frameworks are called ‘logframes’, in short. 
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tings. Local people often raise questions about the organization’s presence, agenda or field 
staff’s self-interests. Legitimation is about making certain representations of organizations 
more acceptable than others (ibid). For instance, policy statements emphasizing principles 
like ‘participation’, ‘shared-values’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘partnerships’ serve to legitimize 
the organization’s existence, and to stay eligible for funding and donations, while these 
principles may mask problematic relationships in the aid chain. Aid agencies need to con-
vince others that what they do is relevant, indispensable and appropriate, and that a 
situation or population needs the organization’s assistance (ibid). Or, they represent them-
selves as neutral and independent actors when dealing with the military or government 
actors in order to obtain access to populations affected by conflict or disasters. Another way 
aid agencies attempt to maintain legitimacy is to convince donors about their successful 
achievements, through producing ‘best practices’ documents, or by distinguishing them-
selves from other organizations by claiming to fill a particular niche. The question is how 
staff deals with the different demands and life worlds in which they operate, and how they 
try to find certain coherence between the NGO’s policy and practice.  
 
Understanding the policy-practice discrepancy 
In the previous paragraphs it appears that policy – when put into practice – is influenced by 
multiple realities, interests and demands of the various actors involved. NGO staff are 
exposed to different ‘pulls and pushes’ that result in non-linear relationships between policy 
objectives, action and results. To explain the policy-practice discrepancy, Argyris and Schön 
(1978), concerned with organizational learning or the lack thereof, make a distinction 
between the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. The espoused theory refers to what is 
written in policy documents or spoken publicly, and “are words used to express what we 
think we do and why, or what we like others to think we do” (Guijt, 2008: 109). The theory-
in-use defines what people actually do, and this may be different or not from the espoused 
theory. Theory-in-use refers to theories that people use in their everyday practice, based on 
routines, tacit knowledge, or on their accumulated knowledge-in-action. These theories-in-
use can lead to intended results, consistent with the espoused theory, and unintended 
outcomes. Argyris and Schön suggest that the more congruence there is between ‘the 
espoused theory’ and the ‘theory-in-use’, the more effectiveness there is. Applying the 
theory-in-use to aid interventions, then it refers to the actions – shaped through norms, 
values, skills, and systems - that have become routines, are taken for granted and go un-
challenged. Argyris et al (1985: xi) therefore argue that because these routines are taken for 
granted, because skills are automatic, and because values are internalized, “the status quo 
and the individuals’ personal responsibility for maintaining it, cannot be studied without 
confronting it”. Only then these implicit assumptions and tacit knowledge become explicit.  
 
Greenwood (2002) who reviewed Argyris and Schön’s work, found these concepts and 
thoughts useful to understand processes of organizational learning, but noticed that their 
theory lacked a social and political conceptualization of organizations. Learning and 
interactive research processes within organizations cause tensions and conflicts. New 
insights and good ideas may not necessarily result in better practice, due to constraining 
organizational institutions. 
 
The idea to confront staff with their routines and theory-in-use was exactly one of the 
aspirations the initiators of the CBDRR pilot programme had: to reflect with staff and their 
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directors on the contradictions that the aid system generates, in the hope that this would 
lead to learning and organizational change within the donor organizations towards effective 
aid programming. During 2009, the Steering Group10 found that the timing11 and the 
ambitious nature of such a task were no longer found appropriate to have it included in the 
CBDRR pilot programme. Instead, the Steering Group decided to focus on piloting CBDRR 
locally, and to empirically investigate the practice of how various actors involved in the 44 
CBDRR pilots feel obliged to comply with the existing routines and norms, and how far they 
feel able to challenge and change practice and aid systems to attune the CBDRR intervention 
to local realities.   
 
The incompatibility of the ‘idealistic logframe model’ with the ‘political arena model’ 
I stated that new insights and good ideas, like Evert’s proposal to shift from relief to include 
a disaster risk reduction approach in development programmes, may not necessarily result 
in better practice, due to constraining organizational institutions. I further referred to the 
various ‘pulls and pushes’ that NGO staff face which result in non-linear relationships 
between policy objectives, action and results. Quarles van Ufford (1993) ascribes such insti-
tutional constraints and the discrepancy between policy and practice to the incompatibility 
between the ‘idealistic logframe model’ and the ‘political arena model’. He points to at least 
two levels in the aid chain where this incompatibility is most felt: (1) the interaction between 
NGO field staff and the local population, and (2) the interaction and relations between the 
NGO project staff with the sponsoring agencies who have authority over funding and the 
continuation of the programme (ibid: 137).  
 
NGO projects staff uses language and frames like ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘bottom-up 
approaches’, ‘local participation’, ‘community organizations’, and ‘empowerment’, in official 
documents to create the image of an active involvement of disaster or conflict affected 
people in the project’s activities, and that the project goals are taken seriously. Logframe 
models are used by those who set policies in motion and who are responsible for the NGO’s 
interventions. Logframe models take an idealistic view on the desirability and manageability 
of social change as a point of departure (ibid: 138). These logframe models do not problema-
tize the relationships between the different actors along the aid chain, and assume that the 
project activities and means will lead to the expected results. Because this model “provides 
an image of efficiency and manageability, of internal coherence and argumentation, as well 
as integration between the different organizational levels, and therefore effectiveness” (ibid, 
139), the model helps to create trust with the funding agency and the wider public.  
 
The ‘political arena model’ does not view the policy process as an integrated whole, but as a 
series of encounters throughout the aid chain, where different actors pursue, negotiate and 
struggle for their interests and agendas to deal with multiple realities (Quarles van Ufford, 
1993; Bakewell, 2000; Colebatch, 2002; Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006). As stated earlier, 
actors interpret and define the circumstances differently, and risk perspectives vary greatly. 
As a consequence interventions are continuously re-defined and re-shaped according to 
those actors who can best negotiate their risk definitions and interests. ‘Arenas’ are social 
                                               
10
 The Steering Group consisted then of Evert, Sjoerd, a programme officer responsible for Afghanistan, one for Maluku, a 
coordinator for the CBDRR-pilots, and myself. Chapter 2 will elaborate on the organizational practices of this interactive 
research. 
11
 In 2009 the decentralization process started shifting responsibilities to regional offices resulting in discharging head 
quarter’s staff.  
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locations or situations, where actors, including the researcher, confront each other, debate 
about issues, resources, and values, and try “to resolve discrepancies in value interpretations 
and incompatibilities between actor interests” (Long, 2001: 59). An arena is not limited to a 
clearly demarcated location or face-to-face meeting place. Also geographically distant actors 
and institutional contexts shape the interactions that take place in localized settings (ibid).  
 
Consequently, ‘interventions’ shouldn’t be viewed as planned projects with a defined time-
space setting that starts in a village on a blank page, but regarded as part of the flow of 
events and experienced history. The seed bank case study is a good illustration of how the 
NGO’s responses are embedded in the wider context. The NGO ‘ignored’ the local people’s 
adaptation strategies to drought, since these did not match with the NGO’s idea of what is 
supposed to happen locally. Promoting sustainable agriculture is part of the NGO’s identity 
and its ‘logo’. This identity provides the NGO with means to gain political support and access 
to funding from like-minded donors. “The images of the local scene must be made to fit 
organizational needs” (Quarles van Ufford, 1993: 140). That is why the NGO disapproved of 
the farmers’ practice to plant high yield variety rice in response to drought, and labelled this 
practice as ‘doing wrong’. This image was important to convey, while at the same time the 
NGO’s ignored the principles of ‘participation’, ‘recognizing people’s existing capacities’ and 
‘addressing people’s urgently felt needs’. The NGO carefully chose which facts about the 
local situation it wanted to share with the different publics, and which ones to ignore. 
Images or official frames are in fact political statements, which are used as instruments 
during the interactions, negotiations, and debates in the political arena with the various 
actors involved. Chapter 3 and 4 deal with how state and non-state actors frame and explain 
disaster events in the Philippines, and in the international DRR communities. 
 
The political arena, through which interventions get shape, produces inherently unpre-
dictable outcomes as opposite to the constructed predictable outcome of goal-oriented 
logframe models (Leeuwis, 1995:19). As a consequence, a discrepancy between policy 
intentions and practice seems to be inevitable, or at least tensions exist to achieve 
congruent outcomes between espoused policy and practice.   
 
In order to understand the policy-practice discrepancy, I studied how and why the policy 
intentions are transformed, resisted, adjusted or implemented over time, how different 
perspectives on risk and risk reduction shape and reshape interventions, and how the 
various actors use different forms of power at the different levels of the aid chain. This 
question is dealt with in Chapter 6 and 7 where I discuss the CBDRR policy-practice process 
and outcomes of the CBDRR pilots in Afghanistan and Indonesia.  
 
A further look into the policy-practice discrepancy: depoliticizing aid interventions 
Through my experience as CBDRR consultant in Asia, I built up the impression that DRR 
interventions tend to protect the wealthier segment of society, rather than the majority of 
poor, marginalized and most vulnerable people as stated in policy documents. This raises 
two questions: (1) why do the aid agencies’ strategies fail to bring out action that benefits 
the marginalized and vulnerable groups in society? And (2) is the local elite perhaps in a 
better position to influence and shape the outcomes of interventions to their benefit? 
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Ferguson (1994) demonstrates, based on fieldwork in Lesotho, investigating development 
projects of the World Bank in the agricultural sector,  how local realities are portrayed in 
project proposals to justify specific interventions, and how ‘politics’ is taken out of these 
‘development’ interventions. He sets a step further than Quarles van Ufford (1993): whereas 
Quarles van Ufford focuses on contradictions within the levels of the aid chain, Ferguson 
focuses on the broader political context, on state-society relationships in which specific 
interventions have to contribute to development and social change without clearly stating 
for whom. It are these omissions and hidden intentions he aims to uncover. 
 
In Ferguson’s study, the World Bank portrays Lesotho as a nation of ‘farmers’, and not of 
wage labourers and thereby leaving out issues as underemployment, low wages and political 
subjugation by South Africa (ibid, 177). Additionally, the Bank portrays the government as an 
impartial instrument to provide services to the poor, and excludes the political nature of the 
state from its analysis, as well as the advantages of government’s inefficiency and corruption 
for itself. Local people appear as a ‘collection of individuals’ and ‘decision makers’ through 
which they are disconnected from the structural and political causes of poverty and margin-
alization. The explanation of why people are poor is then related to their values, attitudes 
and motivations. Hence ‘awareness raising’ and ‘educating the people’ are promoted as 
appropriate interventions to change people’s minds and behaviour.  
 
The World Bank and governments are not the kind of social actors that are expected to 
advance the empowerment of the poor. Ferguson notes, however, that it seems likely that 
such apparent political naivety is not a conscious intention of development planners, but 
simply a low-level manifestation to refuse to face local politics, which for institutional 
reasons, occurs in the entire development and aid apparatus (1994: 178-180). This remark 
implies that perhaps the NGOs involved in this research portray local situations in a way that 
has little resemblance to reality but to justify their aid interventions. During the CBDRR 
intervention process I have to be aware of how aid agencies depict local populations and 
portray local realities, when and why aid agencies tend to leave ‘the political’ out of their 
policies, ignore ‘politics’ in their aid programmes, or when they selectively put it in.   
 
Making a distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ 
The observation that actors take out ‘the political’ and ignore ‘politics’ in their analysis and 
the everyday aid practice, requires a further explanation of what constitutes the ‘political’. 
Chantal Mouffe refers to the ‘political’ as the dimension of antagonism that constitutes 
human societies, a space of power, conflict and antagonism, while by ‘politics’ she means 
the set of practices and institutions through which a social order is created (2005: 9). The 
empirical field of institutions and practices of ‘politics’ refer in fact to what Long (1992) calls 
a ‘political arena’ where actors ‘deal with the political’ ranging from escaping it, denying it, 
neutralizing or canalizing it, to exploiting and confronting it (van der Zweerde, 2008).  
 
Mouffe’s definition is in itself ‘political’ since she refers to a second political thought, namely 
liberal thought. Liberal thought recognizes the existence of multiple perspectives and values, 
but it has difficulties to adequately grasp the pluralistic nature of society, especially with the 
conflicts that pluralism entails. Mouffe makes a distinction between two main liberal para-
digms that explain how different perspectives and values can be brought together while 
‘escaping politics’ (2005: 10-13). The first paradigm views politics as the establishment of a 
 
 
41 
 
compromise between differing competing forces in society, where individuals are portrayed 
as rational beings, driven by a maximization of their own interests. In this view, economic 
market-thinking is applied to the domain of politics. The second paradigm – important for 
this research - believes that consensus can be reached through free discussion and political 
debate. It is this second paradigm that I see prevailing in current disaster risk reduction 
thinking of the UN, on how governments, civil society actors, affected populations and the 
private sector are supposed to join multi-stakeholder platforms to deliberate their views and 
opinions of why disasters happen, and to reach consensus on what should be done (UNISDR, 
2005). The potential antagonism between the various actors at the table is supposed to be 
diffused or tamed, by stressing a ‘harmonious cooperation’ (ibid; van der Zweerde, 2008).  
 
The actors involved in this interactive research would like to know, if and how disaster and 
conflict affected populations in all their diversity, could affect change towards safer commu-
nities by entering the political arena. Earlier, I used the notion of ‘effective agency’ and 
‘social action’, stressing that these have to be organized and mobilized. Acknowledging that 
antagonism can never be eliminated, Mouffe offers a third kind of relationship situated 
between the two extremes of enemy/friend antagonism on one hand, and harmonious 
relationships on the other. She refers to a tamed version of antagonism through the 
establishment of legitimate institutions that can channel dissent voices in an agonistic way 
(Mouffe, 2005: 20-21). The notion of ‘agonism’ means that the conflicting parties, although 
acknowledging that there is no rational solution for their conflict, nevertheless recognize the 
legitimacy of their opponents, and they play out their conflict under conditions regulated by 
procedures accepted by them. (ibid). They are adversaries, not enemies. Mouffe’s notions of 
antagonism, agonism and liberalism are used in this research to assess interactions in the 
political arena, especially between vulnerable and marginalized groups and government 
authorities.  
 
Studying the political arena of disaster risk reduction 
So far I elaborated on theoretical concepts - ‘actors’, ‘agency’, institutions’, ‘interventions’, 
‘political arena’, ’politics and the political’ - without putting them yet in the context of 
disaster events. I regard disasters as more than ‘natural’ or catastrophic events. Their 
emergent outcomes are embedded in a societal history which produced “patterns of 
vulnerability, evidenced by location, socio-political structure, production patterns and 
ideology that characterize a society” (Oliver-Smith, 2010: 33). Disasters are events to which 
political systems must respond, and therefore “within minutes after any major impact, 
disasters start becoming political” (Olson, 2000: 266). The way governments manage 
disaster risk, respond to and explain disasters, influences their interaction and relationship 
with its citizens. Governments may see disasters as a window of opportunity for social and 
spatial reordering, including the permanent displacement of what are labelled the most 
vulnerable (Adams et al 2009; Klein, 2007). Governments that lack the capacity or will to 
respond adequately tend to rely on brute force and repression, or on (I)NGOs and private 
organizations that provide public services, like in Haiti and Afghanistan. 
 
The literature dealing with the politics-disasters connection focuses on two different aspects. 
The first category focuses on state-society relationships before and after disasters happen, 
and investigates how and when disasters have the potential to threaten the powerful elite, 
or where elites capture the space created after the disaster (Drury and Olson, 1998; Klein, 
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2007; Pelling & Dill, 2009). Pelling and Dill (2009) particularly point to how major disasters 
spur political events which eventually led to the downfall of presidents or trigger peace 
negotiations between warring parties. The incapacity of the state to respond adequately to 
major disasters can create opportunities for political action and social change. The question 
is for whom, in what way, and for how long?  
 
The second category of literature focuses on the process of how disaster response outcomes 
get shaped, and on who decides whose risks are prioritized and which risk reduction 
measures will be implemented (Christoplos et al, 2001; Slovic, 2003; O’Brien, 2005; Lebel et 
al, 2006). These questions deal with ‘politics’ as a decision-making process of who gets what, 
where, when and how; as a contest over the distribution of scarce resources (Laswell, 1935). 
There are many conceptualizations of what constitutes ‘politics’, ranging from party politics 
to the everyday politics of all human interaction (Kerkvliet, 1991). Olson (2000) refers to 
disaster politics as how actors frame and explain disaster events, questioning who can be 
held responsible, and how resources are allocated to whom, where and for what after disas-
ters hit. He offers a framework which in my view facilitates the combination of the two cate-
gories of disaster literature to deepen the understanding of the political arena of disaster 
risk reduction. He proposes to ask three fundamental questions after a disaster event: 
 
1  “What happened?”. This question starts the process of defining the event and the social 
construction of meaning, “which is political at least as much as it is scientific or 
technical”(ibid, 266). This question refers to how actors frame and interpret disaster 
events. The way disasters are framed has implications for how goals of disaster responses 
are formulated.  
2  “Why were the losses high/low?”. This question is political since they refer to the 
fundamental pre-event and post-event public policy decisions associated with 
accountability and responsibility issues. What are the existing policies, laws and 
regulations to reduce disaster risks, and are these implemented by the responsible 
authorities? Who can be held accountable for the losses? These questions relate to 
understanding why people affected by the disaster are affected in the way they are, 
referring to their vulnerable conditions.  
   3  “What will happen now”? After the immediate emergency period, people engage in 
recovery efforts which involve resources, and decisions on how to use and distribute 
these resources. This involves politics, the everyday politics of disaster risk reduction. “Aid 
seeks to channel resources and power in a certain direction and in a certain way”(O’Brien, 
2005: 203).  
 
Olson’s focus is, however limited to state-actors. Conventional studies on politics usually 
limit the analysis of disaster politics into what government authorities, states, political 
parties, their supporters and lobbyists do, putting politics in a realm far removed from most 
citizens (Kerkvliet, 2009). Kerkvliet refers to government authorities, states, political parties, 
labour unions and so on as actors involved in ‘official politics’ (2009: 231). They hold authori-
tative positions and are authorized to take decisions on policies, regulations and laws. 
 
Such a restricted view of politics misses a great deal of what is politically significant when 
one tries to understand what affected populations do to survive or cope with disaster events; 
resources are also distributed by (I)NGOs, corporations, religious organizations, media, 
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universities, unions, and other institutions (ibid). Therefore, I ask Olson’s questions to not 
only state-actors, but also to disaster and conflict affected people, to NGOs, and other actors 
involved in disaster response. I argued earlier that various actors interpret events, their 
circumstances and what is happening around them differently. Therefore local people, NGOs 
and state-actors will reply to Olson’s questions in various ways considering their social 
position, and use their agency to convince the other of their explanation of events, their risk 
definitions, whom to blame and how to allocate resources when they negotiate, confront 
each other, negotiate about issues, resources, and values.  
 
Kerkvliet (2009) distinguishes two forms of politics beyond the ‘official politics’, namely 
‘advocacy politics’ and ‘everyday politics’. Advocacy politics involves direct and concerted 
efforts to support, criticize and oppose authorities, their policies and programs, whereas 
‘everyday politics’ refers to how people comply with, adjust and contest norms and rules 
regarding authority over production of, or allocation of resources (ibid, 2009: 232). Everyday 
politics can take various forms - support, compliance, modifications, evasions, and 
resistance – involving little or no organization. Examples are people refusing to obey govern-
ment’s evacuation orders during a volcanic eruption, or Afghan women challenging pre-
vailing gender norms by entering the public domain in search for food. Although these 
people probably do not regard their actions as political, these everyday forms of resistance 
and modifications may eventually feed into more organized and confrontational forms of 
advocacy politics, or contribute to authorities rethinking programs and policies. The impact 
of everyday modifications and resistance may actually be quite significant in political 
systems that are weak, lack the resources to perform well resulting in an eroding legitimacy 
of government authorities. Ordinary citizens like in Haiti and Afghanistan should not be 
stigmatized as powerless (Fordam 2007), since their everyday actions to cope with adversity, 
may have political consequences for the ‘official politics’. Everyday politics is therefore 
equally significant as other forms of politics.  
 
Actors, institutions, politics and now ‘power’ 
The previous sections of the theoretical framework - on actors, institutions, the political and 
politics – do not make the notion of ‘power’ explicit. When CBDRR interventions proclaim to 
empower local people, meaning to change existing power relations, then a further explora-
tion of the way power operates within the everyday interactions between actors and institu-
tions involved in disaster response, is required (after Long, 1992; Jütting, 2003). 
 
Very often, power is perceived as a ‘property’ that persons or groups can ‘possess’, and 
which can be ‘enlarged’ like suggested by the notion of ‘empowerment’. “This ‘property-
notion’ of power ignores the fundamental fact that power is always ‘relational’ and the result 
of the working of multiple, intertwined institutions” (Nuijten, 2005: 1; Foucault, 1980). 
Foucault (1980) argues that power is something which has to be constantly performed 
rather than being achieved. He defines power as a set of relations which are dispersed 
throughout society – in family relations, within an institution, or an administration - rather 
than being located within particular institutions of the state or government. Instead of 
seeing power as oppression - curtailing freedom and constraining individuals –, he views 
power as constructing a set of relations which tend to position people in ways which make 
the political system work (Mills, 2003). Power can be performed to reach consensus, or to 
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enrol others in mobilizing concerted action to accomplish more than people should be able 
to do individually (Few, 2002). 
 
Not only between the state and its citizens, but in each interaction power is negotiated and 
one’s position in a hierarchy is established, recognizing that positions are flexible, changing 
while hierarchy is not necessarily precisely defined. Within a certain set of power relations 
there is space for resistance and change. All forms of dependence offer some resources 
whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors (Giddens, 
1984: 16). An actor-orientation assumes that actors are capable in affecting change through 
negotiation, innovation or experimenting, even if their social space to manoeuvre is 
restricted (Long, 1992: 24-25). I distinguish three forms of power that actors perform or 
encounter in the political arena, which I refer to as discursive power, institutional power, and 
publicly performed power.  
 
(1) Discursive power 
Power operates, amongst others, through discursive means which relate to the actors’ value 
perspective, worldview, identity and meaning given to issues. This form of power shapes 
people’s beliefs, sense of self and acceptance of the status quo. “Processes of socialization, 
culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, 
acceptable and safe” (Gaventa, 2006, 29). Discursive power is closely related to cultural 
values and norms, and shapes the ideological and psychological boundaries of participation.  
Nuijten (2005) calls this structural power which is difficult to reverse. It refers to hierarchical, 
antagonistic power relations in which the subordinated persons or groups have little room 
for manoeuvre. Discursive means can be deployed to mobilize and organize ‘effective 
agency’. For instance, “social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and 
immutable must come to seem unjust and mutable” (Snow, 2004: 383). Different actors 
struggle to secure support for their definition of reality.  
 
(2) Institutional power 
The construction of power relations takes place through institutions like policies, laws, 
regulations which regulate people’s behaviour (Nuijten, 2005). They refer to “the rules of the 
game” as well as to “the players of the game”. Certain powerful actors and institutions have 
authority and maintain their influence by controlling who gets to the decision-table and 
what gets on the agenda, and happen from local to global level to exclude or devalue the 
concerns and representation of less powerful groups (Gaventa, 2006). Institutional power is 
performed through discursive rituals and administrative routines (Nuijten, 2005). 
 
(3) Publicly performed power 
This refers to more visible manifestations of power like observable decision-making, 
procedures of decision making about resource allocation, involving the ‘who, how, and what’ 
of policymaking and interventions. However, power in relation to space and place also works 
to put boundaries on participation, to exclude certain actors or views from entering the 
arenas for participation (Gaventa, 2006: 29). Nuijten (2005) refers to this third form of 
power as strategic games, which can be observed in the many daily interactions between 
people and groups aimed to influence the action of others. This occurs through ideological 
manipulation, rational argumentation, moral advice, or economic exploitation.  
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These various forms of power are closely linked and cannot been seen separately from each 
other. ‘Individual power’ is always part of wider institutions and structural processes, and 
therefore, “power relations can only be studied and analysed in the context of institutions 
and the practices of organization” (Nuijten, 2005: 2). Going back to Long’s notion of ‘political 
arenas’ where various actors debate, negotiate and struggle to further their interests, these 
various forms of power should be considered and related to the broader institutional 
context.  
 
Summarizing, Jütting’s table (1.1) reflects the institutional context in which CBDRR interven-
tions take place, in which government authorities, NGOs, community organizations and 
social networks operate and manoeuvre. The table visualizes the connection between the 
micro everyday disaster ‘politics’ to the macro ‘political’ context in which disasters and 
conflict occur – acknowledging the existence of antagonism in society. Olson’s three 
questions should be asked to the relevant actors involved in CBDRR interventions, and serve 
as an entry-point for the analysis of power relations and institutions around certain risk and 
resource problems. This analysis reveals how and why the policy intentions are transformed, 
resisted, adjusted or implemented over time, and in what way the CBDRR processes reduce, 
produce, or reproduce people’s vulnerability to disaster and conflict. 
 
1.7 Exploring conceptual and theoretical commonalities in disaster and conflict discourse 
This research explores CBDRR interventions in contexts of recurrent disasters, and violent 
conflict. The reason to select these complex contexts is because disasters increasingly 
happen in contexts of conflict or chronic political instability. Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos 
(2004) identified at least 140 incidents where ‘natural’ disasters occurred in countries expe-
riencing complex emergencies between 1998 and 2003 alone. Since then, the occurrence of 
the Asian tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka, and the earthquake in Kashmir triggered renewed 
interest in the nexus between disasters and conflict. In recent years, several studies have 
cross-analysed  datasets like the EM-DAT International Disaster Database to various conflict 
datasets like those of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), the Uppsala conflict data-
base, the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), and the 
Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) dataset (Bhavnani 2006, Spiegel et al, 2007; Nel 
and Righarts, 2008). They all show that natural disasters significantly increase the risk for 
civil conflict.  
 
These studies concluded that approaches to reduce disaster risk and conflict prevention 
should be integrated. One angle to this is the idea of disaster diplomacy. It maintains that 
large disasters can create opportunities for peace since people suffer across existing divides, 
and joint relief efforts and reconstruction could act as a catalyst for building mutual trust 
and reconciliation (Renner and Chafe, 2007). A prime example offered in this line of thinking 
is how the Asian tsunami of 2004 facilitated the peace process in Aceh. Bhavnani (2006), 
however, observes that in most cases, natural disasters do not dampen conflict but trigger 
them. He suggests looking beyond the emergency period into the root causes of people’s 
vulnerability, inequality, grievances and resource scarcity. Likewise, Buchanan-Smith and 
Christoplos (2004) suggest to focus on the vulnerability that underlies both conflict and 
disaster.  
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While the plea to integrate disaster and conflict response has an intuitive appeal, it is not 
common in practice. While many aid agencies started engaging with conflict prevention and 
peace building in the 1990s, they continued to separate this from responding to natural 
disasters (Christoplos et al, 2001). There are several explanations for this continued divide. 
The first one relates to the timeframes used: natural disasters are perceived as short-term, 
temporary emergencies, while conflict and political instability are regarded as long-term and 
sometimes ‘permanent emergencies’. A second reason is a difference in perception of what 
causes disasters, and what the causes of conflict are: the dominant view on disasters is that 
they are caused by natural phenomena, while conflicts are viewed as rooted in complex 
social and political interrelationships, requiring fundamentally different responses. The 
natural disaster discourse emphasizes technological and scientific solutions to forecast or 
withstand the impact of disasters, perceived by those who implement them as politically 
neutral. These differing views hamper the integration of disaster and conflict responses in 
practice.  
 
This section explores similarities or common elements between the disaster and conflict 
discourse with the purpose to find conceptual linkages between disaster and conflict studies. 
Especially those theories related to the different ways of ‘seeing’ disasters and conflict. Both 
fields developed dominant theories that ‘see’ disasters and conflict as external events: the 
hazard-focused theory on disasters perceive grassroots people as being prone and suscepti-
ble to damage or injury caused by sudden external natural phenomena, while conflict 
theories in this category mostly portray the violence of civil wars as being externally imposed 
from the top rooted in social and political interrelationships affecting innocent citizens 
(Kalyvas, 2003: 482). Further, both views perceive grassroots people mainly as victims. These 
views reduce people to passive recipients, and innocent victims, and ignore that local people 
have ‘agency’ or capacities (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989), which has a disempowering im-
pact and erodes people’s dignity. These theories of ‘seeing’ disasters and conflict as external 
events continue to exist and are in fact debit to the disconnection of both fields because of 
their differing causal explanations and proposed solutions. Therefore in order to find com-
monalities between the two fields, we need to explore the critical literature on disasters and 
conflict theories. 
 
Review of critical disaster discourse 
Since the 1970s, critics on the dominant hazard-focused viewpoint emerged, challenging the 
argument that disasters are external, natural and unforeseen events (O’Keefe, 1976, Hewitt, 
1983; Cuny, 1983, Wijkman, 1984: 125; Blaikie et al, 1994; Quarantelli, 1998; Pelling, 2006: 
4). The critics stress that disasters are linked to problems of underdevelopment, to processes 
of marginalization and of failing government responses to disasters. In this view, the in-
creasing number of disasters is attributed to the mounting vulnerability of people to 
extreme events and shocks. Reducing the vulnerability of marginalized and poor people is 
therefore seen as a development question, ...”and such question should be answered 
politically” (Cuny, 1983:7). Maskrey (1989) stated that disaster response is not only the 
responsibility of governments and scientists but that ordinary people have a role as well: 
“nothing will happen unless people themselves who are actually affected by disasters and 
who actually suffer, politically start demanding safety and protection’. Also Anderson and 
Woodrow (1989) promote in their “vulnerability and capacity” framework the view that 
disaster-affected people as active, creative actors who have agency, and that addressing 
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people’s vulnerability has a long-term perspective than is usually associated with humani-
tarian aid. The disaster pressure model of Blaikie et al (1994) further contributes to an 
understanding of why people are vulnerable to disasters by relating people’s exposure to 
hazards, particular unsafe conditions locally to deep-rooted causes like limited access to 
power and resources. The model encourages to look beyond the immediate needs of 
affected populations to understand trends in society that generate vulnerability locally. In 
this view, disasters are not natural but political events (Olson, 2000). 
 
The political nature of disasters increasingly gets clearer. Upland communities in the 
Philippines, for instance, blame the government’s logging policies, mining operations and the 
construction of hydroelectric dams for the increasing occurrence of flash floods, landslides, 
pollution of water and fish kill. Here, vulnerability can no longer be understood as how 
people are prone to sudden unexpected events, but also as “a measure of the impact of 
society on the environment” (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Hilhorst, 2004). The differing impact of a 
typhoon (hazard, extreme event) and of monsoon rain (normal climatic condition) on these 
upland communities has become negligible (Heijmans, 2004). Here, the conceptual dif-
ference between hazards as ‘exceptional events’ and ‘normality’ is difficult to define. Both 
have the potential to cause a disaster at the local level due to a rise in vulnerability. Disasters 
are the result of development as well. Therefore, normal development cannot be considered 
so normal after all.  
 
As elaborated earlier in this chapter, Olson proposes to ask three fundamental questions 
after a disaster hit, focusing on the roles and responsibilities of governments to not only 
respond to disasters but also to explain the event. I proposed to ask these questions not only 
to government officials , but also to affected populations, civil society organizations, (I)NGOs, 
de facto rulers, and the private sector which all respond and try to make sense of disaster 
events. The three questions – the framing, blaming and resource allocation – have a history 
rooted in socio-political relations, and in turn shape or deepen future inequalities, which 
could increase the risk for conflict. 
 
Review of critical conflict discourse 
Like the critics on the dominant hazard-focused viewpoint on disasters caused a shift to ‘see’ 
disasters as a matter of vulnerability linked to processes of marginalization and limited 
access to resources, similar debates are on-going in the field of conflict studies. Majority of 
theories focus on the question of what causes conflict? Homer-Dixon (1994) sees scarcity of 
resources as a cause for conflict, while others view ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ as motivation for 
violence (Collier, 2000), or inequality and marginalization (Duffield, 2001). Although above 
question is valid, ‘seeing’ conflicts as simple binary struggles neatly arrayed along a single 
issue, simplifies reality (Kalyvas, 2003): conflicts are often portrayed as if local conflict 
dynamics are manifestations of the divide at the top. However, reality is more complex and 
ambiguous. Conflicts seem to be a “convergence between local motives and supra-local 
imperatives, spanning the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the 
individual“ (Kalyvas, 2003: 475). Kalyvas shows how local actors can have different motives - 
personal, private feuds, ideology -  to take up arms. He refers to an interaction between 
political and private identities and actions. Actions “on the ground” often seem more related 
to local or private issues than to the war’s driving cleavage. Secondly, individual and local 
actors can take advantage of the war to settle local or private conflicts often bearing little or 
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no relation to the causes of the war or the goals of the belligerents (Kalyvas, 2003: 475; 
Anderson, 1999). Chapter 5 focuses on people’s perspectives and motivations to use 
violence or to make peace in Afghanistan and Indonesia.   
 
Afghanistan is a clear example of this complexity where local rivalries and global aims seem 
to feed off each other. Local commanders swap sides in alliances of convenience that have 
shifted with the conflict dynamics since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Kalyvas, therefore 
suggests to view violent conflict as a process that provides a medium for a variety of motives 
to be realized within the larger conflict context. Approaching conflict as a ‘process’ rather 
than focusing on its causes, allows for a focus on changes in power relations in one place or 
group compared to other places taking a historical perspective. It further allows to ask why 
certain people are affected by conflict or crisis in the way they are.  Richards (2005) explains 
this ‘conflict as process’ perspective as the ‘war-peace continuum’: he proposes to  explore 
how people make war and peace, approaching local people as social agents. Empirical 
research (Richards, 2005; Kalyvas, 2003; Korf, 2006) suggests that violence often (but not 
always) grows from within communities, and that grassroots people participate in making 
war or peace in very direct ways. War, like peace, is organized by social agents who mobilize 
others, and train those (Richards, 2005: 3).  
 
As it has become difficult to distinguish the conceptual difference between hazards as 
‘exceptional events’ and ‘normality’, likewise, the distinction between war and peace cannot 
be clearly demarcated either: conflict contexts like Afghanistan and the Philippines can be 
characterized by “no peace no war” situations. Ceasefire agreements, peace agreements or, 
for instance, the overthrow of the Taliban in the Afghanistan case, are national or inter-
national markers to start post-conflict interventions which differ from humanitarian emer-
gency aid responses (Hilhorst, 2007). However, conflicts have no single cause or explanation, 
and formal peace agreements do not necessarily include all warring parties or views, leaving 
space for renewed conflict dynamics of varying intensity, particularly at the local level 
(Hilhorst, 2007; Kalyvas, 2003; Korf, 2006). In fact, “war and peace are concurrent and 
competing, not alternating phases in the maintenance of ordered social relations” (Richards, 
2005: 3). Mindanao, in the Philippines, for instance, experienced long periods of uneasy 
peace interrupted by occasional eruptions of violence. There, efforts to make war (violating 
ceasefires) exist next to attempts to stop violence drawing on the social institutions and 
networks people deploy to reach their objectives. Instead of focusing on what issue(s) 
triggered war or peace it is important to explore how people make war or peace, 
approaching people as active and creative individuals.  
 
Seeing both conflict and disasters as processes and political events 
Concluding, instead of ‘seeing’ disasters and conflict as external events, I view them both as 
political processes in which local people, civil society, government officials, (I)NGOs, military, 
combatants, de facto rulers, among others, actively make choices that correspond with their 
motives, interests, and the options they have to shape their actions (after Anderson & 
Woodrow, 1989; Richards, 2005). There is a need to better understand what people affected 
by both disasters and conflict actually do in unstable circumstances, and with whom in 
society they entertain economic, social and political linkages. Despite crisis and chaos, 
people try to continue their daily life as usual, although their livelihood strategies may have 
changed and diversified due to a change in social relations. Chapter 5 provides a picture of 
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how disaster- and conflict-affected people do this, and focuses on how within and between 
villages people produce various risk constructs – within a certain setting of power relations – 
negotiate, struggle, or resist change towards protection and safety. It is these contexts in 
which CBDRR pilots are brought in, and where NGO field workers interact with the local 
population. 
 
1.8. Outline of the book  
Chapter 2 sets out the research design using an interactive research methodology. It explains 
how the interactive research got shaped through the involvement of different actors, con-
sidering issues like inter-subjectivity, evolving reciprocal relationships, and positioning and 
roles of the researcher. This refers to the ‘interactive’ part of the research. It further critically 
reflects on the ‘research’ part on knowledge construction and how I dealt with partiality and 
multiple perspectives. Some research encounters led to tensions and conflict among the 
actors involved which needed to be constantly managed to maintain reciprocal relationships 
with the research subjects. The chapter provides insights for why I regard this interactive 
research as a continuous negotiation process, its findings as negotiated outcomes, and what 
value they have. I further elaborate on the relevance, appropriateness and ethics of doing 
interactive research in real-time disaster and conflict settings. The general academic argu-
ment is that insecurity makes it impossible to secure valid data. I argue that research in 
disaster and conflict settings is possible through the right contacts, access through local 
NGOs and flexibility and creativity in research methods. 
 
The outline of the book follows the three sub-research questions posed earlier in this thesis, 
which basically express a chronological sequence of first studying the origins of various 
CBDRR traditions and their particular interpretations from a historical perspective. I then 
elaborate on the CBDRR process in several pilot areas in Afghanistan and Indonesia followed 
by the outcomes and discussion on what CBDRR actually is, and its potential in complex 
contexts. 
 
Additionally, the outline considers a study-up approach aimed to unravel the policy-practice 
discrepancy, where I focused on the interaction between local populations and NGO field 
staff, which is the level in the aid chain where the incompatibility between the idealistic 
logframe model and the political arena model is felt most. The interaction between NGO 
project staff and the funding agency is inserted in those crucial moments in the CBDRR 
process where the funding agencies strongly steered the CBDRR process in favour of their 
interest. All chapters are empirically grounded, but draw on existing literature as well for 
analysis and validation, and link field experiences to broader trends in aid programming and 
debates on CBDRR.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses how CDRC strategically framed and re-framed its CBDO-DR policy in the 
socio-political context of the Philippines since Martial Law in 1972 till now. This chapter 
further makes sense of what constitutes ‘political vulnerability’, and why this contradicts to 
people’s agency and the notion of ‘everyday politics’. The chapter concludes that disasters 
can be viewed as an opportunity for social change, but for whom and in what way is con-
textual, time-bound and contested in local and national arenas.  
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Chapter 4 is a historical account of various other ‘home-grown’ CBDRR approaches like pro-
moted by La Red in Latin America, and Duryog Nivaran in South Asia. These home-grown 
CBDRR approaches already existed before the UN declared the International Decade of 
Natural Disaster Reduction from 1989 to 1999. By the end of the 1990s, the international 
community started to promote community-based approaches as a complementary strategy 
to national and international efforts to reduce risk. However, the meaning governments 
attach to CBDRR rather refers to efficiency, than to genuinely addressing social injustices 
underlying people’s vulnerability. The chapter reveals how the various strands of thinking 
about CBDRR got increasingly intertwined since the Hyogo Declaration in 2005. I argue that 
CBDRR is a contested approach: beyond its relevance to reduce risks of affected populations, 
CBDRR is also a political and ideological construct, with its discursive interpretations and 
justifications. 
 
Chapter 5 explores local people’s perspectives on risks stemming from disasters and conflict, 
the notion of ‘local knowledge’, and how people deal with uncertainty and crisis in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia. CBDRR-literature assumes that the use of local knowledge will 
improve disaster risk reduction policies and project implementation. However, the many 
stories from men and women in Afghanistan and Indonesia revealed that local knowledge is 
differentiated, partial, contested and sometimes dangerous like in Maluku, where local 
beliefs justified the use of violence. When outsiders, like CBDRR-practitioners, say they aim 
to recognize local knowledge in their interventions locally, they should be aware and 
acknowledge the differentiated nature of local knowledge, the diversity in risk constructs 
and the local institutional arrangements that influence them. How this raises problems and 
dilemmas in practice is subject of the next two chapters.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on how CBDRR approaches got shape and meaning in new 
contexts like Afghanistan and Indonesia. Through sequential case analysis and regular 
action-reflection cycles (Chapter 2) the researcher encouraged local NGO staff to reflect on 
their routines that have been taken for granted, and to uncover assumptions, norms, values, 
skills and systems. Chapter 6 particularly focuses on the NGOs’ assumptions and values 
applied when selecting, entering and organizing communities and the reasons behind. 
Despite conscious efforts to reach the most vulnerable groups in a village through creative, 
flexible and context-specific approaches, the benefits still seem to drift towards village elites. 
This means that the elite forces are strong, and that withstanding these pressures is difficult 
for CBOs and vulnerable groups, and for the NGOs which claim to support the latter. The 
chapters reveal the mechanisms in the CBDRR process that reduce, produce, or reproduce 
people’s vulnerability.    
 
Chapter 7 particularly deals with two cases, one in Central Java, Indonesia and the second 
one in Herat province, western Afghanistan, where local people and NGOs entered the 
‘political arena’ to negotiate and struggle for their risk solutions beyond community level. 
The chapter discusses how local people and NGOs mobilized and organized ‘effective 
agency’ and engaged – in one way or another - with the broader institutional context of 
norms, traditions, the judiciary system, the governance structure and institutions related to 
allocation of resources. The chapter analyses the tactics and strategies local people used to 
debate, confront and negotiate with authorities to get their risk problems solved.  
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The final chapter brings the conceptual insights and conclusions together. It discusses firstly 
what CBDRR actually is and means in the various disaster and conflict contexts, and re-
examines the definitions of the key CBDRR concepts. I conclude that the CBDRR approach 
does not exist. Empirical findings show that there are different processes through which 
organizations – CBOs, local NGOs, funding agencies, government in Afghanistan, Indonesia 
and the Philippines – arrived at a specific framing of local realities and their responses in the 
context they live and work, and consequently they attach different meanings to CBDRR. 
These are related to their histories, current state-society relationships, and how they 
legitimize their interventions. Actors either underscore the politics of their interventions or 
rather de-politicize them. From the experiences of this research it is plausible to conclude 
that when one ignores to view CBDRR interventions in a political and institutional manner, 
the outcomes of the interventions are likely to reproduce institutions and people’s 
vulnerability. This is one of the main explanations for the varying outcomes of the CBDRR 
pilots. 
 
Chapter 8 further reflects on the potential of CBDRR in conflict settings. The case from Herat, 
Afghanistan, offers valuable prospects for how to support disaster and conflict affected 
communities in a context where government is weak or contested. By taking an institutional 
and political approach to analyse responses to disaster and conflict, I uncover some of the 
complexities and the political nature of disaster risk reduction practices. The implication for 
aid agencies is that they should invest considerable time and effort to find out who 
cooperates and who opposes particular risk reduction measures and why, and to deal with 
these power plays in such a way that marginal groups could succeed in their demands for 
protection and safety. This practice substantially deviates from most current CBDRR practice. 
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2.                            “Designing the plane while flying it” 
Negotiating an interactive research with aid agencies in disaster and conflict settings 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is an account of how I shaped my PhD research through a process of continu-
ously re-negotiating research priorities and commitment with the actors involved, and 
adapting the research to social dynamics and security issues in Afghanistan and Indonesia. 
The initiators of this research opted for an interactive methodology to be accountable to 
stakeholders in the field. They proposed to take a view from below as a mirror for aid 
agencies to encourage a process of reflexive learning about their everyday practices and 
assumptions. Interactive research is believed to be a way to make research more accessible 
and relevant for the questions and dilemmas confronting humanitarian aid agencies, and 
thus resulting in better-informed and more sensitive policy and practice of responding to 
disasters and conflict. Interactive research breaks through the boundaries of disciplines, but 
also through the distinction between scientific knowledge, practitioners’ expertise, and local 
knowledge of disaster and conflict affected populations (Hilhorst and Heijmans, 2011). 
 
My motivation to opt for an interactive research stems from my previous work where I was 
directly confronted with local people’s critical questions regarding outsiders’ intentions like 
those of NGOs, government, and donors. I consider the role of local people to be more than 
just ‘informants’. They are subjects to whom the researcher is accountable and who can 
contribute valuable knowledge to the research process. I like to give local people a stronger 
voice towards aid agencies and their donors to influence aid practice, and this voice is more 
likely to be heard when aid agencies themselves join the research process than when they 
remain outsiders.   
 
A second reason to opt for an interactive research is that I will have the opportunity to study 
humanitarian organizations from within. For outsiders it is difficult to get access to the 
workings of an aid agency, especially to sensitive issues: information is a private good rather 
than a public asset (Mosse, 2005). Information is then given strategically or filtered to secure 
the organization’s reputation, and poor performance is concealed. Agencies do not want to 
put their external funding at risk. This makes it almost impossible to sustain long-term 
participant observation in the absence of making a contribution (Mosse, 2005). My commit-
ment is to encourage aid practitioners – particularly local NGO field staff and programme 
officers of donor organizations - to jointly reflect on their routines, hidden assumptions, and 
to take more consciously critical decisions to improve aid programming. These actors are the 
frontline-workers and tasked to translate policy into practice trough their interaction with 
villagers. 
 
However, interactive research methodologies encounter many challenges and do not go 
uncontested. The immediate challenge I faced was how to combine interactive research with 
a PhD dissertation: interactive research is often represented as a collaborative endeavour 
among various stakeholders, whereas the culture of PhD dissertations demands individual 
54 
 
demonstration of competence, and the need to maintain an independent role. I experienced 
this interactive research as a continuous negotiation process, involving institutional politics 
in (re)defining research directions, localities, methods and about whose knowledge, values 
and norms count. At the same time I was concerned to do good social research dealing with 
issues of theory, method and validity.  
 
This chapter is structured in five sections. The first section addresses the backgrounds and 
various traditions of interactive research, and explains from which tradition I developed my 
project. Section two deals with the theory of knowledge construction with a focus on pro-
ducing knowledge that is relevant for both practice and theory, and how this evolves in prac-
tice. Knowledge construction creates tensions and conflict among the various actors in-
volved. Instead of considering these tensions as distortions of the research process, I 
regarded them as an inherent part of the process of knowledge construction and as oppor-
tunities to deepen the analysis. The third section reflects on doing interactive research in 
(post) conflict settings. I highly relied on local NGOs and populations to gain access to 
research localities and protection in contexts where security conditions are dynamic. This 
raised issues of ethics, accountability, and appropriate research methods to ensure validity 
and relevance of findings. The fourth section explains the organisational set-up of the 
research, the subsequent roles and positioning of the direct actors involved, its specific prin-
ciples, and interactive research methods. As an invited researcher you cannot fully set the 
research arrangements like directions and localities since the stakeholders – on and off stage 
- have their ambitions and interests as well. I will close this chapter explaining how I kept an 
eye on the quality of interactive research outcomes, and what value they have for whom: 
how do you know that the quality of interactive research outcomes corresponds to good 
social research dealing with issues of ‘rigor’ and ‘validity’, while at the same time the 
research findings are relevant for practitioners and local contexts.  
 
2.1 Traditions of interactive research and knowledge interests 
Disaster Studies uses the term ‘interactive research’ for the kind of research which takes 
shape through interactions between the researcher and staff from aid agencies. It charac-
terizes ‘interactive research’ as a step-by-step approach, where research questions and 
direction are iteratively discussed, reflected and decided upon by the actors involved. ‘Inter-
active’ refers to the different roles, interests and agendas of the actors, opposed to terms 
like ‘collaborative research’ or ‘action research’ which do not necessarily make these differ-
ences explicit from the start. Interactive research usually involves the study of on-going 
actions, like in this case CBDRR interventions, that are brought in a certain setting and 
context. In this perspective, Disaster Studies regards scientific knowledge as socially con-
structed and inter-subjectively validated (Haar, Hilhorst and Heijmans, forthcoming). 
 
‘Interactive’ research is actually an umbrella term covering several approaches that emerged 
from different traditions, and therefore ‘interactive research’ has many faces. It’s most 
important feature is perhaps that it shifts its locus of control in varying degrees from 
academic researchers to those who have been traditionally called the subjects of research 
like practitioners or community people (Herr and Anderson, 2005: 2). The most common 
terms are action research, activist research, participatory action research, collaborative 
research, action science, participatory rural appraisal, practitioner research, and feminist 
action research. Each of these terms refers to different purposes, positionalities, ideological 
55 
 
commitments, and in most cases they grew out of specific social contexts. A lot of ‘action 
research’ is inspired by Freire’s ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (1970), which refers to emanci-
patory practice, aiming to support an oppressed group to identify and act on social policies 
and practices that keep unequal power relations in place. Here the researcher is not con-
ceived as a ‘neutral observer’, but aligns with an oppressed group and acts as change agent 
to solve local problems against injustices people may suffer (Herr and Anderson, 2005; van 
der Haar, 2005). ‘Action research’ and ‘participatory research’ as liberation particularly 
emerged in Latin America during the late 1960s and 1970s. Its aim is to contribute to pro-
gressive social and political transformation.  
 
Linked to the Latin American protest movements, criticism against the dominant, quantita-
tive social science research methodology started to emerge in academic circles as well, par-
ticularly criticizing the value neutrality, the structural separation between theory and prac-
tice, and between the expert researcher and research objects (Huizer, 1973). During the late 
1970s and 1980s women scholars involved in the women’s movement started to develop 
new methodological approaches for feminist research, bringing women’s repression and 
their invisibility in the male-dominated social science into the full daylight of scientific analy-
sis (Mies, 1983: 121). They argued that female social scientists should use their own experi-
ence of oppression and discrimination into the research process: value-free research has to 
be replaced by conscious partiality (ibid: 122). They further promote to establish reciprocal 
relationships between the researcher and the researched, to correct distortions of percep-
tions on both sides, and to ensure a ‘view from below’ (ibid: 122). Like Huizer and other 
activist researchers, also feminist researchers promote the researcher’s active but critical 
involvement in actions, movements and struggles aimed to orient the processes towards 
progressive emancipation.  
 
Although this interactive research empathizes with disaster and conflict affected populations 
and their efforts to cope and reduce risks, it takes its inspiration from a different tradition: 
‘action science’. This tradition is associated with the work of Argyris and Schӧn (1991) whose 
concern is the ability of organizations to learn. They view ‘action science’ as studying ques-
tions, puzzles and problems from the perspective of practitioners within specific local con-
texts. Practitioners, however, are not necessarily interested in developing theories or in the 
truth, but rather in finding practical solutions to problems that arise in complex, changing or 
unknown situations in which they operate. The researcher, on the other hand, may prioritize 
theorizing over practical solutions. 
 
Argyris and Schӧn’s ‘action science’ stresses the importance to not only solve problems, but 
also to generate new knowledge or theory that is useful. ‘Action science’ builds descriptions 
and theories within the practice context itself, and tests them there through intervention 
experiments – meaning that the experiments both tests hypotheses and effect some desired 
change in the situation (ibid: 86). These intervention experiments consist of a spiral of 
action- reflection cycles in which the following steps are taken: 
1. To develop a plan of action to improve what is already happening 
2. To act to implement the plan 
3. To observe the effects of action in the context in which it occurs 
4. To reflect on these effects as a basis for further planning, subsequent action and on  
through a succession of cycles. 
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In this research the CBDRR pilots are considered such intervention-experiments: 
practitioners start ‘doing CBDRR’ in their particular context, as a way to facilitate reflection 
and learning, to transform knowledge and improve practices. Figure 2.1 visualizes these 
action-reflection cycles as an iterative process.  
 
Figure 2.1 Research as spiraling cycles 
 
 
I mentioned in Chapter 1 that Argyris and Schön’s learning cycles – aimed to make the 
espoused theory congruent to the theory-in-use – offers a framework that is useful to 
understand processes of organizational learning, but that their theory lacked a social and 
political conceptualization of organizations (Greenwood, 2002). Learning and interactive 
research processes within organizations are largely “collective, noisy and conflict-filled 
processes” (ibid: 127). New insights and good ideas may not necessarily result in better 
practice, due to constraining organizational institutions that curb new ideas or innovation. 
People then reframe the problem and try other ‘moves’ and assess the consequences till 
they have found a solution that works. This is not necessarily the best or the only solution, 
but a solution that is appreciated (Bersselaar, 2006: 7).  
 
Building on the work of Argyris and Schӧn, Bersselaar (2006) adapted the ‘learning cycles’1 
into ‘knowledge cycles’ to fulfil the specific knowledge interests of both the practitioners 
and the researcher. I therefore use Bersselaar’s three knowledge cycles to explain the 
process of knowledge construction and theorizing, which is subject of the next section. 
 
2.2 Processes of knowledge construction in interactive research 
Interactive research methodologies are significant and of interest for research questions that 
particularly deal with social interventions, with topics of translating theory and policy into 
practice, with social change, and to inform the thinking of policy-makers, practitioners, pro-
gram participants and public (Tromp, 2006). They start from the view that all research is 
value-laden, subjective, connecting theory and practice in a dialogical way, in contrast to 
positivist research which views science as neutral, objective and separates theory construc-
tion from application. In positivist research, it is the researcher who is recognized as the only 
knowledgeable person, and who produces recommendations for the end-users, drawing a 
distinction between ‘local knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’. Whereas in interactive 
research, all actors are recognized to bring with them their specific everyday forms of 
knowledge, whether they are scientists, aid practitioners or local villagers.  
 
Knowledge should not be equated with some professional, specialized set of data, ideas or 
accumulated facts (Arce and Long, 1992). Knowledge involves ways in which people construe 
the world, how they absorb and rework outside ideas. People use their skills, orientations, 
                                                 
1 The learning cycles refer here to the ‘triple loop learning cycles’.  
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experiences, interests, resources, patterns of social interaction to decide which ideas, beliefs 
and understandings are useful, and which ones are no longer valid. Knowledge is “fragmen-
tary, partial and provisional in nature and people work with a multiplicity of understandings, 
beliefs and commitments” (ibid, 211-212). An interactive research methodology allows dif-
ferent bodies of knowledge to interact with the aim to produce, translate or transform 
knowledge to address problems that no longer could be solved by routine practices 
(Bersselaar, 2006). Bersselaar’s three knowledge cycles are (1) empirical cycle, (2) 
hermeneutic cycle, and (3) conceptual analysis cycle, visualized in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Knowledge cycles leading to new theory (Bersselaar, 2006: 6) 
 
        Experience    Experience and understanding  Concept A 
                <           ↓ 
 
 
 
  ↓              ↓          ↓ 
         Reflection on social processes Meaning and significance of events      Implicit assumptions, implications  
        Concept A” for other contexts 
 
The first cycle is the ‘empirical cycle’ and enables practitioners, local people and the 
researcher to reflect on on-going social processes and CBDRR practices. For instance, local 
people experience disaster events or conflict and respond to these events in a particular 
way. Likewise, aid agencies, governments, and other actors respond to these events in their 
specific manner. These observations are still at the empirical level, since they do not explain 
why these specific responses were chosen. A deeper level of reflection is required. As soon 
as disasters or conflict occur, the various actors start to attach meaning to these events and 
experiences, and interpret them. They make sense of what happened, and why it happened, 
referring to the questions of Olson (2000). Therefore, the empirical cycle is followed by a 
hermeneutic cycle, aimed to understand why actors interpret the events and their circum-
stances in a particular way. In my theoretical framework in Chapter 1, I elaborated on the 
concepts that are central in this interactive research - ‘institutions’, ‘politics’ and ‘power’ – to 
understand the social processes and how these affect and shape the CBDRR interventions. 
Through reflection on these real-time CBDRR experiences, the research actors will interpret 
their experiences, and think further on the meaning they attach to concepts that make-up 
CBDRR like ‘disaster’, ‘community’, ‘community-based’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘risk’, ‘vulnerabil-
ity’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘resilience’. The third cycle reflects on these 
meanings, on the implicit presuppositions and implications of the concepts, and considers 
more deeply what the concepts could mean in varying contexts, referred to as the concep-
tual analysis cycle. Abstract conceptualization means to find theoretical concepts that 
explain empirical phenomena which at the same time can be applied to similar phenomena 
in different contexts.  
 
The three cycles intend to blend knowledge from the practical wisdom of grassroots 
communities with knowledge from aid practitioners developed through their interaction 
with these communities. These are then linked to formal knowledge systems which all 
together aim to bring about a positive outcome for local vulnerable and marginalized people 
affected by disasters and conflict, and secondly to generate new theories on CBDRR. 
Interactive research requires the use, the construction of concepts and definitions that 
↓ 
Concept A” 
 
Empirical cycle Hermeneutic cycle Conceptual analysis cycle 
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consider how actors involved identify, understand and give meaning to these. This will 
enable them to take a next step to understand – in this research - what CBDRR means in new 
contexts, where current, mainstream interpretations of CBDRR are no longer obvious. This 
implies that knowledge generated in a specific context needs to be translated to a higher 
level of abstraction, in order to enable aid organizations to apply it in similar situations else-
where (Tromp, et al, 2009: 223). Going through the process of the three cycles: of 
experience/action, towards reflection on practice from different angles (empirical cycle), 
towards understanding, interpretation, analysing meaning and abstract conceptualization 
(hermeneutic cycle), towards developing theories or adapting concepts which could be 
applied in other contexts (conceptual analysis cycle), I looked for patterns, similarities and 
differences in processes of social interactions between the various stakeholders in disaster 
risk reduction with the aim to look for some degree of generalizability. 
 
From an idealistic towards a naturalistic perspective 
Initially, the CBDRR pilots were conceived with an idealized image of what the CBDRR 
approach should achieve, taking the Philippine experience as the exemplar. Soon the 
initiators of the CBDRR pilot programme discovered this was not the way to go about it, 
especially not in complex, unstable environments like in Afghanistan. It became clear that 
the CBDRR intervention-experiments would follow uncertain and unknown paths. Kurtz and 
Snowden (2007) make a distinction between naturalistic and idealized thinking in responding 
to uncertainty. Those with an idealistic way of thinking seek to close the gap between an 
ideal future state and their perception of the present. Those with a naturalistic view intend 
to understand enough of the present in order to stimulate its evolution. Once such 
stimulation is made, - in our case starting to pilot CBDRR – analysing emergent patterns 
becomes essential so that desired patterns can be supported and undesired ones addressed 
(Guijt, 2008). The CBDRR interventions will evolve to a future that is unknowable in advance, 
but will hopefully be more contextually appropriate when discovered (after Kurtz and 
Snowden, 2007). Taking a naturalistic approach means that together we explore and 
increase our abilities to gather the right information in order to make sense of what is going 
on in real time life and then adjust interventions accordingly.  
 
Processes of sense-making  
Knowledge construction and learning in the hermeneutic cycle happens interactively 
through the process of ‘sense-making’. Klein et al (2006:71) define sense-making as “a 
motivated continuous effort to understand connections - among people, places and events- 
in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively”. Explicit efforts at sense-making 
occur when the current state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected 
state of the world, or when there is no obvious way to engage with the world (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005: 409). Particularly in complex and dynamic contexts, the 
iterative process of probing/action and reflection/sense-making may best suit unpredictable 
processes, stressing the importance to engage with those involved to understand and 
explain the significance of events, and to generate ideas about possible responses (Guijt, 
2008). In this process new knowledge is jointly constructed instead of transferred from an 
expert to practitioners through training or reports. However, also sense-making involves 
power that is expressed in acts that shape what people accept, take for granted or reject 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005: 418). Which story is plausible, which perspectives are 
singled out, which cues are highlighted or suppressed? Sense-making is not about truth and 
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getting it right, but about continuing redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes 
more comprehensive, includes more observed data, is consistent with data from other 
sources, and becomes resilient in the face of criticism (ibid: 415).  
 
Guijt stresses to look for surprise, the unexpected, and the little clues: “look for evidence 
that disconfirms [the organisation’s] cherished expectations, and see beyond its simplifi-
cations” (2008: 253). Surprises happen when ‘bits of knowledge’ do not tally with one’s 
assumptions. The Seed Bank experience discussed such a ‘surprise’ referring to the kind of 
adaptation strategies of the farmers that did not tally with the assumptions of the outsiders. 
The inconvenience people feel when discovering aspects that differ from their assumptions, 
may lead them to revise their understanding and attitude. New knowledge will then be 
internalized and increases people’s motivation to change institutions like norms, values, 
beliefs and policies. ‘Surprise’ and ‘sense-making’ are important sources for learning. 
Surprises can also refer to positive experiences as astonishment, for instance, the realization 
of local people in Nahreen, Afghanistan, that they could effectively respond to floods by 
doing things differently, something they could not have thought of beforehand. Hence, 
seeking surprises will be part of the sense-making process to enhance reflective learning and 
organizational practice.  
 
Internal validity 
The actors involved in the interactive research are considered competent in articulating their 
views and opinions, while projecting and accepting critical remarks during discussions and 
debates (Tromp et al, 2009: 232). However, we cannot assume that all will adopt or have an 
open attitude, or are equal partners in the debates. Sharing experiences, open communica-
tion, admitting weaknesses, trust should be regarded as goals in the research process in 
order to attain reciprocal relationships – “communicative symmetry in the discussions” (ibid), 
and adequacy of findings. The research findings generated through interactive research are 
considered adequate or valid, “when they are recognized and preferably accepted as such by 
both the researcher and co-researchers” (ibid, 233). This principle is called ‘reciprocal 
adequacy’ as a criterion for internal validity of the research, and for reliability of data inter-
pretation (Tromp et al, 2009). 
 
This differs from constructivist research where the researcher may aim to present and 
analyse multiple perspectives of various stakeholders, added with his or her own interpreta-
tion without the necessary consent or knowledge of those ‘researched’. Interactive research, 
in its most idealized form, creates the opportunity for the actors involved to make sense of 
data, events and processes themselves or with the researcher, assuming that this will enrich 
the analysis and that the results will be useful for their own purposes (Hale, 2001:14). 
However, it should not be taken for granted that everybody agrees or accepts the findings 
right away, or agrees to each other’s interpretation. Tensions and conflicting interpretations 
lead to on-going sense-making and new sets of questions or areas to explore. Even validation 
of findings is subject of negotiation and debate. Research encounters in real-time settings 
show more likely real behaviour of the actors involved, rather than expected behaviour 
(Mies, 1989; Burawoy, 1998).  
 
The occurrence of tensions and conflict demonstrates that interactive research is more than 
collecting and analysing data in close collaboration with practitioners and other stake-
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holders, which emphasizes the ‘interactive’ side. But interactive research is ‘research’ when 
it develops “habits of counterintuitive thinking, questioning definitions and premises, linking 
findings and process analysis to other cases, and attempting to subject favourite interpreta-
tions to harsh collaborative critiques” (Greenwood, 2001: 131). Multiple readings of a single 
event are collected, discussed, and are subject for various interpretations, debates and 
sense-making. As researcher I interpret the interpretations of the other actors, present their 
multiple perspectives and unresolved issues, and provide my interpretation and under-
standing of reality which may differ from the others. The process of interpreting the inter-
pretations of others is referred to as ‘double hermeneutics’ (Tromp et al, 2009: 231). My 
interpretations of local dynamics, aid practices, reflection sessions, workshops, case studies 
were always fed back for discussion to the local partners and staff within the Dutch aid 
agencies. Even the chapters of this thesis have been discussed with the initiators, while the 
local NGOs read and commented on the empirical chapters and the conclusions. Through 
these steps I aimed to achieve internal validity, and reciprocal adequacy.  
 
The politics of knowledge: whose interpretation counts? 
Interactive research methodologies tend to represent research encounters as ‘collaboration’ 
or ‘teamwork’, which share a common interest in enhancing knowledge and practice. 
However, in the course of this interactive research I experienced research encounters 
varying from discussions to tense debates, agony and even antagonistic positioning where 
actors could not reconcile their views and interpretations of on-going events. Discussions, 
debates and conflicts are inevitable. The researcher has to deal with multiple perspectives, 
power dynamics, institutional politics, partiality and tensions among the research subjects.  
 
Below I share two research encounters. The first deals with tense debates about interpreting 
‘local knowledge’ among community organizers from three different local NGOs aligned in a 
coalition in Indonesia. Their debates revealed tacit knowledge about community organizing 
strategies and about the way they work together in the coalition to reduce disaster risks. 
Tensions and sense-making resulted in a deeper analysis into the donor’s funding conditions 
and assumptions. The second case deals with an evolving antagonistic relationship between 
a local partner and the programme staff of a Dutch aid agency. During a field visit and a 
short period afterwards, the researcher and a newly hired programme officer suddenly 
played the role of mediator, trying to maintain reciprocal relationships, which would 
otherwise threaten the internal validity of research findings. 
 
Case 1:   The political meaning of ‘local knowledge’ and disclosing ‘tacit knowledge’ of 
practitioners 
During a joint reflection workshop in April 2011, community organizers of three local NGOs 
working in nine different villages in three districts on the slopes of Muria Mountain in 
Central Java, debated about the meaning of ‘local wisdom’ and ‘local knowledge’. They 
researched local people’s understanding of why landslides and flash floods occur in their 
localities. Local people’s explanations varied and changed over time as well: “It is up to God 
to decide if a disaster happens”, “it is a punishment from God because we shouldn’t steal 
from the forest” are responses often heard when community organizers start their work in a 
village. The field staff interprets these answers as that people know very well why floods 
happen but that they do not feel responsible for protecting the environment. The sense-
making process constructed an image of people’s beliefs, and explained people’s views in 
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such a way that these matched the NGO’s community organizing strategies like awareness 
raising and promoting environmentally sound practices.  
 
In two other villages, village authorities responded along the lines of “Here, disasters do not 
happen”, while ordinary villagers said “Here we do not talk about disasters”. Community 
organizers interpreted these remarks as a signal that talking about disasters is very sensitive. 
In such cases, it appeared that village authorities were involved in illegal mining practices 
and intimidated people so they wouldn’t protest and keep silent. Also these replies triggered 
a sense-making process that brought out tactical community organizing strategies aimed the 
break the silence over time and to deal with powerful opponents.  
 
“The mountain is old and tired, and gets wrinkles, and this causes landslides”, was narrated 
by village authorities in another village who blamed nature for disasters, while in another 
setting, they articulated that cutting trees and planting corn on steep slopes are destructive 
environmental practices. They were not willing to take responsibility for landslides or change 
their practice. They legitimized their argument further by referring to the expert-knowledge 
of a local geologist who visited the villages in 2007 with the NGO staff2. The geologist  
explained the unique magmatic composition of layered rocks due to violent eruptions in the 
past. In his view Muria Mountain is a volcano, while the local population wasn’t aware of 
this. It has a low water absorbing capacity and because the area experiences a high rainfall 
level (500-5000), water runs off fast. The villagers translated the ‘multiple layered rocks’ as 
the ‘wrinkles of the old mountain’. The NGO community organizer in this village had 
difficulty to convince the village authorities that landslides and flash floods occur as a result 
of both the geological composition of the mountain and people’s farming practices. In the 
various villages, the authorities attributed disaster events to Nature or God, to escape ‘the 
political’ of these events. They did not want to be held responsible, and to quit their 
profiting but destructive practices.  
 
During the workshop, the community organizers debated about how to interpret and value 
local knowledge. Whereas staff of two NGOs attached a political meaning to people’s stories 
that would legitimize their community organizing strategies, one NGO remained puzzled 
about how to interpret the ‘wrinkle story’ and how to proceed discussions and community 
organizing in the village. This NGO was in fact unable to deal with irresponsible village 
authorities and to break through taboos. Its inability to transform local knowledge into 
community organizing strategies, caused irritation among the two other NGOs. Asking why 
they were irritated, they expressed their worries about the future. They brought out their 
tacit knowledge about their intention to synchronize lobby efforts as agreed with the donor. 
In their view, different interpretations about local knowledge could cause a delay in 
community organizing and hamper alliance building among the villages. Consequently, 
targets may not be achieved in time according to the plan. The three NGOs are aligned in the 
Muria Coalition, and together they jointly pursuit an environmental lobby and advocacy 
campaign to influence government policies and forest institutions, supported by I&K. The 
tensions further disclosed their tacit knowledge about the internal functioning of the 
coalition, which otherwise would not have been discussed here. The NGOs partly related the 
weak functioning of the coalition to donor policies, funding conditions and assumptions 
about how coalitions should operate. These tensions provided me with valuable insights into 
                                                 
2
 Dr. Bambang Prastistho who presented his analysis during a CBDRR workshop in November 2007 in Yogyakarta. 
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the workings of aid agencies, bringing out the multiple realities of NGO staff. As of this 
writing, an external evaluation was being conducted which would look into the functioning 
of the coalition and its strategies. 
 
Case 2: Reciprocal relationships under threat: consequences for internal validity 
At the start of this chapter I stated that I viewed this interactive research mainly as a 
continuous negotiation effort, and its findings as negotiated outcomes. There were, 
however, a few research encounters that evolved into conflict and antagonistic relationships 
between some key-actors. These occurred in Halmahera, Northern Maluku. Negotiation and 
mediation efforts were sometimes interrupted by periods of shelving any interaction till the 
donor – after making sense of what happened – decided to pick up the communication 
again. Considering the motivations of Kerkinactie to select church-partners in Halmahera, 
with which it had a sensitive historical background, we did not expect the interaction to be 
harmonious.  
 
Kerkinactie’s relationship with the protestant churches in Indonesia was complicated. Sjoerd 
described Kerkinactie’s partners in Halmahera as hierarchical, top-down, and not connected 
to the everyday realities of community people who still deal with unresolved issues from the 
communal violence. Box 2.1 describes the historical background of the complicated 
relationships and the flow of events that eventually led to conflict and eroding reciprocal 
relationships.  
 
Box 2.1: CBDRR pilot in Halmahera: sequential research encounters evolved into conflict 
 
Halmahera, Northern Maluku, experienced communal violence between Muslims and Christians in 1999-2000 resulting 
in divided and displaced communities. There are various explanations about what caused the conflict and how current 
economic and political dynamics could trigger violence again. Halmahera was selected as location for the CBDRR-pilot 
partly because of its complex context, and because of Kerkinactie’s discomfort of how humanitarian assistance was 
provided to internally displaced people during the conflict. In order to understand the difficulties in the CBDRR pilot in 
Maluku, one has to know the history of how relationships developed over time.   
 
The history goes back to the nineteenth century when Dutch Protestant missionaries settled in Halmahera to serve the 
Dutch colonial community of traders. Later they started to convert the indigenous population to Christianity and 
established the Protestant Church of Halmahera. In 1881, the “Dutch-Indonesian Mission Association” was founded 
which aimed to strengthen cooperation among Dutch and Indonesian Protestant churches and at the same time to 
engage with the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia, regarding education, health, adat-law and to discuss how the 
churches should position themselves vis-a-vis Islam.  
 
In 1984, years after Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands, all Christian Churches in Indonesia united into 
one Council of Churches in Indonesia of which the Protestant Churches of Indonesia (PGI) has the largest representation. 
Its aim was to get rid of its old image of being collaborators of Dutch colonizers by openly supporting the new Indonesian 
Government. During Suharto’s administration, church, government and military institutions were closely related from 
Jakarta to village level. The Protestant Church sided with the powerful elite. Only 10% of the Indonesian population are 
Christians, while the majority is Muslim.  
 
Although PGI wanted to earn an independent reputation, salaries were still paid by the Protestant Churches in the 
Netherlands (PKN). Over time  salary support shifted towards programmatic financing for grassroots projects, channelled 
through Kerkinactie which generated funds through donations by local congregations in the Netherlands. The synods, i.e. 
elected church boards, were made responsible to formulate development policies and aid proposals, and were supposed 
to implement these. And so was the synod of the GMIH. However, Kerkinactie faced several dilemmas, and I&K still do: 
the synods have no professional background in doing development work, synod members change every five years, and 
they hardly relate to grassroots concerns.  
 
Kerkinactie seeks partnership with capable and professional organizations, but due to the historical ties between the 
Protestant Churches in the Netherlands (PKN) with those in Indonesia, it is ambivalent in selecting its partners. To solve 
the dilemmas, the local churches created foundations tasked to provide humanitarian aid while still part of the church 
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structures.  PGI created the Foundation for Disaster Management – YTB in 1991 (later called YTB Indonesia), whereas the 
GMIH created the Crisis Centre and SANRO, a foundation to develop farmers’ capacities. However,  roles and 
responsibilities of each institution were not clearly defined. When Kerkinactie wanted to provide humanitarian aid to 
displaced people during and after the violence in 2000, internal conflicts and tensions arose involving PKN, Kerkinactie, 
PGI, YTBI, GMIH and SANRO. The PKN perceived the GMIH as an actor involved in the violent conflicts, with the 
consequence that Kerkinactie felt reluctant to channel aid funds through the GMIH.  Issues about who manages the 
funds and who is in charge could not be settled and Kerkinactie created – against its own principles - a Working Group of 
professional staff to get the humanitarian assistance to those in need.  
 
During my first visit to Halmahera in September 2006, I heard different versions of what happened and why. Oral 
histories of local people affected by the violence revealed the inappropriateness of the aid provided by the YTBI-GMIH-
SANRO. Sjoerd from Kerkinactie insisted to have the CBDRR pilot here, because she hoped that tensions could be 
reduced through a process of reflection and learning together with community people.  
 
Together with people from YTBI, the GMIH and SANRO I visited many villages in Halmahera from North to South in 
September 2006. While traveling with them, I became  aware of the past and probably unresolved tensions. 
Nevertheless, they expressed their interest in piloting CBDRR, and I could reach a cautious commitment that they would 
start thinking about possible localities. In 2007, the GMIH appointed new synod members , I&K changed its geographical 
approach into a thematic approach, and hired a new project-officer who was not familiar with the church history. The 
combination of these three changes resulted in a research encounter in November 2007 that can best be described as a 
‘battlefield’. Discussions on the aim of the CBDRR pilot were highly distorted. YTBI had prepared the meeting in advance 
with all actors, including the agenda and list of attendants. However, two days before our arrival in Halmahera, the 
GMIH synod had changed the agenda, cancelled the field visits and had not invited SANRO staff.  
 
The newly appointed synod viewed the CBDRR pilot as an opportunity to access funds – to survive. For them it was a 
project to be implemented and a way to restore GMIH’s credibility in the eyes of Kerkinactie. Due to the shift from a 
geographical to a thematic approach, all local partners received a thematic label from I&K which I think, can be 
considered an administrative exercise rather than a well-thought programmatic choice. In this light, GMIH-SANRO were 
labelled as an “Access-to Basic-Services”
3
 partner, which did not match with the historical ties it had with the Mission 
Department of Kerkinactie. The GMIH interpreted this label as that their institution had become irrelevant. This hurt. 
When the new project officer explained that ICCO will relate directly to SANRO regarding the CBDRR pilot, and the 
Mission department with the GMIH, the GMIH stated that the CBDRR pilot will be implemented by them, or not at all. 
They told us that our field visit programme had ended here, and that the GMIH would determine how to proceed with 
the CBDRR-pilot. We could go home. 
 
Later, during 2008 and 2009, relationships between the local partners and I&K were restored and improved. 
 
 
When people and institutions are under stress or in crisis, they reveal much about 
themselves (Burawoy, 1998). As a researcher I met with the synod board in ‘real-world’ 
settings where they negotiated with their donor on how to shape the CBDRR pilot. However, 
the narratives of the different synod members and SANRO staff, with whom I met after-
wards, were all contextualized and circled around unsettled problems from the past in which 
money seemed to be a defining quality of the relationship. Although I&K were aware that 
the institutional environment of the local partners wasn’t conducive for learning and 
reflection, they wanted to continue with the CBDRR-pilot for several reasons.  
 
The initiators of this research still wished to improve the aid practice of its church-partners 
and to challenge the top-down culture and church-doctrine of the GMIH which has limited 
commitment to the concerns of grassroots communities. The Steering Group further felt 
accountable to the communities involved in the pilot which could not be promptly 
abandoned. A second reason was vented by the Mission Department and is situated within 
the relationship between the PGI and PKN. The Protestant Churches in Maluku felt 
abandoned by PKN and Kerkinactie in 2000, when the latter perceived them of taking sides 
against the Muslim population during the violent conflicts in 1999-2000. After ‘9/11’, the 
                                                 
3 Access to basic services refers to health, water and sanitation, education, food security and hiv/aids interventions 
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Protestant Churches in Maluku regained some confidence to restart a dialogue with the PKN 
about the ‘Islamisation of Dutch society’, which, according to the Christians in Maluku, could 
become a threat for the Christian community in the Netherlands. Christians in Maluku felt 
strengthened by the increasing fear among Dutch Christians. The PKN seemed to be per-
ceptive to these sentiments. It must be noted that the Mission department of Kerkinactie 
directly facilitates exchanges between Christian congregations in the Netherlands and those 
in Maluku through visits and e-mail correspondence. For this department it is important that 
distorted church relationships will be restored. The CBDRR pilot had the potential to achieve 
this. 
 
The third reason relates to the institutional embedding of I&K in the international ACT 
ALLIANCE, which channels humanitarian and development aid mainly through protestant 
church organizations like YTBI, GMIH and SANRO4. The interactive research methodology 
proved to be an appropriate and effective  methodology to get access to the workings of aid 
agencies – the processes, contradictions and tensions –, and the Steering Group still hoped 
to uncover constraints, to jointly reflect on them in order to improve the aid practices in 
Halmahera, or to reconsider their aid relations with the GMIH, depending on the outcomes. 
I&K intended to allow an uncertain CBDRR process to evolve in Halmahera and to theorize 
on CBDRR in a post-conflict setting, but the circumstances led I&K to engineer a process to 
allow the GMIH synod to reflect on their way of delivering humanitarian and development 
aid. For this purpose, it used an outside researcher to unravel the constraints, gaps and 
contradictions in this part of the aid chain including the organizations in the Netherlands, 
and to propose improvements.  
 
I increasingly felt uncomfortable in this role, questioning whether it would be ethically 
correct to uncover information and analysis about specific powerful actors in this particular 
pilot that could be detrimental to them. Not because I was afraid for their repercussions on 
me, but because they use their authority to transfer the responsibility of malpractices on to 
their lower ranks. My documentation in 2006 of several open and honest discussions with 
field staff of YTBI and previous GMIH-synod members about the aid practices in Maluku, was 
perceived as critique by the leadership, and had as consequence that field staff was dis-
charged or not re-elected into the synod. I found it ethically incorrect to risk more discharges 
of staff, and in consultation with the initiators of the research we decided to use less public 
means to report constraints and malpractices to I&K. Compared to the CBDRR pilots else-
where, the research encounters in Halmahera revealed more about the complex donor-
partner relationships and the internal power dynamics within church institutions than about 
the meaning of CBDRR in the (post) conflict context of Halmahera.    
 
Hale (2001: 15) raises this concern of “studying powerful people and institutions, with whom 
you do not identify ethically or politically”. In the case of Halmahera, it was difficult to main-
tain trusted reciprocal relationships with all actors, as the inter-subjectivity between the 
researcher and the researched started to erode, which undermined the internal validity of 
those research findings that dealt with donor-local partner interactions. The relationship 
with field staff remained good, but they also increasingly felt distanced from the debates 
going on at higher levels in the aid chain.  
 
                                                 
4
 Since 2010 it became more critical to downward accountability and ends partnerships when this is problematic 
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The two cases demonstrate that tensions and conflict are part and parcel of an interactive 
research methodology, and that these are instrumental for deepening the analysis on the 
workings of aid agencies. The cases further demonstrate how knowledge construction and 
the tensions are embedded in institutional histories and settings, related to organizational 
political agendas. The instrumentality of tensions applies as long as the research subjects 
stay on speaking terms. However, when research subjects enter antagonistic relationships 
with distorted communication, eroding trust and respect for one another, an interactive 
research methodology focusing on organizational learning and improving aid practice is no 
longer appropriate. 
 
2.3  Relevance, appropriateness, and ethics of interactive research in disaster and conflict 
settings 
My fieldwork took place in so-called ‘difficult’ environments referring to (post) conflict 
settings like in Maluku, to unstable security settings like in Afghanistan and to environments 
where the police, military or powerful elite are present to protect the vested interests in 
mining and logging operations and who intimidate local people and NGO staff like in Central 
Java. Wall and Mollinga (2008) argue that field research in difficult political environments 
brings to light several methodological difficulties very prominently, but in the end these are 
part of any development research. Their message is that these difficulties are not just 
isolated problems to overcome, but features that continue to present themselves during 
fieldwork and which need to be constantly negotiated and managed.  
 
References exist about studying conflict, and equally, a lot of references exist about 
interactive research methodologies. However, very little literature can be found on doing 
interactive research in real-time conflict settings. The general academic argument is that 
insecurity makes it impossible to secure valid data and that serious research has to wait till 
the fighting stops (Goodhand, 2000: 12). Goodhand argues that if researchers wait until 
violence and fighting ends, knowledge and understanding tend to be stuck at pre-war level. 
Conflict in Afghanistan has been going on for about three decades, and humanitarian 
responses that would be based on pre-war understanding, ignore the fact that Afghan 
society has moved on, and are likely to be inappropriate (ibid). The local Afghan NGOs that 
are part of this research have been working in the country since the 1990s, even before and 
during the Taliban era. They expressed that their current aid practices and understanding fall 
short in a fast changing security environment, and requested to learn how to integrate 
disaster risk reduction in their development programmes in conflict contexts. From the 
perspective of these Afghan aid agencies, doing interactive research in conflict settings is 
relevant and appropriate.  
 
During the period of this interactive research, however, the way NGOs are perceived by 
Afghans has changed considerably. During the 1990s NGOs were regarded as the main 
providers of basic services in the absence of a functioning central government, whereas in 
the 2000s they were increasingly perceived as being part of the political and military 
agendas of the international community. In addition, the security in the northern and 
western provinces worsened since 2009 and as a result the NGOs adopted a more conserva-
tive security policy to protect foreigners and themselves. We shifted to low profile visits, and 
in Herat I shifted to a remote control research methodology, because the local NGO did not 
dare to take the risk to travel with me to the communities. As a foreign researcher I relied on 
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trustworthy local information on security dynamics to make informed decisions about 
where, when and how to do research, and equally had to accept the decisions of local 
partners when travelling was found too risky.  
 
Security information was offered by the Afghan NGO Security Office (ANSO) and the local 
partner NGOs who relied also on information from villagers. During field visits, this informa-
tion was checked every morning before departure to the field, and by communicating my 
whereabouts every hour to the NGO’s security officer during road travel. We tried to stay 
away from military convoys and police escorts, and always travelled with at least two cars 
without NGO logos and keeping low profile. In this way the security risks could be managed. 
Of course these measures highly limited the intensity of field research. The time I could stay 
in the village was limited to two to three days to reduce the risk of kidnapping. For the same 
reason we could not stay overnight in or close to the villages, and were required to travel 
daily back and forth between the villages and the provincial towns before dark, which 
consumed valuable time we could not spend in the village. However, these measures are 
part of the researcher’s own survival strategies. Additionally I needed to be sensitive to the 
needs and fears of NGO staff and community people (Kuzmits, 2008). Because of these 
constraints, Barakat and Leslie (1996: 152) recommend researchers spread fieldwork over a 
series of short case studies in different locations to reduce the amount of time spent in each 
area. That is what I did. 
 
Flexibility and creativity in adapting research methods 
Research in conflict settings is possible with the right contacts and access through local 
NGOs, and flexibility and creativity in adapting research methodologies (Barakat and Ellis, 
1996; Goodhand, 2000; Wall and Mollinga, 2008). There are many factors though that 
require the attention of the researcher to keep a flexible approach to research methods. The 
research methods I used in Afghanistan differed from the ones I applied in Maluku and from 
those in Central Java. Although I prepared an initial checklist with general topics for semi-
structured interviews to understand local situations and how people deal with their environ-
ment in Afghanistan and Indonesia, I soon realized that I had to adopt different methods for 
different contexts. This had to do with culture, the nature of the conflict, the political 
environment, how local NGO staff is perceived by different actors locally, and whether the 
research would lead to tangible benefits for local people or not.   
 
My fieldwork in Maluku, for instance, took place six years after the violent conflict, which 
raged over Halmahera from 1999 till 2000. When I visited Halmahera in 2006 my first inten-
tion was to understand how and why people living in a (post)conflict zone act as they do, 
and what options they have to shape their life. I had to obtain prior permission from the 
provincial government and the police to be able to enter the southern part of the island, and 
I had to report to military posted in the district. Many people were reluctant to talk about 
the violence when others were present, and I noticed that most people I talked to were still 
in the process of making sense themselves of what actually happened. I decided to forget 
about the checklist and to use oral histories or story-telling as a method to understand how 
people ascribe meaning to events like disasters and conflict, and how to interpret silence or 
distortions in stories (Leydesdorff et al, 1999). To follow-up on the individual oral histories to 
investigate “the conflict setting as inhabited and understood by individuals, households and 
communities” (Boås, et al, 2006: 74), I focused on their coping strategies referred to as 
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‘coping strategy approach’ by Boås. Both methods recognize that people have agency and do 
not passively accept their fate. They actively create ways to deal with adversity. I met with 
Christian and Muslim villagers to hear stories from both sides although I knew in advance5 
that not religion but other issues like land, jobs, ethnicity and transmigration triggered 
violence. However, fear still exists that tensions can become again a vehicle to mobilize 
supporters according to religious lines, hence my interest to get both perspectives.  
 
In Afghanistan, this approach did not work. It was quite difficult to talk to people individu-
ally, since it is the shura (customary village council), or the malik (village head) who is con-
sidered by Afghans the proper institution to represent the villagers to the outside world 
(Johnson and Leslie, 2004). Only in a few occasions I could negotiate time to talk to people 
individually, and maximized my time during breaks, travel or other occasions to talk to 
people informally and in unstructured ways. The ‘coping strategies approach’ was then more 
appropriate than oral histories. Since I am a female researcher I could negotiate access to 
the stories and views of Afghan women and I always requested to organize separate 
meetings with women. The practice was that the meetings with male shura members and 
female shura members were often organised simultaneously, because it is culturally not 
accepted that Afghan women walk in public without male relatives, or attend “public” 
meetings. By organizing both meetings simultaneously in different but nearby localities, 
women could travel with their male relatives, and meet with me. Consequently I had to 
divide my time between the two groups resulting in less in-depth discussions. I accepted this 
constraint, since the benefit of this arrangement was that at least this interactive research 
could fill the gender gap which is unfortunately present in most NGO interventions in 
Afghanistan. In several instances I was invited for tea and lunch inside their houses to discuss 
‘women-things’, leaving the male NGO staff outside who then continued talking with the 
men, if time and security allowed. For such reasons, I preferred to have female translators, if 
possible, since these moments were precious to learn more about the everyday life and 
concerns of Afghan women. Aside from visiting all the villages that were selected for the 
CBDRR-pilots, we also met with the provincial and district authorities to assess the level of 
engagement, commitment and institutional opportunities and constraints.  
 
In specific parts in Indonesia, military and police monitor the movements of NGOs, CSOs and 
foreigners, and the researcher should be alert that they can be present during community 
meetings, especially in localities where mining companies are operating or seek access to 
new exploration sites. At a smaller scale, in villages where the village elite is involved in 
quarrying and logging, local people are intimidated to not oppose these practices, and may 
be reluctant to speak freely. Both in Halmahera and Central Java, I experienced that villagers 
did not feel safe to discuss sensitive issues related to mining and logging, and therefore 
alternative places were arranged to meet outside their villages where they could speak 
freely. Or I checked in advance with community organizers and field staff what issues could 
be discussed and which ones not, since I did not want to upset villagers or destruct the 
community organizing processes. Community organizers would then inform me when time 
was right to discuss these issues openly without fear for repercussions. In most occasions, 
                                                 
5
  Through my work as coordinator at the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, and co-editor of A. Heijmans, N. 
Simmonds and H. van der Veen (Eds), 2004, Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: an overview of conflict prevention and 
peace building activities, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado 
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also NGO field staff and community organizers are target of intimidations like text messages 
with death threats. In this context it is important to raise that in this research the NGOs are 
not the ‘host’ of my research, but ‘partners’ in both the intervention and research part. They 
are committed to engage in complex and politically sensitive processes and are willing to 
take these risks. 
 
‘Do no Harm’ and ‘Do some good’ 
Oral histories and the coping strategies approach aimed to collect data about local realities 
and people’s risk narratives and to understand how they deal with disasters and conflict. 
These interactions between the researcher and local people were non-threatening and 
generated valuable insights (chapter 5). Interactions between local people and the NGO 
staff, including myself, changed as soon as the CBDRR-interventions took off. As I stated in 
chapter 1, CBDRR  interventions should be viewed “as a complex set of historically unfolding 
social encounters and battles over resources and meaning in which spatial and temporal 
dimensions play a role” (Long, 2003: 51). Local people have their motives, agendas and 
understandings about interventions that may differ from the NGO-desired intervention 
process. In a conflict context this implies that researchers and local NGOs should be aware of 
sensitivities that CBDRR interventions can cause among different groups, and apply the ‘do 
no harm’ approach (Anderson, 1999; Goodhand, 2000).  
 
However, it is not always clear from the start how power operates and how relations are 
formed within and beyond villages, to know who are the ‘dividers’ and who are ‘connectors’ 
in the villages, and whose power is reinforced through the CBDRR interventions. I observed 
this in Halmahera where the local partner and I tried to make sense of contradicting stories 
about land disputes between Birinoa, a Christian village, and Togoliua, an adjacent Muslim 
community. These villages got involved in the violent conflict in December 1999. Although 
the violence was organized along religious lines, explanations for violent incidents and 
current tensions point to land disputes between the two villages which go back to the 
transmigration of Muslim families to Togoliua in 19736. Local people in Birinoa complained 
about unclear land borders, and accused people from Togoliua that they intrude their land. 
The people from Togoliua lost their land certificates during the conflict, and left their land 
uncultivated when they evacuated to Ternate. Upon return they reconstructed a specific 
understanding about how adat7 law should be applied in these specific post-conflict 
circumstances. The authorities in Birinoa made up their adat interpretation, which differed 
from the one in Togoliua.  
 
Initially, the local NGO focused on the difference in adat interpretations with the aim to 
solve the land disputes through dialogue and mediation between the villages. While the 
CBDRR-pilot started with collecting more historical, social, institutional and spatial data, 
involving community people from various positions and backgrounds, it became clear that 
individuals from Birinoa informally sold land to individual households from Togoliua for 
personal economic gains without the consent of village authorities. When these everyday 
practices of these individuals were uncovered, the villagers in Togoliua who bought land in 
Birinoa no longer attended meetings and kept silent about the land disputes, while the 
village head and secretary of Birinoa tried to win the NGO support for legitimizing their land 
                                                 
6
 See chapter 5 for the complete background of the violence. 
7
 Adat refers to the set of cultural norms, values, customs and practices found among specific ethnic groups in Indonesia.  
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claim. People’s everyday life consists of multiple realities (Long, 2001: 19) and these are not 
apparent right at the start, but need to be uncovered through the interaction.  
 
Hale (2001: 15) argues that people involved in an interactive research setting “tend to 
provide much more, and much higher quality information when they feel they have an active 
stake in the research process. I agree with Hale that this holds true for the ‘research’ side of 
interactive research, for instance, unravelling contradictory stories about land disputes 
aimed to solve them, and which teach us a lot about the very processes that we try to under-
stand (ibid: 15). I like to add, however, that uncovering contradictions should simultaneously 
consider the consequences for the quality of the interactive side of the research. In case 
contradictions and confrontations lead to polarization of actors, silencing of actors, or when 
the NGO’s interventions are perceived as partial by one group, it is important to maintain 
relationships with all parties. First of all, because it has to be avoided that some villagers 
benefit from the research, while others won’t. Goodhand (2000) warns for being co-opted, 
to be sensitive for the needs and fears of people, to have an awareness of implicit messages 
the NGOs are sending out through the intervention for specific groups, and how it would 
affect tensions or conflict. As researcher and NGO staff, we were aware of these points in 
theory, but it remained a challenge to timely recognize and deal with them in practice.  
 
Goodhand (2000: 13) remarks that there is a need to constantly assess whether the results 
of the research justify the risk involved. “If social learning is the objective and the research is 
likely to lead to tangible benefits to those being researched, the level of acceptable risk may 
be higher than for a more academic research exercise without any planned follow-up” (ibid). 
He refers to the acceptable risks for the researcher and aid agencies who work in conflict 
areas, but acceptable risks are also an issue for the communities involved. They also take 
risks to interact with NGOs and a foreign researcher if they believe the interactive research 
will benefit them, especially in the Afghan context. I view the CBDRR pilot in Herat, western 
Afghanistan, in this light. Goodhand’s and Anderson’s considerations to do no harm were 
also valid for this case, where different ethnic groups and villages competed over natural 
resources and suffered from sandstorms. The NGO recognized and dealt with sensitive issues 
like competing claims on natural resources and facilitated with several villages and 
government institutions a reforestation plan. Since 2009 security dynamics worsened in the 
province with incidental clashes between the Taliban and ISAF troops. The communities 
became a no-go area for me, and this largely affected both the interaction and the research 
part of doing interactive research. As a result, the interaction between me and the 
community took place in the NGO office in the provincial town. Usually the same group of 
villagers would come – both men and women – to update, to discuss and reflect on the 
intervention process and their everyday life experiences. They took the risk to meet me and 
the NGO staff by travelling to provincial capital. The fact that they came to the office every 
time can be interpreted as that the intervention is relevant for them, although I have to 
admit that for several months I doubted whether I was engaged in a fake process or not. I 
missed the ocular visits and other conventional triangulation methods. How could I verify 
what was really going on?  
 
Such circumstances required a creative use of multiple methods and an acceptance of 
certain data gaps. “The use of multiple techniques is not, as in positivist triangulation, to try 
and validate some philosophical notion of absolute truth, but an acknowledgement of the 
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restraints that the circumstances of war put upon the researcher” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996: 
153). I used Google earth to get at least an aerial impression of the environment, and found 
case studies on reducing sandstorms on internet conducted in the same province. I further 
read research reports from the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) about conflicts 
on pasturelands, and landownership and access regulations to natural resources. Together 
with the information in the NGO’s progress reports I formulated sets of questions and 
engaged in e-mail and Skype conversations with the NGO field staff to fill data gaps, 
continue the process of sense-making and ensure internal validity. This remote control kind 
of interactive research felt weird, but it was valued by the NGO and communities. It was not 
only me asking questions to them; they also raised questions about the CBDRR process and 
new developments like what to do to counter a mice infestation which threatened the 
reforested area. We exchanged technical information about pest control that community 
people would test and report back. 
   
Selecting translators 
The best thing to do when working in conflict areas is to learn the local language. From my 
experiences in the Philippines and Nepal I know the importance to be able to understand the 
everyday conversations in the street to pick up signals of threats or fear. This time however, 
it wasn’t possible to learn and speak two new languages. I am aware this is a weakness of 
the research. If this interactive research would have been conducted in one country, I would 
definitely have invested in learning the language. However, considering the short periods of 
time I spent in each country, and the insecurity of not knowing how often I would visit 
Afghanistan, relying on reliable translators was a good alternative. 
 
Over the course of my fieldwork I worked with different translators. In Afghanistan I always, 
except the first time when a male translator was already hired – requested for a female 
translator to get access to both men and women. It is not easy to find a female translator 
since not many women are allowed by their families to travel with a foreigner to rural 
villages. Once we had to accept a mahram, a trusted male accompaniment, to allow her to 
travel with me. She was a medical doctor, born and educated in Pakistan as a refugee, and 
returned to Kabul in 2003. She has been so much protected by her family from the outside 
world that she honestly believed that there was no poverty in Afghanistan. I wondered if she 
would be the appropriate person for being my translator, but she turned out to be a brave 
and curious woman with many aspirations. Her dream was to study surgery to cure Afghan 
women from those diseases, like breast cancer, for which they currently cannot find 
assistance due to the male dominated medical care system. Female surgeons are actually 
not accepted in Afghanistan. Her medical background turned out to be an asset when we 
visited villages and met with the women and children. Her diagnoses, practical advice and 
referral notes were highly welcomed. Witnessing so much ailments and disorders during a 
short visit made me realize why Afghanistan was ranked as the most dangerous place in the 
world for women due to violence, dismal healthcare and poverty8. I felt grateful that my 
translator could bring some relief. My other Afghan translators had also studied or lived 
abroad (US, Germany, and England). They had NGO backgrounds and were familiar with the 
areas where the CBDRR-pilot took place. Important is that these translators were all 
outsiders to local conflict dynamics, and did not interfere in discussions.  
 
                                                 
8
 According to a survey conducted by TrustLaw, an arm of Thomson Reuters. 
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In Indonesia translators came from the local NGOs that were involved in the interactive 
research, but who themselves were not involved in the implementation. They were very 
conscious in separating the translation of what has been said in the discussion, and providing 
their own interpretation. They are or have been researchers themselves and know the art of 
translating, and did not attempt –as far as I could intuitively tell - to conceal or hide any 
sensitive information.  
 
2.4 Shaping the interactive research – “designing the plane while flying it” 
Early 2006, I had many discussions with Evert and Sjoerd of I&K on how to shape the CBDRR 
pilot programme organisationally. Interactive research is often perceived as cooperation 
between the different parties, involving a subject-subject relationship between the re-
searcher and researched subjects, also referred to as inter-subjectivity. However, it was not 
very clear at the start what kind of subjects the various actors were supposed to be (Roose 
and de Bie, 2009). We distinguished four parties: (1) the researcher; (2) the research subjects 
like programme officers of I&K, and local partner NGOs; (3) those who should benefit from 
the research – in this case disaster and conflict affected population; and (4) those who stand 
to benefit from this research, the management and policy makers (ibid: 109).   
 
Evert and Sjoerd insisted from the start that the interactive research should take the 
perspective of local people, and their participation in aid programming as a starting point. 
This means that people’s views, ideas and interests should be acknowledged and recognized 
in the CBDRR pilots. Knowing that the incompatibility between policy and practice is most 
felt in the interaction between local people and NGO field staff, and between the local NGO 
and the donor agency (Quarles van Ufford, 1993: 137), Evert, Sjoerd and me took the 
decision to focus on the local level, and to create subject-subject relationships between the 
researcher and the local NGO staff. The research objects were the CBDRR pilots as a specific 
form of aid intervention, and the manifold ways in which various actors interact – both on 
and off stage – with NGO field staff to shape these CBDRR interventions.  
 
Another subject-subject relationship was formed through the establishment of a Steering 
Group consisting of the researcher and several staff members from the head-office of I&K in 
the Netherlands: Evert and Sjoerd, the concerned staff dealing with the Afghanistan and 
Indonesia programmes, and a part-time coordinator for the CBDRR pilot programme. Later 
representatives from three thematic programmes9 joined the Steering Group. Within the 
Steering Group we discussed our roles. I was assigned to act as facilitator, advisor, capacity 
builder, to keep a critical eye on the whole process and ensure quality of information and 
methodology. The other members of the Steering Group were responsible to communicate 
with selected local partners about the CBDRR pilots, and to use the findings from the CBDRR 
pilots for negotiating different aid practice and policies with their managers and policy-
makers in the head-office. The organizational change agenda was put in the hands of the 
Steering Group: they were the change agents to lobby and influence policy, procedures and 
operational systems with the management and policy-makers. My role as researcher in the 
organizational change process was defined as to explain the methodology applied to 
establish validity and credibility of findings, and to produce and present the field-based 
evidence to the organizations’ management. Whereas the Steering group had frequent 
                                                 
9
  These three themes were ‘Democratization and Peace building’, ‘Access to Basic Services’, and Sustainable and Just 
Economic Development’ 
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meetings with I&K’s managers and policy-makers, my interaction was limited to three times: 
in 2006 to present the research design; mid-2008 to present the interim-findings of the 
CBDRR-pilots, and at the end of this research I presented the conclusions, main findings and 
implications for aid programming.  
 
‘Inter-subjectivity’ is a notion in interactive research to mark the nature of relationship 
between the researcher and the actors involved in the research, which is close because the 
researcher and the researched study a shared reality of aid practice and policy. As a previous 
CBDRR-practitioner working with local NGOs in Asia, I could appeal to the experiences, 
dilemmas and frustrations of local NGO staff, and in this sense I could come close to them as 
researcher. However, I also needed a certain distance when I wrote about their experiences 
and analysed them using a conceptual framework. I do not solely rely on their information, 
since I can use other references which help to enlighten the problems to be solved.  
 
Like an intervention, also an interactive research creates power relations from its inception, 
and also during the process of shaping the research design and its implementation, discus-
sions, debates and conflicts are inevitable. This raises questions concerning positioning and 
roles of the researcher, the institutional politics related to the selection of local partners, 
and negotiating research principles and methods.  
 
2.4.1 Multiple roles and positioning of the researcher 
I was aware of the fact that my role and position as researcher changed according to 
circumstances, institutional context and the roles I was asked to play. To start with my 
positioning in this interactive research, I distinguish three dimensions: (1) the position of the 
researcher vis-à-vis the power-holders and the change-motives of initiators of research; (2) 
the researcher’s own research agenda and change-motives; (3) the position as independent, 
distant outsider, and ‘knowledge broker’. 
 
(1) Position of researcher vis-à-vis research initiators and power holders  
In my case Insiders invited an outside researcher to join the research in collaboration with 
them (Herr and Anderson, 2005). I was part of a Steering Group created within I&K that 
consisted of like-minded people who aim to understand the discrepancy between grassroots 
realities and aid programming and intend to change organizational culture and settings. The 
insiders/outsider team faced a hierarchical power within the organisation. The change-
motive was directed to institutional arrangements within the aid chain. It is important to 
mention that the Steering Group solicited funds for this research from PSO’s capacity-
building programme, an independent source.  
 
(2) Position of researcher as CBDRR-practitioner and reflective insider 
The reason why I agreed to this interactive research was my motivation to reflect on my own 
work experience in Asia. Several research questions came from there. I worked for almost 
eight years with a local partner of I&K in the Philippines. Therefore I could position myself 
partly as insider, particularly at the problem-posing and data-gathering part of the research 
together with the local partners’ field staff in Indonesia and Afghanistan. I brought in 
contextualized knowledge from the Philippines, which I shared with the NGOs’ staff. They 
related this knowledge to their specific contexts and either adapted or criticized it. Their 
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knowledge and experience contributed to valuable discussions, reflections and ideas to look 
at CBDRR interventions differently, while I became aware of my own assumptions.  
 
(3) Position as PhD researcher: independent, distant outsider, and ‘knowledge broker’ 
Although subject-subject relationships were established between the researcher and local 
field staff, my independent position as researcher and distant outsider, allowed me to collect 
views, experiences and opinions of local populations on how they dealt with risk, and who 
were sometimes not (yet) involved in the CBDRR interventions. For instance in Afghanistan, I 
negotiated with local partner NGOs to meet with Afghan women knowing that the NGO did 
not involve them. In central Java, I talked to landless settlers affected by floods but who 
were not yet included in the CBDRR pilot. I could critically reflect on the routines and aid 
practices of field staff, and ‘broker’ the opinions and views from local populations to aid 
practitioners and policy makers. 
 
When writing field visit reports, interim-reviews or chapters for my dissertation, I stepped 
back further and as an outsider I reflected on all practitioners’ actions and reflections taking 
a bird-eye’s view position to interpret the findings, opinions of the different learning cycles, 
policies and documents and to relate them to theories. Ideally, there is mutual dialogue 
between practice and theory during the interactive research process. We studied very 
complex and dynamic problems, which required the mobilization of research expertise from 
various academic disciplines and locations. What could be mobilized locally, we tapped. 
What was not available we tried to broker through contacts, MSc research or literature. In 
this PhD, I focus on theorizing on CBDRR, but making sense of all the interactions and 
dynamics in the varying CBDRR pilots in Afghanistan and Indonesia and relating it to theories 
often goes slower than the social dynamics in the field and practitioners’ demands for 
solutions and answers. It is a challenge to synchronize academic theorizing with social 
engagement.  
 
A second challenge of interactive research is to maintain one’s independence as a 
researcher. In the end it is the researcher who is responsible for the content of the PhD 
dissertation and written products in between. Sometimes I felt that the actors involved in 
the research looked over my shoulders to what I wrote about them. I dealt with this by 
concentrating on how I write about them – in a critical but respectful, emphatic manner – 
and by submitting written pieces about process and reflection outcomes to the Steering 
Group for joint analysis and validation. In case of disagreement, I explained how I arrived at 
a certain interpretation. I opened a genuine dialogue with them, and allowed their perspec-
tives to be expressed. My concern was to keep a balance between being critical and main-
taining and appreciating relationships. As researcher you can be critical to the researched, if 
you show empathy to understand why they did something in a certain way, when you offer 
workable alternatives or solutions, and when you respect practitioners’ expertise (Chisholm, 
1990).  
 
Shifting roles during research process 
During the research process my roles as researcher continuously changed from independent 
observer, facilitator, trainer, advisor, mediator, communicator, sounding board, knowledge-
broker, to researcher. This requires clarity and awareness on when to play which role, and 
the flexibility to change roles. As much as possible I documented the process, the changing 
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roles I played and if possible how others perceived me in these roles. The latter turned out 
to be important to understand their (changed) attitudes towards me or to the CBDRR pilot in 
general. Often these perceptions come out later during a trusted internal environment for 
reflection, or as a surprise when new staff, for instance, articulated prejudiced views on the 
CBDRR pilot.  
 
During the course of the research I attended seminars and workshops about interactive 
research methodologies with WUR researchers like the Community of Practice on 
collaborative research from 2007-2008, and through the Action Research Action Learning 
Interest Group (ARALIG) in 2009 on the politics of interactive research. In this way I sought 
dialogue with peer-researchers to reflect on research encounters, to monitor the quality of 
this research, and to get inspired by new insights. 
 
2.4.2 Selection of local partners to be involved in the CBDRR pilots 
Early 2006 the Steering Group prepared an initial short-list of potential partner NGOs which 
could be interested to join the research, and discussed selection criteria for the CBDRR pilot 
communities. The aim for the first year was to select local partners in Indonesia and Afghani-
stan and to identify communities where to pilot the CBDRR-approach. Local partners were 
oriented on the CBDRR pilot through kick-off seminars and actual visits during 2006, and 
invited to join if they were interested. For this purpose I travelled twice to Afghanistan and 
once to Indonesia. I started with an open mind exploring local and institutional contexts, 
assessing past and current aid practice of local partners, their histories with donors, and 
their interest and willingness to join the CBDRR action-reflection process. I prioritized 
investing in relationships as participant observer, respecting their practice. I did not want to 
immediately engage in developing concrete research plans and arrangements. I presented 
CBDRR as an entry-point to reflect on their practice, on constraints in the aid chain, and to 
reflect on donor policies. Everyone was motivated to have discussions on content and 
concepts instead of talking about finance and reporting. I noticed lots of frustrations, 
particularly among field workers. Table 2.1 lists the local partners involved in the research 
and research localities. 
 
Table2.1 Partners and villages involved in interactive research 
Research partners Localities Duration CBDRR pilots 
Oxfam-Novib: 
Afghan Development Association (ADA) 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(CHA) 
 
- 8 adjacent villages in Nahreen, Baghlan, Afghanistan 
- 3 adjacent villages in Khulm, Balkh, Afghanistan 
 
 
2007 - 2009 
2007 - abandoned 
ICCO (first two also Kerkinactie partners): 
Cooperation Centre for Afghanistan (CCA) 
Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) 
SHEEP 
 
YLSKAR 
YAPHI 
 
- 3 remote villages in Bamiyan, Afghanistan  
- 2 adjacent villages in Ghoryan, Herat, Afghanistan 
- 11 villages along Juwana river + 4 villages on Muria 
Mountain, Pati district, Central Java 
- 4 villages on Muria mountain, Jepara district, Central Java 
- Legal support function to the other NGOs in Central Java 
 
2009 – on-going 
2009 – on-going  
2006 -  on-going  
 
2009 – on-going 
2009 -  on-going 
Kerkinactie: 
YPL 
GMIH-SANRO 
 
- 2 villages on Muria Mountain, Kudus district, Central Java 
- 4 villages in Weda –Gane, Halmahera, Maluku 
- 3 villages in Tobelo district, Halmahera, Maluku 
- 1 village in Buli district, Halmahera, Maluku 
 
2009 – on-going 
2006 – never started 
2009 – 2010 
2009 -  2010 
Total number of villages involved in the pilot: 44 villages (see maps 1, 2 and 3 in front of the book).  
11 villages were abandoned, not because of security reasons or internal village dynamics, but because of decisions of local partner and 
aid chain dynamics between donor and local partners. Chapter 6 will deal with these decisions. 
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Two other partners of Oxfam-Novib were involved in the CBDRR-pilot: IbnSina and BRAC-
Afghanistan. They were part of the whole process but I decided not to include them in this 
PhD thesis, since I considered BRAC-Afghanistan as a foreign NGO, while IbnSina, a public 
health organisation, used CBDRR as an approach to be integrated in their health programme, 
with very promising results though, but beyond the scope of this PhD thesis. Then, local 
partners had to select communities that fulfilled pre-set criteria and were willing to join.  In 
chapter 6, I will elaborate on the politics of selecting the communities for the CBDRR-pilot 
which is considered part of NGO aid practices and object of this research.  
 
2.4.3 Negotiating research principles and methods 
I&K were very strongly adhering to one particular research principle: “real-world research 
requires interventions that do not deviate too much from real world conditions” – according 
to Sjoerd. He meant that in order to improve the aid practice of local partners and project 
staff of both funding agencies, the researcher has to experience the constraints and 
pressures herself to produce relevant and meaningful solutions. The implication was that I 
shouldn’t spend more time in the field than programme officers usually do, meaning that I 
was supposed to visit partners and communities not more than twice a year for a short 
period of time. This was an issue of serious debate within the Steering Group, since I pre-
ferred to stay longer in the field to do more in-depth research as a participant observer. My 
PhD supervisor also attempted to convince the Steering Group about the importance to have 
space and time for doing independent in-depth research, but the principle remained 
unchanged. Whereas a prolonged exposure to local dynamics in villages would have resulted 
in more detailed information about community organizing processes, or NGO field staff prac-
tices of participation, I realized that the many short visits over an extended period of six 
years still enabled me to investigate the interaction between local level institutions with civil 
society groups, and government institutions. I was able to observe some tangible, prelimi-
nary outcomes of political struggles and negotiations among the various CBDRR actors like in 
Herat and Central Java. The limitation of short visits forced me to organize my field visits to 
Indonesia and Afghanistan more effectively, and to adopt a ‘multi-sited fieldwork’ approach 
(Marcus, 1995) along the aid chain tracking ‘CBDRR’ as a new idea and concept.  
 
Multi-sited field work 
In chapter 1, I contextualized CBDRR approaches in evolving development policy and prac-
tice from a historical perspective, and remarked that various interpretations of CBDRR exist 
among actors across nations, embedded in particular state-society configurations. This in-
teractive research explores CBDRR interventions in new contexts involving different actors 
along the aid chain, and is therefore already in itself ‘multi-sited’. This research particularly 
aims to understand why different interpretations of CBDRR exist and how these are opera-
tionalized in practice. In order to answer this question, I adopted a multi-sited approach for 
my fieldwork (Marcus, 1995). Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, and 
conjunctions that are connected through the object of study, and where the researcher es-
tablishes some form of presence (ibid: 105). In multi-sited field work, the researcher can 
follow a specific group of people, the production, processing and consumption of things, or 
the travelling of metaphors, an idea or concept, evolving events like conflicts, or –in this case 
– the translation of CBDRR policy into practice (ibid).  
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For this research, I followed actors in the head offices in the Netherlands to understand their 
construction of concepts like risk, vulnerability and CBDRR, and followed programme officers 
traveling to Afghanistan and Indonesia who explained and espoused new CBDRR policy to 
local partners, and local NGO field staff when they interact with local people. Locally, I 
studied how community people, civil society organizations and government officials con-
structed their meaning of CBDRR and the various concepts, which are embedded in their 
cultural, organizational, historical and even so political environment in which they live and 
operate. “Multi-sited field work is thus always conducted with a keen awareness of being 
within the landscape, and as the landscape changes across sites, the identity of the 
researcher requires renegotiation” (ibid: 112). Moving between sites as researcher required 
changing roles or positions, influenced by the researcher’s affinities for, affiliations with, or 
alienation from those with whom the researcher interacts at different sites. “In certain sites, 
one seems to be working with, and in others – like in Maluku - one seems to be working 
against, changing sets of subjects” (Marcus, 1995: 113).  
 
An exchange visit to the Philippines – countering prejudices, uncovering hidden assumptions 
At the start of shaping this interactive research, I&K proposed to organize an exchange visit 
to Bangladesh or the Philippines. These two countries experience many large and small 
impact disasters, and are known for their various CBDRR-approaches to reduce disaster risk 
(UNISDR, 2004). The Philippines was chosen because I&K wanted to expose its local NGO 
partners from Afghanistan and Indonesia to a kind of CBDRR practice that recognizes the 
political nature of disaster risk reduction. The Philippine experience of the Citizens’ Disaster 
Response Centre (CDRC) served as a source of reference to provide direction for the CBDRR-
pilots.  
 
In November 2008, staff from all local partners NGOs involved in the CBDRR pilot in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia travelled to the Philippines to join a two-week exchange pro-
gramme. Also staff from three local partners in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador joined 
the exchange visit since their experience in CBDRR could also contribute to a valuable 
exchange of experiences. The exchange visit was organized together with the Centre for 
Disaster Preparedness (CDP), CDRC ,I&K, while several local NGOs and government officials 
in Central Luzon and Mindanao hosted field visits. Staff of CDP who were temporarily doing 
advisory work for UNDP in Pakistan, were very instrumental in arranging visa for the Afghan 
participants at the Philippine Embassy in Islamabad, and to get permission from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to travel with Afghan and Indonesian citizens to war-affected parts of 
Mindanao.  
 
The purpose of the visit was to reflect on CBDRR concepts and community organizing 
strategies; to critically reflect on ‘participation’ by actually conducting a participatory risk 
assessment in an urban flood-prone community in Manila, identifying appropriate risk 
reduction measures for that community, and then reflecting on the proposed measures with 
the community. Field visits to both disaster and conflict areas were organized to relate 
observations and reflections on CBDRR practices in the Philippines to the specific contexts in 
their home-countries. The Afghan and Indonesian partners were particular interested in 
understanding people’s risk perceptions and why these can differ among various actors, how 
to link people’s vulnerabilities at the local to macro level root causes, and how to engage 
with local government and other relevant actors.  
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The exchange visit revealed that by ‘doing CBDRR’ in new contexts - like doing a risk assess-
ment with urban poor in Manila - one’s own perceptions and values become more explicit, 
and that these often differ from the perceptions and values of community people. Through 
several real-time exercises, the Afghan and Indonesian NGO staff discovered the value of 
participation, and that local people are able to provide relevant feedback on the staff’s pro-
posed measures. These new practices deviated from their routines at home, and made the 
Afghan and Indonesian staff’s implicit assumptions and tacit knowledge explicit. “In 
Afghanistan we work top-down, because we assume that people are not yet ready to 
participate and take decisions like these urban poor do in Manila”. They looked at the 
“Philippine world of CBDRR” through their contextualized lenses, like I did in their countries. 
“In Indonesia it is not possible to just enter a village without having spoken or getting 
permission from the village head”. By carefully listening to the kind of questions they raised, 
I could learn about the realities in their home-countries and their hidden assumptions.  
 
The exchange of multiple perspectives on CBDRR increased the reflective ability of the whole 
group and made our prejudices explicit. Instead of posing the question “is CBDRR – meaning 
like in the Philippines- applicable in the Afghan and Indonesian context” we asked: “what will 
CBDRR look like in Afghanistan and in Indonesia?”. This may seem an innocent twist in a 
question, but it raised new questions. Questions about how does change happen in each 
context, what do we want to strengthen and what do we challenge through our interactive 
research, whose and which norms and values are inserted, and whose expertise counts?  
 
Visiting the Philippines with a group of foreign CBDRR practitioners confronted me with my 
own conceptualization of CBDRR. I gained a deeper insight in the particularities and context-
specificity of the CBDRR approach. By allowing multiple perspectives on CBDRR and related 
concepts, I was confronted with my own perceptions and prejudices. I increasingly became 
aware that my so-called expert knowledge on CBDRR was not only contextualized but also 
idealised. The multiple reflections during the exchange visit made me realize to change my 
idealized image of CBDRR into a more naturalistic approach, emphasizing the unknown and 
unpredictability of current and future social dynamics in the selected CBDRR pilot areas. 
Instead of an ‘expert interpretation’ of CBDRR, I let its meaning emerge in the Afghan and 
Indonesian contexts. During the course of this interactive research I changed from a true 
CBDRR believer to someone questioning my own CBDRR practice in the Philippines.  
 
The exchange visit further produced hope and inspiration for particularly the Afghans who 
visited conflict-affected and displaced communities in Mindanao, and observed how CBDRR 
could prepare people to prevent or reduce violence, and to report human rights and 
ceasefire violations through grassroots networks using text-messaging. The Indonesians 
returned home with more confidence10, taking with them many creative ideas for risk 
mapping, community organizing, and community exchange visits, which they applied in their 
CBDRR-pilot areas. Later, I noticed that the exchange visit had been instrumental for Afghan 
and Indonesian partners to open up to me, as researcher, in sharing their dilemmas.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This is what they expressed to me after they returned home. 
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2.5 Quality criteria for interactive research  
Herr and Anderson (2005) searched for a definition of ‘validity’ that suits the nature of 
interactive research methodologies, which differs from how ‘validity’ is defined in positivist 
or constructivist research traditions, because researchers involved in interactive research are 
interested in outcomes that go beyond knowledge generation. Herr and Anderson offered a 
variety of criteria that are frequently cited and summarized in literature on action research 
and collaborative research methodologies. Using their overview, I distilled the following five 
quality criteria for this interactive research dealing with (1) the achievement of the CBDRR 
pilot outcomes, (2) relevance for local settings, (3) the quality of reciprocal relationships, (4) 
the usefulness of the CBDRR pilots for future aid programming, and (5) whether new 
knowledge was produced.  
 
These quality criteria supported the researcher in observing the research process, its 
outcomes and the research quality. Triangulation in interactive research refers to the 
inclusion of multiple perspectives to guard against viewing events in a simplistic or self-
serving way (Herr and Anderson, 2005: 56). Together with the local partners, except 
SANRO11, I reflected on these criteria and whether they were met or not. 
 
(1) Objectives of the interactive research are achieved - ‘outcome validity’ 
According to the local NGOs involved in the CBDRR pilot programme, the objectives were 
achieved in terms of learning and changing their aid practice from separating emergency 
relief and development work, towards acknowledging different risk perspectives and the 
role of institutions in their on-going programmes, except in Halmahera and Khulm. All 
partners, except in Halmahera, adopted CBDRR into their organizational policies and 
strategic plans for aid programming. This is an indicator that they appreciated the piloted 
approach and its relevance for the local contexts. “Even if CBDRR will not become formal 
policy of I&K, we will continue with CBDRR in current and new areas of operation” 
expressed by the Muria Coalition members.  
 
At the level of the funding agencies, CBDRR has been accepted by Oxfam-Novib as a 
relevant strategy to improve the humanitarian capacity of its local partners in Afghani-
stan, and it developed a policy paper on DRR in conflict situations elsewhere. I&K, 
however, did not yet formulate a DRR policy paper. Despite many attempts of the 
Steering Group to discuss the CBDRR pilot programme within its organizations, a genuine 
interest among individual managers and policy-makers exists, but it did not crystalize into 
new policy. I&K regard themselves as development organizations, and still view CBDRR as 
being part of the humanitarian programme, despite the intentions of the Steering Group 
to mainstream CBDRR in development programmes.  
 
More specifically, I&K aimed to improve its downward accountability through CBDRR, 
using criteria like ‘needs-based interventions’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, and 
‘resilient communities’. This research revealed that these criteria confront us with a chal-
lenge: the CBDRR-interventions were never completely ‘needs-based’, ‘participation’ of 
the most vulnerable was a challenge because of its boundaries set by social norms and 
values, ‘resilience’ as a concept was not really used, whereas ‘empowerment’ did happen 
                                                 
11
 SANRO was contacted about the researcher’s visit to Indonesia in September 2011 and also I&K staff in Indonesia 
attempted to arrange a meeting to reflect on the whole research. Unfortunately, SANRO did not reply.  
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in various degrees. What does this mean? Is downward accountability as an idea pro-
blematic, or did we select the wrong criteria? Possibly both. The criteria we proposed 
rather matched with the idealistic logframe model expressing a desirability and manage-
ability of social change (Quarles van Ufford, 1993). This research focused on the lowest 
level of the aid chain where local NGOs interacted with various social actors, on and off 
stage, viewing the interaction as ‘a political arena’ with unpredictable outcomes. Knowing 
the incompatibility between the logframe and the political arena model, we should have 
selected criteria that recognize complexity, connections, and the non-linear nature of in-
terventions. This is an unexpected insight with implications for aid agencies to measure 
downward accountability differently, and to be clearer about to whom they are account-
able.  
 
(2) Results are relevant for the local settings -‘local validity’.  
The CBDRR-pilots were implemented through action-reflection cycles to make sense of 
what happened locally and why the CBDRR process evolved as it did. Through the inter-
actions between community organizers and various local actors, risk problems emerged 
from a particular context, and appropriate solutions were negotiated for. This quality 
criterion refers not only to the relevance and appropriateness of the research outcomes 
for local settings, but it also refers to whether all parties who had a stake in the CBDRR-
process were involved (Herr and Anderson, 2005). The key actors in this research were 
the NGO field staff and community organizers, and they expressed that the research 
findings – both the practical insights from ‘doing CBDRR’ and the revisited concepts – 
were relevant for them, and for the local settings. In terms of CBDRR intervention 
outcomes, which are of a different level, it depends on whom you ask. The board of the 
local partner NGO in Halmahera did not appreciate the CBDRR-approach for its slow and 
politically sensitive nature, and as a result the research outcomes were not found 
relevant. Also the local people from the five downstream villages in Khulm did not 
appreciate the intervention outcomes, while the NGO field staff learned from their initial 
short-sightedness, and may improve their future performance.  
 
(3) Findings are result of reflexive cycles, reciprocal relationships and reciprocal adequacy – 
‘internal validity’. This criterion has been complied with as I elaborated in this chapter, 
although the creation of reciprocal relationships, a precondition for joint reflections and 
sense-making, took in Indonesia about two to three years to happen, considering that I 
visited local partners only twice a year. I assumed to regularly reflect on the NGO’s 
practice, using a set of practical cycles that I developed for that purpose to analyse the 
interactions within villages, between community people and field staff, and between field 
and management staff. It was only in 2009 when local partners were willing to openly 
reflect on their performance and practice, after they realized that ‘CBDRR’ wasn’t part of 
new donor policy pushed on them. They started to share their insights learned which they 
hadn’t shared with me during previous visits. They did use my practical cycles for internal 
reflections. Since then we exchanged views and experiences jointly, on community 
organizing and strategies for change at the village level, we shared different kinds of 
knowledge to analyse problems and to find ways to deal with them. They expressed that 
they appreciated such discussions, because they are about content instead of project 
management and reports. So, although I did not stay for long periods in the field as 
researcher, I did develop a prolonged engagement with the local NGOs and the respective 
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staff in the headquarters through feedback reporting, e-discussions and later on through 
Skype-meetings that occurred in between the actual visits. In Halmahera the reciprocal 
relationships established with the field staff came under threat, which resulted in partial 
reflections which undermined the internal validity of the research findings of this case.  
 
For Oxfam-Novib, I worked with local partners through short-term research contracts 
which lasted till 2009. Our relationships were good, but I realized afterwards that they 
were not based on reciprocity. While I met with Oxfam-Novib’s partners in Afghanistan 
during a workshop organized by ICCO’s partners in April 2009 and discussed with them 
CBDRR updates and reflections, the relationship with the head office’s staff had ended, 
both formally and informally. No interest existed anymore in the progress of this 
research, or what I did with the data and analysis of the CBDRR experiences of its Afghan 
partners. When reciprocal relationships end or do not exist, the practice of double 
hermeneutics becomes problematic, and affects the internal validity of interactive 
research. 
 
In the course of the interactive research I further experienced that my interaction with 
the various local NGOs differed significantly from intensive interactions about CBDRR-
practice and coming up with new meanings of concepts, to a minimal form of interaction 
to basically understand what was going on locally. Some NGO staff are not well-versed to 
outsiders, and extra efforts were required to allow them to express their thoughts, and 
for me to understand them, valuing their contributions equally as the other NGOs with 
whom it was easier to relate. It is tempting to validate findings with only those who are 
well-versed, but reliability of data interpretation required the engagement of all, and not 
necessarily all at the same time. The last round of validation was done by purposely 
visiting and Skyping the NGOs separately to allow them to speak freely without comments 
of other NGOs. 
 
(4) Reorienting, focusing and energizing the actors involved towards knowing reality in order 
to transform practices - ‘Catalytic validity’. During the CBDRR-pilots and reflection 
workshops I observed a spiralling change in the field staff’s understanding of local 
realities. They reflected on their practice and started doing things differently, did not only 
gain a better understanding of how interventions interact with social systems, they also 
gained skills on how to interact differently. Comparing the first introductory workshops 
on CBDRR with the reflection sessions after two-three years, field staff espoused their 
CBDRR practice differently in terms of diversity in risk perceptions, of changing the 
hazard-viewpoint into a more structural, institutional viewpoint. Also my understanding 
about CBDRR changed, especially due to the reflections on the Afghan pilots. I was 
amazed how local staff could transform my inputs that were initially based on the 
Philippine experience, to the Afghan situation. The exchange visit to the Philippines 
generated inspiration and changed understandings as well. Describing local settings as 
political arenas, generated the most energy among community organizers as if their 
efforts and challenges got formally recognized by the NGO management staff. Despite the 
challenging political CBDRR arenas, the NGOs intend to apply the CBDRR approach in 
other localities, like in Aceh, because they view it as a viable and relevant approach to 
find durable solutions. Equipped with new insights and skills, they can apply these in 
other localities where they will work in the future. This is referred to as catalytic validity. 
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This notion is also discussed under the term ‘trans-contextual credibility’, referring to the 
actor who seeks to make an application of the newly defined concept elsewhere (Herr 
and Anderson, 2005).  
 
(5) New knowledge is generated for both practice and theory –‘dialogic validity’ 
Although this research is basically practice-driven, interim findings and experiences were 
tested with academic literature, related to on-going theoretical debates, and presented 
and debated during conferences, while experiences with an interactive research 
methodology were tested in workshops with WUR researchers involved in interactive 
research, like the Community of Practice on collaborative research from 2007-2008, and 
through the Action Research Action Learning Interest Group (ARALIG) in 2009 on the 
politics of interactive research. In this way I sought dialogue with peer-researchers to 
monitor the quality of this research. I emphasized to value scientific theory-driven 
knowledge equally as practitioners knowledge, and at the end of this research I realized 
that interactive research is not only about knowledge production for both theory and 
practice, but also about different ways of knowing that are blended into a new way of 
perceiving and understanding local contexts and aid practices. The concluding chapter 
presents how knew insights led to revisited CBDRR concepts and specific meanings of 
CBDRR in different contexts, as well as what this knowledge means for aid practices 
through formulating several implications for aid practitioners and policy-makers. 
 
Reflecting on the whole research process, I regard the establishment of reciprocal 
relationships and maintaining these, as one of the most crucial criterion for interactive 
research, because it is a precondition for complying with the other criterion to achieve 
results that are valid and meaningful. Because of reciprocal relationships, local partners and 
the Steering Group of I&K challenged my thinking and remained critical to my texts and 
interpretations, which I defended or adjusted according to their arguments. In this way we 
dealt with multiple perspectives, partiality and preconceived judgment, and produced 
findings that were not just ‘right’ but ‘meaningful’.  
 
2.6 Limitations of the research 
One limitation has been raised in chapter 1, and refers to the decision to focus on the level 
of the aid chain where local NGOs interact with disaster and conflict affected populations, 
government officials and other local actors, since this is the level where the incompatibility 
between policy and practice is felt most, according to Quarles-van Ufford (1993), and 
because local people’s perspectives were regarded as leading and important. This choice 
was a deliberate one. The common approach to study aid practices in disaster and conflict 
settings is to focus on people’s livelihoods taking the household as unit for analysis, followed 
by recommendations for humanitarian aid workers. These studies then tend to become thin 
about the interactions between local people and aid workers, and the social- political 
relationships that start to emerge when aid interventions are brought in. Particularly in 
CBDRR literature, handbooks and policy documents this interaction is often romanticized 
and therefore I focused more on this level than on the interactions and power dynamics 
within villages. Consequently I focused on how social-political relationships and interven-
tions generate, reduce or reproduce people’s social, political and institutional vulnerability 
to disasters and conflict, leaving out the economic and material dimensions, which are 
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interrelated and important as well. Practical limitations were caused by local security 
situations, particularly in Afghanistan, that prevented me staying long in a village. 
 
If I could do the research again, I would do the research in one country, reduce the number 
of communities and local NGOs, and extend the aid chain to include the higher levels of the 
aid chain and to have more time to engage with directors, policy-makers and programme 
staff. I could have better explained the multiple realities of local NGOs and funding agencies, 
which contribute to the discrepancy between CBDRR policy and practice, which now 
remained thin in this research. Because of the short length of the field visits, I could not 
really engage with local government to better understand their life world. I relied on 
interviews with them, and on the reflections of the local NGOs involved.  
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3.    Disasters as an opportunity for social change 
CBDRR in the Philippines: experiences to organize effective agency for risk reduction 
 
“Within minutes after any major impact, disasters start becoming political”  
Olson, 2000: 266 
 
 
The Indian Ocean tsunami, the earthquake in Kashmir, Hurricane Katrina, cyclone 
Nargis in Burma and the earthquake in Haiti are recent examples of how major disas-
ters influence national and international politics. These disasters highlight the im-
portance of the political context in which they happen. The occurrence of disasters 
and the way relief is handled do involve politics, and impact on state-society rela-
tions (Watts, 1983; Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984; Pelling & Dill, 2009). The incapacity 
of the state to respond adequately to major disasters can create opportunities for 
political action and social change. The question is for whom and in what way?  
 
Disaster events and their management are part of unfolding political histories. 
Bankoff (1999) argues that the frequency and magnitude of past disasters exacer-
bated the extreme differences in power and wealth in Philippine society favouring 
the elite few. Solnit (2009) refers to different cases in Latin and North America where 
disasters have led to the reordering of political power. She points to elite panic after 
disasters, who in fear of social unrest – even when people pull together acting in a 
sphere of post-disaster solidarity – take repressive measures towards disaster vic-
tims. Klein (2007) goes a step further by stating that governments and business con-
sciously take advantage of disaster events and manipulate post-disaster recovery 
processes in favour of the vested interests. The question is if disasters could ever 
lead to social change that benefits marginalized, poor and vulnerable people.  
 
Pelling and Dill (2009) conclude that disaster shocks do open political space for the 
contestation or concentration of political power. They argue that the moments that 
people’s rights are claimed or denied can be seen as potential tipping points for 
political change. In this light this chapter examines the politics of disaster events and 
their management in the Philippines through the experienced history of the Citizens’ 
Disaster Response Centre (CDRC) based in Manila. CDRC developed its Citizenry-
Based and Development-Oriented Disaster Response (CBDO-DR) approach amidst 
oppositional politics since the 1970s, when the people’s social movement contested 
President Marcos’ dictatorship. The case shows the importance of viewing disaster 
risk reduction as a political process – considering the history of state-society relation-
ships, power dynamics, politics and the broader institutional context - to change 
patterns of authority and relations with the government in favour of disaster-
affected citizens. CDRC and related civil-society groups increasingly were able to use 
the opening of political spaces to engage with government to influence institutions 
and policy to positively affect people’s safety and protection, despite the ways the 
Philippine government and business take advantage of disasters to strengthen their 
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vested interests. People’s successes at the local level, however, remain small and are 
not necessarily sustainable.  
 
The chapter aims to uncover the political meaning CDRC attaches to its Citizenry-
Based Development-Oriented approach to disaster management. I will do this by 
first reviewing how CDRC shaped its CBDO-DR tradition within the historical context 
of oppositional state-society relations. Secondly, I will elaborate on how CDRC and its 
network engage with other actors like the government in the political arena of disas-
ter risk reduction and responding to violent conflict, how they organize effective 
agency of vulnerable sectors, and whether this is indeed effective or not. It is in this 
broader institutional context that its Citizenry-Based Development-Oriented ap-
proach got its political meaning, and therefore the last section of this chapter will 
discuss the CBDO-DR concepts defined as embedded in the specific cultural and 
political historical context of the Philippines.  
 
3.1 Making sense of my CBDO-DR experience in the Philippines 
From 1993 till 2001, I worked as a field officer in the Field Operations Department of 
CDRC. My initial task was to improve CDRC’s monitoring and evaluation system with 
the purpose to make CDRC’s aid interventions more effective and appropriate. Over 
time, my tasks expanded to include project management, capacity building of net-
work-members and I contributed to policy development. I recorded notes from field 
visits, office meetings and reflections on my work experiences. In March 2007 I re-
turned to the Philippines to review, with selected leading practitioners, the evolution 
of the CBDO-DR approach of the Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre since its incep-
tion in the 1970s. This was done through interviews, and several field visits to 
communities and local member organisations of the network. During this visit I also 
searched through archives of CDRC and a selected number of Regional Centres, 
particularly proceedings of network consultations, CBDO-DR assessment reports, and 
policy documents. Six years after I left CDRC, I was able to return to the places and 
people who inspired me and shaped my view on pro-active disaster response strate-
gies from the perspective of local communities. I knew that most of them have left 
CDRC, and took on positions elsewhere: at the Centre for Disaster Preparedness 
(CDP) in Manila, at International NGOs, at UNDP, at ECHO or within the people’s 
mass movement, while some staff from the regions moved to CDRC. Because staff 
moved to other positions outside CDRC, they were more open to reflect on the 
CBDO-DR-approach and practice. I could not only complete the official narrative of 
the CBDO-DR approach, but was able to make sense of the hidden narratives I heard 
during the everyday interaction with my office-mates in the Field Operation Depart-
ment before 2001.  
 
3.2 CBDO-DR in the Philippines: historical roots of citizens’ responses to disasters 
The Philippines is located at the centre of typhoon, tectonic and volcanic belts, while 
people’s vulnerability is compounded by widespread poverty rooted in the country’s 
socio-economic, political and environmental context (CDRC, 1992). According to 
Bankoff (1999) disaster occurrence in the Philippines has been one of the ordering 
elements shaping state-society relations over centuries. He argues that the fre-
quency and magnitude of past disasters in the country exacerbated the extreme 
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differences in power and wealth in Philippine society. The majority of poor and 
marginalized people live below subsistence level suffer from recurrent disasters, 
adopting coping strategies which often undermine the basis of future livelihoods. 
The elite and powerful few, on the other hand, take advantage of disaster events, 
diverting relief and reconstruction funds for their own benefit and to consolidate or 
enhance their financial and political position in society (Bankoff, 1999: 408). The 
government is further responsible for destructive environmental practices such as 
deforestation, extracting mineral resources through open-pit-mining and consequent 
pollution of river basins. These human-induced changes contribute to the increasing 
number of disasters like landslides and floods, affecting poor and marginalized peo-
ple. Environmentally irresponsible practices by powerful persons not only contribute 
to the increasing incidence of floods, landslides and displacement of local communi-
ties, but also to maintaining the status quo of huge social inequalities within Philip-
pine society. Delica (1997) suggests that the Philippine government seems to nurture 
the causes of people’s vulnerability instead of reducing disaster vulnerability. 
 
Because of these inequalities, the Philippines have a long history of contested state-
society relations, with a ‘tradition’ of peasant struggle, social protests and opposi-
tional politics. The origin of the Filipino CBDO-DR tradition should be understood 
within this context of oppositional politics, and can be traced back to the early 1970s 
when peasant organisations and students took the initiative to render support to 
peasants affected by floods in Central Luzon. Relief goods were generated among 
peasants who were not affected by floods and distributed to those who were in 
need. Students, church-based social action workers and the academic community 
supported these initiatives which were ad hoc, and channelled through so-called 
People’s Organisations (POs) (Vargas, 1996, Luna, 2001). These are community-
based organisations, and in the Philippine context organized along sectoral lines, 
representing peasants or workers, and later fisher folk, women, indigenous people 
and urban poor at the grassroots level.  
 
Ad hoc citizens’ responses to disaster survivors started at the time when president 
Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, and when human rights were increasingly vio-
lated, fuelling the contradictions within Philippine society (Lubi, 1992). Ordinary 
people and disaster survivors complained and criticized how the government 
handled disasters during the Martial Law years. Government responses were often 
insufficient, inappropriate, driven by favouritism excluding legitimate victims, and 
lacked coordination. Disaster management had a low priority in the government’s 
budget as most of the budget went to allocations to the military and servicing of 
foreign debt. Violation of human rights continued. The assassination of Benigno 
“Ninoy” Aquino, a leading oppositionist, in August 1983 was a trigger to transform 
small fragmented movements into a massive unified one, including people from all 
walks of Filipino life.  
 
This process of a growing people’s social movement coincided with a series of severe 
disasters hitting the country: a severe drought affecting the country’s agricultural 
production in 1982-83, followed by six successive typhoons in 1984, killing about 
2,500 people and rendering more than 280,000 families homeless. In September of 
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the same year Mayon Volcano erupted, affecting more than 35,000 families in Bicol 
region. The Government’s response was negligible, raising the anger of not only the 
affected population, but also of concerned citizens. The disasters fuelled people’s 
protests to express their growing discontent with the increasingly oppressive Marcos 
administration (Heijmans & Victoria, 2001).  
 
Affected peasants and urban poor approached so-called cause-oriented groups com-
posed of the churches, people’s organisations, student-unions, and concerned 
progressive individuals for assistance. As a result, a “Support Disaster Victims Cam-
paign” was launched from October 1984 until July 1985. Its aim was to mobilize and 
unite the greatest number of people, particularly in the urban centres and Metro 
Manila to generate financial, material, technical and human resources to support the 
people in disaster affected areas, especially in the rural areas where there was no 
ready access to basic social services. The positive experience of working together in 
relief gave rise to the idea of institutionalizing a so-called “citizenry-based and 
development-oriented” approach to disaster response, in short CBDO-DR. The Citi-
zen’s Disaster Response Network started in 1985 with two NGOs: the Citizens’ 
Disaster Response Centre (CDRC)1 in Manila and Tarabang Para sa Bicol (TABI)2 in 
Bicol region. The network expanded to other regions nation-wide and was formally 
launched as the Citizen’s Disaster Response Network in 1989.   
 
3.2.1 Social movements, framing collective action and a neutral image 
People’s discontent alone will not automatically result in collective action to chal-
lenge authorities (Snow, 2004). Snow argues that if a social movement should get off 
the ground, “social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable 
must come to seem unjust and mutable” (Snow, 2004: 383). CDRC relates to 
similarly-minded organisations, including grassroots communities through People’s 
Organisations, referred to as the people’s mass movement. In this network CDRC 
provided meaning to disaster events and experiences around them in Philippine 
society to convince grassroots communities that disasters are not natural, but a 
matter of vulnerability for which the Philippine government is held responsible. 
Further, CDRC had to convince them that they have agency and capacities to change 
their situation, and show how this could be done through collective action. Equally 
crucial for CDRC was to create a neutral image because president Marcos’ dictator-
ship had not yet ended.  
 
Community-based or citizenry-based? 
The CDRC belongs to the so-called progressive NGOs who are affiliated to the 
broader people’s mass movement. Hilhorst (2003) and Lubi (1992) provide a detailed 
historical analysis of how NGOs and mass organisations developed in the Philippines 
inspired by the upsurge of liberation movements worldwide as a reaction to failed 
development strategies. Churches in particular were active in adopting progressive 
ideas, moving from traditional welfare projects to social action. One of the first NGOs 
                                                     
1
  In 1991, the year that Mt Pinatubo erupted, CDRC changed its name from Citizens’ Disaster Rehabilitation 
Center to Citizens Disaster Response Center, meaning that its response consists of preparedness, relief, 
rehabilitation, mitigation and development work.  
2
  In 2009 TABI changed its name from Tabang para sa mga Biktima sa Bikol – “Support for the victims in Bicol 
province” to Tarabang Para sa Bicol – deleting the victims from its name. 
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involved in organizing peasant communities, and which took initiatives to support 
disaster survivors in the early 1970s, was the Philippine Ecumenical Action for 
Community Empowerment (PEACE). It used its church-network and the organized 
peasant sector as a venue to provide relief. During the early years of Martial Law, 
when Marcos closed all ways for legal protest, forcing all legal mass organisations to 
go underground, only the historically traditional institutions such as the church and 
trade-unions were allowed some leeway in legal organizing (Lubi, 1992: 25).  
 
CDRC was formed during Martial Law, and in order to openly support disaster 
affected communities, it had to adopt a neutral outlook. At that time, civil-society 
organisations came out with alternative perspectives to achieve the goal to change 
the political scene (Luna, 2011). Some groups aimed to change the social system, 
while others targeted to change the political leadership, and also methodologies 
varied from violent revolution to more reformist strategies of non-violent confronta-
tion (ibid). In this context, the notion ‘community-based’ had a political connotation 
meaning ‘anti-government’. High government officials labelled, and still label, pro-
gressive NGOs like CDRC as sympathizers of those favouring the violent revolution 
option. These labels provide the military tacit approval to kill the government’s 
political opponents (Amnesty International, 2006). To reduce the risk of government 
harassment or of being forced to work underground, the people establishing CDRC 
framed their approach ‘citizenry-based’ instead of ‘community-based’.  
 
‘Citizenry-based’ is explained as adhering to moral duty and solidarity among citizens 
to help each other, recognizing that local people have agency and capacities to deal 
with crisis and to overcome it. ‘Citizenry-based’ further expresses the partnership 
between the vulnerable and less vulnerable sectors – called the middle forces in the 
language of the people’s mass movement3. The less vulnerable sectors are able to 
contribute resources like finances, leadership, technical skills, intellectual thinking 
and material resources which are much needed to sustain the movement to achieve 
its vision of a just, democratic and peaceful society. This explanation for the term 
citizenry-based was acceptable for a wide range of outside actors. Initially, the 
citizenry-based approach proceeded pragmatically, but gradually gained meaning. 
‘Citizenry-based’ is a distinguishing feature of CDRC’s approach compared to other 
CBDRR-traditions, emphasizing that communities at risk require partnerships among 
a wide range of actors in society to reduce their vulnerability.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, the concept of Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction 
had become a generally accepted approach by the international community and the 
Philippine government. Additionally, CDRN’s community organizers increasingly 
critiqued the notion of ‘citizenry’. They argued that the notion of ‘citizen’ can refer to 
anybody, masking power differentials. In the field, community organizers had to 
solve this internal contradiction. They understood the meaning of ‘community-
based’ as putting premium on organizing the marginalized segments in the commu-
                                                     
3
  The people’s mass or social movement refers here to the National Democratic Front (NDF), which was formed 
in 1973 to bring down president’s Marcos dictatorship. The NDF is a coalition of left political parties like the 
Communist Party of the Philippines, churches, agricultural unions, trade unions, and other related groups in the 
Philippines, including the NPA. In 1993, the NDF split in different factions.  
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nity, since this refers to their day-to-day work. This interpretation stems from the 
tradition of the people’s mass movement that time to start labelling practices alter-
native to those of the government as ‘community-based’, like Community-Based 
Health Programs, and Community-Based Coastal Resource Management, referring to 
self-reliance, building local capacities and recognizing local people’s  perspectives. In 
2001, CDRC decided to change the CBDO-DR-label into Community-Based Disaster 
Management (CBDM).  
 
The difference between ‘citizenry’ and ‘community’ can be dismissed as merely 
wordplay, yet it brought out a fundamental question of how CDRC situates itself vis-
a-vis the poor. In CDRC’s view ‘community-based’ refers to the agency and capacities 
of the neediest, deprived, least served and poorest segments in a village, whose 
socio-economic conditions make them highly vulnerable to hazards and disasters. 
‘Community’ here does not necessarily refer to the whole village, or a village 
administration unit. Rather, it refers to a particular group of people facing up to the 
difficulty of surviving in adversity, and who find themselves committed to contri-
buting time and resources to change societal structures locally and beyond their 
community. ‘Citizenry-based’ on the contrary, got a more liberal meaning, since it 
could refer to any citizen affected by disaster, whether very vulnerable or not 
vulnerable at all. ‘Citizenry-based’ neutralized politics and the power differences 
between citizens. 
 
3.2.2 Framing and re-framing CBDO-DR policy in a dynamic environment 
CDRC framed and re-framed its CBDO-DR policy strategically to manage relationships 
with different actors in a changing political environment. ‘Frames’ refer to how 
people use language to give meaning and coherence to events and experiences 
around them, and how they use language as discursive means to shape people’s 
beliefs, their acceptance of the status quo, and defines what is normal and what isn’t 
(Gaventa, 2006). CDRC frames its CBDO-DR narrative by blending scientific 
knowledge, political interests and cultural patterns. During the years I worked within 
the Field Operations Department of CDRC, I noticed that CDRC staff shifts between 
frames during department meetings and field visits. We talked ‘people’s mass move-
ment’ language when internally discussing the dilemma of prioritizing organizing 
work for social change vis-à-vis improving people’s livelihoods through social and 
economic projects. When writing proposals, we used language from disaster 
management literature, foregrounding CDRC’s political view on ‘disaster’ and 
‘vulnerability’, which provides CDRC with a distinctive identity and mandate to the 
network, and a framework to communicate with donors. Humanitarian language is 
used tactically vis-à-vis government forces and the military to create access to disas-
ter and conflict affected communities. Multiple frames are used strategically at the 
same time (Hilhorst, 2003).  
 
It took CDRC several years to frame and re-frame its CBDO-DR policy. In 1993 CDRC 
produced its first policy document to present its CBDO-DR policy to the wider public 
(CDRC, 1993). Over time, CDRC adjusted this policy document due to a changing con-
text, or created new frames to enhance the mobilization of resources. Nonetheless, 
a core set of values can be detected (Heijmans & Victoria, 2001):  
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(1)   It views disasters primarily as a question of people’s vulnerability;  
(2)   It recognizes people’s existing capacities and aims to strengthen these 
capacities;  
(3)   It seeks to contribute to addressing the roots of people’s vulnerability and to 
transforming or removing the structures generating inequity and underdevelop-
ment;  
(4)   It considers people’s participation essential to disaster management;  
(5)   It puts a premium on the organisational capacity of the vulnerable sectors 
through the formation of grassroots disaster response organisations;  
(6)   It mobilizes the less vulnerable sectors into partnership with the vulnerable  
sectors in disaster management and development work.  
 
In the next section I discuss how these values are embedded in the dynamic political 
context of the Philippines with recurring disasters and conflict, and how CDRC 
blended this experienced reality with scientific knowledge and Philippine culture to 
cope with adversity.  
 
Feature 1: views disasters as a question of people’s vulnerability 
When I started working with CDRC in 1993, the coordinator of the Field Operations 
Department gave me the following publications, and asked me to read them in order 
to understand CDRC’s view on disasters and the purpose of its operations: “Taking 
the naturalness out of natural disasters” (O’Keefe et al., 1976), “Disasters and 
Development” (Cuny, 1983), “Natural disasters: Acts of God or acts of Man?”  
(Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984) and “Rising from the Ashes” (Anderson & Woodrow, 
1989). These authors were very important in framing CDRC’s alternative agenda 
using disaster studies language to legitimize CDRC’s practice and directions to both 
the people’s mass movement and foreign donors.  
 
‘Vulnerability’ is the key-concept of CDRC, borrowing its definition from Anderson 
and Woodrow (1989). CDRC interprets vulnerability as conditions and interdepend-
ent processes interacting between global and local level, which adversely affects the 
ability of people to respond, to cope with or to recover from the damaging effects of 
disaster events. CDRC uses the term ‘vulnerability’ to help local communities under-
stand the Philippine disaster situation and the reasons why they are vulnerable, 
using methods of critical consciousness raising. In 1986, CDRC published ‘The Philip-
pine Disaster Situation: a Question of Vulnerability’, which explains why Filipinos are 
vulnerable to disasters, substantiated by government’s statistics and reports. This so-
called ‘National Situationer’ served as a means to raise the awareness of communi-
ties at risk to convince them that disasters are not natural, but occur due to injus-
tices in Philippine society, and that they themselves can change this. Raising people’s 
awareness is to convince people that “...Reducing the vulnerability of the poor is a 
development question, and such question should be answered politically” (Cuny, 
1983: 7). This differs from the CBDRR traditions which emerged later during the late 
1990s among the INGOs and UN-community, which limit awareness-raising to disas-
ter risks and what to do in case of an emergency (Chapter 4). 
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In the mid-1990s, CDRC included ‘development-induced disasters’ in its definition of 
‘disaster’ giving it the term ‘development aggression’ which cause-oriented NGOs 
already used during Marcos’ time (Lubi, 1992). During Fidel Ramos’ presidency (1992 
- 1998), development projects resulted in increasing numbers of displaced communi-
ties, due to mining operations, construction of power plants and hydro-electric 
dams, plantations, and demolition of urban slum areas to give way to shopping 
centres and infrastructure. Local people perceive ‘development aggression’ as worse 
than typhoons or floods, since they lose not only crops or livestock but also their 
homes, land, livelihoods, and development aggression further negatively affects 
their identity and roots (Heijmans, 2004). Through the frame of ‘development 
aggression’ CDRC was able to organize and mobilize “effective agency through the 
actions of a chain of agents” (Latour, 1986) ranging from human rights activists to 
environmentalists, lawyers, economic experts, students, and local people who were 
directly affected. This broader mass base could also be mobilized in support to 
communities affected by natural hazards, because the cause of both natural and 
man-made disasters is believed to be similar, i.e. inadequate and biased disaster 
management policies and practice of the Philippine government. With more actors 
involved, CDRC and its members could become more effective in advocacy and 
lobbying at the national level.  
 
Feature 2: recognizes people’s existing capacities and aims to strengthen these 
capacities 
Despite people’s vulnerabilities, the history of CDRC proves that people still have 
capacities and are not helpless in times of disasters. CDRC finds this confirmed by 
Cuny (1983) and Anderson (1989). CDRC stresses Filipino traditional values like 
family and community cooperation here, the damayan and bayanihan spirit. Also 
being ‘madiskarte’ (resourceful) coupled with Filipino wit and humour enables Filipi-
nos to deal with hardship (Heijmans & Victoria, 2001). Bankoff (2004) explains the 
origins of these Filipino core values as a way to maintain cultural resilience. In a 
disaster-prone country like the Philippines, the frequent experience of hazards influ-
ences the way how cultures develop, not only in terms of adapting livelihoods, or the 
construction of houses, but also in terms of practices to deal with the emotional and 
psychological requirements of living with uncertainty. People in the Philippines make 
sense of what happened, allowing ‘nature to speak’. They explain flash floods, 
typhoons, mudslides as the ‘revenge of nature”, not to express fatalism, but to indi-
rectly blame those to be held responsible for exploiting natural resources. The 
Tagalog expression bahala na – literally translated “leaving it to fate” – does not 
simply imply ‘indifference’, but refers to the lack of people’s confidence in the ability 
of government’s agencies to protect their citizens, and therefore to people’s shared 
realization that they need to carry their burdens themselves (Bankoff, 2004).  
 
There are several arguments for CDRC to highlight these cultural values, and social 
and motivational resources of people. In a context of recurrent and increasingly 
damaging disasters, physical and material vulnerabilities presently far outweigh 
capacities, and CDRC believes it is more viable and durable to strengthen people’s 
organisational and motivational resources. Skills, knowledge, positive attitudes and 
beliefs are assets that stay with people, regardless displacement, can be shared, 
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transferred, and are believed by CDRC to reduce local people’s vulnerabilities in the 
long run and are instrumental in accumulating material capacities. Interventions to 
strengthen organisational and motivational capacities are closely linked to features 3 
and 5. They deal with leadership development, negotiation skills, speaking in public, 
awareness raising on human rights and paralegal training, and are part of the organ-
izing work to strengthen the people’s mass movement. A second argument is that 
the appreciation of cultural values and people’s social and motivational resources 
enables CDRC, particularly the community organizers, to mobilize and organize local 
people with little financial input, and convincing people that they – again - need to 
carry their burdens themselves, but that when organized, they increase their 
chances to rework constraining power relations, policies and institutions.  
 
Feature 3: seeks to contribute to addressing the roots of people’s vulnerability  
The work of Anderson and Woodrow (1989) facilitated CDRC to view disaster 
response conceptually as a process of community capacity building. CDRC 
acknowledges that community capacity building cannot be achieved through one or 
two ‘projects’, but is a series of interventions which link local actors to macro-level 
institutions as a precondition to addressing the root causes of vulnerability. This is 
not a linear process, but one with opportunities and set-backs. CDRC does distinguish 
short-term interventions to save lives and to relieve immediate suffering, and 
responses aimed to reduce people’s vulnerability in the long run. Relief and disaster 
preparedness are entry-points for long-term capacity building and not one-time 
events. CDRC integrates disaster vulnerability reduction into a broader agenda to 
transform the socio-economic and political roots of people’s marginalization on one 
hand, and of irresponsible depletion of natural resources on the other. The task of 
preparing people for disaster events implies and includes the effort of shifting the 
locus of social power into the hands of the majority for their own benefit – in this 
case the marginalized of Philippine society (CDRC, 1986: 2). By challenging power 
inequalities and holding the government accountable to implement disaster risk 
reduction policies, CDRC – jointly with other issue-based organisations and groups - 
hopes to achieve justice, peace and responsible governance.  
 
Feature 4: considers people’s participation essential to disaster management 
CDRC argues that disaster management is not the sole domain of experts and scien-
tists, but that local people play a major role too. Particularly in demanding ‘safety’ 
and ‘protection’. People affected by disasters are not passive victims or recipients of 
aid, but they can be powerful claimants with rights (Heijmans, 2004). CDRC further 
recognizes that villages are socially heterogeneous. Therefore a community organ-
izer must spend ample time to integrate into a community, to understand the prob-
lems, to get to know who is who, the local elite, the most marginalized, and who has 
potential to become leaders of a People’s Organisation. This process of social 
analysis is biased towards deprived groups in the community, and the resulting 
interventions may exclude local elites in terms of benefitting from it. Power plays are 
acknowledged to be part of reality and discussed, and where possible dealt with 
properly to reach the most marginalized groups.      
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CDRC emphasizes that people’s participation is not limited to providing information 
to aid agencies in order to identify appropriate interventions. People’s involvement 
in data gathering, situational analysis, identification of interventions, implementa-
tion and assessment are embedded in a long term process of conscientisation and 
learning, of strengthening organisational and social capacities, of developing leader-
ship competencies, and developing people’s knowledge, potential and confidence. 
Central in this long-term perspective is people’s empowerment. In this way vulnera-
ble groups will be able to challenge policies and decisions taken by authorities which 
negatively impact their lives. Although CDRC means here policies and government’s 
decisions related to disaster response, its interventions implicitly contribute to 
broadening a mass base that can be mobilized for other purposes as well.  
 
CDRC uses disasters instrumentally to involve, mobilize and organize the disaster-
affected population into a critical mass base that can be linked to the broader 
people’s social movement. ‘Participation’ is not limited to involvement in local 
CBDO-DR interventions, but means long-term engagement in the people’s social 
movement. These social movements, however, create new forms of power relations, 
in which local POs have little influence on decisions made at the top. Although this is 
not part of this research, I would like to note that ‘participation’ is a relative notion 
in the Philippines, where political agendas and NGOs’ interests set the boundaries 
for people’s influence. The example of the Seed Bank Program in chapter 1 fits in this 
argument. Particularly CBDO-DR interventions that aimed to strengthen people’s 
livelihoods and social economic projects generated fierce debates among CDRC staff, 
and within the network. Staff who viewed POs as instrumental in strengthening the 
people’s social movement would argue against livelihoods projects, fearing a 
decrease in community cohesion4. Those who viewed CBDO-DR interventions 
primarily as strengthening local capacities would argue in favour of livelihoods pro-
jects and people’s participation. This was a recurrent dilemma.  
 
Feature 5: puts a premium on the organisational capacity of the vulnerable sectors 
through the formation of grassroots disaster response organisations 
This feature distinguishes CDRC from most current CBDRR practices in that it views 
disasters not only as a matter of vulnerability, but also as an opportunity for political 
organizing. This means that addressing the immediate suffering of disaster survivors 
is not an end in itself, but that it regards as the most important task to assist local 
marginalized Filipino people in identifying and addressing the root causes of their 
vulnerability. This requires a long-term process which goes beyond the artificial 
boundaries of isolated short-term CBDRR-projects and beyond a focus on natural 
hazards. While the work of Anderson and Woodrow (1989) offered a ‘disaster 
science frame’ for addressing the root causes of disaster vulnerability (feature 3), 
CDRC links the grassroots disaster response organisations’ frame to the language of 
the people’s mass movement. Grassroots disaster response organisations are 
functional in disaster preparedness, but additionally in enhancing collective bargain-
ing capability. Community organizing is meant to enhance representation of vulnera-
                                                     
4
  Livelihood projects like micro-credit, post-harvest machineries, and community seed bank, led in many 
instances into competition over resources and tensions within communities. This resulted in a negative image 
of livelihood projects. 
93 
 
ble groups beyond community level, and forms a mass base for collective action. 
These grassroots organisations link up with each other enabling communities to raise 
common issues beyond community-level. CDRC’s mitigation measures are mostly 
non-physical in nature, strengthening the social and organisational capacities of 
people at risk. 
 
Feature 6: mobilizes the less vulnerable sectors into partnership with the vulnerable 
sectors in disaster management and development work 
While the most vulnerable people are supposed to be the main actors in CBDRR, 
CDRC considers the support of and partnership with less vulnerable sectors as an 
essential feature of sustaining and up-scaling CBDRR efforts. These less vulnerable 
sectors played a key role in mobilizing relief goods during the spontaneous “Support 
Disaster Victims Campaign” in 1984. With the less-vulnerable sector is meant social 
workers, health and medical workers, food and drug sector, church-related organisa-
tions, teachers and students, scientists, technologists, media, and even managers 
and entrepreneurs. They extend assistance to disaster survivors, and manage volun-
teer groups - the ‘core’ of the less vulnerable sector - performing tasks to sustain and 
improve voluntary services during and beyond emergency periods (Dulce, 2003: 
111). In this way, CDRN can be viewed as a network of networks, which despite the 
limited number of regular staff, is able to conduct large operations and deliver 
continuing support to communities and people’s organisations. Organized disaster 
affected communities are not isolated entities, but linked to institutional mecha-
nisms created beyond community level, both horizontally and vertically, which facili-
tates raising grassroots voices and entering the political arena to demand safety and 
protection, although with varying success.  
 
In Table 3.1, I provide an overview of how CDRC translates these features into prac-
tice. The table should not be regarded as a linear step-by-step model, because 
depending on the local circumstances, entry-points and sequence of activities vary. 
 
Over more than 25 years, CDRN has kept on analysing and adapting its interpreta-
tions and models to a changing social and political environment. Through its regional 
networks CDRC has the flexibility to analyse people’s vulnerability and capacities by 
linking macro policies and processes to grassroots realities. This results in a diversity 
of regional ‘translations’ of CBDO-DR policy framed by CDRC. What works in 
Mindanao for internal refugees may not be a priority for lahar-affected communities 
in Central Luzon. CBDO-DR practice is very contextual to become effective, and 
therefore its outcomes are difficult to replicate in other localities. What they have in 
common, though, is a shared analysis and vision, and crucially a shared network 
which can mobilize collective action to ‘up-scale’ local initiatives.  
 
So far I reviewed how CDRC shaped its CBDO-DR approach within a historical context 
of oppositional state-society relations, and how it arrived at its six core values. These 
core values highlight a multi-level approach beyond community level, linking disas-
ter-affected communities through alliances and networks to the macro context, and 
a long-term political process of community strengthening aimed to address the root 
causes of people’s vulnerability.  
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Table 3.1: Process from at-risk community towards a grassroots disaster response organisation  
                   (Heijmans and Victoria, 2001: 47) 
Description of community level process 
to strengthen social and political resources 
Activities of CDRC and network members  
to support community process 
Community at risk: people are exposed to one or more recur-
rent disasters. They developed coping strategies, but these may 
fall short. 
 CDRC/CDRN enters community during emergency situa-
tion, conducts damage-needs assessments, provides re-
lief 
 Getting to know situation in the community, key-
persons and potential leaders 
 Trust building with local people and authorities 
Start conscientization process: 
 Understanding nature and behaviour of hazards, disaster risks 
and the causes of vulnerability in their locality 
 Prioritization of risk to be addressed 
 Identification of what people can do at local level before, 
during and after disasters happen 
Start of process to strengthen organisational resources 
 Facilitation of conscientization process on why people 
are vulnerable to disasters in their locality 
 Conduct hazard, vulnerability, capacity assessment 
 Disaster Preparedness Training  
Formulation of a Counter Disaster Plan (CDP):   
 Identify pre-, during and post disaster community needs 
 Identify available community resources 
 Identify roles and responsibilities of the Disaster Response 
Committee (DRC) 
 Identify the people and committees for DRC 
 Formulate communication and decision-making system 
 Set-up warning system and evacuation plan (if needed) 
 Formally launch DRC in community (can be part of existing 
PO, or new Grassroots Disaster Response Organisation 
 
 Follow-up consultations, meeting with PO 
 Leadership training 
 Participatory monitoring and facilitate documentation 
of process, results, lessons 
 Organisational development support 
Activities of functioning GDRO 
 Share Counter Disaster Plan with the whole community 
 Conduct evacuation drills and draw lessons to improve CDP 
 Coordination with Barangay and municipality Disaster 
Coordination Council, churches, NGOs, other POs. 
 Monitoring threats and hazards in community 
 Issue warning and manage evacuation 
 Search and rescue 
 Report damages and needs to disaster agencies for assis-
tance 
 Coordinate, plan and conduct relief delivery with aid agen-
cies in community 
 Identification, selection and implementation of vulnerability 
reduction measures. 
 
 Facilitate learning through drills 
 Training on networking, campaigning, negotiation 
 Training on damage, needs and capacity assessment; 
emergency response 
 Training on planning, monitoring and evaluation 
From here the PO or GDRO can tackle more demanding activi-
ties, link up with other communities and support-groups. They 
also take on efforts to recover or strengthen livelihoods like 
seed bank, repair of damaged irrigation canals, village phar-
macy, negotiation and networking 
 Issue-based training 
 Various skills training 
 Facilitates strategizing to address vulnerability beyond 
community-level 
 
The next sections elaborate on how CDRC and its network engage with other actors 
like the government in the political arena of disaster risk reduction, and respond to 
violent conflict. I further review what CDRC, its network and the broader people’s 
social movement found room for manoeuvre and what they achieved within the past 
25 years in the terms of reworking the institutional context towards safer communi-
ties. 
 
3.3 The institutional context of disaster risk reduction in the Philippines 
My experience at CDRC from 1993 till 2001 opened my eyes for the politics-disaster 
connection. Disaster politics happen from the local to the national level involving 
affected communities, government officials, military, citizens, and other organisa-
tions and actors who respond to disasters. The politics-disaster connection is there-
fore not limited to formal and official politics, to what government authorities, state-
actors, political parties, their supporters and lobbyist do, and how they respond to 
disasters. Also the responses of affected populations to survive and cope to disas-
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ters, and how resources are allocated by (I)NGOS, corporations, religious institutions, 
media, universities and other institutions are politically significant, since these 
actions interact with state actors and influence aid outcomes locally.  
 
In Box 3.1 I provide a compact overview of the Philippine institutional context – using 
Jütting’s categories (2003). It connects the micro everyday disaster politics to the 
macro political context in which disasters and conflict occur. It is in this broad 
institutional context that CDRC and its network of networks manoeuvre to particu-
larly strengthen people’s organisational, motivational and political resources to hold 
the government accountable to implement or change its policies.  
 
CDRC and its networks exercise all three forms of politics that Kerkvliet (2009) 
distinguishes: as a member of the Disaster Risk Reduction Network Philippines 
(DRRNetPhil) – led by the Centre for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) - it engages with 
‘official politics’ and lobbies with the Office of Civil Defense, the National Disaster 
Coordinating Council, legislators, and with members of the House of Representatives 
for a new Disaster Management Bill. This lobby-work was successful; in 2010 a New 
Bill was approved in Congress replacing a reactive Bill from President Marcos’ 
administration. CDRC’s community organizing work and alliance building is meant to 
engage in ‘advocacy politics’ to hold the government accountable to provide safety 
and protection to its citizens while the ‘everyday politics’, is mainly practiced by 
People’s Organisations locally challenging local institutions.  
 
Box 3.1: Interrelated institutions in the Philippines dealing with disaster response (after Jütting, 2003) 
Informal institutions, traditions and social norms 
Common experience of disasters – a normalization of threat  – resulted in informal institutions enabling people 
to adapt to changing conditions not only physically, but particularly emotionally through bayanihan, damayan, 
madiskarte, bahala na, and other social, religious supportive and reciprocal interactions (Bankoff, 2004: 102). 
CDRC builds on these existing strengths. They represent people’s view of decent social relations, and the 
pooling of risks. These also include particular rules of reciprocity with better-off community members like 
landowners and local elite, who are expected to practice charity to the poor, helping them to manage through 
periods of difficulty (Scott, 1976). CDRC also recognizes the existence of traditional and indigenous forms of 
village governance which usually relate to or overlap with the formal government system.  
 
The overall institutional environment 
This refers to formal policy and the judiciary system related to disaster management like the Presidential degree 
1566 dated 1978, and to existing laws that supplement PD 1566 like the Building Code, the Fire Code, the 1991 
Local Government Code, Republic Act 8185 (local calamity fund), the Urban Development and Housing Act of 
1992, the Clean Air Act, and the Environmental Impact Statement system. In 2003, NGOs like CDP, CDRC, POs 
and other civil society groups came together to promote CBDRR in the country and to influence government’s 
policy. This loose network established the Disaster Risk Reduction Network Philippines (DRRNetPhil) in 2008, 
and continued serious lobby efforts for a new DRR Bill that encourages the government to shift its focus to 
disaster prevention and risk reduction adhering to the principles and strategies consistent with the Hyogo 
Framework for Action
5
. In 2010, the Philippine Congress ratified the proposed “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion and Management Act”. If enacted into law, the legislative measure would provide a new perspective by 
adopting a disaster risk reduction framework, viewing disasters as a reflection of people’s vulnerability, 
replacing government’s reactive disaster preparedness framework with a proactive one that is more responsive 
to the needs of the people (Luna, 2011). Civil society organisations however, will continue to hold authorities 
accountable for their decisions. Local people are made aware about the content and procedures of laws 
relevant for their situation. They act on the conviction that the government has the moral obligation to provide 
                                                     
5
 The Hyogo Framework for Action is a comprehensive, action-oriented response to the international concern 
about the increasing impact of disasters on people and national development efforts. The HFA was formulated 
and adopted by 168 governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe in January 2005. 
Chapter 4 will elaborate on the HFA. 
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safety and protection to its citizens. When the government cannot fulfil this role or does not show the political 
will to do so, social protests emerge.  
 
After the end of president Marcos’ dictatorship in 1986, the Aquino administration and the succeeding Ramos 
administration, increasingly institutionalized NGO’s and civil-society participation in governance. The enact-
ment of the Local Government Code in 1991 offered opportunities for NGOs and POs to influence local 
development decisions. In 1998, the Party-List  system was first contested during the elections allowing sec-
toral groups like peasants, labour, women, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, and youth to be 
represented in the Parliament with a maximum of 20% of the total seats. This sectoral representation enables 
the people’s mass movement to influence national policies, like the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act”. 
 
Institutions related to “the play of the game” and the creation of organisations and councils 
The Philippine government established a nation-wide network of regional, provincial, municipality and 
barangay level disaster coordination councils that are activated in times of emergency. CDRC participates in the 
National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) which has been renamed in 2010 into National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), but still headed by the Ministry of Defense, while the CDRN-
members are invited to councils at lower levels. The DRRNetPhil proposed a shift in supremacy of civilian 
authority over military authority especially in complex emergencies and human-induced disasters, and to 
expand the NDRRMC to include, among other, the National Anti-Poverty Commission, and the Office of the 
Presidential advisor on the Peace Process (DRRNetPhil, 2008). This would open space to manoeuvre for CDRC to 
support Internally Displaced People (IDPs). At the local level, CDRC actively supports the creation of Grassroots 
Disaster Response Organisations and strengthening of existing People’s Organisations and as institutions that 
are in charge of CBDRR at the local level, and that represent local people to the wider governance context to 
influence government policies and decisions. Where indigenous or barangay councils exist that are willing to 
take on the CBDRR agenda, CDRC does not create new POs. CDRC strengthens the political resources of local 
people as the expansion of their social and motivational capacities. 
 
Rules and procedures related to resource allocation for disaster response 
This level refers to the political arena of decision-making: whose risk, which risk reduction measure to take 
where; who is involved in making decisions, and who is excluded; Where to channel resources and how much? 
At this level CDRC supports local people to enhance their negotiation skills, to speak in public, to know their 
rights, to facilitate meetings, and where to go to lobby. 
 
This institutional context makes it complicated for CDRC to respond to both disaster 
and conflict affected communities. Actors directly or indirectly engaged in relief and 
rehabilitation operations, also actively participate in the conflict, in particular the 
military (Soriano, 2006). The institutional set-up of the government to provide relief 
and rehabilitation allows the military, being the head of the NDRRMC, to gain control 
over these humanitarian resources, which they can strategically use against their 
enemies, i.e. Muslim settlements which are allegedly hiding rebels, whereas evacua-
tion centres are located in Christian settlements in Mindanao (ibid).  
 
In a context of deep mutual mistrust and oppositional politics between the state, 
military, civil society organisations and rebel groups it is quite difficult for CDRC to 
manoeuvre confidently in this political arena as it does in case of addressing root 
causes of disasters. In Chapter 1 I argued that both disasters and conflict can be 
viewed as political processes and events, in which local people, civil society, govern-
ment officials, (I)NGOs, military, combatants, de facto rulers, among others, actively 
make choices that correspond with their motives, interests, and the options they 
have to shape their actions (after Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Richards, 2005). Also 
CDRC carefully makes choices regarding where and how it implements CBDRR in 
disaster and conflict affected areas.  
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One of the research questions relates to the disaster-conflict nexus and asks if 
CBDRR would be an appropriate approach in environments where communities are 
divided, disintegrated or displaced, or in environments not conducive to dialogues 
between local actors and the state. In the next section I will briefly present why 
CDRC responds to disasters differently than to conflict affected populations, which 
are part of the unfolding political history. Whereas CDRC sees disasters and how 
responses are handled as highly political events, it approaches armed conflicts in the 
Philippines and the impact on communities, behind a more neutral outlook, 
constructing less political images of what happens on the ground. It does this for 
mainly institutional reasons to get access to displaced communities, and for keeping 
up its credible and reliable image towards government agencies.  
 
CDRC’s ‘neutral’ positioning vis-a-vis armed conflicts in the Philippines, and its 
construction of ‘disasters as political events’, contradicts to the dominant view on 
disaster and conflict as  explained in chapter 1, which views disasters as caused by 
natural phenomena, while conflicts are viewed as rooted in complex social and politi-
cal interrelationships, requiring fundamentally different responses. The next section 
will explain why CDRC and its network manoeuvre as humanitarian chameleons in 
the political arena of responding to both conflict and disasters as a way to deal with 
their multiple realities.  
 
3.3.1 The political arena of responding to both disasters and conflict 
In the Philippines the occurrence of disasters and the armed struggles – between the 
communist New People’s Army (NPA)6 and the Armed Forced of the Philippines 
(AFP), and between AFP and several Muslim rebel groups in Mindanao - are interre-
lated since they have common root causes, like poverty, injustice, foreign domina-
tion and political marginalization (Casambre, 2004). 
 
After Marcos dictatorship ended in 1986, CDRC started to document incidents of 
violence and numbers of families displaced by armed conflict. It expanded its opera-
tions to support Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Despite the end of Martial Law 
and a democratically elected new government headed by president Corazon (Cory) 
Aquino, military operations continued in the country-side to counter Muslim rebels 
in Mindanao and to a lesser extent NPA rebels nation-wide. The IDP-cases docu-
mented by CDRC were families who sought refuge in evacuation centres, while CDRC 
knew through its regional networks that most displaced households fled into forests 
out of fear for further harassments by military and para-military groups. These 
remote hiding places caused difficulties for documentation purposes - also 
documenters were harassed - as well as for reaching people for relief and medical 
assistance.  
 
In order to gain access to these remote places to serve IDPs, CDRC initially presented 
itself to government officials and military as a neutral humanitarian agency, and 
developed strong coordination mechanisms with well-established institutions like 
churches, children rights organisations, the health sector, the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development, and UNICEF. Overtime, CDRC became a reliable source of 
                                                     
6
 The New People’s Army is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. 
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IDP statistics and documentation for government departments, NGOs and media. As 
such CDRC gained legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of authorities to serve IDPs in 
a humanitarian way which was limited to relief. This legitimacy was very much 
needed to negotiate access to IDPs and to communities with established POs living in 
remote conflict areas.  
 
In 1989 CDRC abandoned the label ‘humanitarian’ after internal discussions, deciding 
that it should bear the risks of rendering humanitarian aid in conflict areas as part of 
its broader political agenda, and be consistent with the way it responds to disasters. 
This decision implied that CDRC will implement its CBDO-DR approach in conflict 
affected areas and in areas where ‘development aggression’ takes place which often 
overlap with each other. CDRC aims to strengthen local people’s effective agency 
and political resources to resist development aggression or to be in a better position 
to negotiate with companies and government for compensation.  
 
The Regional Centres that are part of CDRC’s network are the ones that directly sup-
port IDPs and threatened communities. Conflict in the Philippines can be character-
ized as a ‘no peace no war situation’ where periods of violence are alternated by 
times of relative calmness. The aim of CBDO-DR is to provide immediate relief and 
livelihood support to IDPs, and use this interaction like after disasters happen, as an 
entry-point for CBDO-DR. CDRC’s CBDO-DR interventions focus on strengthening 
people’s social, motivational and political capacities for the reason explained in fea-
ture 2. In a context of recurrent violence, this implies that communities systematize 
their early warning system to forecast violence and to take precautions; they attend 
paralegal training to enhance their skills and confidence to negotiate with military 
and rebels; they receive training on human rights and humanitarian law, and how to 
report human rights violations to outsiders like media, human rights organisations 
and to the warring parties.  
 
Almost all communities I visited in conflict areas nation-wide appreciated such sup-
port, but several admitted from own experience that at the same time, being orga-
nized and holding community meetings, increases the risk of military harassment. 
The military associates POs in remote areas with NPA presence. Not all communities 
can withstand military harassment, particularly not when their leaders are tortured 
or killed. The kind of pressure CDRC intends to escape at the national level, is played 
out locally. These are harsh realities, and subject for reflection to adjust strategies.  
 
The positive side of strengthening people’s social, motivational and political capaci-
ties is felt during forced evacuations to escape violence, and during the process of 
securing a safe return. Organized communities do this often together: they jointly 
arrange transportation, they know in advance where to go or where to assemble. In 
several cases POs do not want to go to government’s or NGOs’ evacuation centres 
where it is crowded, services limited, and where aid providers set the rules. Instead, 
they prefer and succeed in making a deal with landowners in safe places who allow 
them to live in semi-permanent housing instead of temporary tents, and to cultivate 
the land. Organized communities further have a plan for how to divide roles and 
responsibilities in an evacuation centre, and know whom to contact to check security 
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in their original communities and for support to return to their homes. Strengthening 
local capacities of grassroots communities is particularly effective in remote insecure 
areas. Communities initially can rely on their own resources, capacities and contacts 
since outside agencies face difficulties in getting access to them. Barrs (2009)  docu-
mented grassroots preparedness and protection strategies in conflict contexts glob-
ally that largely resonated with the CBDO-DR experiences in the Philippines.  
 
At the provincial and national levels CDRC and related networks organize campaigns 
to stop violence and war, and to make funds available to support returning IDPs. The 
latter – enabling IDPs to return home and to rebuild their livelihoods – require the 
involvement of local and provincial government, the police, representatives from 
military and rebel groups, and these processes are usually facilitated by church-
related organisations. Before families return to their lands, they try to reach an 
agreement among all these parties concerning security, food aid, no trespassing of 
warring parties in the community, lifting of food blockades, respect of human rights, 
support to livelihood, and a monitoring team to be installed to report violations of 
the agreement. During these negotiations NGOs like CDRC and its network remain at 
the background, and critically observe the negotiation and power processes, as I wit-
nessed in Mindanao. They only interfere when they feel a better deal could be 
reached for the returning refugees. CBDO-DR focuses on preparedness, rehabilita-
tion and recovery measures for both disasters and conflict through strengthening 
people’s organisational, motivational and political capacities to better deal with the 
various risks 
 
CDRC does not engage in peace-building activities, like mediation between warring 
parties or dealing with divided communities in Mindanao. In a context of deep 
mutual mistrust and oppositional politics between the state, military, civil society 
organisations and rebel groups it is quite difficult for CDRC to manoeuvre confidently 
as it does in case of addressing root causes of disasters. CDRC and its regional 
members are frequently harassed and accused by the military of being affiliated to 
the National Democratic Front (NDF) and of being sympathizers with the armed 
struggles in the country. It is the church-sector in the Philippines which is the most 
active and experienced, and has the most sustained effort in peace building, 
including wide-ranging forms of support to government-NDF, and government-MILF 
peace negotiations (Casambre, 2004).  
 
While CDRC has an outspoken political approach to deal with disasters, it takes a 
more modest, and backstage position when it supports conflict-affected communi-
ties. Providing assistance to conflict-affected communities involves different kinds of 
politics from the national level to local contexts. CDRC does not want to lose its good 
reputation and potential donors, so in the regions CDRC relies on local network 
members to play their role in the humanitarian arena locally which affects aid out-
comes for disaster and conflict-affected people. This is not without danger and staff 
of the local NGOs move in and out of conflict areas as humanitarian chameleons. 
They have to choose their aid labels carefully depending on local conflict dynamics, 
and on whom to negotiate access with to communities.  
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In 2007, CDRC proposed to create a separate NGO that will give full attention to IDPs 
as a result of man-made disasters like conflict and ‘development aggression’. The 
reasons behind are tactical in nature and related to how government actors perceive 
CDRC’s role in the context of disasters events differently from its role in a conflict 
context. While CDRC enjoys a good reputation as established disaster response 
agency in the country, it does not want to spoil this reputation, when opposing and 
confronting government policies and decisions to start a war or on development 
aggression which cause massive displacements. In Mindanao and the Cordillera, for 
instance, there exist a nexus between planned government projects like mining and 
the occurrence of violent conflict involving various warring parties. In these arenas, 
the government uses deterrent strategies to harass NGOs. In the next section I will 
further detail the state-civil society interactions in responding to disaster and 
conflict. 
 
3.3.2 Mobilizing effective agency to find room for manoeuvre in the Philippine 
context 
The previous section outlined the history of CDRC, its guiding principles, and the 
institutional context in which CDRC operates and adapts its CBDO-DR approach to a 
changing environment of disasters, development induced disasters and on-going 
armed struggles. This section details the political arena of risk reduction and how 
CDRC strengthens people’s effective agency to find room for manoeuvre: institu-
tional and societal change can only happen when risk reduction strategies are formu-
lated to rework institutional relationships at multiple institutional levels. I used 
Olson’s three questions to further discuss the politics of disaster in the Philippines, 
and how CDRC and the Philippine government exercise different forms of power to 
respectively change the status quo, or to protect it.  
 
Olson (2000) proposed to ask three fundamental questions after a disaster hits: (1) 
“What happened?” (2)“Why were the losses high or low?; and (3) “What will happen 
now”? Since various social actors interpret their circumstances, events and what is 
happening around them differently, local people, NGOs and state-actors will reply to 
Olson’s questions in various ways considering their social position, and try to con-
vince the other of their explanation of events, their risk definitions, whom to blame 
and how to allocate resources when they negotiate, confront each other, negotiate 
about issues, resources, and values. In this political arena, actors use different but 
interrelated forms of power, referred to as discursive power which actors use to give 
meaning to disaster events and to get support for their risk definition; institutional 
power which constructs power relations between actors through policies, laws, rules, 
authority and procedures for instance; and publicly performed power performed in 
the political arenas to influence decision-making on resource allocation. The way 
power is performed, should then be placed within a broader institutional context.   
 
Ad 1. “What happened?” Using discursive power 
CDRC constructs a disaster narrative that aims to convince grassroots communities 
that disasters are not natural, but a matter of vulnerability for which the Philippine 
government can be held responsible. Academic paradigms find their way in 
discursive struggles of the meaning of disasters: CDRC’s narrative stresses the politi-
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cal nature of disasters, which should only be understood vis-à-vis the disaster 
management politics of the Philippine Government, which are driven by patronage, 
incompetence and ‘organized irresponsibility’ (Bankoff, 1999). CDRC is critical, and 
sometimes antagonistic, towards Philippine government’s policies and includes 
development-induced disasters in its disaster definition. CDRC views disasters as an 
entry-point for making people more conscious of the injustices prevailing in Philip-
pine society: disasters are viewed as an opportunity for social change. The long-term 
solution lies in transforming the social and political structures and institutions that 
breed poverty and injustice. This view on social change guides CDRC’s actions and 
principles. “Disaster vulnerability can only be reduced if an aware and organized 
public can pressure  the Philippine government in such a way that their interests can 
no longer be ignored in government’s decision-making and planning” (Heijmans & 
Victoria: 2001: 16). CDRC subscribed to the liberation of the people from oppression 
perpetrated by the American hegemony, local elite and corrupt bureaucrats, - an 
ideology that took shape during Marcos dictatorship (Delica, 1997). This is actually 
CDRC’s theory of change which usually remains implicit in its official CBDO-DR narra-
tive. In the regions, CDRN staff regarded their disaster management practice very 
much as a class struggle, like suggested by Bankoff (1999: 400). This was particularly 
reflected in the type of rehabilitation interventions in low-land peasant communities 
which aimed to break through patron-peasant dependency relations by providing 
working animals and small farm machineries like water pumps, threshers, blowers, 
or corn mills. People’s needs were analysed using ‘SICA’ referring to an assessment 
tool for community organizing: Social Investigation and Class Analysis. In the mid-
nineties this tool was integrated in the Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis, to weave 
disaster jargon into the language of the people’s mass movement.  
 
For the Philippine government, disasters are external natural phenomena which dis-
rupt normalcy (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009). The government’s political aim is to 
restore damages and return to the status quo prior to the event. Seeing disasters as 
external events results in approaches that apply geophysical and engineering 
knowledge (Hewitt, 1983: 5). Government officials particularly prefer engineering 
and physical projects since these are visible, showing the electorate and potential 
investors that government is responding to disasters to achieve safety and protec-
tion. These physical projects do not threaten the status quo, but neither are they 
apolitical. Pelling (2003) argues that especially contractors and even political leaders 
usually benefit economically from such investments, and in this way reinforce exist-
ing power disparities in society. There are many examples of huge engineering pro-
jects which turned ineffective due to inappropriate design or construction work and 
which re-allocated risk to already vulnerable social groups. An example is the con-
struction of the “Mega-Dike” in the Philippines which ought to serve as catchment 
for lahar (volcanic mudflows) coming from Mount Pinatubo after its eruption in 
1991, directing the lahar to the sea. The mega-dike collapsed each year, due to faulty 
design, and ignoring scientists’ recommendations to take different measures. As a 
result the lahar-flow turned uncontrollable and unnecessarily affected many villages 
and valuable agricultural lands displacing many lowlanders. Meanwhile much profit 
was made in “building ineffective dams and dikes, largely ignoring scientific, moral 
and common sense” (Rodolfo, 1995: 88; Bankoff, 1999).  
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Additionally, government uses discursive power to frame disaster events in certain 
localities as very dangerous, or declares localities ‘no-man’s land’, particularly there, 
where it has commercial investment plans. For instance, coastal areas are labelled as 
dangerous places to live due to typhoons and tsunamis - and consequently govern-
ment authorities prohibit people to return and rebuild their houses there. I personal-
ly witnessed brutal displacement of urban poor living on the high-value reclamation 
area along Manila Bay which was being developed as a commercial area. On 
November 2, 1995, typhoon ‘Rosing’ hit Manila. The urban poor families found 
shelter in the national basketball stadium not far away from their homes, which was 
arranged with the local government. When they returned the next morning, they not 
only found their homes damaged due to the strong typhoon, but what was left over 
was burnt down, and torn apart by military forces while a huge fence was erected to 
close off the area for the returning families and aid providers. The typhoon had 
eased the demolition process in favour of the vested interests in business. Pelling 
and Dill (2009) and Klein (2007) also highlight this aspect of the politics-disaster 
connection where disasters exacerbate existing inequalities by post-disaster 
government manipulation. These discursive means – supported by physical force- 
result in very asymmetrical relationships of power in which these subordinated 
groups have little room to manoeuvre.  
 
Ad 2. “Why were losses so high and responses inadequate?” Performing institutional 
power 
The Philippines has a legal framework for disaster management since 1978 known as 
the Presidential Decree (PD) 1566 “Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control 
Capability and Establishing the National Program on Community Disaster Prepared-
ness”. It refers to the supportive role of the National Government to the local 
governments in times of emergencies. Although the Barangay (village) chairpersons 
have the responsibility to provide leadership to disaster response operations, the 
policy lacks provision for community participation and citizen’s involvement in disas-
ter management (Delica, 1997). Even if government would invite people to attend 
consultation meetings, affected people’s opinions and views are likely not to be 
registered since these could undermine the vested interests (White, 1996).  
 
In this context of antagonistic state-society relations, CDRC developed its policy 
emphasizing the strengthening of community ‘institutions’ to connect local realities 
to the wider context. CDRC and its network members aim to increase people’s voice 
in the political arena, enabling them to act collectively to create space for manoeu-
vre to negotiate, oppose and change societal structures which give rise to their 
vulnerability. Strengthening local institutions refers, amongst others, to strengthen-
ing or reviving traditions, norms and values like bayanihan, self-help and mutual 
assistance which relate to the social structures of society (level 1 institutions in box 
3.1). Local institutions further refer to organisations or associations like the forma-
tion of Grassroots Disaster Response Organisations (GDRO) with its specific roles and 
responsibilities. In addition, CDRC raises people’s awareness about injustices in 
society and that these are changeable through collective action beyond the own 
village. Organized disaster affected communities are not viewed as isolated entities, 
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but are linked to other organized communities and to the broader people’s mass 
movement with its own governance and obligations depending on the issue at stake.  
 
While the citizenry-initiated relief operations were originally spontaneous actions of 
sharing resources from the “haves” to the “have-nots”, they now have become 
institutionalized efforts to reduce people’s vulnerability from the local to the 
national policy level. CDRC and CDRN only invest in these efforts in localities that are 
recurrently affected by disasters, that are usually neglected by the government, or 
where new risks are expected like development induced disasters. Organizing is a 
continuous process before, during and after disasters in coordination with other POs, 
and the less vulnerable sectors as described in feature 6. The aim is to engage with 
local government to access resources and to hold them accountable for implement-
ing a disaster management approach that provides safety and protection for all 
people. Over time CDRC has developed good relationships with the Department of 
Social Welfare and Development, and is part of the National Disaster Coordination 
Committee (NDCC) which was recently renamed into the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), while it has an antagonistic attitude 
when issues like mining, military abuses, demolition in urban poor communities and 
the government’s refusal to provide alternative land and livelihood opportunities to 
displaced communities. 
 
Hilhorst (2003) describes how the distance between grassroots and NGOs increased 
over the years, and how gradually more different kinds of organisations made up the 
protest movement: ‘People’s Organisations’ referring to community-based organisa-
tions. ‘Sectoral Movements’ referring to ‘grassroots’ movements composed of a spe-
cific sector like peasants, women, or indigenous people. Through these sectoral 
organisations local people can be mobilized for political purposes, or the other way 
around, can serve to voice their disagreement with local policies and decisions, 
mobilizing people from other places for their cause, or to enhance collective action 
to seek protection and safety. In addition, thematic social movements were distin-
guished like the human rights and environmental movements. NGOs are viewed as 
‘intermediary organisations, which support grassroots organisations through 
funding, technical advice and advocacy’ (Hilhorst, 2003: 14). Although all these 
organisations may belong to the same people’s mass movement and sharing a 
common vision, in practice however, the relationship within and between the differ-
ent entities is not always without tensions or conflicts. Differences arise about 
tactics, strategies, mandates and procedures, which sometimes threaten internal 
cohesion of the network or between smaller regional networks. 
 
The example of UGNAYAN in Central Luzon in box 3.2 describes how local communi-
ties gained a political voice through local institutions linked to the broader political 
context up to Malacañang, the Office of the President. UGNAYAN’s aim was to 
demand land and livelihood support from the Government after they lost their farms 
due to lahar flows from Mount Pinatubo. The Philippine Government however, was 
very reluctant to comply with the demands of Pinatubo survivors, because of lack of 
resources and due to vested interests of business.  
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Box 3.2: Alliance building among lahar affected communities in Central Luzon 
 
In 1992, one year after Mt Pinatubo erupted, grassroots communities still experienced on-going lahar flows 
from the slopes of the volcano triggered by recurrent typhoons. Lahar flows- sometimes covering land and 
houses up to 5 meters or higher - destroyed properties and took lives. Urban residents, wage labourers, and a 
large number of displaced peasants, formed UGNAYAN-Pampanga, an alliance of People’s Organisations to 
lobby for resettlement for all lahar-affected families living in evacuation centres without land or any source of 
livelihood. UGNAYAN later expanded to include POs from other provinces as well creating a region-wide 
survivors’ association whose membership has different political levels. In 1995 UGNAYAN was ready to openly 
address vulnerability issues as landlessness, poverty, unemployment and the government’s Central Luzon 
Development Plan which aimed for land conversion favouring industries and landlords. UGNAYAN got the sup-
port from CDRN, human rights groups, and local media to mobilize more evacuees, to create favourable public 
opinion and influence policy makers from the local and national government. They were able to cultivate idle 
land within Clark Airbase, one of the former US military bases until 1999, while negotiating with the 
Department of Agrarian Reform for land titles. Until 2011, the Philippine Government has not rewarded 
UGNAYAN’s demand. Instead, People’s Organisations, alone or in groups, were able to access idle lands of big 
landowners in their respective municipalities, took the risk to cultivate abandoned lahar-covered land, or tried 
to adopt alternative livelihood options – practicing a form of everyday politics.  
 
It remains a big challenge for CDRN and related networks to change this unjust system in favour of landless 
peasants and displaced families.  
 
So institutional arrangements created beyond community level, both horizontally 
and vertically, facilitate collective action, raising grassroots voices, and serve as 
entry-points to political arenas for addressing the causes of their vulnerability, 
although with varying success. In the context of the Philippines with very polarized 
civil society-state relations, these institutional mechanisms to generate collective 
action, or active citizenship, function as parallel governance challenging the central 
government in Manila (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009). Individual staff members of CDRN 
and CDRC express their ambivalent opinion on how to relate with the government. 
On the one hand they blame the government for the continuing vulnerabilities 
experienced by the people. They criticize some agencies for graft and corruption like 
the Mount Pinatubo Commission, and they condemn the military harassments of PO 
leaders and CDRN members (Delica, 1997). On the other hand, CDRN relates with the 
government to lobby and gets invited to national, provincial or municipality consulta-
tions. Every time it is a dilemma to attend or not such meetings where government 
plans are discussed, afraid to be co-opted. In many instances, DSWD included CDRC’s 
served communities in its compliance reports claiming these to be served by the 
government. Although the experience of UGNAYAN shows that influencing govern-
ment’s policy and practice is not an easy task, it also proved that people’s everyday 
politics practice could affect positive change on a limited scale.  
  
The Philippine government attributes high losses and its inadequate response to the 
lack of financial and human resources, arguing that disasters happen beyond their 
control. Since the 1970s the loss of human lives due to disasters is decreasing, 
despite the increasing number of disaster events. However, alarmingly, the eco-
nomic damage in the country due to disasters has increased 18-fold (UNSIDR, 2010). 
The Philippine government faces indeed many challenges like tens of millions of 
people in chronic poverty, extremes of social inequality, a recurring fiscal emer-
gency, eroded long-term economic viability amid a still unfolding global crisis, weak 
and undemocratic institutions of governance, systemic corruption, and on-going 
armed conflicts (IBON, 2010). The major criticism of NGOs is the government’s 
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tendency to be more reactive than preventive. This is a result of inadequate institu-
tional capacity due to insufficient funding, inadequate skills and inappropriate pro-
cesses that would support disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness. While 
the country has numerous laws which could theoretically contribute to preventing 
and mitigating disasters, they are inadequately implemented (Velasquez, 2011; Luna, 
2001: 224). According to a village leader in a flood-prone area in Metro Manila (see 
Box 3.3), the government blames them for their own suffering, because they violate 
environmental laws or ignore land use regulations, since they ‘illegally’ occupy 
riverbanks. It is this irresponsible attitude of the Philippine government - of breaking 
the ‘social contract’ with a large group of citizens who cannot rely on guarantees 
from the government for any form of protection, physically, economically nor politi-
cally – that inspires CDRC to do its work as it does.  
 
Disaster events in specific locations are used by the government to blame its political 
opponents instead of nature. From November to December 2004, four typhoons hit 
Quezon province killing over 1,000 persons through floods and landslides in areas 
with a long-standing guerrilla conflict between the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
and the New People’s Army (NPA). In the media illegal logging was identified as one 
of the causes of the disaster. The Philippine government promptly associated the 
illegal logging with the NPA (Kelman & Gaillard, 2007). The opposition blamed the 
government for not tracking down the loggers and for contributing to environmental 
degradation. Both sides have media allies, and these typhoons became political con-
structions around the allegedly responsibility of nature, illegal loggers and the NPA. 
 
The various examples show the inconsistency in how disaster events are explained. 
There does not seem to be a scientific argument behind these explanations. All 
actors search for explanations that suit their worldviews and political interests. 
“Within minutes after any major impact, disasters start becoming political” (Olson, 
2000:266). Whereas CDRC constructed an image of the Philippine government as 
corrupt and as an instrument of the elite taking advantage of disaster events, it 
increasingly started to view the state as a political arena where some of the issues of 
vulnerable marginalized sectors can be fought and won.  
 
3. “What will happen now?” Publicly performed power 
Olson’s third question refers to the post-disaster recovery phase pointing to 
resources, and decisions on how to use and allocate these resources. He regards 
post-disaster responses from a government’s perspective, while I propose to 
broaden this perspective to include all actors involved in disaster response and 
disaster risk reduction. Decisions about resource-allocation are inherently linked to 
issues of power, participation, inclusion and exclusion, and whose agenda or interest 
dominates the decision-making process. Further the kind of ‘default’ responses 
depends on one’s interpretation of vulnerability and the way disasters are framed. 
Since disasters happen locally, it is there where major debates and struggles about 
resource allocation occur, especially around the question whose risk will be reduced? 
 
Over time I have been witnessing the unfair distribution of risk in Metro Manila. The 
people in Barangay Banaba, for instance, in the municipality of Marakina, Metro 
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Manila face an on-going struggle to put their risk-problem on the municipality’s 
agenda (Box 3.3).  
 
Box 3.3 Re-allocation of risk to a poorer, social excluded community  
 
Barangay Banaba is situated between Marikina and Nangka river in the eastern part of Metro Manila. People in 
Banaba earn an income as taxi-drivers, wage-labourers in factories or construction-work while they supplement 
their income by cultivating small plots along the dirty rivers with vegetables, root crops and bananas. They are 
organized in a PO. The people are aware of the riverbank code which prohibits settlement within 10 meter from 
the river, but they have no alternative place to go. In 1995 a high wall of almost 500 meters long was built by 
the city government to protect a middle class subdivision on the other side of the river against floods. While the 
wall indeed protected the subdivision, the floodwater now runs in other directions, particularly to barangay 
Banaba – the lowest area- which completely submerges in the water. Children and chickens drown, while 
people cannot stay in their houses. The people from Banaba initiated protests through direct consulting and 
lobbying local and municipality government and they filed a case against the construction company. The protest 
resulted in a restraining order against the company. The wall was not removed, but the company was not 
allowed to complete the wall. Meanwhile, the people from Banabe continued lobbying at municipality level for 
protection and re-allocation to a place where they can make a living. However the people lack the money to 
buy land. Because their houses are constructed within the 10 meters from the river, their village is a blank spot 
in government’s land use plans. Because they are made invisible, they are also excluded from any flood risk 
reduction decision process. This is the more painful when knowing that the houses of the middle class 
subdivision are constructed within the 10 meter zone as well, but apparently they are sufficiently able to 
influence their municipality government to obtain the needed flood protection. Risk reduction resources were 
channelled to those with more political power. People suffer from the same risk differently. 
 
While barangay Banaba is invisible on the government’s land use plans, it managed to create an early warning 
system in cooperation with the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), the institution responsible for 
flood control in Metro Manila. The PO leader receives text messages from MMDA on rainfall data and water 
levels upstream which are interpreted by the PO leader into alert levels for evacuation purposes. This early 
warning system is an important preparedness measure that prevents casualties.  
 
The experience of the people in Barangay Banaba is not an exception. In many other 
parts of the country, disaster risks are not reduced, but re-allocated to poorer, 
marginalized and social excluded segments of society (Lebel et al, 2006). For ordinary 
citizens it is difficult to tap government resources for disaster risk reduction 
purposes, except for relief goods in times of large-impact disasters. Most commu-
nity-based work to address people’s vulnerability to disasters is supported by civil 
society organisations and their foreign funding agencies.  
 
The CBDO-DR approach focus on recurrent small-scale disasters which are largely 
neglected by national and international actors, while the damages – at least in 
financial terms - caused by all small scale disasters together outrange one large 
disaster (Wisner, 2008)7. Small-scale disasters do not trigger aid flows due to the lack 
of or flaw emergency procedures of (local) governments, unless affected citizens 
jointly start demanding proper responses (Voss & Wagner, 2010). Research on scale 
issues in relation to the responsible political subsystems is still rare. Moving up from 
recurrent small disasters at the local level to provincial level emergencies and 
national calamities, the political stakes increase as a direct result of event effects, 
and therefore of the response requirements and related government’s resource 
allocation.  
 
                                                     
7
 More research into the financial impact comparing small and large disasters is needed to support this argument. 
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This chapter started with the statement that disasters have the potential to spur 
political events. Pelling & Dill (2009) particularly refer to large, rather than small 
disasters that could trigger a breaking point in the political status quo. It may be true 
that only large-scale disasters could reach the political agenda at national and inter-
national level, but in the case of the Philippines, the occurrence of multiple disasters 
in 1984 fuelled social protests which ultimately resulted in a regime change in 1986. 
However, the change in government did not actually translate into transforming pre-
existing inequalities. What did change since 1986 was an increasing opening of 
political space for civil society groups to engage with government in several arenas, 
including the House of Representatives since 1998. CDRC and its network use these 
spaces at each level of the political system with the aim to influence institutions that 
affect safety and protection –  from getting resources from the local government’s 
calamity fund, towards more fundamental changes in the 1978 DM bill, and 
addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability.  
 
These multiple strategies have different time horizons for making communities 
resilient. CDRC consciously accumulates lessons from concrete multiple-scale 
disaster events to substantiate its viewpoint that disasters are not natural but politi-
cal. This requires a long breath and cannot be sustained by international donors only, 
who prefer to support short-term projects at the local level. Key is to make the 
existing legislation work and generate financial resources from the responsible 
government institutions locally and nationally. This is another reason why CBDRR 
interventions in general should look beyond village level and project durations.  
 
3.4 The meaning of CBDO-DR in the Philippines 
The particular and unique circumstances in which CDRC conceived and adapted its 
CBDO-DR approach to a changing institutional environment – from Martial Law to 
more open political spaces, while being part of a people’s social movement - resulted 
in an approach with a specific meaning and interpretations of the concepts that 
make up the CBDO-DR approach.  
 
CBDO-DR means in the first place that disaster and conflict affected populations 
should be made conscious about why they are vulnerable to disasters and conflict. 
CDRC does this by explaining that disasters are not ‘natural’, but in fact ‘political’ 
events; those social arrangements causing poverty and marginalization in the 
country, and perceived as normal, just and immutable by vulnerable communities, 
are changeable. CDRC further stresses that people have ‘agency’ which can be 
mobilized and organized into a People’s Organisation that lines up with other POs, 
experiencing similar issues or conditions. CDRC enables POs to gain access to social 
and political resources to obtain safety and protection from the local to the national 
level. CDRC further facilitates alliance building between the vulnerable and less 
vulnerable sectors which enter the political arena with government officials to 
negotiate, debate, and challenge power inequalities, holding the government 
accountable to implement disaster response policies and struggle for justice, peace 
and responsible governance. CDRC defines specific concepts differently than ADPC or 
UNISDR referring to the prevailing definitions in Chapter 1. 
 
108 
 
‘Community’ and facilitating partnerships between the most and less vulnerable 
sectors 
The meaning CDRC attaches to ‘community’ differs from ADPC’s definition of 
‘community’ in the sense that CDRC prioritizes groups of people facing difficulty in 
coping with adversity, and not automatically all villagers. It targets the most vulnera-
ble to disasters and conflict – in an analytical sense. However, within communities, 
CDRC also looks for people who find themselves committed to contributing time and 
energy to rework societal structures locally and beyond their community. Partner-
ships between the most vulnerable and less vulnerable sectors are a way to mobilize 
the agency of grassroots people towards effective agency, with various successes. 
This conscious division of roles between the most and less vulnerable groups is a 
useful distinction that is not mentioned in ADPC’s definition. 
 
Risk or vulnerability reduction? 
CDRC does not use ‘risk’ language, deliberately. While it views vulnerability as the 
product of past political, economic and social processes, it sees ‘risk’ as a concept 
which links the present with the uncertain future. The notion of ‘risk’ will then not 
offer clear and easy explanations to community people of why disasters occur, nor 
examples to blame or held the government accountable for past losses. CDRC there-
fore prefers to use the notion of ‘vulnerability’.  
 
The way CDRC views ‘risk’ refers to its most common definition as the ‘probability’ of 
a disaster occurring, resulting in a particular level of loss. Risk is here objectively 
measured using statistical formulas - considering intensity, frequency, related 
damage, and so on, of a particular hazard - translating ‘uncertainties’ into 
‘probabilities’ (Althaus, 2005). In this definition, the sources of risk are placed 
outside society “in the environment” as presumed accidental unscheduled forces 
that “erupt” within (Hewitt, 1998: 78). This risk definition is deeply rooted in the 
technocratic and scientific view of disasters, blaming nature and hazards as the 
cause of people’s vulnerability, which fluctuates according to the intensity, 
magnitude and duration of external events. As a consequence, ‘risk reduction’ is 
mainly dealt with in aspects that are susceptible to technical solutions (Cannon, 
2000) while the social, economic and political origins of disaster vulnerability are 
ignored (Blaikie et al, 1994). This is the reason why CDRC does not favour this notion 
of ‘risk’ and prefers to focus on vulnerability reduction in its most holistic meaning.  
 
Although this is understandable given the experienced history of CDRC, the notions 
of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘risk’ are not necessarily each other’s opposites. Also ‘risk’ and 
‘risk reduction’ can be connected to disaster politics. Exploring Althaus’ (2005) over-
view of how various disciplines view risk, I found theories from an anthropological, 
social and philosophical perspective which resonate with my observations in the 
Philippines. These theories define risk not as an analysis of probabilities, using so-
called objective mathematically calculations, but as a political construct about ‘wel-
fare dangers’ (Cullpit, 1999: 92; Althaus, 2005: 575). Risks are often not reduced, but 
re-allocated to poorer, marginalized and social excluded segments of society (Lebel 
et al, 2006) like illustrated by the case of the flood-prone urban poor community in 
Barangay Banabe (Box 3.3).  
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From a sociological perspective, risk is defined as that it is people who define it: we 
must turn to people and the societies they live in to understand risk. In this approach 
different risk perceptions are recognized, and again politics emerges in analysing 
whose risk perception is considered, and who decides on which risk reduction 
measure where to implement, and what is safe enough? Blending the different views 
on risk, I define risk as a subjective, multi-dimensional social construct. Whoever 
controls the definition of risk controls the solution to the problem at hand. “Defining 
risk is thus an exercise in power” as stated by Slovic (1999: 699).  
 
Slovic also refers here to risk debates between ‘experts’ and ‘lay people’ as a result 
of differing risk perceptions, and of the power differentials between them. The case 
of drought in Panay –discussed in chapter 1 – illustrates that the farmers’ risk 
perceptions and responses were subordinated to the problem definitions and solu-
tions of the NGO. Power differentials determine which risk reduction measure will be 
selected, and who benefits from this. Defining risk, and debates about resource 
allocation, and whose risk to reduce involves politics, not just between the state and 
civil society actors, but in all human interactions (Kerkvliet, 2009).  
 
Distinguishing political from social vulnerability 
I mentioned that CDRC prefers the notion of ‘vulnerability’ over ‘risk’ to mobilize and 
organize local people. Feature 5 of the CBDO-DR approach explicitly mentions that 
CDRC intends to reduce people’s political vulnerability. In most literature however, 
no clear distinction is made between social and political vulnerability. The two are 
closely interrelated; political exclusion is mentioned as a major component of social 
vulnerability. People are made vulnerable to hazards by their marginalized political 
and socio-economic positions. People’s vulnerability is due to their limited access to 
economic, environmental, social, political and personal assets (Blaikie et al, 1994, 
Pelling, 1998). When these different components are tied together by one label of 
‘social vulnerability’, the concept remains “fuzzy” and chances are high that people’s 
political assets will be overlooked.  
 
I propose to make a conceptual distinction for analytical purposes to better under-
stand the political meaning CDRC attaches to vulnerability. ‘Social vulnerability’ 
refers to traditional values like ‘bayanihan’, and other forms of cooperation that may 
be weakened due to outside pressures and constraints. (Seasonal) migration is such 
a pressure that may undermine actual, innate connections and networks among 
people. These include extended family networks, reciprocal links, frequent 
supportive interactions, community bonds, roots and commitments, collective 
action, and institutions that provide a basis for coordinating a response (Norris, et al, 
2008). 
 
‘Political vulnerability’ refers to a field of differential relations between actors. These 
relations are characterized by struggle and competition over access to resources, 
positions and power, a so-called force field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This field 
of differential relations exists within communities and beyond the local level like 
class, gender, ethnicity and other forms of differentiation. The existence of multiple 
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force fields – locally as well as referring to power dynamics between civil society and 
the state - has consequences for the resulting forms of governance, power relations 
and room for manoeuvre for  social action of the different parties involved (Nuijten, 
2005). When this room for manoeuvre is limited, people’s political vulnerability is 
high.  
 
Korf (2004a) also distinguishes social from political assets. He argues that households 
which face high levels of risk and uncertainty, largely rely on their social assets, but 
can stabilize and even expand their opportunities to reduce their vulnerability by 
actively seeking connections with power holders as a way to obtain protection. 
Identifying sources of power is part of poor and marginalized people’s everyday life 
(Li, 1996). 
 
Hence, I refer to ‘political vulnerability’ as people’s inability to access resources, posi-
tions and power to demand safety and protection outside their innate social support 
networks due to power differentials and political exclusion from decision-making 
processes from the local to national level. CDRC particularly aims to reduce people’s 
political vulnerability meaning that it seeks to enable people to have a political voice, 
to gain access to political resources, positions and to perform power to achieve 
safety and security from the local to the national level.  
 
I regard ‘vulnerability’ not something that really happens to people or communities, 
but rather a construction of reality to serve a different purpose, value or meaning 
(Ingram and Endter-Wada, 2009: 2). In the Philippine context, CDRC uses the notion 
of ‘vulnerability’ instrumentally, as a tool for analytical and conscientization 
purposes. In the process of conscientization, ‘vulnerability’ is used to make people 
understand their current conditions and the reasons behind. ‘Vulnerability’ is an 
analytical tool to unravel institutional arrangements and power relations, rather than 
a real-time description of local people’s situation that will disempower and label 
people as poor, landless, disabled, widow, or elderly. Once people are aware of why 
the government can be held accountable for their disaster losses, and that unjust 
conditions are changeable, CDRC shifts its language to people’s capacities, 
emphasizing their ‘agency’. ‘Agency’ includes people’s organisational and motiva-
tional resources - terms used by Anderson and Woodrow (1989) in their Capacity 
and Vulnerability Assessment framework. Likewise I prefer to use the notion of 
‘political resources’ which includes abilities to actively look for connections with 
power holders outside their social networks, to organize and mobilize effective 
agency through a chain of agents and networks (Latour, 1986), and the various forms 
of people’s everyday politics practice (Kerkvliet, 2009).  
 
3. 4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter explored the politics of disaster response in the Philippines. The histori-
cal review of how the Philippine CBDO-DR-tradition got shape within a context of 
oppositional politics illustrates how the elite and powerful few who make up the 
government either neglect disaster response or take advantage of recurrent disaster 
events. The majority of poor and marginalized sectors rely particularly on their 
social, motivational and political resources. Both CDRC and the Philippine govern-
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ment attach their specific meaning to disaster and vulnerability and construct their 
paradigms of reality of whom to blame and about what caused the damages. All 
actors search for explanations that suit their beliefs and political interests and use 
discursive means to win others for their cause. As a consequence, responses to 
disasters vary according to their political visions. 
 
The CBDO-DR-tradition generated several features that enable at-risk communities 
to mobilize and organize effective agency to rework institutions from the local to 
national level. The CBDO-DR tradition is a context-specific approach and cannot 
consequently be replicated to other contexts just like that. This research however, 
aims to explore the potential of CBDRR by looking into how CBDRR can organize 
‘effective agency’, and some of the CBDO-DR features are significant to examine in 
different contexts like Afghanistan and Indonesia. The following features will there-
fore become part of the CBDRR pilots, and their potential reviewed. 
 
Strengthening local people’s social and motivational resources to deal with adversity 
Especially in an institutional context where government policies, the judiciary sys-
tem, and governance structures are not functioning properly, people affected by 
disasters or conflict highly rely on social supportive institutions like safety nets. In 
contexts of recurrent conflict and increasingly damaging disasters, where outside aid 
assistance is limited, it is considered more viable and durable to strengthen people’s 
social, organisational and motivational resources. These are resources that stay with 
people regardless displacement, and can be shared or transferred to others. These 
resources could be instrumental in obtaining material resources, like access to land 
for Pinatubo survivors through UGNAYAN either through local arrangements with 
landlords or through a formal government resettlement programme.  
 
Strengthen people’s ‘political’ resources to stabilize and further expand effective 
agency  
CDRC explicitly intends to strengthen people’s political resources, referring to 
people’s ability to access resources, positions and power to demand safety and 
protection outside their innate social support networks. CDRC develops people’s 
political resources by developing leaderships skills, negotiation skills and speaking in 
public. Local people attend paralegal training to enhance their skills and confidence 
to negotiate with military and rebels; they receive training on human rights and 
humanitarian law, and how to report human rights violations to outsiders. CDRC 
facilitates the process of linking People’s Organisations to other People’s 
Organisations that may evolve into issue-based or sectoral alliances mobilizing so-
called ‘effective agency’ (Latour, 1986).  
 
Consider politics, power and the broader institutional context  
The Philippine experience illustrates that CBDRR interventions should not limit their 
scope to village level analysis and interventions. Communities cannot rely on them-
selves, and need collaboration with less vulnerable sectors and engagement with 
government actors beyond village level. CDRC puts emphasis on strengthening social 
and political institutions to connect grassroots people to the wider context enabling 
local people to act collectively to create space for manoeuvre, to negotiate, to 
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oppose and change unequal social relations that give rise to their vulnerability. CDRC 
views its CBDO-DR approach as a long-term political process, and not only as a series 
of short-term risk reduction interventions. This requires multiple strategies – 
immediate- and long-term - addressing multi-level institutions, involving a broad 
collaboration of actors, proper representations, and opening new arenas and strate-
gies for engagement: an engagement with government officials that varies from 
constructive relationships, to critically monitoring policy formulation and 
implementation to confrontation and opposition. In the long term, this could change 
patterns of authority and relations between government and ordinary citizens, trans-
forming and taming antagonistic relationships.  
 
While CDRC has been stressing the political nature of disaster events and responses 
since the 1980s, more researchers and policy-makers now call for a more political 
focus on risk and risk reduction (Pelling & Dill, 2009: Christoplos, 2001). This includes 
the UNISDR acknowledging that risk has moved from a technical to the political 
sphere (Wahlström, 2010). In the next chapter I will analyse the roots and political 
perspectives of other CBDRR traditions taking a historical trajectory, and analyse 
how home-grown CBDRR traditions like the Philippine one, get intertwined with 
CBDRR initiatives promoted by governments through the Hyogo Framework for 
Action. CBDRR turns out to be a politically contested approach. 
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4.                                   The social life of community-based  
disaster risk reduction  
 
“Those who put victims in the limelight without considering the political context, 
could do more harm than good” 
Achterhuis, 1999 
 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, policy-makers and practitioners rapidly adopted Community 
Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) as an alternative to top-down approaches in disaster 
management. CBDRR approaches claim to build resilient communities. To achieve this, CBDRR 
raises people’s awareness of disaster risks, using intimate local knowledge, and recognizes pre-
existing local capacities and institutions. Hereby, policy-makers and practitioners assume that 
CBDRR approaches improve the position of vulnerable, disaster-affected people by addressing 
the root causes of their vulnerability (UN-ISDR, 2005). This chapter is an account of how CBDRR 
evolved and how it has been associated with various strands of thinking, and used by particular 
social groups to strengthen the legitimacy of their agendas.  
 
Behind a shared CBDRR language, I observe differing ways in which organisations attach mean-
ing to CBDRR and ‘do CBDRR’. These variations arise because people have divergent world-
views, values, and experienced histories of their environment. People interpret and construct 
‘meaning’ of these events and experiences. For some, CBDRR means developing technical solu-
tions to improve early warning systems and cyclone shelters at local level, while for others 
CBDRR is a governance and human rights issue (Wisner & Walker, 2005b). Some consider 
CBDRR as an approach to advance local level decision-making and partnering with local govern-
ment, while others interpret CBDRR as a strategy to transform power relations, and to chal-
lenge policies responsible for generating vulnerability locally. I want to find out how these 
CBDRR variations are rooted in social, cultural and political histories, and how they interact with 
one another in the arena of explaining and responding to disasters. 
 
In this chapter I review the origins of CBDRR since the 1970s, through the life histories of people 
who wrote about their experiences to respond to disasters, who wrote about CBDRR in their 
specific local contexts and about how their view on disasters developed. I further use my own 
experience with some of these people with whom I worked, and who were part of the history 
of CBDRR in Asia. Their views on disasters are influenced by their experiences with problems of 
underdevelopment, processes of marginalization and failing government responses to recur-
rent disasters. These home-grown CBDRR-traditions have a clear political perspective. Since the 
end of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), governments have 
been promoting a CBDRR tradition that engages with multi-stakeholder platforms to enhance 
public participation and institutional reform in the field of disaster risk reduction. This approach 
– laid down in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) - supposes a harmonious interaction be-
tween the government at different levels and civil-society actors: the government shapes poli-
cies and institutional frameworks, while civil-society actors play a complementary role in sup-
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porting vulnerable communities. This approach, however, raises questions about mutual trust, 
the nature of participation of grassroots people, about representation and power dynamics 
(Warner, et al, 2002). I focus on the social and political life of CBDRR by showing how the 
approach as a package of concepts is used and appropriated by various constituencies in the 
‘political arena’ of disaster risk reduction. This chapter stresses that, conceptually, CBDRR is a 
contested approach, and makes a plea for a more explicit recognition of the contested nature 
of CBDRR policies and realities.  
 
Methodology: about personal constructs, and the social life of CBDRR 
My interest in the question of why there are different interpretations of CBDRR, despite the 
shared language in agencies’ policy documents, began when I started to move between differ-
ent CBDRR life-worlds. From 1993 until 2001, I worked for the Citizens’ Disaster Response 
Centre (CDRC) and its network, which views disasters as an opportunity for social change. For 
CDRC its CBDO-DR approach means not only addressing people’s immediate survival and 
recovery needs, but includes long-term strategies to transform social and political structures in 
society which generate vulnerability (chapter 3). From an insider’s position, I was able to gain 
insight into how CDRN constructed its CBDO-DR narrative, and I was part of its everyday prac-
tice at grassroots level.  
 
In 1999 – while still working with CDRC – I gained an outsider-position as CBDRR consultant in 
other Asian countries. This provided me with the opportunity to take a step back from CDRC, 
and to critically reflect on its practices, allowing me to better identify the challenges of CBDRR. I 
got involved in the development and facilitation of CBDRM courses1 at the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre (ADPC) in Bangkok. Most participants came from international NGOs and 
Asian national governments, and their worldviews, experiences and background often differed 
from those of the course fellows2. They interpreted CBDRM in various ways. At this point in 
time I realized for the first time that people use the same CBDRR-language but mean different 
things. These people analyse causes of disasters in terms of immediate and structural factors, 
but in their practice they view disasters mainly as external events, while largely ignoring the 
wider context (Ramalingan, et al., 2008: 13). I wished to understand the assumptions and ideas 
behind these different interpretations, and why the political perspectives, which I appreciated 
in the CBDO-DR tradition of CDRC, were absent in the CBDRR traditions promoted by the inter-
national community.  
 
To better understand the reasons behind this diversity, I decided to recount the evolution of 
CBDRR by looking into the origins of the various CBDRR traditions. I did this through a personal 
constructs approach (Robson, 2002: 366; Long, 1989: 252), by focusing on the people who 
wrote about CBDRR, and whose views and ideas inspired CDRC to construct its own CBDO-DR 
narrative. I used their life histories and careers to understand how they developed their views 
                                                 
1
  ADPC uses the term Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 
2
  The first two CBDRM courses were facilitated by Mihir Bhatt and Andrew Maskrey (1997-1998). The third course in 1999 was 
facilitated by Duryog Nivaran and ADPC, including me. Then Duryog Nivaran and CDP reviewed the CBDRM course in 2000 
and produced new course materials promoting the home-grown CBDRR tradition. In 2004, ADPC published its formal course 
CBDRM Field Practitioners Handbook taking out the political perspective on disaster response. 
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through their experiences. Not only did their ideas inspire CDRC, but their joint efforts also in-
fluenced the content of several UN policy documents on disaster risk reduction, including the 
Hyogo Framework for Action. In addition to life histories, I used narrative inquiry methods. I re-
viewed policy and workshop documents of organisations which actively promote CBDRR in Asia, 
such as Duryog Nivaran in South Asia and CDRC, two networks representing what I call ‘home-
grown’ CBDRR traditions. I further analysed texts produced by the UN-ISDR representing the 
CBDRR tradition promoted by the international community. Narrative inquiry methods aim to 
de-construct the various CBDRR narratives: how is CBDRR framed and why? What are the pri-
mary features? What are the gaps, ambiguities and contradictions within these narratives? How 
one views CBDRR has consequences for CBDRR practice, the kinds of strategy and interventions 
one selects, and who benefits from risk reduction at the grassroots level and who does not.  
 
I finally looked into the Global Network of Civil-Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction 
(GNDR). The GNDR was established in 2007 with the intention to critically monitor the govern-
ments’ progress in disaster risk reduction as laid down in the HFA, and to create one voice to 
hold governments accountable. Through the HFA, the different strands of thinking about 
CBDRR came together, when in 2008 the UNISDR invited the GNDR to come up with a ‘Views 
from the Frontline’ report to monitor the progress of the HFA. The GNDR, through its interac-
tion with the UNISDR, increasingly recognizes the ‘Views from the Frontline’ as a political in-
strument vital to understand the power dynamics within the UN system (Gibson et al, 2011). I 
followed the activities and discussion of the GNDR through its e-discussions, I attended the 
Global Network Workshop in London in January 2010, and had discussions with the chairman 
and project manager of the GNDR.  
 
Origins of ‘home-grown’ CBDRR traditions 
The origins of CBDRR-traditions are, among others, closely related to the different ways of 
‘seeing’ disasters (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009). For a long time, experts such as meteorologists, 
seismologists and volcanologists have been ‘seeing’ disasters as sudden external events caused 
by nature. Loss of life and the extent of damages are regarded as a function of the magnitude, 
frequency and intensity of the natural hazard. This view still prevails, explicitly or implicitly 
acknowledging nature or hazardous events as the cause of disaster occurrence, and has been 
called the dominant hazard-focused viewpoint (Hewitt, 1983). Since the 1970s, this view has 
received critiques challenging the argument that disasters are natural, and has been the subject 
of heated debate (O’Keefe et al., 1976, Cuny, 1983, Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984: 125, Blaikie 
et al., 1994, Quarantelli, 1998, Pelling and Dill, 2009). 
 
Phil O’Keefe, Ken Westgate and Ben Wisner, at that time linked as researchers to the Disaster 
Research Unit of Bradford University, analysed global disaster statistics from diverse interna-
tional organisations, government departments, academic institutions and insurance companies, 
and observed several tendencies. In their article “Taking the naturalness out of natural disas-
ters” (1976), they first mentioned the trend of the increase in occurrence of disasters over the 
period 1947-1970, paralleled by an increasing death toll per disaster. Secondly, they observed 
that the greatest loss of life per disaster was in developing countries. In their article they ex-
plained these observations by viewing disasters as the interface between an extreme physical 
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phenomenon and a vulnerable human population. They attributed the increasing number of 
disasters to the growing vulnerability of people to extreme physical events, accepting that no 
major geological and climatological changes took place during that period. To underscore their 
argument, the authors included a quote from Paul Richards - who was at that time working at 
the Environmental Unit in the International African Institute – which emphasizes the point that 
the ultimate causes of people’s vulnerability…. may well be traceable to the structural imbal-
ances between rich and poor countries, and we would be right to replace the term natural with 
the more appropriate term social or political disaster” (Richards, 1975: xi ). This view greatly re-
flects the experiences of disaster survivors like peasants or the urban poor in Third World coun-
tries. It also suited the Philippine context, and “Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters” 
was one of the few scientific sources the founders of CDRC used to construct their CBDO-DR 
narrative and legitimize its practice and direction.  
 
Those who actively consider the social-political environment in their disaster management 
work are mostly people who work closely with people living in adverse conditions prone to dis-
asters. These real-life experiences make them realize that disasters are much more related to 
development - which benefits the rich more than the poor - than to natural factors. One of 
these people was Frederick Cuny who witnessed many relief operations in Biafra in 1969 and in 
1971 in Bangladesh. Shocked by the mismanagement and naively conducted food distributions, 
he was determined to improve the way in which aid is offered to people in crisis (PBS online). 
Like Phil O’Keefe, Ken Westgate and Ben Wisner, Cuny stressed in his book “Disasters and 
Development” (1983) that disasters should not be treated as separate events, but that they are 
linked to poverty and vulnerability. He questioned rapid, short-term relief operations, and pro-
posed that emergency response should consider the broader development context by adding 
disaster prevention strategies. He particularly criticized regimes in Third World countries which 
perpetuated underdevelopment to maintain the status quo of their privileged class. Dole-out of 
relief goods after emergencies is a preferred strategy of these governments, which does not 
really challenge state-society relations, although this is not a guarantee. Disasters and the way 
relief is handled do impact on state-society relations as noticed by Wijkman and Timberlake in 
their book “Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?” (1984). They noticed “the creative 
side of disasters” (1984; 125) meaning that disasters can trigger societal change – even benefi-
cial change for vulnerable communities.  
 
Stressing that “...Reducing the vulnerability of the poor is a development question, and [that] 
such question should be answered politically” (Cuny, 1983: 7), is a shared perspective of the 
previously mentioned authors. However, they viewed ‘interventions’ from the perspective of 
international aid agencies, and national governments which are assumed to coordinate aid with 
voluntary agencies at grassroots level. Local communities may perceive this very differently. 
Andrew Maskrey was the first person to highlight grassroots efforts in reducing disaster risk 
from a local perspective in his publication “Disaster mitigation: a community based approach ” 
(1989). Maskrey – at that time an urban planner – started to rethink his understanding of disas-
ter management in the early 1980s, when the Peruvian government asked him to conduct an 
earthquake risk analysis for the city of Lima (Carillo et al, 2006). He discovered that the oldest 
part of the inner city, built between the 17th and 19th centuries, was most prone to earth-
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quakes. The houses – originally designed for rich households – had gradually been occupied by 
20 to 40 poor families. Lack of maintenance and overuse resulted in unsafe housing for the 
poor. Maskrey realized that disaster mitigation is not just about physical measures, but includes 
legal measures, proper urban planning and management, and economic interventions. When 
the earthquake risk assessment task was completed, “the work got stuck on the shelf [of the 
Peruvian government] and nothing happened!”. Together with colleagues he decided to create 
an NGO to work directly with local communities and local authorities. They believed that 
“nothing will happen unless people themselves who are actually affected by disasters and who 
actually suffer, politically start demanding safety and security” (Carillo et al, 2006; 45). The 
principal message of his book is that disaster risk reduction is not strictly the domain of scien-
tific and technical disciplines – the job of seismologists, meteorologists, engineers or architects 
– but is closely linked to development processes, and that grassroots people and local govern-
ments have a voice too in reducing disaster risks. In the following years, Maskrey got in touch 
with people in other parts of Latin America - from universities, NGOs, local governments and 
international organisations - sharing the same perspective. The idea of the Red de Estudios 
Sociales en Prevención de Desastres en Amėrica Latina (LA RED) was born. LA RED aimed to 
build evidence from local disaster experiences in order to advocate change in (inter)national 
policies that dealt with relief, preparedness and scientific research.  
 
In 1994 the Sri Lanka office of the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) - now 
known as Practical Action – initiated a South Asian network of organisations and individuals, 
called ‘Duryog Nivaran’ meaning disaster mitigation.  ITDG was inspired by La Red, particularly 
through ITDG’s Peru office where Andrew Maskrey was at that time director. ITDG’s Sri Lanka 
office sought out like-minded organisations in South Asia to start the network. The All India 
Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI) – one of the very active organisations in the network - was 
one of those invited to the founding meeting that shaped the network’s agenda. The overall 
aim of Duryog Nivaran is to reduce local communities’ susceptibility to disasters and conflict, by 
promoting an ‘alternative perspective’ at conceptual, policy and implementation levels of disas-
ter mitigation and development programmes in South Asia (Ariyabandu, 1999).  
 
In the Philippines, ad hoc citizens’ support to disaster survivors gave birth to the Citizens’ 
Disaster Response Network (CDRN) in 1985. Ordinary people and disaster survivors criticized 
government handling of disasters during President Marcos’ dictatorship. CDRN views disasters 
as an opportunity for social change, and relief as an entry-point for long-term organizing work. 
CDRN, La Red and Duryog Nivaran share a common perspective that disasters are a matter of 
vulnerability; that disasters are linked to processes of underdevelopment; they all critique top-
down emergency response and the dominant hazard-focused viewpoint which fails to recognize 
grassroots realities; they stress the importance of recognizing grassroots perceptions and 
efforts to respond to disasters, and therefore the need for genuine grassroots’ participation.  
 
Representatives from CDRN, Duryog Nivaran and La Red influenced policy frameworks pro-
posed by the IDNDR, especially after the mid-term IDNDR conference in Yokohama in 1994. The 
social life of CBDRR evolved from the home-grown traditions in the specific contexts of Peru, 
South Asia and the Philippines to the global level where the international community increas-
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ingly got concerned about the rise in the number of disasters. The next section will discuss how 
CBDRR got appropriated in the UN agenda to reduce disaster risks, and how its meaning got re-
framed in the process.  
 
Brief history of UN-led disaster risk reduction policy 
While Maskrey published his book on CBDM, and while in the Philippines CDRC was institution-
alised, the UN General Assembly in 1987 took the initiative for the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) from 1989 to 1999. The basic idea behind the IDNDR was 
the unacceptable rising levels of losses due to disasters on one hand, and the existence of a 
wealth of scientific and engineering know-how on the other, which could be effectively used to 
reduce these losses. Initially, governments promoted a strictly technocratic and scientific ap-
proach to reduce disaster losses. Since the mid-decade IDNDR conference in 1994 in Yokohama, 
however, also socio-economic aspects as components of effective disaster prevention were put 
into perspective (IDNDR, 1999). The participants, mainly from governments and the scientific 
community, acknowledged that social factors like cultural traditions, religion, economic stand-
ing and trust in political accountability are important factors in reducing social vulnerability too. 
The ability to do this requires knowledge and understanding of local conditions (IDNDR, 1994). 
Hence the Mid-term Review in Yokohama recommended to UN-member states to develop Na-
tional Platforms to adjust the general disaster risk reduction objectives to local conditions. 
Since the end of the 1990s the international community has started to promote community-
based approaches as a complementary strategy to national and international efforts to reduce 
risks. However, the meaning governments attach to community-based approaches rather refers 
to making disaster response more efficient than to genuinely addressing the underlying causes 
of people’s vulnerabilities.  
  
Representatives from La Red, AIDMI and CDRC attended UN conferences during the IDNDR and 
joined the group of critical and concerned observers at that time. Initially they felt marginalized, 
since the 1994 Yokohama conference was not designed to have their inputs. Several represent-
atives of NGOs from different continents met to discuss how their voice could be heard by a 
wider audience. Their shared aim was to change the dominant top-down, technocratic disaster 
management framework promoted by the IDNDR (Bhatt, 2007: 5; Davies and Myers, 1994). 
They launched the Global Forum of NGOs for Disaster Reduction (GFNDR) to share experiences, 
and promote the agenda of progressive disaster risk reduction through training and advocacy 
work, choosing Zenaida Delica, director of CDRC, as president (Delica-Willison, 2007). Unfortu-
nately, the Global Forum ceased to exist after having participated in the closing meeting of the 
IDNDR in 1999. The GFNDR was born out of frustration with the UN-meetings, and the main 
reason why it ceased to be was that such global initiative requires intensive preparations and 
thoughts about purpose, strategy, structure, management and finance. The GFNDR felt there 
was a lack of facilitation from the IDNDR secretariat to support civil society actors to participate 
in UN-conferences, and therefore questioned IDNDR’s commitment to considering local agen-
das (Delica-Willison, 2007). However, La Red, Duryog Nivaran and CDRC continued voicing their 
alternative disaster management agenda at subsequent disaster risk reduction conferences, as 
well as through ADPC and various UN institutions where some of their members found posi-
tions later on. 
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After the IDNDR, the UN General Assembly decided to continue its activities in disaster reduc-
tion and established the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR). The Secretariat’s mandate is to engage with as many different actors as pos-
sible, and as such it encourages an open debate, allowing different views on disaster manage-
ment within the UN-system (Christoplos, et al., 2005). Civil society actors from disaster-affected 
countries in particular, perceive the secretariat as an ally in advocating CBDRR approaches 
within the UN system and in reforming traditional disaster management structures. In the pro-
cess to prepare for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Kobe in 2005, the 
secretariat collected comments from civil society actors on the WCDR draft programme out-
comes, of which some are integrated in the official Hyogo Declaration, adopted by 168 gov-
ernments.  
 
Since the start of the IDNDR in 1990, governments have met every five years to discuss strate-
gies and progress made to respond effectively to disasters. The Hyogo Framework for Action 
should be interpreted as part of this process, and builds on previous documents like Strategy 
for a safer world in the 21st century (IDNDR, 1999) and Living with Risk: a global review of disas-
ter reduction initiatives (UNISDR, 2004). Coming from governments’ predominant practice of 
top-down reactive emergency responses, the focus in the HFA document shifted towards disas-
ter preparedness, which is a positive development in reducing, at least, people’s physical vul-
nerability. The HFA reflects a growing coherence in ideas and views - at least at policy level. 
Civil-society actors like Bhatt (2007) argue, however, that the HFA is still a top-down, UN and 
donor-driven process, and although many civil-society actors are currently involved and con-
sulted, “the process is still decided at the top, not according to local agendas” (Bhatt, 2007: 5). 
It is important to view the HFA document as the outcome of a political process of making 
choices, as an interactive process of pulling and pushing between CBDRR advocates and re-
sistant members within the UN-family, who frame, advise, and negotiate changes reflecting 
their perspectives. CBDRR is not a ‘thing’ or ‘solid object’ but rather an idea operated through 
actors, their relationships and interactions through which CBDRR gets different meanings and 
intentions, to which I refer to as ‘the social life of CBDRR’. 
 
The social life of CBDRR: diversity in meaning and perspectives of actors  
The HFA is a compromise on numerous issues. Bisiaux (2005) provides insight into the various 
debates and views during the WCDR. The cluster panel on reducing underlying risk factors, for 
instance – in which CBDRR advocates participated – highlighted the challenge of a lack of com-
mon terminology and of differing frames, which hampers creating effective partnerships in dis-
aster risk reduction. By looking into the backstage dynamics and negotiations among various 
actors leading to the HFA, and through narrative inquiry of policy documents, I studied what 
meaning governments attach to CBDRR and its goals. Here I focus on the various concepts 
which make up CBDRR according to the UNISDR, like ‘disaster’, ‘community’, ‘participation’ 
‘vulnerability’, ‘risk’, ‘partnerships’ and ‘resilience’. By establishing what is in the texts and what 
is not, what is vague and what is clear, I will set out who is in and who is out (Fairclough, 2003, 
Lakoff, 2000).  
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Disasters as external extraordinary events 
In Resolution 1 of the HFA, the governments state that “We are convinced that disasters seri-
ously undermine the results of development investments in a very short time, and therefore, re-
main a major impediment to sustainable development and poverty eradication” (UNISDR, 2005: 
p. 3). Governments view disasters as an interruption of development and normalcy. In this view 
disasters are external, extraordinary, uncertain events with unanticipated damages (Hewitt, 
1983; Gaillard, 2010). During the WCDR, participants debated about the ‘naturalness’ of disas-
ters and whether the framework should include natural hazards only, or those induced by hu-
man processes as well, like industrial and nuclear power plant accidents. Despite resistance 
from Iranian representatives, the final document definitions and scope include now both types 
of hazards (Bisiaux, 2005: 5), although they are not analysed as political events. Compared to 
the IDNDR, disasters are not necessarily ‘natural’ anymore, but still regarded as sudden, unex-
pected and external events. 
 
The HFA frames the problem of disasters in terms of losses due to a lack of disaster risk aware-
ness, and more implicitly the lack of legislation and poor coordination between different actors. 
The HFA proposes five priority areas to substantially reduce disaster losses (UNISDR, 2005, p. 
11-18): 
(1)   Ensure that DRR is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for imple-
mentation;  
(2)   Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;  
(3)   Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all 
levels;  
(4)   Reduce the underlying risk factors;  
(5)   Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.  
 
These five areas for action are based on an image that fits well with the institutional needs of 
the UN. The HFA constructs an image of governments being inefficient to adequately respond 
to disasters at the local level. Poor coordination between the various actors and the lack of 
legislation are not perceived as political problems, but as a lack of knowledge and information, 
scarcity of financial resources and unclear authority at the local government level (UNISDR, 
2005). Structural change to build a culture of safety and resilience is therefore a matter of in-
forming and educating people at all levels, adopting early warning using appropriate technolo-
gies, and devolving roles and responsibilities for DRR to the local levels. The final document is 
silent on the role of the UN and World Bank in promoting investments that fail to consider dis-
aster risks and generate disaster vulnerability, although this topic was debated in the main 
committee (Bisiaux, 2005: 7). During the closing session of the WCDR, the Civil Society Address 
to the WCDR, delivered by Zenaida Delica3,  pointed out that the sharp debates and insights ex-
changed during the thematic discussions did not reach the final document, and stated that 
governments were avoiding to take responsibility instead of making the strongest commitment 
to DRR (ibid: 18). The HFA escapes political debates on DRR by casting problems and solutions 
                                                 
3
  Former Executive Director of CDRC and at the time of the WCDR working at ADPC in Bangkok as Director of Education and 
Training. 
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in technical terms, and legitimizing governments’ role in times of emergencies as central com-
mands, who timely warn and efficiently coordinate disaster responses (ibid: 20). Root causes of 
people’s vulnerability to hazards and ‘the political’ continue to be ignored in UN policies and 
actions (Wisner and Walker, 2005a: 90). The following section aims to uncover the meaning the 
UN attach to concepts that make up CBDRR, and when and how they leave ‘the political’ out of 
their policies.  
 
Grassroots people as ‘proper beneficiaries’  
How governments view grassroots people, their communities, and what is expected from them 
is not univocally formulated in sequential policy documents. ‘Community’ is defined as “A social 
group which has a number of things in common such as shared experience, locality, culture, 
heritage and social interests (UNISDR, 2004: 177). “Politics and financial disparities exist in most 
villages and neighbourhoods so, it becomes important to identify shared values and concerns” 
(UNISDR, 2004: 186). These quotes imply that governments focus their attention on ‘the com-
mon good’. Emphasizing shared values, community cohesion and common interests is func-
tional for mobilizing purposes, and leads to an a-political formulation of community problems 
(Pelling, 2007: 378). By focusing on the common good, people are detached from their social, 
economic and political context, and the unequal power relationships between local actors are 
neutralized. But who then are mobilized? Not all community members have equal access to 
community institutions and resources. Particular subgroups like landless workers, migrants, 
women, or minority ethnic groups have distinct priorities or interests, which tend to be sub-
sumed by decision-making processes that are ‘consensus-based’ and framed as serving ‘the 
common good’. The ones mobilized for decision-making are therefore usually prominent com-
munity people like local leaders, local elites and their kinship networks.  
 
The Living with Risk publication further mentions that “Communities cannot implement com-
munity-based disaster mitigation plans on their own” (UNISDR, 2004: 177-178). This quote 
could mean, like CDRC explains, that addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability requires 
the involvement of multiple actors beyond community level to challenge multi-level institu-
tions. Since the UNISDR does not intend to do this, it is more likely that UNISDR either views 
grassroots people as incapable, unable to protect themselves and dependent on government 
response; or that governments do not allow local people to take initiative. The UNISDR explains 
that the initiative for CBDRR is located at the local government level which will decide how to 
involve citizens and which citizens. Here, ‘community’ has an administrative meaning and a 
formal leadership structure with an elected village head and appointed councillors (Allen, 2006: 
84). The Living with Risk text further implies that local government officials control the partici-
patory process to assess risks rather than sharing power to debate and define risk together with 
grassroots people while recognizing their – often differing - risk perceptions. The HFA con-
structs an image of the regions and people affected by disasters as under-developed, ignorant, 
un-informed, un-prepared, and un-planned (see Hewitt, 1983 for a critique; Gaillard, 2010), and 
need therefore to be informed, motivated and educated about risk and what to do in times of 
emergency. It detaches people’s vulnerability from the institutional context while depoliticizing 
disaster events.  
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Participation as a policy tool 
The HFA considers scientific and technical knowledge essential to reduce risk, but mentions 
that this information does not reach local populations automatically (UNISDR, 2004: 180). 
Therefore public awareness is one of the priority actions where experts provide information to 
local people in a culturally appropriate manner. On the other hand, “over-reliance on technical 
experts and one-way communication is ineffective”, and “special effort is required to recall 
locally-valued traditional coping mechanisms” (UNISDR, 2004: 180). Community participation 
here is regarded as instrumental, as a necessity for effective communication and appropriate 
management giving grassroots people ‘the chance to influence decisions and manage resources 
to reduce their vulnerability” (UNISDR, 2004: 180). Participation is supposed to increase the 
success of policy and management (Warner et al, 2002: 14). Implicitly, participation means con-
sultation, listening and understanding risks to which they are exposed, and what to do when 
hazards occur. Participation is not meant here to question or confront power inequalities that 
generate disaster vulnerability, because as said earlier, governments depoliticize disaster 
events, and detach disaster affected  people from their social and  institutional context. In prac-
tice however, ‘participation’ is not something people will ‘do’ when asked, since people always 
participate in on-going events, and practice their everyday politics to influence and respond to 
these events even if they are not asked to participate (Long, 1992; Kerkvliet, 2009). Ineffective 
communication and disaster response are likely to be caused by power differentials rather than 
by a lack of knowledge and preparedness measures. 
 
Participation is further seen as a way of tapping people’s local knowledge. The UNISDR refers to 
local knowledge as practices developed by a group of people from an advanced understanding 
of the local environment, which has been formed over numerous generations of habitation 
(UNISDR, 2008: vii). The UNISDR distinguishes local knowledge from other types of knowledge 
in that it originates from the community, that it is disseminated through informal means, it is 
collectively owned, subject to adaptation, and embedded in a community’s way of life as a 
means of survival. Most common examples of the use of local knowledge are indigenous warn-
ing signals for impending danger, building-techniques to withstand typhoons, floods and earth-
quakes, and mutual help systems like bayanihan in the Philippines. These localized technical 
solutions to respond to disasters form just bits and pieces of what constitutes local knowledge; 
local risk perspectives and differing risk interests are not analysed. 
 
Increasingly, international NGOs look beyond a hazard event, and consider people’s perspec-
tives by taking into account how hazards interact with their experiences of vulnerability and 
their livelihoods. In discussions with government however, the scope of risk assessments re-
mains an on-going debate. During the third session of the Global Platform for DRR in Geneva 
from 8-13 May 2011, a few civil society organisations pointed to the narrowly defined hazard-
focused viewpoint on DRR, and referred to, for instance, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
affecting the livelihoods of fishermen, and the population of Pakistan whose exposure to 
terrorism causes more fear and danger than the country’s experienced floods and earthquake 
(online debate moderated by GNDR, 2011). “Let us focus on natural disasters only, otherwise 
our work becomes too complex!” was a serious remark however, of one of the organisers of a 
workshop on good practices in CBDRR and strategies to partner with local governments. The 
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HFA prefers to focus on natural hazards only instead of people’s broader risk landscape. A 
narrow definition of disaster risk means a simplification of reality, conceals the everyday life-
worlds and interests of local poor people, while escaping politics (after Li: 2002). 
 
‘Risk’ or ‘vulnerability’ language? 
In contrast to home-grown CBDRR traditions, the HFA uses ‘risk’ language more frequently than 
the term ‘vulnerability’. ‘Risk’ is defined as “the probability of harmful consequences, or ex-
pected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activities disrupted or environ-
ment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and 
vulnerable conditions (UNISDR, 2004: 6). This risk definition largely matches the technocratic 
and scientific view of disasters, which I discussed in chapter 3. The Living with Risk document 
spends a whole chapter on understanding the nature of risk (ibid: 35-77) and that risk is rooted 
in physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerability.  Physical vulnerability refers here 
to e.g. exposure, density of populations and design of infrastructure. Social vulnerability in-
cludes aspects of illiteracy, access to human rights, health, social cohesion, gender roles, tradi-
tional knowledge and power relations. These factors are presenting a list of aspects that people 
lack or have problems with, without an explanation or reference to the underlying societal 
causes. Likewise, economic vulnerability refers to the economic status of people, like a lack of 
income and access to loans and credit, without explaining the interrelationships and economic 
dynamics between the poor and wealthier segments in society. Environmental vulnerability in-
cludes natural resource depletion and the state of resource degradation. In the end these vul-
nerability factors are presented as facts and conditions which increase people’s susceptibility to 
hazards. The chapter continues to discuss the frequency and intensity of the various hazards 
with the related damages of each particular hazard, and looks to trends in people’s vulnerability 
- translating ‘uncertainties’ into ‘probabilities’ (Althaus, 2005). By focusing on risk in terms of 
probabilities, and vulnerability factors in terms of susceptibility, the HFA ignores the social, 
economic and political origins of disaster vulnerability (Wisner and Walker, 2005a). As a conse-
quence, ‘risk reduction’ is mainly dealt with in terms of technical and physical solutions 
(Cannon, 2000). 
 
Reducing the underlying risk factors is one of the priority actions in the HFA. It promotes strate-
gies which deal with institutional reform, like improving communication channels, land-use 
planning, access to safety-nets, or are physical in nature. They leave existing power relations 
unchallenged. Local government officials particularly prefer engineering and physical projects 
since these are visible showing the electorate and potential investors that government is re-
sponding to risk (Pelling, 2003: 49). These physical projects do not threaten the status quo, but 
neither are they a-political. Pelling (2003) argues that contractors and even political leaders 
benefit economically from such investments and in this way reinforce existing power disparities 
in society.  
 
The UNISDR definition of risk does mention people’s vulnerable conditions, but ‘the why’ re-
mains unmentioned. The Living with Risk document explains that the reason why especially 
poor people are worst affected by disasters, “is because the poor outnumber the rich and live in 
greater density in more poorly built housing on land most at risk” (UNISDR, 2004, p. xi). This im-
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plies that HFA views vulnerability in terms of numbers, poverty, and physical exposure to hazard 
events, not in terms of marginalized or excluded segments of society like Maskrey did when he 
made the same observation in Lima, Peru. The HFA does not question why so many poor peo-
ple live in unsafe housing on land most at risk. To illustrate, the UN attribute the high number 
of casualties in the Haitian earthquake to poverty and lack of preparedness measures (Maigna, 
2010), not to the neo-liberal policies of the US and the World Bank in the past, instructing the 
Haitian government to abandon its agricultural past and develop a robust, export-oriented 
manufacturing sector in its capital city (Lindskoog, 2010). Many Haitians migrated to the city 
forced into low-paying jobs sewing baseballs and assembling other products, while living in in-
creasingly crowded slums (ibid). “Vulnerability’ is narrowly defined as physical exposure omit-
ting the larger political historical context.  
 
Platforms and partnerships 
Forming National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction, networking, building links, cross sector 
coordination and partnerships are key-words used to express intentions for more inclusive and 
effective collaboration. The spectrum for collaboration varies from sharing information to 
undertaking joint strategic planning and programming (UNISDR, 2004; 223). According to 
Warner (2007) the international community perceives platforms and networks for cooperation 
as problem-solving institutional innovations: involving multiple voices is a new way forward to 
address complexity and diversity, and is believed to be broadly accepted. This fits within the 
liberal thought, which recognizes multiple perspectives and values, but when put together, they 
constitute a harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble, negating ‘the political’ in society 
(Mouffe, 2005: 10). 
 
This approach, however, raises questions about mutual trust, the nature of participation of 
grassroots people, about representation and power dynamics (Warner et al., 2002). Therefore, 
we shouldn’t simply see these platforms and partnerships as the ultimate goal to ensure that all 
stakeholders are involved. Grassroots representatives could only benefit from such platforms if 
they have the capacity, confidence and opportunity to negotiate with local government officials 
and local elite to have their voices reflected in the decisions taken to obtain protection, and 
when they are recognized as legitimate opponents (Mouffe, 2005: 20-21). This does not happen 
overnight given power inequalities, limitations to genuine participation and differing mind-sets.  
 
The notion of ‘empowerment’ is absent in the HFA document. Its belief in harmonious partner-
ships and platforms does not require a concept like ‘empowerment’, because the existence of 
power differentials in society is denied. In the liberal view on DRR, the notion of ‘empower-
ment’ has been replaced by ‘partnerships and platforms’. 
 
One area where partnerships have proven their value is early warning. Therefore the HFA 
stresses the importance of “institutional capacities to ensure that early warning systems are 
well integrated into government policy and decision-making processes” at different levels 
(UNISDR, 2005: 13). The death toll of cyclones in Bangladesh significantly went down thanks to 
early warning mechanisms and involvement of community people. But whereas the number of 
disaster deaths has gone down by 30% over the last two decades, the number of people 
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affected by disasters has gone up by 59%, despite technical fixes like warning systems, better 
communication and cyclone shelters (Wisner and Walker, 2005b). This increase can be 
attributed to people’s increasing vulnerability to disasters due to unfavourable economic poli-
cies related to processes of liberalization, privatization and globalization, to environmental 
degradation, to increasing occurrence of violence, and to erratic weather conditions due to 
climate change (Wisner et al., 2004).  
 
Resilient communities 
The HFA document defines ‘resilience’ as described in the working definitions in chapter 1: 
 
“The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by 
resisting or changing in order to reach or maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organiz-
ing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection 
and to improve risk reduction measures” (UNISDR, 2004: 6 volume II). 
 
This definition frames resilience no longer within the “back to normalcy and recovery” strand of 
thinking, but as the ability to learn to live with change and the capacity to deal with it. However 
it still has a hazard-focused viewpoint, and the explanatory text in Living with Risk on resilient 
communities (UNISDR, 2004: 139-141) focuses on tools and strategies for hazard reduction and 
risk management like urban designs, regulations and resources to protect assets. The text men-
tions support to institutions that are responsible for crisis management, response and recovery. 
Institutions refer specifically to local government authorities. The hazard is the central event in 
building resilient communities, not the processes, policies and institutions in society that gen-
erated the vulnerable conditions in the first place. The HFA document expresses ‘Disasters can 
be substantially reduced if people are well informed  and motivated towards a culture of disas-
ter prevention and resilience’ (UNISDR, 2005: 14). Resilience is a matter of sufficient know-how 
and collection, compilation and dissemination of knowledge to local levels to enable communi-
ties to withstand and recover from hazards and changed circumstances. This notion of 
‘resilience’ expects people to adapt endlessly to their circumstances, not the circumstances to 
people’s risky lives. 
 
In summary, the CBDRR-tradition developed by the international community is an approach ini-
tiated and led by the local government, where grassroots people are educated on what to do in 
case of a disaster or how to best prepare for it. CBDRR activities that will reduce disaster risk 
consist of influencing people’s awareness and behaviour in times of disasters, and technical 
measures. Volunteers groups and committees to take on specific disaster preparedness 
measures are formed – following more or less a standard format. When these actions are 
taken, the government intends to restore ‘normalcy’. In essence, this CBDRR-tradition still 
resonates with the dominant, top-down, hazard-focused approach to disaster response. Figure 
4.1 shows the  implicit interpretations and worldviews behind the HFA-promoted CBDRR-tradi-
tion and the home-grown CBDRR tradition. In reality, CBDRR-practice switches between the 
two CBDRR extremes as visualized through their features on the continua presented in Figure 
4.1. Seeing the continua as a volume-bar of a radio, one can hear some voices louder than 
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others, when moving the volume-bar between the features of the home-grown and HFA 
CBDRR-traditions, or when regarding the figure as a DJ’s mixing panel, some features will reso-
nate stronger with one CBDRR-tradition than the other. 
 
Figure 4.1: Nature of CBDRR traditions expressed through their primary features on the continua 
 
Origin 
 
View on disasters 
 
 
Purpose 
 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
Priority in inter-
vention 
 
 
Participation 
 
Levels involved 
 
 
Community 
 
 
 
Resources 
 
 
 
Longevity 
 
Internationally negotiated                                                Home-grown, locally negotiated 
 
External event                                                                     Matter of vulnerability –  
                                                                                               Opportunity for social change 
 
Reduces people’s physical                                                Social transformation 
exposure to hazards 
 
Natural hazards                                                                   Integrates everyday livelihoods, 
restoring normalcy                                                              security concerns with preparing for 
disruption/disaster/conflict  
 
Physical measures, early                                                    Strengthening community  
warning, awareness raising                                               institutions, mobilizing collective action 
life-saving actions                                                                 
 
Consultation, project-focus                                              Empowering, process-focus 
 
Multi-level partnerships,                                                    Multi-level, multi actor collaboration 
harmonious cooperation                                                    in power force field 
 
Administrative unit of local                                                Most vulnerable groups, recognizing  
government, “common good”                                           local elite  
approach 
 
External funds                                                                      Locally generated resources, volunta-
rism, political commitment, external 
funds 
 
On-off through platforms                                                  Dynamic and adaptive to changing 
institutional context 
 
CBDRR is a contested approach: different interpretations and divergent practices 
The origins of CBDRR lay in the critique of the top-down, single-event relief operations of 
governments. Although the UN has recognized the importance of involving local communities in 
disaster risk reduction, its CBDRR-tradition still resonates a lot with top-down, short-term and 
isolated responses. In particular, the political connotation that was essential to the original con-
ception of CBDRR has become marginal to mainstream CBDRR. Behind a shared CBDRR 
language, home-grown and mainstream CBDRR-traditions represent different origins that 
attach radically different meanings to CBDRR and the related concepts. The home-grown 
CBDRR views disasters as the outcome of bad governance, while the mainstream CBDRR views 
disasters as external events disrupting and undermining development investments (Bankoff & 
Hilhorst, 2009). Both CBDRR-traditions support people to build their resilience to disasters. The 
mainstream CBDRR does so through risk awareness raising, disaster preparedness, physical 
measures, safety-net mechanisms and institutional reforms, among others, while the home-
grown CBDRR regards disasters as an opportunity for social change, therefore viewing CBDRR as 
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a long-term community capacity building process to enable vulnerable groups to demand safety 
and protection. CBDRR is a contested approach, not simply because people cannot agree on a 
common definition, but because they have different worldviews and intentions in mind that 
determine their actions. This causes misunderstanding and confusion but also irritation and 
agony. These emotional experiences refer to the existence of ‘politics’, to a political arena 
where different views on what CBDRR is, interact (Mouffe, 2005). 
 
During the course of this research however, I noticed that since the Hyogo Declaration in 2005, 
national governments increasingly recognize civil society organisations as important actors in 
disaster risk reduction despite their differing views and intentions. Both in the Philippines and 
Indonesia new legislation on disaster risk reduction was formulated and enacted with the active 
involvement of civil society organisations. There is still a long way to go, though. Many govern-
ments do not prioritize, lack the resources, or are reluctant to implement policies or legislation 
at the local levels which favour vulnerable communities. In general, their aim is to return to 
‘normalcy’ after a disaster hit, as espoused in the definitions and views in the HFA signed by 
168 governments, which usually does not change the status quo. Equally, involving disaster-
affected communities in local decision-making will also not automatically lead to reducing their 
vulnerability, if we do not ask whose risks are being prioritized and who decides which risk re-
duction measures will be implemented. Christoplos et al. (2001) mention the need for a shift 
from a focus on which technical solution works, towards a concentration on the political pro-
cess of how these choices are made and their impact. 
 
While I conclude that CBDRR is a contested approach, I think it is important to view the estab-
lishment of platforms and partnerships, as proposed in the HFA, as a means to encourage 
agonic relationships between governments and civil society organisations (Mouffe, 2005). This 
may bring the various actors closer to finding a match between technical solutions and institu-
tional reforms to create safer communities on the one hand, while on the other hand grass-
roots’ collective action beyond community level will still be needed to change the political 
climate in favour of the most vulnerable on the long run. The next section discusses how the 
home-grown CBDRR traditions got intertwined with the UNISDR and governments’ promoted 
CBDRR strand of thinking through their monitoring activities to assess the progress of the HFA 
after Kobe. The match has not yet been found, nor did values change. What did change is that 
the initiatives of several passionate civil society actors who were critical at the WCDR in Kobe 
expanded to a global movement of civil society organisations which has become a legitimate 
player in the international arena on DRR.    
 
Beyond Kobe – CBDRR as a political construct in the UN – civil society arena on DRR 
During the Kobe conference in January 2005, a coherence in messages could be heard from 
donors, governments and civil society organisations to build common views and consensus on 
DRR. Particularly the civil society organisations had a strong rationale for forming or reviving a 
civil society network to collect good local DRR practices, case studies and to have one voice in 
monitoring the governments’ progress as laid down in the HFA. In this context, the Global 
Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR) was formally established 
in 2007, but like the GFNDR in the 1990s, it lacked funding and consisted only of a group of in-
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dividuals, wondering how it could mobilize civil society in disaster-prone countries to join the 
network, and  about what should be the added value of joining the network. Within a year they 
were invited by the UNISDR, by Andrew Maskrey, to get involved in monitoring the progress of 
the HFA made until 2009. 
 
Andrew Maskrey joined the UN in 1999, and in 2008 he was responsible for the coordination of 
the UN Global Assessment Review (GAR), which is a self-assessment done by government offi-
cials at the national levels of their progress concerning the five action points in the HFA. The 
GAR is done in all 168 countries which signed the HFA in 2005. Andrew Maskrey was concerned 
that this would be a meaningless exercise if the local level wouldn’t be involved. Therefore he 
proposed that the GNDR could do a local level assessment with local level government officials, 
“to demonstrate the divide between policies established at national level, and implementation 
at the local level“ (Gibson and Namisi, 2011).  
 
The GNDR however insisted on conducting an independent assessment to be able to be more 
critical to governments than the UN is able to do. Besides, the GNDR insisted on also consulting 
local populations affected by disasters – to collect ‘views from the frontline’ - as they are ulti-
mately intended to benefit from the HFA (ibid: 4). The ‘Views from the Frontline’ project was 
the activity that brought the Global Network together involving 48 countries in Africa, Asia and 
the Americas, and mobilised over 400 civil society organisations which collected responses from 
about 7000 people4 (GNDR, 2009). The overarching goal was to present robust data reflecting 
the perceptions of local actors on their respective government’s DRR performance. 
  
The Views from the Frontline report “Clouds but little rain...” revealed a contrast between the 
national self-assessments reported in the UNISDR’s GAR, and the local level perceptions based 
on the VFL survey. The data reinforced the message that policy at the international level is not 
leading to effective implementation at the frontline. “At national level there has been  invest-
ment in institutional frameworks, science and technology, and new policies and legislation for 
disaster risk reduction. However, for people at the frontline trying to handle the practical conse-
quences of vulnerability to disaster, national policy has not yet yielded the fruits of these in-
vestments on the ground” (GNDR, 2009: 11).  
 
When taking a closer look at the country scores, the Philippines scored best of all participating 
countries in terms of DRR performance described as ‘some progress but with significant scope 
for improvement’. The VFL report indicates that in the Philippines, government culture is sup-
portive and open to the formation of local partnerships between government, civil society and 
communities. The report attributes the high score to the frequent occurrence of disasters in the 
Philippines requiring a proactive approach in DRR. Chapter 3 revealed that the supportive and 
open attitude of the Philippine government is limited to specific government departments. It is 
likely that the active lobby work of DRRnetPhil contributed to this score, since they are part of 
the GNDR and participated in the VFL. Afghanistan scored very low, since local people re-
sponded that progress was made to a very limited extent. Indonesia ranks in the better part of 
                                                 
4 Compared to less than a hundred respondents in the UNISDR assessment 
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the average scores. Remarkably, both the ‘Views from the Frontline’ and the Global Assessment 
Review found “that countries that have made the greatest progress are the ones that adopted 
local community-based approaches” (GNDR, 2009: 13). Especially when these are supported by 
decentralisation processes and government-civil society partnerships.  
 
The GNDR secured space in the main plenary session of the Global Platform on DRR in 2009 to 
present the report, and it featured in many discussions. The immediate achievement of the 
‘Views from the Frontline’ effort in the conference was the chair’s closing statement that high-
lighted the need for increased recognition of grassroots processes. The global network mem-
bers felt proud, but basically, this statement was already made 15 years ago during the mid-
decade IDNDR conference in 1994 in Yokohama. The difference is that now civil-society repre-
sentatives got access to the discussions and participated in the conference, while before they 
had the status of observers.  
 
Civil society’s policy influence or co-optation? 
Six months after the global platform conference, GNDR organised its first Global Network 
Workshop in London from 25-27th January, 2010. The aim was to reflect on the VFL, on the 
added value of the GNDR and on its future. In the meantime Andrew Maskrey requested the 
GNDR to produce another VFL report in 2011. However the opinions and views of the GNDR 
members present at the workshop varied and many questions were raised. The main discussion 
circled around the kind of relationship the GNDR wished to have with the UN. The UN was 
represented in this Global Network Workshop by Margareta Wahlstrӧm, the head of the 
UNISDR, and Andrew Maskrey. Both stressed the important role the GNDR can play in support-
ing and advising the UN. Margareta Wahlstrӧm articulated the need for a more political focus 
on risk and risk reduction as one of the major challenges ahead. She particularly referred to 
moving the DRR agenda to action point number 4 – addressing the underlying risk factors – and 
preferably to do this together with the GNDR. She views the GNDR as a strong partner of the 
UNISDR. “During the 2007 Platform meeting, civil society showed its traditional behaviour, criti-
cal, negative and feeling marginalized, while in the 2009 Platform meeting you were more con-
structive, showed self-confidence which is important to build trust between you and us” – 
Margareta Wahlstrӧm.  Andrew Maskrey also expressed his wish for a close cooperation with 
the GNDR particularly now “risk discussions are moving from technical to the political sphere”. 
He referred to conducting the GAR together with the GNDR to improve progress indicators, to 
integrate GAR and VFL dialogues, to deconstruct ‘risk’ to provide more concrete recommenda-
tions to governments, and to uncover cost-benefits analysis which are often hidden in reports. 
They both have an interest in reforming the UNISDR agenda, and invite the GNDR to support 
them. 
 
In small working groups, GNDR representatives discussed future aims and role of the GNDR. 
They questioned whether the HFA is the right framework to measure DRR progress, proposing 
to enrich the HFA with more comprehensive progress markers, particularly in the area of action 
point number 4, i.e. addressing the underlying risk factors. Others remarked that the ‘Views 
from the frontline’ is not just about measuring progress but also a tool to influence govern-
ments’ actions.  A concrete example was proposed to lobby for more DRR resources at the local 
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level. “90% of DRR resources go to the national level, so the GNDR should lobby for more re-
sources for the local level”. According to GNDR’s chairperson “governments allocate resources 
through channels where they can maintain the status quo, and this is not in the interest of the 
vulnerable sectors”.   
 
Several GNDR members from Europe stressed the need to keep its distant position to criticize 
the particular UN policies and decisions. For instance, “Civil society can engage with the UNISDR 
to push the UN to address the underlying risk factors, but this is a challenge for the UN since 
many UN economic policies are contradictory to DRR actions. So civil society needs space to be 
critical to the UN as well”. GNDR members from the disaster affected regions, felt that the VFL 
activity was more than collecting data and views from the frontline. The process of data collec-
tion created opportunities for partnerships at the local and national levels through meeting ac-
tors they previously had no access to. It also created advocacy conditions at national levels and 
it contributed to multi-stakeholder efforts (Gibson et al, 2011). GNDR members concluded that 
the VFL had not only mobilized civil society worldwide but also claimed and created political 
spaces within their home-countries. GNDR uses Gaventa’s framework (2006: 26) defining 
‘spaces’ as “opportunities, moments, and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect 
policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests”.  These 
spaces however are not neutral but shaped by power relations which set the boundaries for 
who can participate and who cannot, and in which role or identity (Gaventa, 2006).   
 
John Gaventa, who was one of the invited speakers at the Global Network Workshop, argued 
that the VFL participatory monitoring of the HFA’s progress will be unsustainable and 
frustrating, when the GNDR cannot be involved in the UNISDR policy formulation. The UN as an 
institution does not create space to officially respond to the VFL findings. Therefore, Gaventa 
recommended to the GNDR to work on both sides: to strengthen local voices and  to find the 
champions within the government and UN who hold the doors open for civil society to reform 
UN policies5. The GNDR then proposed to examine how the various spaces it entered were 
created, in whose interest and what the terms of engagement were. Because of the momen-
tum and unexpected positive impact of VFL 2009, the GNDR decided to conduct VFL 2011 and 
to reflect in depth on the future afterwards. The design of the VFL 2011 put greater emphasis 
on presenting material from the local and national level surveying local risk governance, and to 
expand the number of respondents through texting-surveys. 
 
The second VFL report (2011) “If we do not join hands...” was based on 20,000 people in 69 
countries who responded to the 2011 survey, and on 36,000 people who replied through text-
messaging. The focus of this VFL report was on local risk governance. Key findings showed that 
government functions of coordination, planning and partnerships are not being matched with 
by sufficient expertise and financial resources for effective implementation at the local level 
(ibid: 15). 57% of people felt disasters losses have increased over the last five years compared 
with only 21% who felt disaster losses have decreased.  
 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.globalnetwork-dr.org/home.html and go to Global Network YouTube Channel. 
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The GAR reported the HFA progress differently: “The Mid-Term Review states that significant 
progress is being made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action and that its 
principles have been firmly established and endorsed. The discussions at the Third Session 
demonstrated that we now possess the knowledge, the means and the commitment to make 
disaster risk reduction a national, local and international priority. There is a sense of urgency 
and clear political and economic imperatives to invest in disaster risk reduction” – point 4 of the 
Chair’s Summary.  
 
The GNDR felt highly disappointed and frustrated after two iterations, in 2009 and 2011, of 
conducting the “Views from the Frontline” (VFL). Where the GNDR delegates got official seats in 
2009 – in the back row – in 2011 they were relegated to observer status in the balcony. They 
were particularly frustrated that two surveys – GAR and VFL - based on well documented facts, 
led to a significantly different interpretation of the progress and constraints in reducing disaster 
risk. “We are simply being drawn into the system to support the status quo rather than 
influence and change policy” – GNDR-member (Gibson et al, 2011: 15). The GNDR felt that the 
Chair’s Summary only paid lip service to the goal of the conference. No concrete, measurable 
goals were formulated for the next two years. The GNDR decided, in response, to draft a 
‘shadow statement’ with measurable outcomes at 2013 (GNDR, 2011).  
 
“We, as representatives of civil-society organisations working alongside vulnerable people 
primarily in low and low-middle income countries, believe the official UN statement provides 
an incomplete and overly optimistic assessment of progress towards the HFA expected out-
come. The official summary omits to report on the continued upwards trend in disaster 
losses, particularly the realities of implementation of the HFA at the local level, despite this 
being the required goal of the HFA. In so doing it does not take into account some of the key 
findings of national, regional and international studies and reports (including GAR 2009 & 
2011; HFA Mid-Term Review;  Views from the Frontline 2009 & 2011) which provide strong 
evidence of a persisting and growing gap between policy and practice” (GNDR, 2011: 1). 
 
The GNDR inserted the image of “running up the down escalator” to express its struggle against 
the current trend of substantial increase in disaster losses by 2015. The number of disasters, 
including the unrecorded small and frequently occurring disasters, is expected to increase due 
to climate change and a rising exposure and people’s vulnerability (UN and World Bank, 2010). 
And very few governments and inter-governmental organisations are able to address the un-
derlying risk factors that are configuring the rapid growth of risk. Despite the expansion of the 
network members, the GNDR felt frustrated. The 2009 and 2011 VFL demonstrated that the 
HFA was not achieving its goals, and that there appeared to be no concrete progress in shifting 
paradigms or towards measurable locally oriented action.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Following the interactions between civil society and the UN in the area of (CB)DRR, specifically 
during the last three years between the GNDR and the UNISDR, revealed some insights about 
why the political perspective and concrete changes towards local level actions are being subor-
dinated, resulting in the maintenance of the status quo. The first refers to the dynamics be-
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tween the UN as an institution, and its state-level actors and the UNISDR. The UNISDR seems to 
be limited in its ability to be critical of member states, and their interactions should be viewed 
as ‘saying the right things without provoking its members’ (Gibson et al, 2011). In this light it 
needs civil-society groups to speak up for them, which explains Wahlstrӧm’s and Maskrey’s 
various attempts to invite GNDR to work with them, stressing their inter-dependence. UN 
agencies are not hegemonic structures, but they are influential and not isolated from changes 
in society (Ilcan and Philips, 2006). Wahlstrӧm and Maskrey are very aware of all the current 
trends and threats, using NGO language in their discussions, and try to enrol civil society in their 
agendas. A second reason is that the UN still regards the knowledge and opinions of experts, 
scientists and authorities more accurate, relevant and privileged over local and indigenous 
knowledge, thereby ignoring or absorbing – read neutralizing – the ‘Views from the Frontline’ 
(Gibson et al, 2011: 20). The third insight is related to resource allocation, and how govern-
ments allocate about 90% of DRR resources to the national level without transfers to local 
levels, according to GNDR members. The HFA through the UNISDR portrays a harmonious inter-
action with and complementary role of civil society at different levels, while in reality interac-
tions cause irritation and frustration of the GNDR. The GNDR has to reflect and re-examine how 
it wishes to engage with the UN-system at the various institutional levels.  
 
The GNDR currently consist of over 500 civil-society organisations operating worldwide, and the 
majority are practicing CBDRR in forms that are closer to the home-grown CBDRR traditions 
than to the UN promoted CBDRR tradition or somewhere in the middle. Through their involve-
ment in the VFL they became more aware of the contested nature of CBDRR and the intentions 
behind. Although GNDR’s efforts to influence or change the UN’s values and views on DRR still 
have minimal impact, the ’Views from the Frontline’ resulted in increasingly concerted efforts 
of civil-society organisations worldwide.  For the rapid mobilization of a vast network and its 
success to coordinate local organisations to report on local conditions, the GNDR received a let-
ter of Commendation from the UN Sasakawa Award Jury6. The UN Sasakawa Award for Disaster 
Reduction is awarded to individuals or institutions that have taken active efforts in reducing 
disaster risk in their communities and advocates for disaster risk reduction. 
 
The GNDR members’ everyday political arenas are however local, where local people interact 
with civil-society organisations and their governments to negotiate about the meaning of 
CBDRR and to lobby for DRR in localities far away from Geneva, New York or Japan where the 
UN hold their meetings. The three kinds of power dynamics – negating politics in language and 
texts, subordinating local perspectives to expert knowledge and authorities, and channelling 
resources there where governments can maintain the status quo - play out in the local DRR 
arenas as well. This is the subject of the following chapters. 
 
 
                                                 
6
  The jury decided that the Network is too young to be recognized with an official award like the monetary award or the 
Certificates of Merit/ Distinction, but wanted to give this Letter as an encouragement for its continued efforts for reducing 
risks at local level. 
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5.       The risk of using local knowledge in CBDRR 
 
“Danger is real, but risk is socially constructed” 
 Slovic, 2003:7 
 
 
The appreciation of local knowledge in CBDRR stems from the realization in the mid-
1990s that technocratic and scientific approaches alone cannot reduce losses (see 
Chapter 4). There was a call in the mid-decade IDNDR conference in Yokohama in 
1994 to better understand local conditions, cultural traditions and religion. CBDRR-
handbooks assume that the use of local knowledge will improve disaster risk reduc-
tion policies and project implementation. Research and evaluation reports of 
humanitarian aid assistance regularly conclude however, that aid practice is often 
based on simplified realities and little on situational analysis and recognizing local 
risk perspectives (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005; Bhatia, 2003; Pain, 2002). This 
refers to a discrepancy between policy and practice regarding the usage of local 
knowledge, or that it may be difficult to grasp people’s local knowledge and risk 
perspectives. 
 
This chapter aims to explore local people’s perspectives on risk stemming from disas-
ters and conflict, and how people deal with uncertainty and overcome crisis. This 
exploration was one of the first activities of the CBDRR-pilots. Recognition of local 
risk perceptions and local knowledge is one of the spearheads of CBDRR policy. But 
what is local knowledge actually? And whose risk perceptions at the local level 
should be recognized? This chapter will answer these questions, and provide insight 
in what way local people’s risk experiences differ from how aid agencies assess and 
label local disaster and conflict situations. The chapter concludes that local 
knowledge and practice to overcome crisis is not just ‘out there’ or collectively 
owned. It cannot uncritically be utilized or empowered, since local knowledge has its 
limitations, is differentiated, conflicting and partial. Using local risk perspectives in 
CBDRR approaches should therefore not be romanticized.  
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part (section 5.1), I discuss how I 
view local people, what I mean with local knowledge and local risk perceptions, and 
how these can best be analysed through listening to people’s stories. The second 
part (section 5.2) contains local narratives on risk and risk reduction from Afghani-
stan and Indonesia, accompanied by a process of sense-making and analysis to 
understand why and how people construct risk in a particular way. The stories from 
Maluku are ordered according to the chronology of violent events to understand 
people’s motivation to join or to flee the violence. The stories from other parts of 
Indonesia and Afghanistan do not follow a particular order, but demonstrate varia-
tions in prevailing gender norms, age groups, social cohesion and other local institu-
tional arrangements which result in differing risk perceptions and vulnerability out-
comes. The last part (section 5.3) brings together the insights of the various cases. I 
will also highlight the dilemmas when one considers appreciating local knowledge 
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and local risk perceptions in a CBDRR approach with the aim to empower people, 
and some of the felt gaps between local people’s perspectives and aid programming.  
 
5.1 Concepts and methodology 
 
5.1.1 Affected people as ‘social actors’ 
Every culture and religion has produced arrangements to protect the most vulnera-
ble inside their community, to cope with disasters, to regulate violence and to con-
tain war (Meriboute, 2004; Anderson and Woodrow, 1989). This chapter starts from 
the premise that people have ‘agency’. This means that people have the capacity to 
process social experience and device ways of coping with life, even under the most 
extreme forms of coercion (Long, 1992: 22). The term ‘human agency’ refers  to the 
blend of goals, aspirations, power, and organizing capacities which people combine 
in their problem-solving, survival and development strategies (ibid). Although people 
have alternative ways to shape their coping strategies and to formulate their objec-
tives, it is important to point out that people’s strategies are culturally embedded 
which influences their interactions with others. People are ‘social actors’, meaning 
that they draw their strategies from their individual rationality, but equally from 
their structural location in society. People’s agency and consequently their chosen 
coping strategies are related to their social position in society and prevailing cultural 
norms. Local people’s perspectives on risk therefore vary greatly across countries, 
within villages, and between men and women.  
 
5.1.2 Local risk perceptions, local knowledge and local practice 
CBDRR-literature emphasizes the importance of people’s existing capacities including 
local knowledge - also referred to as indigenous knowledge. It is assumed that the 
use of local knowledge will improve disaster risk reduction policies and project 
implementation (UNISDR, 2008). The UNISDR refers to local knowledge as practices 
developed by a group of people from an advanced understanding of the local 
environment, which has been formed over numerous generations of habitation (2008: 
vii). The UNISDR distinguishes local knowledge from other types of knowledge in that 
it originates from the community, that it is disseminated through informal means, it 
is collectively owned, subject to adaptation, and embedded in a community’s way of 
life as a means of survival. Most common examples of the use of local knowledge are 
indigenous warning signals for impending danger, and building techniques to with-
stand typhoons, floods and earthquakes. Local knowledge and practice further refer 
to mutual help systems like bayanihan in the Philippines, gotong royong in Indonesia 
and ashar in Afghanistan to mobilize community labour, to specific values and rituals 
to create harmony or to justify defence in conflict situations, to routines to dismantle 
and hide assets, or to farm in groups as a form of protection against violence. 
 
As the local narratives in this chapter show, however, local or indigenous knowledge 
shouldn’t be romanticized; it has its limitations and can even be dangerous. Further, 
local knowledge is not simply a reflection of people’s environment, but rather con-
structed in social processes (Jansen, 1998; Hilhorst, 2004). Jansen (1998) distin-
guishes three views on local knowledge which Hilhorst modified to the field of disas-
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ter management (Hilhorst, 2004). These three ways of looking at local knowledge are 
relevant for analysing people’s local risk perceptions: 
1. The first one is the instrumental view that sees ‘local knowledge as a barrel of 
knowledge’ that can be tapped for reducing risks. This instrumental view reso-
nates with the definition of UNISDR.  
2. The second view positions ‘local knowledge in contrast to modernization’, assum-
ing that local knowledge blends nature with culture and that it can inspire re-
sistance to western, colonial or outsiders’ ideas. The revival of ‘adat’ (custom, 
tradition) in post-Suharto Indonesia fits in this view. Adat is associated with his-
tory, land and law, with order and consensus. Here, revival of adat has, among 
others, the strategic purpose to oppose land appropriation by the state for mining, 
timber, plantations, and transmigration (Henley and Davidson, 2008).  
3. The third view closely relates to the second view: local knowledge as a source of 
political-economic empowerment of local people, instrumental to mobilize people. 
It stresses participatory societal change aimed to address the root causes of 
people’s vulnerability.  
 
Hilhorst points out that these three views share the assumption that local knowledge 
is homogeneous, shared by the community and can be separated from outside 
knowledge, and that this assumption is problematic (2004: 62). She refers to the fact 
that not everybody in the village possesses the same knowledge, or shares the same 
ideas about nature, disasters or risks. Sticking to the adat example, different 
interpretations of adat exist locally between and within villages causing tensions 
rather than consensus as will come out of the local narratives from Maluku. Also the 
local narratives from Afghanistan show diversity in risk views and ideas about the 
same risk events. So, people’s local knowledge inherently is diverse and conflictive, 
which they express through their varying risk perceptions and which result in differ-
ent risk practice and responses.  
 
Further, local knowledge is never purely local. People construct their knowledge 
through interaction with their neighbours, through social networks, from what they 
hear on the radio or in the market, or through seasonal migration. In this way local 
knowledge is not an accumulation of facts, but “the result of a great number of deci-
sions and selective incorporations of previous and new ideas, beliefs and images”, 
and at the same time deleting other possible frames of understanding (Arce and 
Long, 1992: 211). In the same way people construct their risk perceptions. They do 
not only take into account the possible exposure to danger and future damages, but 
they also consider their resources, knowledge, skills, past experiences, opportunities 
and alternatives, as well as weighing the different probabilities of things happening 
and the consequences of their risk-decisions. As local knowledge and risk percep-
tions get constructed in social processes, power relations play a role as well. Some 
people are much better positioned to obtain knowledge than others, and can make 
their interpretations of events and processes authoritative in the community 
(Hilhorst, 2004). Similarly some are in a better position to articulate and define their 
risk perception than others, and - as  explained in chapter 4 - whoever controls the 
definition of risk, controls the solution to the problem at hand (Slovic, 2003). Local 
knowledge is therefore also partial.  
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5.1.3 How to analyse different local people’s perceptions and their agency?  
In Afghanistan and Indonesia, most people affected by disasters and conflict do not 
write their stories down, and are seldom heard because they have little voice in the 
events that determine their lives. Aid practitioners do talk to affected people, but 
basically with the aim to collect facts and figures about immediate disaster impact 
and short-term needs, not necessarily to understand how people make sense of 
these recurrent events, or how they use their various resources to mitigate or over-
come crisis (IFRC, 2004). To understand how people ascribe meaning to events like 
disasters and conflict, to interpret silence and distortions in their stories, I used ‘oral 
histories’ and ‘story-telling’ as a method for data collection (Leydesdorff et all, 1999). 
Personal stories of survival are an important addition to the official narratives about, 
for instance, the conflict in Afghanistan or the recurrent floods and landslides in 
Indonesia. Life stories are a source of knowledge about how people perceive their 
circumstances, how they portray themselves, how they put their lives in a historical 
perspective beyond the current situation, how they manage to build a new life and 
what meaning they attach to outside aid. People, however, may change their story, 
or omit specific traumatic events or feelings of guilt and shame, as I experienced in 
Maluku. Sometimes the researcher poses new questions to people who experienced 
the event and a new process of sense-making may start. Talking to people through 
informal conversations or interviews can be used, on one hand, ‘to collect infor-
mation’ but also ‘to study story-telling, and to listen for meaning’ (Leydesdorff, 2007; 
Nuijten, 2003). ‘Listening for meaning’ can be done through listening to the narra-
tor’s moral language. Sometimes feelings or practice uncovered exceed the bounda-
ries of acceptable or expected behaviour according to the prevailing norms 
(Anderson and Jack, 1991: 24). The researcher should further be attentive to meta-
statements, referring to moments in the interview when people stop talking, look 
back and comment on what they just said or thought, and to the logic of the narra-
tive (ibid). This refers to contradictions, or silences, to events crucial to understand 
the person’s story and current feelings, but which are consciously omitted from the 
story. Since local knowledge is partial, the researcher needs to listen to stories from 
different social actors, and analyse why their risk perspectives about the same event 
differ, which is part of the sense-making process. 
 
In addition to oral histories and story-telling, I talked with people about their liveli-
hoods and coping strategies, as a way to understand how they make a living and sur-
vive in adverse conditions. This is referred to as ‘the coping strategy approach’ (Boås 
et al, 2006), which also recognizes people’s agency and that people do not passively 
accept their fate.  
 
It is important to stress that the significance of people’s narratives can only be deter-
mined in relation to the rest of the research material. Aside from the personal stories 
or small group discussions, especially with women, I engaged with the villagers 
through the CBDRR-pilots over the course of a few years. I met with them in differ-
ent settings, in formal community meetings discussing risk, land and water conflicts, 
and prioritizing interventions, or during informal settings afterwards. I listened to 
how they talked and how they framed issues. Towards the end of my fieldwork I con-
fronted people with what I saw as contradictions in their earlier statements and cur-
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rent actions. Their explanations added to the meaning of the various life histories 
that were documented separately and vice-versa. In this way, as researcher, I inter-
preted and re-interpreted life histories to discover patterns in people’s narratives, on 
how they construct local history, give meaning to disasters and conflict, how they 
manage uncertainty and survival, and how they perceive risk. All in relation to their 
position in the community and in society.  
 
I made use of MSc research done in Halmahera and Central Java in the CBDRR pilot 
areas conducted by students of Disaster Studies1. They stayed in the villages much 
longer and were able to unravel local perspectives on disasters and conflict. From 
their studies and my own fieldwork I distilled patterns of how people deal with risk 
and uncertainty and relate these to academic literature concerned with local level 
survival and coping. This is mainly literature focusing on livelihoods, coping and 
protection strategies, often written from the perspective of aid agencies.   
 
The local narratives in this chapter do not yet reveal everything about people and 
their immediate environment: people’s opinions, views and practices are incomplete, 
and specific practices are not yet mentioned because these were disclosed in reac-
tion to the evolving CBDRR-intervention and not yet at the initial phase of the CBDRR 
pilots. Through the action-reflection cycles various layers of complexity got 
unravelled, which will be discussed in the proper context and the scope of each 
following chapter. 
 
5.2 Local narratives on dealing with risks, disaster and conflict 
 
In this section I share stories of people who deal with violence, who got displaced, 
who regularly face floods, landslides, avalanches and droughts, and who refer to a 
broader risk landscape beyond conflict and disasters. Most of the stories were col-
lected during the initial stage of my fieldwork, when we were still in the process of 
selecting areas to pilot CBDRR or in areas that were just selected. The stories start in 
Afghanistan, where risks stemming from disasters and conflict are strongly interre-
lated, and where people’s perceptions depend on how local institutions mediate 
protection and safety measures. In addition, I highlight gender differences in local 
narratives on risk and risk reduction, because in Afghanistan, men and women tell 
very different stories about the same events. When selecting people for the oral 
histories I further considered age groups, locality in the area, and authority and posi-
tion in the village ranging from village heads, religious leaders to marginalized groups 
like the landless. In Halmahera, Northern Maluku, people shared experiences before, 
during and after the communal violence in 1999-2000. In people’s stories, dignity 
and a lack of recognition for their acute concerns and capacities by government and 
NGOs are recurrent issues. They do not feel taken seriously, as if they do not matter 
as people. In Central Java people shared how they experience and explain new risks, 
like (flash) floods, mining and storage of nuclear waste. They use their religious and 
cultural beliefs in explaining events and in mobilizing people to protect their environ-
ment.  
                                                          
1
 Charlotte van der Tak in Halmahera, and Marian Meulenkamp in Central Java 
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All these stories are diverse and cannot be compared. They are collected with the 
intention to analyse how local knowledge is used in people’s risk experiences 
considering that local knowledge is not commonly owned, but heterogeneous and 
socially constructed within the prevailing power relations, and considering the three 
views on local knowledge as (1) instrumental, (2) local knowledge as a blend of na-
ture and culture as opposed to modernization, and (3) local knowledge as a source of 
political-economic empowerment of local people (Jansen, 1998).   
 
5.2.1 Gender-segregated local narratives from Afghanistan 
The image of Afghanistan abroad is usually one of a country where conflict has led to 
state collapse, the breakdown of social institutions, destruction of infrastructure, of 
a country where all Afghan men wear a Kalashnikov2, where women are consigned 
to the margins of social life, and where aid has been central to people’s survival 
(Bhatia et al, 2003). Many of these, usually constructed images, turn out to be wrong. 
Despite decades of conflict people have devised ways to continue everyday life as 
normal as possible and developed livelihood pathways to deal with extreme events. 
Some even prosper under conditions of insecurity and high risk (Rubin, 2008). 
 
 
Map 5.1: Province map of Afghanistan 
 
I visited Afghanistan for the first time in January-February 2006. It was winter but 
despite the snow, the cold and badly accessible roads, I visited Parwan and Kapisa 
province together with Oxfam-Novib partners (see Map 5.1). It was the month when 
the Dutch Parliament voted positively about sending Dutch troops to Uruzgan. 
People I met in 2006 - both in the NGOs and in communities – were positive about 
the arrival of ISAF troops and they had high expectations that they could establish 
peace and order. However, these hopes shattered over time due to non-compliance 
                                                          
2
 This is an image I often heard among NGO staff in the Philippines and Indonesia. 
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of ISAF promises, disappointing results of the international aid and the Karzai 
government, and a continuing war in most parts of the country.  
 
When I asked the people again in May 2009 - in villages, at district and provincial  
government offices, and NGO staff - they expressed their frustration that they see 
foreign aid being channelled to insecure areas instead of to stable areas where 
investment in development would make more sense. The vice-governor of Bamyan 
Province told me that people feel like being punished for their peacefulness. I did my 
fieldwork in the northern and central part of the country from Herat in the West to 
the provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Kunduz, in the north, Bamyan in the central high-
lands, and in several localities near Kabul. These areas are relatively secure although 
insecurity increased over time, particularly in Kunduz, Herat and along the roads 
from Kabul to Parwan and Kapisa.  
 
The stories from Afghanistan were collected during single-sex meetings, and each 
story represents the collective views of men separated from those of women. Only in 
Kunduz I talked to men and women in a mixed-sex setting, where the women did 
speak out. In Afghanistan, women and men talk very differently while being in a 
group. The men narrate about their experiences and views in a quite formal way. In 
the meetings I attended, only one person talked extensively, usually the shura head, 
while others patiently waited for their turn to speak. Women on the other hand, 
overlapped one another’s talk, not interrupting each other, but two or more women 
continued talking at the same time on the same topic. According to Wareing (2003) 
this is an expression of that women value cooperation and solidarity very highly in 
their conversations. Women could not talk one by one despite several requests from 
our side, which caused difficulties for translation and recording. Additionally, women 
who shared their experience, moved closer to the interviewer, and in some cases 
they hold my knees to stress the seriousness of what they had to say. These gather-
ings were chaotic but lively, full of self-reflection, sometimes breaking-through 
prevailing gender norms, and the women were very explicit in what they wanted and 
what they did not. I listened to multiple voices that wanted to be heard. I noticed 
that women regularly stressed that their experiences and views on surviving and 
coping with disaster and conflict, are opposed to what men would have told me. For 
instance: 
 
“Our husbands do not allow us to earn money. They say that we are not able to 
work, but of course we are! Men say that we cannot work because we do not 
know how to read and write and due to our rural background. But we could 
learn that! [….] ”We want to work to earn additional income to buy food. Due to 
inheritance the amount of land has become less and men look for work abroad. 
The remittance from our husbands in Pakistan is too little. That is why we want 
to work”.  
[….] “If the men would have known that you would come, they would have in-
structed us about what to tell you and what not” – a woman in Ghulistan, 
Bamyan province 
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After I met these women, I returned to the house where the male shura members 
were having lunch. The head of the shura asked me immediately if the women had 
told me that they are being beaten by their husbands?......I honestly and politely re-
plied, that they did not. The man was clearly worried, and possibly felt threatened by 
my presence and interest in talking to the women. Being attentive to gender 
differentials and the powers involved, involves ethics about whose voices are heard 
and whose knowledge counts. My discussion with the women may have reverber-
ated for some time afterwards since the village head was suspicious about what the 
women had told me. At the same time, if data collection is combined with social 
learning aimed to lead to tangible benefits to those being researched, it may reduce 
the risk for women to talk to me next time (Goodhand, 2000).  
 
The ‘red thread’ in the stories from Afghanistan, despite the variety in places and 
environments, is the seasonality of local conflicts related to the occurrence of disas-
ters like floods, drought, and avalanches, and the moment in the agriculture cycle. 
Most conflicts are about land and water, and the extent to which conflicts are settled 
depends on local institutional arrangements like water allocation and distribution 
practices, functioning of shuras, influence of commanders who operate parallel to 
shuras, the social fabric in villages, and on the relations between villages which rely 
on the same resources. The stories from members of local peace shuras demonstrate 
that beliefs and practices to settle disputes are changeable, albeit slowly, and that 
the majority of Afghans find informal peace shuras more credible and efficient than 
the official judicial system. “Water conflicts cannot wait to be solved after 12 years, 
but require immediate attention”- according to a male Peace shura member in 
Kunduz.  
 
Place and environment do matter for local gender dynamics. At the grassroots, sto-
ries of men and women reveal that they experience disasters, conflict and war differ-
ently. This does not mean though that one can simply conclude that women are 
disadvantaged due to Afghan traditional culture and Islam, or because of the war. 
Attention is needed to recognize the effects of disasters, conflict and displacement 
on gender relations and norms, both negatively and positively. Women from 
Nahreen and Khulm shared the dual effects of living in harsh circumstances and how 
these force them to do things beyond prevailing gender norms, like going out in pub-
lic to earn an income, or which are supposed to be non-existent like prostitution. 
Young women who attended school during the years of displacement in Iran or 
Pakistan, have different motives to break through gender norms. It depends on how 
strongly households and communities adhere to certain gender stigmas whether 
women get space for manoeuvre and to positively influence gender outcomes. And 
this varies from place to place. In general, the stories reveal that local traditions, 
local knowledge and gender stereotypes in Afghanistan are dynamic, changeable and 
not so local, due to experiences of people as IDPs which influenced their beliefs and 
social norms. However, these processes go slow, very slow and in the meantime 
women continue to suffer from a lack of attention to their health needs and mater-
nal care, which is a poignant example of women’s distress in Afghanistan.   
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Stories from Nahreen, Baghlan province: interplay between disasters and conflict 
I visited Nahreen in April 2008 when the early signals of drought were already 
noticeable due to little snowfall, and no or very little rain during spring. Nahreen 
bazaar, the town centre, is located at a 1 ½ hour drive on a rough road eastwards 
from Baghlan city. In 2002 it was heavily affected by an earthquake measuring more 
than 7 on the Richter scale, with approximately 2,000 lives lost. It is situated in a 
mountainous semi-arid terrain, a harsh environment for agriculture since Nahreen 
district, together with Burka district, are the only districts in Baghlan Province with-
out perennial irrigation facilities. People fully depend on rain and melting snow for 
farming. When it rains, the water runs down quickly, due to lack of vegetation to re-
tain the water. Decades of war and severe drought have led to the disappearance of 
trees and shrubs which increases the risk for floods and drought. Around 50% of the 
households in the whole province report having problems satisfying their food needs 
at least 3 – 6 times a year lasting several weeks (MRRD, 2007), meaning that the area 
is highly food insecure. The stories confirm these figures and reveal people’s motives 
to join criminal and violent activities as an alternative source of livelihood. 
 
When I went to Nahreen with ADA staff, we expected to first meet with a group of 
about 10 to 20 shura leaders from eight villages. However, when we entered the 
compound noticing the huge amount of shoes at the gate, we were surprised that 
about 120 men were waiting for us. They formally welcomed us, and we exchanged 
some polite words. One man holding a paper started to talk and I sensed that all the 
shura representatives had sat down earlier to prepare this meeting. Johnson and 
Leslie (2004) point out that villagers quickly work out what is going on when interact-
ing with NGOs or government officials, either foreign or Afghan. They sit all together 
at night, working out what outsiders want, and then they tell you what they want 
you to hear. This is not typical Afghan behaviour, but quite universal for villagers try-
ing to manage the world around them (Hilhorst, 2003). It is a way to control infor-
mation and to keep authority where local people want it. In insecure environments, 
like Nahreen, it is also a way to protect information. The man with the white beard 
started to read from the paper on which their suggestions are written to improve 
their situation: 
 
“We need solutions to our problems that are practical”. Then he continued 
with listing the following suggestions. “Our women want to improve their skills 
on income-generating activities; we like alternative livelihoods like carpentry; 
our drinking water facility needs improvement, as well as veterinary support 
for our cattle, which suffers from diseases”. 
 
Although the items sound like a shopping list to be given to the NGO, they corre-
spond with the expected problems related to the nearing drought. The men shared 
about the erratic rainfall and limited snow this spring, commenting that these were 
the signals of a nearing drought. Men had stopped ploughing. Nobody was working 
anymore in their fields. We saw fields partly planted with winter-wheat, partly 
ploughed and more than half still fallow. This is an indicator that people feel insecure 
to invest in agriculture. Many adult men had left the villages to find a job in provin-
cial towns or even as far as Iran. Another man mentioned that during drought 
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periods the risk of different diseases and pests among livestock increases. They rely 
on livestock during difficult times like a drought period, since livestock is an asset, a 
kind of saving, which you can sell when you need cash to buy food. But when these 
animals are sick, the price is low, or you cannot sell it at all.    
 
Fig. 5.1: Nahreen, Baghlan province 
    
Partly ploughed field                                            Flood wall along dry riverbed  
 
   
Shura meeting in the open air with representatives from eight sub-villages              
 
I asked about their experiences in other years, for instance last year, and the discus-
sion turned a bit less formal and more men joined the conversation. They started 
sharing about the annual floods. “When clouds get darker, the wind starts blowing 
and a thunderstorm is approaching, we know that it usually takes three hours before 
the floods reach the village”. In this short period, a few shura members start warning 
the men whose households are most exposed to floods through mobile phone. It 
takes again three hours for the water to recede. Protection from floods, and 
measures to maximize available water for their livelihoods, seem to be a concern of 
particular the men. They stressed the duality of floods: “they [floods] kill cattle and 
people, damage our fields and houses, but we also depend on floods for our liveli-
hoods to grow crops [people grow wheat, onions, and a few grow poppy], for our 
cattle, and for drinking water.” How to protect the villages from floods and at the 
same time maximizing the available water for their livelihoods is their major concern. 
In some parts they apply ‘spate irrigation’, a unique form of water harvesting and 
managing unpredictable and sometimes destructive floods for crop and livestock 
production. Farmers divert floodwater that runs off the mountains, from the river 
bed and spread it over larger areas. The uncertainty comes both from the 
unpredictable nature of floods, and the frequent changes to the riverbeds from 
which the water is taken. It is often the poorest segments for rural populations 
whose livelihood and food security depends on spate flows (www.spate-irriga-
tion.org).  In the absence of reliable irrigation facilities, men stress the need for 
alternative livelihoods for themselves, like carpentry, and for women skill develop-
ment for income-generating activities.  
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On my way to the meeting place I noticed a long flood protection wall along the dry 
riverbed. The wall is currently being constructed with support from the district 
government, but – despite people’s involvement in the design and construction of 
the wall -they are not satisfied with the outcome: the wall is protecting only part of 
the village; there are still holes in the wall where the road crosses the dry river, and 
the level of the riverbed is higher than the level of the villages due to sedimentation.  
As a result the wall will not function as it is supposed to do, and could even divert 
water to directions which were safe before. We further observed that the protection 
wall is not strong enough to withstand the force of water, and may collapse easily. 
Due to time-constraints I could not discuss and analyse the ‘social construction’ of 
the flood protection wall: whose idea it was, why this design, why this location, who 
decided, and so on. In the middle of this discussion ADA staff whispered in my ear, 
that the women were waiting a few houses away to meet me, and that I should leave 
the compound. On my way out the men continued their discussion with the ADA 
staff, while my female translator and I left through the gate – where we saw that 
somebody had turned around all the 120 pairs of shoes to ease departure – and with 
some ‘community bodyguards’ we walked to a small house where about the same 
number of women were waiting for us3. 
 
About 100 women had gathered in two small rooms, and asked what we have been 
discussing with the men. They immediately stressed that it are not floods – like 
prioritized by the men and the NGO staff - which are the main problem, but their 
insecure livelihoods: “While floods affect only part of the communities, drought and 
food shortage affects us all, especially the poor who have no access to land”. In 
Nahreen, only few households own land, while the majority of the families till the 
land of others. Tenants are responsible for the cultivation of the land and have to 
buy seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. In case the harvest fails due to flash floods or 
drought, the burden is on the shoulders of the tenants, since investments will not be 
compensated by the landowners. In the room are many widows who lost their hus-
bands during the war, and female heads of households, whose husband is working 
abroad. Consequently they do not have anybody left to till the land, since this is 
considered a male task. Particularly these women face hardship in accessing food 
through agricultural activities.  
 
“We women are more affected by food shortage than men who often get meals 
while they find jobs elsewhere. But we stay behind with our children, and we just 
eat less to save food for them, but they still go to school with an empty 
stomach”.  
 
Widows - about 45% of the women in Nahreen is widow - and female-heads of 
households told us they earn an income by making scarves and blouses (embroidery 
and tailoring) which are sold in Iran. They receive materials from a trader who lives 
in Nahreen bazaar, has shops in Iran, and who collects the handicrafts weekly.  The 
                                                          
3
  Women cannot go out alone in public to for instance, attend a meeting, they need a male mahram, like their 
husband, brother or another male relative. The meeting of the men and women are scheduled simultaneously 
to enable them to go home together. 
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women are aware of the fact that they receive very little money for their products: 
300 Afghani’s (6 US$) per blouse, while the trader sells it for 20 US$ in the market. 
“We do not mind if the price is low or if there is no market, we need money and are 
prepared to work day and night”. The way they talked to us, was a mixture of despair 
and perseverance, of never giving up. That their livelihoods are very insecure and 
unstable illustrates the following remark of a woman, who told us that several male 
youth had recently joined the Afghan military and local armed groups. These are 
rewarding options for earning a livelihood, at least better than subsistence farming 
or migration to reduce the family’s food shortage. The woman warned us to not 
come back tomorrow, because ‘they’ now know that we are here…….. 
 
Since my translator introduced herself as a doctor, the women used this opportunity 
to get advice or treatment for their ailments and health problems. I saw neglected 
skin problems, a woman with a neglected wound on her foot, and another woman 
with an egg-shaped tumour in her belly. In principle their ailments could easily be 
treated, according to my translator. But since these women either lack male 
accompaniment to see a doctor, or the respective body part is culturally labelled as 
‘indecent’, or they lack the resources to see a doctor, women’s health is hardly at-
tended to. In Afghanistan, women’s grievances are generally addressed through 
male representation, and the loss of male protectors and mediators (fathers, hus-
bands or brothers) may leave them without recourse (Kandiyoti, 2007: 188). How-
ever, as I will discuss in the next chapter, several educated women in Nahreen are 
allowed by the male shura to attend training on early warning, on search and rescue 
and to be involved in settling disputes and mediating domestic violence. The women 
said to be afraid to walk in public spaces, but to remedy their fear, they walk with 
other women and use the burka as protection “to look like ordinary women”. The 
men in Nahreen appeared to be relatively less conservative than in for instance 
Ghulistan, Bamyan province, where women complain about their husbands’ 
conservative gender norms preventing them to earn an income. In Nahreen, on the 
contrary, men allow educated women to participate in the CBDRR-pilot. ‘Educated’ 
means in this context, that the women attended elementary school and some a few 
classes high school, or that they received vocational training while being a refugee 
abroad. 
 
In general, households in Nahreen derive about 54% of their total income from 
agriculture, while the remaining 46% is derived from livestock, and non-farm labour. 
The level of economic hardship in Baghlan province is reasonably high: 83% of rural 
households in the province experienced natural disasters in 2005, out of which 77% 
reported that they had not recovered at all from external shocks experienced over 
the past 12 months, while 21% said they recovered only partly (MRRD, 2007).  
 
After meeting the women, we went with several male shura members to a meeting 
with the district authority. The district governor was previously the head of the shura 
of Nahreen bazaar. About 25 years ago, he told us, Nahreen district was food secure. 
Many factors contributed to the depletion of resources and livelihood insecurity. 
Decades of war and extensive drought periods, resulted, among others, in a high 
percentage of widows in Nahreen, which together with out-migration of male family 
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members, led to a lack of labour in agriculture. In addition other factors contributed 
to increasing food insecurity: the cutting of trees and bushes - for heating to survive 
cold winters and for cooking, building and fodder for cattle during drought periods -, 
the lack of irrigation facilities, absence of extension services, and the wrong use of 
fertilizer resulted in infertile lands and environmental degradation. The district 
authorities are aware of the concerns of the people in Nahreen, but lack the re-
sources to support these villages. ADA remarks informally that the district govern-
ment lack the political will to genuinely initiate and follow-up resource generation. 
The idea to construct a dam with irrigation canals or water-harvesting measures has 
been communicated to the provincial level authorities, because resources (budget, 
design, and technical support) has to be mobilized at the provincial Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) line department. But at the provincial level 
they were still waiting to get funds from Kabul for conducting a feasibility survey. 
Support for irrigation facilities and water harvesting had priority, but what the dis-
trict governor offered was an ill-designed flood protection wall that did not really 
protect the villages. The men complained about the neglect by their government, 
and the limited NGO support. In a report compiled by MRRD, containing a provincial 
profile of Baghlan, it is evident that Nahreen district indeed did not get much atten-
tion from its government, neither from international and national NGOs. Most of the 
donor aid went to the provincial towns of Pul-i-khumri and Baghlan (MRRD, 2007). 
And when aid was given it was relief and food aid through the World Food Program. 
This is usually done through “food for work” schemes, and since the nature of the 
work is always ‘male’ work, widows and female-headed households do not benefit 
from this kind of assistance, while they need it the most. 
 
We lacked the time and focus to deepen the discussion and analysis on how people’s 
situation is affected by the war, natural hazards, and the performance of the overall 
political economy (like the price-hike of wheat, donor aid distribution), and on 
people’s entitlements to goods, services and resources. While I listened to the dis-
trict governor’s stories I did not notice the dark clouds outside, but I heard thunder 
and felt the sand blowing through the windows. Around me people started to be-
come stressful and waving at me that I should stop the interview. They even pre-
vented me to politely say goodbye and to thank for the discussion. The stress was 
caused by the bad weather approaching, while we had to cross two rivers on our way 
back, and needed to be back before dark. The risk that we could be stranded in our 
cars in between the rivers was high, and this would increase the risk of kidnapping. 
They pushed us in the car and we left the village in a hurry. This incident illustrates 
well ‘local knowledge in action’ with the purpose to protect us.  
 
Stories from Khulm district, Balkh province  
“Better to be a servant in the upstream area than a king downstream” – is an Afghan 
proverb on water access in irrigation canal systems which can be related to people’s 
stories in Khulm. They narrated about the dynamics in local water governance, how 
seasonal floods and drought periods increase tensions among upstream and tail-end 
villages which all depend on the same irrigation facilities. Despite the tensions 
households are on the average better-off and less vulnerable to disasters than in 
Nahreen, thanks to the availability of irrigation water. However, stigmas on gender 
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are more conservative in Khulm, constraining women’s options of going out in public, 
to attend meetings and even to rescue neighbours during floods. However, widows 
and female heads of the households shared stories about how adverse realities force 
them to do things that are publicly denied that they happen, but necessary to survive, 
like prostitution. 
 
Khulm district is located a 40 minute drive along the highway eastwards of Mazaar-i-
sharif. Driving from the direction of Mazaar one first crosses a flat and dry area, and 
when approaching Khulm, the landscape turns greener (in April) with mountains at 
the background. The villages selected for the CBDRR pilot, are located along the 
Samangan River and several irrigation canals, which take water from this river. As the 
name suggests, the river originates in Samangan Province, and Khulm district used to 
be within the provincial administrative boundaries of Samangan. After the Taliban 
was defeated in 2001, the boundaries of Khulm district changed and it became part 
of Balkh Province, creating opportunities for new government positions at district 
level. These were seized by local elites who changed the rules for water distribution. 
During the Taliban water was distributed according to land size, an approach which 
helped to keep tensions over water in check. After 2001 new water distribution rules 
favour upstream villagers with whom the commander is closely affiliated. This results, 
especially during drought periods, in increasing tensions about water division be-
tween upstream and tail-end villages. The villages are situated close to the main 
highway connecting Kabul and Mazaar-i-shariff. We visited three places in the area: 
(1) the villages upstream near the bazaar of Khulm, (2) Molakoli village at the tail-
end of the canal, and (3) Mullah Sultana, a village near the spectacular gorge where 
the Samangan River leaves Samangan province and enters Khulm district in Balkh 
province.  
 
We started our field visit with observing the newly rehabilitated irrigation intake 
which diverts half of the water into a canal providing water to eight villages, while 
half of the water flows through the river to other villages. The riverbed is higher than 
the surrounding villages and one can easily imagine what would happen in case of a 
flash flood. When entering the villages one could still observe the remaining ruins of 
damaged houses due to the flash-flood of two years ago (2006). Also the irrigation 
canals are higher than the surrounding fields, sometimes more than one meter. 
From the intake the main canal splits after a hundred meter into three secondary 
canals and particularly the houses and fields along the middle canal are the ones 
most vulnerable to floods; when it floods, these people are surrounded by water and 
have no escape route to higher dry areas. One woman told us: “I do not know whom 
to rescue first, myself or my children. There is water everywhere! We discussed risk 
perceptions and practices to reduce risk with men and women separately, but in the 
text they are interwoven to stress the gender differences and women’s dilemmas.  
 
Preparing for floods 
Warning is a male activity in Khulm. Men observe the weather, they observe rain 
clouds near the mountains, and when the rain is intense, they know the flood will be 
muddy and destroying crops. In addition they check or receive warnings from people 
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in Samangan province by mobile phone4, they monitor the water levels and colour in 
the river and canals to assess alert levels, and convey warnings through the 
mosque’s loudspeaker and by knocking on doors. Based on past experience, the 
warning is given two hours before the water reaches the villages, which is very short. 
When it happens during the day, women receive the warning through loudspeakers, 
and this is important because men are often away. Some women said they do not 
always receive the warning in time, since they do not hear the loudspeakers. In the 
past when floods happened during the night, there was no warning at all, and people 
were just surprised to see water inside the house.  
 
When I talked to the women, they expressed their wish to have their own women 
volunteer groups, while simultaneously they feel the limitation of not being allowed 
to go next-door to render assistance during emergencies, or to perform ‘public’ 
activities. “We can rescue our own family members, but not our neighbours”! With 
this statement they expressed their wish to challenge existing gender roles. On the 
other hand, women cannot be rescued by men unless they are family-relatives. Life-
threatening situations may be exceptions, but “when the water comes, we rely on 
our own capacities”. When asking further it appears that women are involved in tak-
ing precautions for floods, which they frame as “supporting their husbands like filling 
sandbags with mud which our husbands put around the orchards and at both sides 
along the irrigation canals, collecting grasses which is put in between the sandbags, 
and we help with weaving twigs to reinforce the canals”.  
 
The need to evacuate people and cattle depends on the intensity of the flood - if it is 
likely to damage houses - and on the level of the water. Some women are afraid to 
leave their house when it is flooded, while some other women told that they move 
to a friend’s house with their children, but they do not stay long. Once the water 
starts receding they return to their homes to start cleaning and repair. It is not clear 
if the women are afraid of the water or of their husbands since they are not sup-
posed to leave home alone. When households need a place for about one week, 
they can use the school and the hospital for evacuation purposes as decided by the 
male shuras. In 2006 when the flood damaged many houses, the affected families 
received tents from the government and used them for about six months till they 
had rebuilt their houses. The water intake was rebuilt in 2007. 
 
Differing risk perceptions embedded in social and spatial positions 
Floods usually occur from the months April till June, but it can happen that the ca-
nals are still frozen when the water comes. Men then try hard to remove the ice 
from the canals to keep the water within the canals. However they lack the appropri-
ate tools to do this quickly, and do not get support from the government. Three up-
stream communities went to visit the district authorities many times, also to voice 
their interest in flood protection, but in vain.  They claimed that certain government 
officials have land downstream, and that downstream villages actually depend on 
the floods to get irrigation water for their crops. Hence, their non-cooperation. Dur-
ing floods, all people are stand-by, and try to protect their fields and houses through 
                                                          
4
  Before they received warning from truck drivers along the highway coming from Samangan, but now the head 
of the DMC receives phone calls from relatives in Samangan, which makes forewarning longer.  
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sandbags and try to divert the water with spades. The men showed us a video filmed 
during a flood to give us an impression of the impact. We observed houses threat-
ened by the water because they are made of mud and the water weakens the 
foundations.  
 
When talking to the villagers living in Molakoli village situated at the tail-end of the 
canal, the floods turned out to be a relative problem. For them floods are a blessing. 
They stressed that this year (2008) drought was more likely to happen than flood. 
They depend on floods for land preparation and irrigation in spring, but experience 
drought instead, if it does not rain, due to their inability to negotiate for access to 
water with upstream villages. From the end of February until the end of September 
the upstream villages keep their gates closed to ensure sufficient water for their 
crops like wheat, figs, almond, pomegranate, mustard seeds and vegetables. The 
downstream villages grow the same crops but wheat can only yield when it rains or 
when they get water due to floods. In September the upstream villages open the 
gates, and only then the tail-end communities receive irrigation water. They prepare 
their lands – ploughing and sowing – and wait till spring in the next year for the 
seeds to sprout (seeds will not rot or freeze during winter). According to the villagers 
in Molakoli, the people in the three upstream villages are more powerful and allo-
cate the water to serve their needs first.  
 
Especially from June onwards there is no drinking water in this area. Children fetch 
water upstream using donkeys. Only during extreme drought periods, the gates are 
opened for ten to twenty days (24 hours) to allow tail-end villages to store water in 
brooks (5 meter deep) for drinking purpose. This is an old practice based on merciful-
ness. Similarly tail-end villagers came to help upstream people when they experi-
enced the severe flood in 2006. Digging wells for drinking water is not a solution, be-
cause the water will be salty. 
 
In Khulm district there are about 20 more villages like Molakoli who have no access 
to irrigation water when they need it most. They have tried again and again to start 
discussions and negotiations with upstream villages about the water allocation, but 
they do not know anymore how to proceed. They attribute the problem to the 
change in provincial boundaries in 2001 when Khulm became a district of Balkh prov-
ince, and suddenly the water division “rules” changed. This resulted in less secure 
livelihoods and people told us they had to diversify their livelihood sources. They 
now collect firewood (or shrubs from the dessert) to earn an income, or they do 
construction work and migrate. The tensions among the villages around competing 
claims were identified during the vulnerability assessment, but to assess who is most 
vulnerable in the whole area, the local NGO together with the local people needed 
to continue the analysis and to include all villages in the CBDRR pilot when it  aims to 
find durable solutions. The next chapter elaborates how the NGO community facilita-
tors made courtesy calls to several influential people to get permission to enter the 
community, and how they failed to properly engage with the Community Develop-
ment Councils (CDCs) and the ruling groups in order to identify risk reduction 
measures that would benefit the most vulnerable people in a lasting way.  
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Besides the differing risk perceptions between the upstream and tail-end villagers, I 
observed differing risk perceptions between men and women. Like in Nahreen, 
particularly widows and female-heads of households articulate their main problem 
as food shortage.  Some widows told they have a small vegetable garden within the 
compound, and allow daughters to work as domestic helper for rich people in Khulm 
bazaar. A widow sitting next to me whispered that this refers to prostitution. Earning 
little income through transactional sexual relations occurs frequently. Women 
stressed they do anything to earn an income to buy food for their children, because 
“If your stomach is empty, you do not like to listen to music”- according to an Afghan 
proverb. Mothers choose to make the sacrifice and, going against prevailing gender 
norms, undertake income generation that enables their children to avoid work and 
attend school (Hunte, 2009). Another women shared that allowing daughters to 
marry at an early age, e.g. an age of seven, also happens as a way to get cash or as-
sets to secure food. In addition, particularly widows depend on friends who share 
food with them. A widow said she receives some food from neighbours every three 
days. Another widow with three daughters and four sons shared that one son gives 
her money, while she moves from one child to another to be taken care of. She has 
no land. 
 
The men in Khulm, compared to those in Nahreen, are more reluctant to allow their 
wives and daughters to go out. Widows and women whose husband is away suffer a 
lot from disasters, but on the other hand, they - particularly elderly widows – are 
able to enter the public space in order to survive. These women can be crucial for 
enabling other women to attend meetings, to assist in selling products in the bazaar, 
or they could get specific roles like becoming head of women shura (we met such 
widow living close to Khulm bazaar) because she has no husband who could prevent 
her leaving her house, to take on economic activities, or to go out in the public.  
 
Men view floods as most destructive to their livelihoods since they damage canals, 
crops and sometimes houses. It is their responsibility to repair irrigation canals, re-
build protection walls, which is costly and labour intensive. Since men are able to 
define their problem to the NGO staff, their problem gets attention, while the 
women, despite the involvement of outside female community organisers hired by 
the NGO, are not able to get their problems on the agenda of the NGO nor discussed 
in the male shuras.   
 
Generalisations about gender dynamics in Afghanistan are impossible to make, since 
they depend on locality. Women’s involvement in public spaces or agricultural work 
partly depends on whether the household can afford to hire in labour, how strongly 
social stigmas around women and men’s involvement in certain activities are, as well 
as how strongly individuals of households adhere to them (Grace, 2004, 6). The sto-
ries illustrate the minor differences in public space used by women in Nahreen and 
Khulm. In general, the vast majority of women in Afghanistan have hardly contact 
with the state, markets, and civil society organisations. Women’s options are condi-
tioned by the fortunes of the communities and households in which their livelihoods 
and everyday lives are embedded (Kandiyoti, 2007: 176). Ironically, women shuras 
never existed in Afghanistan. They were introduced in 2002-2003 by the interna-
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tional donor community as part of the National Solidarity Program (NSP). They were 
created – mostly as parallel (powerless and without authority) structures to male 
CDCs – to accommodate donor requirements rather than to create inclusive, 
participatory, democratic and representative committees at village level. This ex-
plains their disconnectedness to village level decision-making. But given the fact they 
now exist, and the opportunity they provide for women to come together, to ex-
change views and to learn, and for female outsiders like me to talk to them, I view 
women shuras as an entry point to reach women. Realizing that gender relations are 
not static but changeable like practiced by the women I met, women shuras mark 
the beginning of a public space for Afghan women.  
 
Stories from Ghulistan, Bamyan province 
People in Ghulistan village belong to one ethnic group and because social cohesion is 
strong here, they feel confident to deal with any adversity. Sar-e-Qul on the contrary, 
a village facing similar environmental conditions as Ghulistan, has difficulties to deal 
with the impact of disasters which people attribute to social divisions, a result of past 
wars. People’s narratives support the argument that local institutional arrangements 
largely determine vulnerability outcomes locally. These include gender norms. 
 
Ghulistan is a mountain village of about 240 households. It takes a 1.5 hour drive 
from Bamyan town along a rough road going to the north-west part of Bamyan dis-
trict to reach the village. The houses are built close to one another on a slope near 
the snow line. Around us are the peaks of the Hindu Kush Mountains covered with 
snow. The landscape is spectacular, and one would easily forget the cruelties that 
took place here since the 1980s, particularly during the last few years of the Taliban 
regime. In August 1997, the Taliban had installed a food blockade on Bamyan by 
closing all the roads from the south, west and east to force the Hazaras to surrender, 
which happened in 1998 when the Taliban took control over Bamyan province. This 
area used to be the stronghold of the opposition to the Taliban, but when the 
Taliban entered, the population could not withstand the brutal killings, massacres, 
torture, and rape while they tried to escape through the mountains (Rashid, 2000). 
To humiliate the local population, the Taliban dynamited the Buddha statues, start-
ing in 1998 with the head of a small Buddha, and in spring 2001 they fired rockets to 
the two big Buddha’s, destroying Afghanistan’s greatest archaeological heritage. The 
official story is that the Taliban government declared that the Buddhas were “idols", 
which were forbidden under Sharia law. Local people told me that Taliban fighters 
were getting frustrated, that the Taliban started to fall apart, and that they got tired 
of the refusal of the international community to send humanitarian aid to Afghani-
stan as long as the Taliban harbour terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. Afghanistan was 
increasingly isolated. 
 
We arrived in Ghulistan in the morning where we were welcomed by the men. They 
guided us to the house where the shura usually meets and they prepared tea for us. 
For security reasons, our visit was not announced, although Bamyan province was at 
the moment the most peaceful province in the country. According to the head of 
shura, Ghulistan is a multi-hazard village: 
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“During the occupation of the Taliban, they tortured us, - we have some martyrs 
-, they took our livestock, burned our houses and they destroyed our trees. There 
was a lot of suffering, but we escaped into the mountains. We ate grass and 
tried to bake bread using the available stones in the landscape as make-shift 
ovens. We used to have hundreds of sheep, but now we have five to ten animals 
or no animals at all. […] We never suffered from an internal conflict, only exter-
nally we did, during the Taliban regime. As a community we are very coopera-
tive. If there are problems we rely on ourselves; the government does not render 
support”. 
 
The man stressed ‘community cohesion’ as their strength in dealing with adversity. 
They use the traditional system of ashar to mobilize community labour, for instance, 
to mitigate floods by redirecting the water with shovels, to restore irrigation canals 
or other community activities. Women and children move to higher grounds when 
floods happen. 
 
“Every year at the end of the winter we experience avalanches, then rocks start 
falling down, and floods occur when snow melts too fast. The impact varies, but 
floods have the potential to damage farm land, kill livestock, and destroy feed-
ing stockpiles and houses. Recently, the bridge has been destroyed too, which 
connects two parts of the village. About 10 years ago two children died and we 
could rescue one. But there are also problems we cannot solve on our own. Like 
those big rocks above us [see figure 5.2]. They can fall down any moment and 
destroy our houses. We monitor the movement of the rocks and told people not 
to sleep anymore in the houses that are being threatened. We urgently need 
equipment from outside to remove the rocks and to minimize damage”.  
 
    
Figure 5.2: Ghulistan, threatened by big rocks, avalanches and floods 
 
The head of the shura continued explaining about the roles and responsibilities of 
the shura in dealing with disasters. The shura is tasked to timely warn the villagers. 
Loudspeakers are used to warn people for floods. Then the shura mobilizes the men 
to divert water through the practice of ashar, i.e. voluntary community labour. The 
shura further has the responsibility to link up with external actors to address prob-
lems that are beyond their control. He told that the rocks were a real threat, but the 
shura had other concerns as well like the annual flooding, getting electricity in the 
village, and the difficult access to the health clinic during winter which is 10 km away. 
Other problems on their list are unemployment and illiteracy of both men and 
women.  
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The discussion then shifted to how the shura functions, how decisions are taken and 
how women’s concerns are addressed. The man who has been talking all the time 
continued:  
 
“The shura represents the people. ‘Shura’ means council, the village parliament. 
So we consult people through meetings. Through discussing the issues we arrive 
at decisions. […]  We meet only with the men. Men and women talk within the 
household. Men and women cooperate through the household, within the family. 
We do not discriminate against women; everything is equally distributed among 
men and women”. 
 
I knew I had a chance to meet with the women to validate the man’s remark. So in-
stead of going into the gender dimension of decision-making, I was curious to know 
about who can become a member of the shura, how do you become a member, and 
are they appointed or do they use voting like introduced by the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP). But then a younger man entered the room, requesting me and the 
translator to move to the mosque, where the women are waiting. It somehow felt 
annoying to cut off an interesting discussion, but overtime I have learned to accept 
this fact as the cost I need to pay to meet with the women. This time my translator 
was a student from Bamyan who spent several years in Germany. As an internal refu-
gee, she was seriously ill and needed treatment that was not available in Afghanistan 
that time. A German NGO facilitated her treatment in Germany where she stayed 
several years to recover while attending school. She speaks German fluently.  
 
Women’s stories from Ghulistan – feeling the power, but scared to use it  
The mosque where the women were waiting was spacious but quite dark. Flimsy 
light entered through two small windows high up in the wall. About 15 women and a 
few children gathered. They all wore bright red scarves and colourful hair-pins in the 
fringe, very different from the women I met in other places. Apparently the self-
made red scarves provide sufficient cover to walk in public, because I did not notice 
a pile of burkas lying in a corner. We introduced ourselves and after a brief report 
about our discussion with the men, an older woman fiercely started her story: 
 
“Yeah, we know about the problems with the rocks, the snow and floods. We 
carry our children into the mountains during crisis. But a more serious problem 
we face is that we do not have work like weaving carpets, so we could earn 
money. We want to work to earn additional income to buy food. Due to inher-
itance, the amount of land has become less and men look for work abroad. The 
remittance from our husbands in Pakistan is too little. That is why we want to 
work”. [….] Our husbands do not allow us to earn money. They say that we are 
not able to work, but of course we are! Men say that we cannot work because 
we do not know how to read and write, and because of our rural background. 
But we could learn that! How to convince our men? We do not like that men 
take all the decisions for us”.  
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The earlier remark of the men that they consult women through the household is 
denied by the women. It is in this context that a woman stated that “If the men 
would have known that you would come, they would have instructed us about what 
to tell you and what not”. The women did not feel taken seriously by their husbands. 
The women really do not understand why the men do not see the urgency of addi-
tional income, given the poverty in the village. The women themselves do feel the 
urgent need, and they are convinced about their ability. However, they feel re-
stricted by the prevailing gender norms in their remote community that women are 
not supposed to participate in work beyond their home and farm. They are scared 
though to break through these gender norms. It is plausible to assume that the 
women may face violence by their husbands when they start carpet weaving for in-
stance, referring to the question of the shura head asking me whether the women 
have told me that they are beaten by their husbands. The women continue their 
story about another constraint regarding NGOs that come to Ghulistan:  
 
“As women we are not supposed to talk with the male NGO workers. [For NGOs, 
it is very difficult to hire female staff]. One NGO came with food aid. And once a 
lady trader promised us to help us with carpet weaving, but she never came 
back. We do not feel represented by the male shura. There is a female shura but 
not active at the moment. We want the male shura to talk with us, to listen to us. 
But this does not happen. We are eager to accept work from the male shura, 
whatever sort of work. We have very little to do now. During the winter we have 
lots of time. Carpet weaving we can do inside the house. Even widows with chil-
dren are not allowed to work, which is a huge problem. In winter, widows are 
being helped by other families.  
 
While the men stressed ‘community cohesion’ as their strength to face crisis, their 
implicit and hidden gender norms on the other hand, greatly limit the room for 
manoeuvre for women, particularly for widows. Women have a positive sense of self, 
but still feel constrained to challenge the accepted gender norms. They wish the sup-
port of a female NGO facilitator to take away this hindrance. The women shura, cre-
ated by NSP is a farce, since women’s views and ideas do not reach community deci-
sion-making, and they are not taken seriously by the men.   
 
The position of the women in Ghulistan differs a lot from those in Nahreen. Although 
the level of poverty in both localities may not vary a lot, the opportunities for 
women to earn an income differ substantially due to differing cultural and gender 
norms. The extent to which men and women are exposed to the outside world may 
also be a factor. While Nahreen has a bazaar which functions as a cross-road, 
connecting remote villages in the district to, for example Iran, the village of Ghulistan 
is situated high in the mountains. People’s livelihoods opportunities are generated 
by various factors like local security regimes, ethnicity, gender, wealth, and even by 
proximity to borders, access to roads, markets and water. “In Afghanistan ’place’ 
matters” (Bhatia, et al, 2003: 9).  
 
What the women in Ghulistan and Nahreen seem to have in common is their strug-
gle to get access to health services. In Ghulistan it is quite common that women and 
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babies die during the delivery. There is a traditional midwife who helps women dur-
ing their labour, but in case of complications she lacks the tools, and uses her hands 
and feet instead. Although a health clinic is built 10 km away through the NSP, it is 
inaccessible during winter, and more importantly, it lacks doctors and nurses.  
 
Stories from Chapdara sub-village, Sar-e-Qul village, Bamyan Province 
The 500 families of Sar-e-Qul live in several sub-villages, and Chapdara sub-village is 
located nearest to the snow-line where currently about 45 households live after 35 
households left after a destructive avalanche in 2008. Local narratives – from both 
ordinary villagers and local NGO staff – demonstrate the difficulties of sub-national 
state building, and how commanders operating parallel to the shura, or Community 
Development Council, ignore the concerns of disaster affected households. The 
community is divided and the shura is not able to settle land disputes caused by the 
annual avalanches.  
 
Like Ghulistan, Sar-e-Qul is located high in the mountains, about an hour drive south-
west from Bamyan town. Winters can be harsh here; it sometimes starts snowing 
while the wheat is still on the fields. Snow usually starts falling in October and only in 
March-April the village becomes accessible again. Occasionally the snow can be as 
high as fifteen meters. Before the winter people stockpile food and firewood to sur-
vive. 
 
When we visited the village in the month of May, the snow-line was still nearby. 
Here, farming is only possible during four to five months. People in Chapdara are 
represented in the local shura through two persons, a man and a woman, who were 
not present at the time of our first visit. Therefore, we met with ‘ordinary’ men and 
women together in the local mosque, although the women kept silent during the 
meeting. I therefore requested if I could talk to them in a separate occasion, which 
was possible. 
 
This sub-village experiences avalanches, and the worst happened in March 2008. A 
woman who still remembers the horrific event starts telling: 
 
“It was in the middle of the night, around 3:00 am when I suddenly heard lots of 
noise. Suddenly our house was hit, it was dark, I screamed but the noise of the 
snow was loud. I was lying in the rumble of my damaged house, waiting to be 
rescued. The noise of the snow continued. Around 5:00 am people, using pick 
and shovels took me out of my damaged house. I wasn’t injured…..” [She does 
not complete her story. Instead, a woman sitting next to her completes the 
story] “She lost her brother and four children. She had no husband anymore, so 
she could not farm herself. The family has a piece of land, which is now being 
cultivated by a sharecropper. That is how she can survive.” 
 
When the snow disappeared, nobody from outside rendered assistance to those 
households who lost their house. 35 families got displaced and moved to houses of 
relatives further away who had vacant rooms due to migrating household members. 
They still live there, while 45 households remain to live in their original houses. Ava-
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lanches happen yearly but the impact differs. In March 2009, an avalanche damaged 
three houses, killing 9 people. Houses, trees, livestock and also farms and irrigation 
canals are damaged. The surrounding slopes are very steep causing the snow to run 
off very fast taking with it rocks and stones. The only remedy people see is to rebuild 
their house with borrowed money or they migrate to towns and cities to do 
construction work, leaving their destroyed houses behind. If they cannot borrow 
money, they rent out their small piece of land, or leave it idle since they lack the 
money to buy seeds, or because their farm animals were killed by the avalanche. 
They say they lack the proper equipment to repair the damaged fields and canals. 
They perceive the avalanches as something inevitable that Allah decides on. This atti-
tude differs a lot from how people in Ghulistan face the similar kind of problems. 
What about ‘community cohesion’ in Sar-e-Qul? 
 
There are several traces in people’s stories that refer to little or no cooperation 
among households. Instead of repairing the damaged houses, fields and canals to-
gether through ashar, like in Ghulistan, a woman complained that nobody helped 
her to rebuild her house. And the men complain that the avalanches trigger local 
conflict every spring. They demarcate their fields with rows of piled stones, and ava-
lanches not only destroy these demarcations, they also change the environment – 
course of water flows, position of rocks and stones. It then becomes unclear which 
land belongs to whom, and it affects the flow of irrigation water. The local shura 
does not deal with these land disputes according to the men. “Our two representa-
tives from this sub-village are powerless; they have no influence in shura decisions. 
Our voice is not heard”. Another man has the opinion that the local shura only has 
the authority to deal with social conflict, probably not with problems related to land 
rights. He refers to the government as the proper institution to address land issues: 
“In 1972 land ownership was arranged but not officially registered; we never received 
documents to prove ownership.” The way the men talk reveals passivity. In their view, 
it is the task of the shura - the elders - to solve disputes, to solve problems, and to 
plan and initiate action. However, they say that “we have no idea about what hap-
pens in the shura”. They keep silent about why the shura does not function. 
 
It could be too risky for them to disclose sensitive information. Also the women 
strongly expressed their frustration with the shura, and with the men:  
         “We have no influence”. ”They [the men in the shura] do not ask us anything, so 
why should we ask them something?”  
“We cannot imagine that anybody would listen to us except the female half of 
this village”. “We cannot do anything about our problems, as long as men do 
not recognise these”. “Please do not tell the shura that we said the shura is not 
functioning”.  
 
After we left Chapdara, CCA staff told me in the car that hostility and latent conflict 
exist among the various sub-villages related to politics. The sub-villages are sup-
ported by several commanders belonging to different factions which go back to the 
struggle against the Taliban. These commanders use the village shura to legitimate 
their activities, to access NGO resources, not to genuinely discuss concerns or solve 
problems and disputes. Several NGOs have given up working in this village. Also the 
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National Solidarity Program – which is in fact a government programme, but imple-
mented by NGOs - did not reduce tensions. On the contrary, a few powerful 
commanders used the NSP to further strengthen their position by allowing the NGOs 
to implement their western ideas about democratization. The two representatives 
from Chapdara belong to the mazdoor - landless wage labourers, who do the 
heaviest work for the landowning class5. It is quite unusual in Afghan tradition that 
these groups are member of the shura6. Like the women shura, making mazdoor 
member of the shura is an attempt of the NSP to make village governance more 
inclusive. In reality, the representatives from Chapdara remain powerless, since com-
manders and local elite ignore their concerns. The case of Sar-e-Qul demonstrates 
the problematic of sub-national state-building in Afghanistan and the donors’ naive 
expectation to change Afghanistan into a democratic country over a couple of years, 
using western standards. The government in Bamyan hardly plays a role at the vil-
lage and district level. It is not an exception though. I observed many different out-
comes of NSP in the villages I visited. NSP did not yet result in a coherent governance 
structure connecting the local to the higher levels of government (Nixon, 2008). 
Changing social structures and norms requires a long time horizon, like I explained in 
chapter 1 referring to Jütting’s institutional framework (2003). 
 
5.2.2 Intermezzo: Making sense of local narratives in Afghanistan 
The cases from Afghanistan demonstrate how local conflicts and tensions are closely 
related to the seasonality of disasters and their immediate impact on people’s liveli-
hoods. 50% of local conflicts in Afghanistan are primarily about livelihoods 
associated with access to land and water (Dennys and Zaman, 2009). Whether 
communities can deal with the tensions and negative disaster impact or not, seem to 
be linked to local formal and informal institutions and to people’s position in society. 
Women, landless families, widows and female-headed households have the least 
possibilities to influence village decision-making. The extent to which their concerns 
are considered depends on how the shura adheres to social stigmas around gender 
or traditional protection principles regarding low income groups. In Nahreen and in 
Sar-e-Qul there are signals that local conflicts are linked to broader divides or that 
the broader conflict context offers livelihood opportunities for unemployed youth. In 
many areas local government – from village to provincial level – does not function, 
nor does the formal judiciary system, which local people regard as slow, expensive 
and often corrupt. As conflict is a daily reality that Afghans must address, there is a 
dire need to address these local conflicts to avoid escalation and that they feed into 
the multi-layered conflict system in the country (Dennys and Zaman, 2009). When 
visiting CBDRR-areas, I came across a few peace shura initiatives which attempted to 
change the traditional practice, norms and values of settling disputes, like avoiding 
killing as revenge, and which seem to act as an appreciated institution that is able to 
solve a large number of disputes7. In many places in Afghanistan, people are tired of 
                                                          
5
  Mazdoor is the lowest income group involved in cutting grass for livestock, fetching water, cleaning the stables 
and collecting firewood. Dehqan are also landless but do work with a little higher status like cultivating the land. 
Dehqan are a kind of sharecroppers receiving 1/5 of the produce.  
6
  Notions of village ‘representation’, ‘participation’ and community decision-making are subject of Chapter 6. 
7
  Particularly civil cases, while criminal cases are more difficult to tackle. 
157 
 
conflicts and making war, and do not want to passively wait for the government to 
achieve peace and order.  
 
The organisations in Afghanistan that collect data about conflict and insecurity focus 
mainly on issues that affect the operations of the humanitarian and development 
community8. The information, however, does not tell much about the everyday 
experience of conflict for Afghans at the local level. Therefore, I added stories of 
peace shuras which demonstrate trends to understand the Afghan reality of conflict, 
particularly at the local level, and how these are linked to the broader context. More 
importantly, the peace shura stories reveal people’s motivations for using violence, 
and their motivation for mediating and breaking through the negative spiral of con-
flict and revenge. Part of this research also aims to study how local institutions, like 
traditional and peace shuras, produce, reproduce or reduce people’s vulnerability to 
disaster and conflict. Peace shuras are newly established institutions after 2001 that 
operate parallel to the traditional shuras, although people can be member of both 
like religious leaders. 
 
5.2.3 Stories from peace shuras in Kunduz, Herat and Kabul provinces 
In May 2007 I travelled by car from Kabul to Kunduz to meet with a local peace shura. 
A small group of elders, religious leaders and government officials approached 
CPAU9 in 2005 to help them to settle local disputes and to reduce tensions in Kunduz 
district. They heard about CPAU from their relatives in Badakshan who were involved 
in a serious conflict. CPAU played a positive role there so the elders wanted CPAU to 
help them as well. A local leader starts telling:  
 
“25 years of war has divided people in different political camps. Fighters took 
land, women and other assets from ordinary people. During the Russian time, 
the communist fought against the mujahedeen. When somebody was killed, the 
perception is that the person is killed by an opposing ‘family member’. During 
the civil war, different factions of the mujahedeen fought against each other, 
and then the Taliban came. Violence is being personalized at the local level 
targeting people from different ethnicity or clan” […] Many people in Kunduz 
lost ownership of their land to commanders, and this worsened the relationships 
with neighbours and between families. Regardless the layer of conflict, revenge 
is always projected at the village level”.  
 
“People do not go to court, because court takes too long and it is corrupt; get-
ting money is more important for the court than applying the law. Water con-
flicts cannot wait to be solved after 12 years, but require immediate attention”.  
 
“Traditional shuras do not always want to interfere in local conflicts, or they 
come up with old, awful solutions that are not beneficial to particularly women, 
or not durable because solutions did not take away tensions, were not always 
                                                          
8
  These are, among others, the Afghan NGO Security Office (ANSO), The Afghan Conflict Monitor, and the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). 
9
  CPAU (Cooperation for Peace and Unity) is a local Afghan NGO founded in 1996. CPAU encourages people to 
actively participate in peace building through advancing knowledge and skills to mediate conflicts.   
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perceived as just by both parties. That is why we have changed our perspective 
on conflict resolution. For instance, we want to get rid of the practice of settling 
disputes through compensation that involves women. We further promote ‘for-
giveness’ instead of revenge. We use customary law, sharia law and mediation 
depending on the case, while abolishing rude practices” […] Although we may 
not always be respected by some powerful parties, our motivation and numbers 
keep us going. Sometimes we ask advice from lawyers.” 
 
Because the justice system in Kunduz is barely functioning, the local population pre-
fers to approach the informal peace shura. In Kunduz about 50% of the conflicts are 
related to land and water, caused by illegal occupation and selling of land by 
commanders, and increasingly by inheritance related problems. The latter results in 
an increase in inter-family conflicts.  
 
The peace shura in Kunduz has a women committee which meets with the men to 
consult and coordinate tasks regarding specific cases. The women particularly deal 
with divorce, domestic violence and inheritance matters.  
 
“We are happy to go out of our homes. We are fed up with violence and war. 
We are educated women [several teachers and a doctor] if we do not do it, who 
will do it? We want to know more about women’s rights and how to deal with 
domestic violence. We want to serve others, to get the women out of their 
houses. We see an increase in domestic violence in Kunduz after the Taliban left, 
because women had hoped to go out again”. 
 
In Herat I met with five women who are active in peace shuras in Ghoryan district 
which borders Iran. They also are educated women - high-school teachers - and 
committed to support women who are in trouble10. The eldest woman is active in 
the district peace shura, and in a saffron processing cooperative as an entry-point to 
reach women. Their motivation to mediate in local conflicts stems from their belief 
that Afghanistan needs their support. They do not have the capacity to address con-
flicts nation-wide, but they believe they can contribute to reduce local conflict. As 
women they are particularly motivated to mediate conflicts related to domestic vio-
lence and drug addiction, which in their view has the highest priority in their area.  
 
“Drug addiction is highest in districts that border Iran. Ghoryan has about 5000 
drug addicts – 300 women and 4700 men. Three years ago the total number of 
addicted people was only 800. Husbands increasingly force their wives to use 
opium so they wouldn’t complain about their husbands’ addiction and misbe-
haviour. Last month 8 women were killed after quarrels with their husbands 
over selling assets like jewellery in order to buy drugs. When the women resisted 
they were killed. […]Many conflicts start within the family, between husband 
and wives, between mother and daughters-in-law, and among co-wives.” 
 
                                                          
10
 Three women are in their early twenties, and got their education while seeking refuge in Iran. Girls educated in 
Iran are exposed to different gender norms and ideas which they bring back into Afghan villages.  
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“Geographically, Ghoryan district is along a smuggling route between Iran and 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces poppy which is smuggled to Iran, where 
poppy is processed into crystals. Addiction is not a new phenomenon but a prac-
tice Afghan people from Herat adopted while they were refugees in Iran. When 
they returned home many of them became smugglers, particularly ‘Kuchis’, for 
whom it had become almost impossible to return to their nomadic way of exist-
ence. […] There are now also crystal factories in Faryab (a province north of 
Herat). Crystals are very small and smugglers offer US$20 to ordinary people to 
tempt them to taste the crystals to, so-called, test the quality. This is the way 
how people get addicted. It is perceived as a painkiller and to heal cancer. It is 
also given to small children. We are very concerned with these trends because it 
will be a big problem for the next generation. The government ignores the prob-
lem. In fact the government benefits from the smugglers and drug lords, like the 
brother of Karzai. The provincial health department does not take the increasing 
addiction seriously referring to the insecurity along the border. The government 
uses ‘insecurity’ as an excuse, because it is safe”. 
 
Women and men set different priorities to which conflict should be settled first. 
Women perceive drug addiction as a high risk in Ghoryan district, which the women 
living in Dehran and Roshan villages11 confirmed. Drug addiction is closely linked to 
criminal activities and prostitution. The women I met are frustrated that there is not 
even a rehabilitation centre or a safe house for female drug addicts. The head of the 
district’s Education Department told the women that “nobody can stop drug addic-
tion, even the US government cannot while a former women’s affairs minister in 
Kabul even denied that prostitution happened in the country. To render support 
“Sometimes old women in the village offer their house as a safe place”, according to 
the women. Men in Ghoryan, on the other hand, put conflicts related to land and 
water as the highest priority, which are related to rules for grazing areas for cattle, 
protection areas to reduce the impact of sandstorms, and to irrigation water.  
 
Men and women experience conflict and war differently, and have different stakes in 
peace-building and stability. Kandiyoti (2007) rightly points out that instead of view-
ing gender in Afghanistan only through the lens of indigenous culture and Islam, 
attention is needed to recognize the effects of conflict and displacement on gender 
relations and norms, because it is against this background of new challenges, that 
the politics of gender is being played out” (Kandiyoti, 2007: 176). It is common prac-
tice, for instance, to use women as compensation payment to settle disputes12, or as 
a disposable asset to settle debts.   
 
The various stories from the peace shuras demonstrate that people go to informal 
institutions to settle disputes. However peace shuras like the ones I talked to are still 
rare in Afghanistan. The majority of conflicts may be settled temporarily, but are 
likely to revive and escalate again later on. In light of the lack of a formal judicial sys-
tem, of impunity and corrupt courts, local informal institutions to settle disputes 
must be recognized. In Kabul, several unresolved cases were referred by the formal 
                                                          
11
 These two villages in Ghoryan district are the CBDRR-pilot areas of SDO, partner of ICCO.  
12
 Through sex or marriage. 
160 
 
court to the informal peace shura. A peace shura is a local institution which has the 
potential to reduce people’s vulnerability to disasters and conflict.  
 
The stories from Afghanistan show the differentiated nature of local knowledge 
through the diversity in risk views and ideas within villages about the same risk 
events. The diverse risk views are embedded in specific social, cultural and institu-
tional settings. People’s livelihood options and decisions are further determined by 
geographical and environmental factors, and by the effects of conflict and displace-
ment. The knowledge people apply is neither local, commonly owned nor solely reli-
gious or cultural in nature. The peace shuras are a good example of how different 
bodies of knowledge – sharia, customary law, western reconciliation ideas - are 
blended, and how norms about justice and gender are changing. The cases from Sar-
e-Qul and Nahreen illustrate that local knowledge can also have its limitations, 
resulting in out-migration in search of new opportunities. 
 
5.2.4 Halmahera, Indonesia: How people talk about the communal violence and its 
consequences 
There are numerous accounts of the violence in Maluku, especially about the events 
in Ambon (Klinken, 2007; Azca, 2006; Panggabean, 2004; Lingsma, 2008), whereas 
the conflict in Halmahera, North Maluku, received far less attention (Duncan, 2005a; 
Adeny-Risakotta, 2005). Violence in Halmahera happened from August 1999 through 
June 2000, resulting in 220,000 people displaced and almost 2,800 dead (Klinken, 
2007b). I found competing versions, explanations and numerous causes for the vio-
lence among local people’s accounts. There is no doubt about the subjective nature 
of all the stories documented, but it are these subjectivities that provide insight into 
the causes, local people’s motives to use violence (or not), the consequences of the 
conflict, and people’s current attitudes (Duncan, 2005a). As explained in chapter 1, I 
view conflict as a process of how warring parties mobilize and organise their 
supporters, looking into the agency of violence (Kalyvas, 2003; Richards, 2005; 
Duncan, 2007). At the local level this allows to ask why certain people are affected by 
violence in the way they are, and how they make sense of the events. How do local 
people understand and experience the violence on the ground? In what way did local 
knowledge play a role in preventing or making violence? The stories were collected 
in different parts of Halmahera between 2006 and 2010: in the north around Tobelo 
and Kao (Birinoa, Togoliua, Daru, Gamlaha), in central Halmahera near Sofifi, in the 
south near Weda (Going, Sosowomo, Tilope) and in the east, near Buli (Geltoni). 
These are mostly villages selected for the CBDRR-pilot program (see map 5.2).  
 
All people I interviewed had returned to their old village, while a few moved to 
places allocated to them by the government. No one was staying anymore in a refu-
gee camp or in a temporary shelter. I arranged the stories according to their chronol-
ogy, to better understand the link between events, people’s motives to use violence 
or not, and the consequences. 
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 Map 5.2 Halmahera and surrounding islands 
 
 
 
Story from Malifut-Kao district – fall 1999 
The first person who told his story was a 63-yearsold reverend from Gamlaha, a vil-
lage close to Kao in Kao district, Northern Halmahera. He belongs to the Tobelo 
Boeng tribe. He starts his story with a brief history of the village and how protestant 
missionaries encouraged people in 1897 to build their houses closer to each other 
and to convert to Christianity. As a reverend of a local protestant church he explains 
why he mobilized the men in the village to take up arms and to join the conflict. 
 
“The protestant missionaries were made to believe that we are cannibals. To at-
tract local people’s attention, they used a tambour, which is in our culture a way 
to announce wedding-parties. People would gather and listen to the missionar-
ies. They told us that if we would convert to Christianity we would meet again 
with our ancestors, parents and friends in heaven. We used to believe that death 
means a definitive farewell. So we appreciated this new idea, and were eager to 
be baptized and become Christian. The missionaries brought schools and 
healthcare, but we still use traditional medicines as well. In our culture and 
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traditions there are practices and values we still adhere to and that were not 
part of evangelization. Like Jesus Christ in Christianity, our tradition has O Gihiri 
Moi as the creator. Whereas Christianity focuses on gratitude to God, our tradi-
tions focus on sincerity and honesty. Before we do something, we need to look 
introspectively if we do it with good or bad intentions. We only should do things 
with a pure heart. For instance, if we want to cut trees, we need to ask permis-
sion to O Gihiri Moi, the creator. It makes people conscious about what they do. 
It is not allowed to cut trees for self-enrichment. [……..] Although we are Chris-
tians, most of us are emotionally still guided by ancestral spirits like “O Roha 
Mapareta”, a spirit offering protection, and by” O Dilikine”, a spirit offering 
strength during fights and who accompanies us. During the conflict, we called 
on these spirits. In our tradition we do not have enemies. We did not want the 
conflict. “Do not start the problem” is a local saying. But if we are being threat-
ened or attacked, we shouldn’t walk away, or give up. On the 24th of October 
1999, a Sunday, I was leading a service in our local church when we heard that 
Kao has been attacked [by the Makians from Malifuth]. I instructed the men to 
collect their weapons and to come back in the church. I know this is wrong from 
the perspective of Christianity, but from the perspective of our tradition it is 
right. So we all went to Kao to help our brothers to defend themselves”. As a 
spiritual leader I had to join….” 
 
A report of the International Crisis Group (2000) confirms that on Sunday October 24, 
1999 violence broke out again between Makian and Kao tribes and they fought for 
two days. Every Makian house was burned to the ground. As a result, about 17,000 
Makian fled to the islands of Ternate and Tidore with a dominant Muslim population. 
I asked the reverend how he can justify the use of violence with his belief to only do 
things with a pure heart. He answered that local beliefs have no bad intentions while 
referring to ‘O Dilikine’. Although he admits he had an aversion to join, he is very 
open in how he mobilized and armed the male villagers which felt as the right thing 
to do. After six years he still showed no regret. As belonging to the indigenous peo-
ple of Kao he feels a strong sense of unity based on the adat belief that their  
ancestral lands cannot be divided. He referred to a new law of the Habibie govern-
ment that was passed in August 1999 (Government Regulation No 42/1999), and 
that created a new Malifut sub-district for the Makian in the southern part of the 
Kao-sub-district (see Map 5.3). There are many accounts written about the rivalry 
and increasing tensions between the two ethnic groups, and how a local ethnic con-
flict over land and boundaries, combined with longstanding dormant grievances, had 
been transformed into a province-wide religious one (Klinken, 2007a; Klinken, 2007b; 
Azca, 2006; Duncan, 2005a; Panggabean, 2004; Adeny-Risakotta, 2005).   
 
Functioning as a reverend in a local protestant church, he had authority in the village, 
and as such he could use the Sunday church service to mobilize his supporters. While 
the reverend referred to local beliefs to justify his use of violence, his actions could 
be – and were later – interpreted by opponents as religious violence. The reverend’s 
partisan role in the conflict and the remarks of my translator made me alert to be 
critical about the role of the Evangelical Messiah Church of Halmahera (Gereja 
Masehi Injil Halmahera, GMIH) in the CBDRR pilot. The GMIH is the immediate  
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Map 5.3 1999 Sub-district boundaries on the island of Halmahera (approximately) 
 
successor of the Dutch protestant mission church and the local partner of Kerkinactie 
and ICCO in Halmahera for channelling emergency relief and development aid. Its 
allegedly partial role in the communal violence caused a problematic relationship 
between the Dutch Protestant aid agencies and the GMIH when Kerkinactie wanted 
to support displaced families in 2000. The GMIH is the dominant Christian church in 
northern Maluku around Tobelo, which became the next arena of conflict after Kao-
Malifut.  
 
Stories from Tobelo – Rumours about “Bloody Christmas” and “Bloody Ramadan” 
In the whole of Halmahera, 85% of the population is Muslim and 15% is Christian. 
This Christian minority lives particularly in Tobelo sub-district, where they are the 
majority. They live throughout the sub-district while Muslim communities were more 
concentrated like in Tobelo town, and in the village of Togoliua. Many Christian IDPs 
from other parts of Halmahera sought refuge in Tobelo, and they brought with them 
stories of Muslim atrocities - real or imagined - which had a significant impact on the 
conflict (Duncan, 2005a). The stories or rumours were believed by their hosts, and 
are still believed, and often cited to justify the violence around Tobelo. Most stories 
were about the brutal killing of children in Payahe by Muslims (Duncan, 2007). There 
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were further rumours about a “Bloody Christmas” and a “Bloody Ramadan”, “If we 
do not kill them, they will kill us” and both sides were preparing for the violence. The 
GMIH was accused by the Muslims to gather Christians IDPs in Tobelo to strengthen 
their forces for a planned attack. The Christian community spread slogans like “Mus-
lims are our brothers, but all ethnic Makian, Tidore and Kayao should leave Tobelo” 
until the government has restored peace and order. The fighting started in the night 
of December 26, 1999. Christians claim that the Muslims started throwing stones to 
their homes in Gosomo, a neighbourhood in Tobelo town, while the Muslims claim 
the opposite. The situation quickly spiralled out of control since both sides inter-
preted the stoning as a start of the attack. Both sides mobilized their forces from 
within and beyond Tobelo. On December 28 the Christians controlled Tobelo while 
the Muslims fled to their mosques, where they were rescued by the army who 
moved them to a military camp for protection. Then violence broke out between 
Muslims and Christians in villages north and south of Tobelo.  
 
The stories I include here are from two neighbouring villages: Togoliua and Birinoa. 
The GMIH selected these villages for the CBDRR pilot with the intention to reduce 
the tensions. It has a long-standing relationship with the people in Birinoa which is 
dominantly Christian, and because Birinoa still experiences tensions with the people 
from Togoliua who are all Muslim13. The GMIH and SANRO used the CBDRR-pilot as 
an opportunity to play a mediating role between the two villages to reduce tensions. 
The stories showed how the communal violence got its religious outlook as projected 
in the media and that was later picked-up by aid agencies abroad, whereas the way 
local people talk about and justify the use of violence refers rather to land disputes 
using the notion of ‘adat’. The practice, values and politics around adat and land 
rights are the recurrent themes in the stories from the north to the south of Halma-
hera which were largely ignored by the aid agencies that entered Halmahera after 
the violence. Therefore, local people do not feel taken seriously by outsiders. 
 
Stories from Togoliua  
Togoliua is a Muslim village. It is located less than one hour drive along the road be-
tween Tobelo and Kusuri, a town northwest of Kao. The attack on Togoliua is one of 
the most violent ones in Halmahera (Klinken, 2007). Duncan (2007) recorded a story 
from a woman from Togoliua when she stayed in a refugee camp in Ternate:  
 
“When they [the Christians] invaded there were too many people so we fled to 
the mosque. When we got to the mosque they started knocking in the mosque 
windows and they were able to get into the mosque and started hacking at peo-
ple. I was cut but did not see it because I was under people. Those who were still 
alive were hacked at again…..Many women were killed in the mosque…..from 
bombs, from being chopped up.” 
 
Even nine years after the violence, the village head felt the need to reconstruct the 
village’s history and the violent events in December 1999 without me directly asking 
                                                          
13 Both villages are covered by the fieldwork of Charlotte van der Tak (2008). 
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him to do so. Tensions with the neighbouring villages, dominantly Christian, still 
existed. From time to time there were violent incidents deep in the forest, or women 
and children sought refuge as a result of rumours they picked up along the highway. 
The village head related these incidents to the past violence and to how Togoliua 
started as a settlement. Through telling his version of the history of Togoliua he 
seemed to legitimize his right to live here. The village head started his story in 1973 
and it circled around land issues: 
 
“83 families received land from the government as part of a transmigration pro-
gram. We originally come from Tolonulo [a small island northeast from Tobelo]. 
The settlement of these 83 families is documented by the land registration office 
in Ternate and we received an official land certificate which was kept in the vil-
lage archive. The total land is about 4000 ha. Unfortunately, the certificate got 
lost during the violence when my house burned down. […..]All families in 
Togoliua fled, leaving their land behind, uncultivated. We have this unwritten 
rule: when you have to abandon your land in such situation, others are not al-
lowed to occupy it or to cut large trees.  […..] In 1973, there were very few 
houses in this area [Birinoa and Tagalapaca]. These were not yet villages. We di-
vided the land among us: each family got about 25 hectares. Over time 
newcomers received lesser land as a result of influx of families: 15, 7, 5, 5 and 
now 2,5 ha. So now in the village, there are people owning 25 ha, but also those 
that only possess 2,5 ha. The land size is a decision made by the village council 
according to adat law, not by the government. Adat law tells that once you culti-
vate a piece of land, it is yours! We know the borders of our land very well. 
Intruders are told to leave, but they come back and back. They do not respect 
our boundaries. We [village officials] have been visiting adjacent villages to dis-
cuss our problem we have now for the past two years, but without a durable 
solution. [Why not? I asked] The sub district government silently allows and sup-
ports the ’illegal’ land occupation here in Togoliua by the village head and coun-
cil members from Paca who cultivate a 2 km long strip of land. I see the follow-
ing solution: Paca could get a 1 km strip of land instead of 2 km, and then the 
problem is solved. But if nothing happens, we all fear renewed violence.  
 
Without going into detail about what happened in Togoliua during the conflict he 
focused his story on land disputes. These land disputes are related to their 
transmigration, the loss of  land certificates and to their temporary absence from 
their village after the conflict. The village head, and the other village officials have a 
specific understanding about how adat should be applied in their circumstances 
which seems to differ from how others [the native population] view adat. Later in 
this chapter I elaborate on this when I will make sense of the conflicting stories. An 
interesting fact in the village head’s story is that Paca does not immediately border 
Togoliua, and this land issue is not related to the changes in administrative borders. 
It is further remarkable that he is silent about the tense relations with the people 
from Birinoa which directly borders Togoliua. From the oral histories of various peo-
ple in Birinoa I learned that village officials from Togoliua have ‘granted’ a piece of 
100 ha of forest land, within the Birinoa territory, to the military in return for protec-
tion the Togoliuans received to escape the violence. Especially the native Birinoans 
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are furious about this, since from time to time they are chased away by military men 
from the ancestral land they used to live in. Native people in Birinoa accuse people 
from Togoliua of intruding their land. Disputes about land and varying interpreta-
tions of adat seem to be a plausible explanation for why several violent incidents still 
happen exactly deep in the forests between Togoliua and Birinoa.  
 
The current village head and some other officials  in Togoliua portray themselves as 
victims, both during and after the conflict. “People from outside came to Togoliua 
and provoked us” while several others share they have no hard feelings: ”what hap-
pened, has happened, and we should leave it behind”. The latter either have Chris-
tian relatives in nearby villages, who came to Togoliua to rescue them, and to fight 
the others14, i.e. Muslim non-relatives. Or they depend on Christians to earn a liveli-
hood (Tak, 2008). Christians from adjacent villages claim, however, that the Muslims 
in Togoliua had blocked the road with felled coconut palms and had sent taunts to 
neighbouring Christian villages to provoke violence, stories I heard in Birinoa and 
read in literature (Duncan, 2005a). A 65-year old kepala adat in Kusuri shared:  
 
“People from Kusuri went to Togoliua to fight. I also went, but only because my 
children went and I wanted to protect, to stop them. It was very difficult what 
one should do, a dilemma, because you did not know whom to trust, and in 
some cases [Kusuri people] killed relatives. People from Kusuri did not want to 
fight, but people from Kao went to Togoliua, and we had to help them.” 
 
It is clear that competing versions still exist and that the oral histories are biased. In 
order to understand the violence and the complexity of the land issue, it is necessary 
to hear the stories from other actors involved in the violence and subsequent land 
disputes like the stories from Birinoa.  
 
Stories from Birinoa 
Till the 1990s the area of Birinoa, belonging to the village of Kusuri15, was mainly 
forest inhabited by shifting native tribes who depended on these forests for their 
survival. During the 1980s the native inhabitants allowed newcomers from other 
places in Halmahera to use 2 ha of forest garden per family. In 1988 a protestant 
missionary and staff of World Vision encouraged the native population to settle 
down in a village, to adopt western style of clothing, and new techniques to grow 
crops as part of its Area Development Programme. Then the native population con-
verted to Christianity. Currently 35 native households settled in Birinoa living to-
gether with about 17 families coming from other places in Halmahera. Persuading 
forest people to live in villages was part of government’s policy that officially aims to 
raise the level of ‘civilization’ and social welfare of these groups who are ‘socio-
culturally isolated’ and ‘backward’, while it serves the strategic purpose to open the 
forests for logging, mining and plantations (Duncan, 2002). Before the conflict 
Birinoa used to be a mixed village of forest people, Christians and Muslims, all 
belonging to the indigenous tribes of Halmahera.  
 
                                                          
14
 Based on interview with village policeman in Kusuri, an adjacent village with dominantly Christians (Tak, 2008).  
15
 In 1993 Birinoa became part of the village of Tobe till it got the status of village itself in 2006.  
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People in Birinoa followed the news about the violence through the radio, neigh-
bours and relatives. People in Birinoa got scared, and both Christians and Muslims 
decided to leave the village to seek protection elsewhere, using their social networks. 
While the village was abandoned, both Christian and Muslims mobs came to Birinoa 
to look for and attack the other religion, and burned all houses down. The Christians, 
while in Kusuri, met with refugees from north of Tobelo, who wanted to return to 
their homes, but were blocked by the people from Togoliua. These were holding 
machetes, and threatening to attack them if they would pass. To support the refu-
gees to return home to Tobelo, Christians from neighbouring villages, including 
Birinoans, assembled and decided to attack Togoliua with the argument to re-open 
the road as they felt as if their religion was attacked16.  
 
“The Togoliuans started the conflict, so they may start it again”, has become a domi-
nant narrative in Birinoa to cover up their fear for revenge. It is also a way to portray 
themselves as ‘vulnerable’ towards outsiders in the hope to be eligible for external 
(international) support, especially to solve the land disputes. The Birinoans are frus-
trated that Togolians encroach their forest gardens belonging to Birinoa, and that 
the Togolians ‘granted’ a piece of 100 ha of forest land to the military. Underneath 
the dominant us-them narrative, I found a variety of local narratives about everyday 
Muslim-Christian interactions, narratives that are positive and optimistic about the 
other, aside from a few narratives that show a kind of indifference.  
 
All Christians returned to Birinoa in 2001. A while later, the Muslim families returned. 
The Christians claimed that the Muslim brought relatives and friends with them, and 
the Christians did not want these ‘strange’ Muslims in their village, leaving them with 
no choice than to leave. Some Muslims converted to Christianity to be able to stay in 
Birinoa, while the majority went to Ternate, Tidore and Makian. The village leaders in 
Birinoa made a pact to not allow new families to settle in Birinoa for the next five 
years, neither Christians nor Muslims. However, from various respondents I learned 
that since then new families did settle, but Christians only. The village officials, domi-
nated by the village secretary, maintain an us-them divide in public.  
 
When at the start of the CBDRR-pilot a risk assessment was conducted, the land dis-
putes turned out to be more complex: officially, adat land cannot be sold, but 
individual people in Birinoa did sell land to Togoliuan families for personal gains. The 
local adat narrative in Birinoa is not consistent with its practice. This caused a lot of 
tensions, not just between the two villages but also within Birinoa. The stories reveal 
that people, in the absence of clear government laws or institutional arrangements 
regarding land, define their own rules to perform power over the other to access 
land.  
 
5.2.3 Making sense of competing local narratives in northern Halmahera 
The more stories I heard I realized that it is quite impossible to make a distinction 
between victims and perpetrators. The dominant narrative I heard is that “Christians 
and Muslims can live together”, “We do not know who organised, mobilized the vio-
                                                          
16
 One of those leading the attack was the village secretary of Birinoa at the time of this research. 
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lence, how it started”, “What has happened, happened. We must leave it behind”. 
The conflict in Northern Maluku was fought at different levels by various groups by a 
complex mix of motives (Klinken, 2007a). Most of the motives remained invisible to 
local people, and many told that they shouldn’t be involved, that they did not want 
to be involved. Publicly talking about the violence and what really happened has be-
come a taboo in Northern Maluku (Klinken, 2007a: 122). This dominant local narra-
tive, however, contradicts to story-traces of on-going tensions, fear, trauma, silences 
due to unsolved land disputes. The most heard complaint is that “Government is not 
taking us seriously”. Government in Halmahera promoted reconciliation through 
adat ceremonies, and focused on achieving security targets, while promoting a ‘cul-
ture of forgetting’. This attitude reinforces local people’s feeling that they do not 
matter as people. They want to be treated with more respect and dignity. 
 
The conflict happened in a time with great uncertainty about rules and laws, when 
the government of Indonesia was weak, which created opportunities for conflict 
entrepreneurs (Klinken, 2007). Although adat law was officially replaced by a nation-
wide bureaucratic regional and village administration in the mid-1970s, it was still 
practiced in remote areas inhabited by indigenous groups. Particularly these areas 
were prime targets for state transmigration programs which were essentially a 
continuation of the colonial ‘civilizing mission’ (Henley and Davidson, 2008). The 
beneficiaries of the transmigration program in Togoliua are Muslims from Northern 
Maluku, not from Java or Sulawesi, and the rivalry therefore seems to be about who 
is most indigenous, or who seems most eligible to get government’s support for their 
claims. In 1999, the Habibie government passed laws that led to a revival of local 
adat in village governance. The Birinoans now use adat to oppose the claims of the 
Togoliuans that go – in their perception - beyond the original transmigration agree-
ments, and they use adat as an instrument to redress past injustices. The Togoliuans 
on their turn, argue that the Birinoans apply adat too strictly and they feel neglected 
by local government to provide clarity.  
 
People in the villages look first of all to the sub-district, district and provincial 
government to solve land disputes, but till now without satisfactory outcomes. 
Villagers expect that borders will be clarified and officially registered at the Land 
Registration Department. They hope to get documents. The priority of the local 
government, however, is to provide security by establishing military security posts 
near violence-prone villages, and to mitigate the tensions through organizing dia-
logues and reconciliation. It uses traditional values from adat, like Balai Besar, liter-
ally meaning ‘Big House’ referring to a shared history and ancestors, with accompa-
nied traditions to reach consensus and to lower tensions. These values are exclusive 
rather than harmonizing traditions, since newcomers and immigrants are not fully 
recognized in the referred shared history. With these measures, the government 
does not tackle land disputes. Why not?  
 
Creating a culture of peace and harmony is safer than touching on political matters 
like land governance and competing claims. The process of decentralization and re-
defining administrative boundaries of sub-districts and villages is still on-going. 
Decentralization means an increasing control of local governments over revenues 
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from natural resource extraction. The transfer of authority and control over reve-
nues increased the prestige and profitability of local politics (Duncan, 2005a: 59). 
Local politicians are competing over these positions and may use local disputes to 
mobilize supporters in their campaigns during elections. They enter villages to pro-
voke and to convince people of their utter reliance on them. Local politicians expect 
to win votes, while reinforcing existing divisions among people (Tak, 2008). 
Appreciating adat as local knowledge for a political struggle requires critical reflec-
tion about who uses it for what purpose, and who will be excluded. The purpose 
could be to simply document and record land rights to do justice to local indigenous 
people’s rights, but adat could also be used to promote ethnic conflict like the sto-
ries from Halmahera have shown. 
 
It should be noted here that adat and Balai Besar are notions promoted by Christian 
institutions in Maluku as well, including the GMIH, and supported by Kerkinactie. The 
question is how aid workers in Halmahera, supported by the GMIH and Kerkinactie 
take a position in such a conflictive context, given the partial past of these church 
institutions. In the next chapter the positioning of aid workers in communities will be 
a central theme. 
 
5.2.5 Stories Central Java – making sense of ‘new risks’ 
The village of Tempur is situated inside the caldera of Muria Mountain, in the north-
ern part of Central Java  in Jepara district17. In 1990 Tempur became accessible by 
road for motorbikes, and since 1995 for cars. Lowland communities constructed the 
narrative that the severe floods in 2005 and 2006 in the lowlands surrounding Muria 
Mountain started in Tempur and its surroundings, after several hours of heavy rain. 
Tempur itself, consisting of six sub-villages on the slopes of the caldera, was hit by a 
flash flood for the first time in history. Due to damages to the road and several 
bridges, the village was isolated from the outside world for about 10 days. The water 
level in the river rose seven meters, damaging houses and more than 100 ha of rice 
fields either completely destroyed or being filled with big stones and rocks. A total of 
750 households in Tempur were affected by the flash flood.  
 
     
Figure 5.3: Tempur, located in the caldera of Muria Mountain, hit by a flash flood in 2006 
 
The oral history of Tempur goes back to 1900 when people lived in the forests 
through hunting and gathering, and considered the forest and particularly the top of 
Muria Mountain as a holy place. From the 1930s people started to construct more 
permanent housing using bamboo and leaves plastered with manure. They stole  
                                                          
17
 Based on MSC thesis of Marian Meulenkamp and own field work 
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coffee plants from Tolont, a Dutch coffee plantation nearby, and currently coffee is 
their main source of livelihood which grows in their forest gardens. People devel-
oped their own traditional tenurial system to use and maintain the forest according 
to their socio-cultural lives. During the Dutch colonial time these traditional tenurial 
system were overridden by new rules. The Dutch declared all forest to be owned by 
the state, which could be made suitable for commercial interest and establishing 
plantations (McCarthy, 2000). Although the Dutch never entered Tempur, and peo-
ple considered their forests as inherited from their ancestors, their forests were offi-
cially put under state control. Later, Suharto’s administration created the Basic 
Forestry Provisions (No. 5/1967) to divide several forest areas into specific land use 
categories, like timber production, conservation area, and community forests (ibid: 
94). This categorization was done on paper, marking out the acceptable boundaries 
for different forest land uses without taking into account local communities, or no-
tions of local territoriality (ibid). In Tempur, the boundaries between community 
forest and state forests are not very clear, but local people say they recognize the 
boundaries from the different tree species. The most degraded areas are in the state 
forests – categorized as conservation area - due to logging activities which became 
rampant since the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and Suharto’s fall in 1998. Whether 
these logging activities are legal or illegal remains ambiguous depending on whom 
you ask. In Tempur, stories link environmental degradation to a system where elite 
networks captured ‘formal’ logging permission over state forests, even in conserva-
tion areas, which is possible in the absence of state authorities that control resource 
use. This sudden increase in logging activities and environmental degradation, in 
combination with extreme rainfall, is believed to be the cause of the first flash flood 
in Tempur in 2006.  
 
The occurrence of the flash flood caused people to make sense of the event, why did 
it happen, and how to deal with this new risk. In Tempur, people’s risk perceptions 
are closely related to cultural and religious interpretations of risk and insecurities. 
The majority of the people in Tempur are Muslim while a few households are Chris-
tian, although many elements from Animism, Buddhism and Hinduism can still be 
found in their religious practices (Meulenkamp, 2009). People’s risk perceptions are 
shaped through a mix of religious and traditional beliefs. The villagers attribute ‘acci-
dents’ like the flash floods to their Karma, “you will get what you deserve”, “It is an 
action of God”, although they know that the flood of 2006 was a man-made disaster, 
and that they can influence its impact. This is not necessarily a contradiction, be-
cause people believe they can positively influence their Karma. In order to reduce 
risk people believe they should live a good life, taking care of others and of their 
environment. ‘Accidents’ refer to harvest failure, forest fire or landslides which do 
not harm the whole community. People view an ‘accident’ as a warning signal for a 
larger impact disaster, a test from god.  
 
Reflecting on the village’s recent ‘accidents’, people interpret the fire in the state 
forest in 2003 as such an ‘accident’. This fire was a warning for the flash flood in 
2006. However, people ignored this warning “do not steal from the forest”, and 
therefore the flash flood was a punishment from God, because people failed to man-
age the forest properly and to use the forest resources in a sustainable way. 
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Whereas many people in Tempur think that actual and potential loss associated with 
disasters is in the hands of divine forces, their religious and cultural beliefs are 
instrumental in enabling them to mobilize and organise villagers to better protect 
their environment and to restore the degraded portions in the forest.  
 
This does not mean that they completely blame themselves for the degradation of 
the environment; they know very well that the main actors in the illegal logging on 
the steep slopes in the conservation area are outsiders, backed by powerful elite. In 
2007, one year after the flash flood, the village authorities decided to better manage 
the forests in cooperation with the villagers. Particularly Karang Taruna, the youth 
group, is an active actor in monitoring illegal logging practices and in getting the log-
gers prosecuted. Initially there was however difference in views between the Karang 
Taruna and the older people in the community on how to protect the environment. 
The older people were concerned with their short-term seasonal economic needs, 
while the youngsters were concerned with restoring the forest without considera-
tions for seasonal economic needs. The differing views relate to their different 
experiences and bodies of knowledge: the youngsters are mostly involved in trading 
and livelihoods outside the village, while older people have been working in the 
forest gardens since their youth, and know how to combine the maintenance of the 
forest with seasonal cropping like coffee, vanilla, spices and vegetables. Through the 
CBDRR pilot, the NGO field staff acted as a facilitator to bring both views together 
and to maximize the knowledge of both age-groups for formulating an environment 
protection and land use plan.  
 
In 2007, the villagers in Tempur received the news about the government’s plan to 
build a nuclear plant in Jepara district, and that the national government intends to 
store nuclear waste in the caldera of the Muria Mountain. The district government of 
Jepara and the local governments are against this nuclear plant, but the national 
government insists that it needs this form of energy. Until now rumours are still ru-
mours, but the villagers of Tempur belief that God will punish the government in 
case they are forced to leave Tempur. Tempur is their cultural heritage, a holy place 
which they will never leave out of free will. In case the nuclear plant becomes reality, 
they will resist the plans and organise demonstrations. Their cultural and religious 
beliefs are a source of mobilizing effective agency to oppose outside interventions 
that threaten Tempur’s environment.   
 
5.3 Overall insights and conclusions about what is local knowledge 
 
The stories demonstrate that people affected by disasters and conflict survive be-
cause they do not operate as individuals, but actively use their social networks, past 
experiences and local knowledge. The stories also show how people expand their 
social networks towards areas of displacement, adapt or change traditions by 
integrating new values and beliefs like peace shuras do in Afghanistan, or why Mus-
lims in Maluku convert to Christianity in the hope to stay alive, and why women in 
Afghanistan break through the prevailing gender taboos to earn some money. They 
survive not because of professional aid or risk reduction programs (Christoplos, 
2004). I argued that local knowledge shouldn’t be romanticized. It has its limitations, 
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it can be dangerous, and is partial as the conflicting stories about adat in Halmahera 
show. Uncritically recognizing and using local knowledge in CBDRR approaches is 
therefore problematic and tends to obscure the wider institutional setting and gen-
der norms in which local knowledge is produced and where CBDRR interventions are 
put in practice. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the main analytical points and in-
sights on local knowledge from the various stories and localities.  
 
Table 5.1: insights on local knowledge  
Afghanistan Analytical points Insights on local knowledge 
Nahreen, Baghlan 
province 
Dual risk perception of men towards floods: 
destructive but crucial for livelihoods. 
Women stretch gender norms to reduce risk 
of food shortage.  
Local knowledge has its limitations. 
Local knowledge is not so local. People 
are able to acquire, incorporate new 
knowledge relevant to survive.  
Khulm, Balkh 
province 
People’s risk constructs go beyond the village 
level. Differing gender perspectives on risk. 
Breaking through gender taboos despite 
conservative gender norms 
Local risk perspectives differ and are 
embedded in social positions. 
Local knowledge has institutional 
dimensions which are changeable. 
Ghulistan, Bamyan 
province 
People rely on innate social networks and 
resources to cope with adversities, like 
ashar, and social protection. 
 
Local knowledge is embedded in institu-
tional context and power relations, 
determining vulnerability outcomes for 
households. Vulnerability has institu-
tional dimension as well. 
 
Sar-e-Qul, Bamyan 
province 
Seasonal disasters result in local conflict, 
unattended by divided shura, causing out-
migration of poorest population.  
Kunduz and Herat 
peace shuras 
Peace shuras blend local knowledge, custom-
ary law with sharia law and mediation based 
on imported western values, to solve urgent 
disputes, and are a credible alternative to 
formal judiciary system.  
Local institutions produce new 
knowledge-systems to respond to peo-
ple’s urgent needs in a context of recur-
rent disasters and conflict. 
 
Indonesia Analytical points Insights on local knowledge 
Gamlaha, Kao sub- 
district, Halmahera 
Local beliefs in ancestral spirits are used to 
justify violence 
Local knowledge can be dangerous and 
partial.  
Togoliua, Tobelo 
sub-district, 
Halmahera 
Adat serves to justify violence, to defend 
people’s land rights, to oppose trans-migra-
tion policy, or for reconciliation purposes and 
promoting harmony.  
Local knowledge to oppose national 
policies 
Local knowledge is conflictive 
Local knowledge to escape ‘politics’. Birinoa, Tobelo sub-
district, Halmahera 
Tempur, Jepara 
district, Central Java 
Local religious and cultural beliefs used to 
explain new risk and to mobilize villagers to 
protect environment and oppose outside 
threatening interventions 
Local knowledge as a source for political 
economic empowerment;  instrumental 
to mobilize effective agency 
 
What is local knowledge in the context of CBDRR policy and practice? 
This chapter revealed that local knowledge is not just ‘out there’ or collectively 
owned, but differentiated and partial. And this raises the question about CBDRR pro-
cesses of ‘participation’, which actors to involve, and consequently what does 
‘community-based’ mean? As a concept in itself, local knowledge does not reveal 
this differential character, nor the varying ways people understand adat, the history 
of land distribution in their village, or the consequences of floods. Knowledge is con-
structed and embedded in a social, cultural and institutional context. Knowledge 
consists of ways in which people categorize, code, process and impute meaning to 
their experiences (Arce and Long, 1992), and since knowledge is fragmentary and 
partial, I conclude that local knowledge as a barrel of community information which 
can be tapped, does not exist. Instead different bodies of knowledge exist, and these 
“do not only have social meaning, but they also have a practical and instrumental 
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content” (Jansen, 1998; 193). The various cases show that local knowledge, and its 
related social meaning and instrumental content, are applied in both positive and 
negative manners, supporting people’s urgent felt needs, or excluding specific actors.  
 
The different bodies of local knowledge are not so local, but often a blend of differ-
ent sources of knowledge and experiences that people gain both locally and outside 
their village. People’s beliefs, new ideas and results of their sense-making processes 
are incorporated as well. This makes local knowledge dynamic, and enables people 
to adapt to an ever changing environment and to deal with uncertainty and crisis. It 
can motivate people to influence and change prevailing social norms or gender 
stereotypes like young Afghan women who returned from Iran or Pakistan.  
 
The differentiated nature of local knowledge becomes clear in people’s narratives 
from Afghanistan and Indonesia showing the diversity in risk views and ideas about 
the same risk events, which people express through their varying risk perceptions, 
and which result in different risk practice and responses. In Khulm “floods are 
destructive” for upstream villagers who invest efforts in flood protection, sandbag-
ging, enforcement of irrigation canals, and in lobbying for flood protection measures 
at the side of the canal intake. Whereas “floods are a blessing” for downstream 
farmers to access irrigation water during spring. It is in their interest to maintain 
good relations with the upstream villagers since they depend on them for drinking 
and irrigation water. This case shows best how risk perceptions are embedded in 
people’s social positions, and how people’s options are related to local institutional 
settings. Local knowledge has institutional dimensions which are changeable.  
 
The cases from Halmahera reveal the conflictive nature of local knowledge. Different 
actors have their own specific interpretation of adat, which they use to legitimize 
their actions like for using violence (the reverend in Gamlaha), or for reconciliation 
purposes (provincial government and the GMIH), to defend their ancestral lands 
against transmigration (Birinoa) or to defend land rights (Togoliua). Local knowledge 
has institutional dimensions which are embedded in power relations that produce, 
reproduce or reduce people’s vulnerability to conflict or disasters. While the 
Birinoans use adat for political reasons to defend their land, the government uses 
adat to escape politics. Since the government is in a better position to articulate its 
meaning of adat, land disputes will not be solved easily, reproducing people’s 
vulnerability to conflict after the violence in 1999-2000. Because local knowledge is 
differentiated, conflictive and partial, it cannot be uncritically utilized in CBDRR prac-
tice. 
 
People’s stories from  Ghulistan and Sar-e-Qul reveal the institutional dimensionality 
of local knowledge. The difference in ability to deal with adversity in both villages, 
despite the similarity in environmental conditions, can be attributed to varying local 
institutional arrangements. I refer here to the functioning of shuras, ability to settle 
disputes, access to resources, ashar, and social protection. These local institutional 
settings largely determine how vulnerability to disasters and conflict plays out locally. 
‘Vulnerability’ as a concept or analytical tool, has an institutional dimension as well. 
In both villages people use their innate social networks to deal with adversity, they 
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establish links to be represented in shuras to influence decision-making on commu-
nity affairs, but their safety and protection are regulated through institutions, the 
‘rules of the game’. In Sar-e-Qul, avalanches and floods manifest particularly 
people’s institutional vulnerability due to dysfunction and divided village authorities.  
 
In Tempur, as in many other villages on Muria Mountain, people’s religious and cul-
tural beliefs are not necessarily naive, conservative or passive, but function as a 
source of political-economic empowerment of local people to protect their ‘holy’ 
environment against threats from outside.   
 
The question posed at the beginning of this chapter about whose perceptions should 
be recognized, is a complex one, and I conclude that as much as possible all percep-
tions and views should be recognized. The issue here is whether and how the various 
actors can articulate their view to those with more power or authority, and if their 
views are acknowledged or not. Outsiders like researchers and aid practitioners, 
should be conscious about whose voices are heard, whose knowledge counts, and 
whose ideas are suppressed.  When outsiders, like CBDRR practitioners, say they aim 
to recognize local knowledge in their interventions locally, they should be aware and 
acknowledge the differentiated nature of local knowledge, the diversity in risk con-
structs and the local institutional arrangements that influence them. How this raises 
problems and dilemmas in practice is subject of next chapter.  
 
The stories of local people further reveal that their views on risk go beyond the 
emergency paradigm of disasters and conflict like applied by aid agencies. Both in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia conflict and disasters are part of daily realities that people 
must address. Conflict is not just external, but closely related to people’s access to 
land and water to sustain their livelihoods threatened by seasonal disasters. Disas-
ters like floods, avalanches, and sandstorms, can trigger conflict and violence when 
institutions to handle disputes – formal and informal, local and national - are absent 
or not functioning well. Local people then actively make choices that correspond 
with their motives, interests and the options they have to shape their livelihoods, 
and so occasionally violence erupts. Whereas governments and aid agencies label 
Afghanistan and Maluku as post-conflict contexts, local people define their post-con-
flict and displacement reality as more risky, or as the ‘normality of crisis’. As a conse-
quence, the responses of aid agencies may not match people’s real concerns that 
deal with land rights for instance in Halmahera.  
 
In the context of recurrent disasters and conflict, local risk narratives are primarily 
about ‘dignity’, ‘respecting people’s rights, recognition of people’s capacities’, ‘sur-
vival’, ’breaking through accepted norms’, searching for justice. Not about their 
vulnerability, or that people rely on outside aid. Even if the formal institutional con-
text is unclear or weak, people create new rules, re-order power relations and try to 
change the local institutional arrangements so that these benefit them while exclud-
ing others. People are not passive, nor powerless.  
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CBDRR’s current definitions re-examined 
The empirical data gathered and analysed in this chapter, provide insights to re-ex-
amine the current definitions of ‘local knowledge’ and ‘vulnerability’: 
 
Local knowledge: Ideas, beliefs, and practices of ‘social actors’ that are embedded in 
their social, political and institutional position in society, and therefore local 
knowledge is differentiated, partial and at times conflictive. Social actors use local 
knowledge to legitimate their actions, and to oppose or change institutions to re-
duce risk for disasters and conflict. 
 
Vulnerability: the concept of vulnerability is problematic when viewing disaster and 
conflict realities from the perspective of local people. However, as I argued in Chap-
ter 3, the notion of ‘vulnerability’ remains an important analytical tool to understand 
local processes of how people deal with disaster and conflict events, and how they 
explain and make sense of these events. Aside of a social and political dimension, 
‘vulnerability’ has an institutional dimension. In CBDRR literature and policy docu-
ments, aid agencies seek to support the most vulnerable groups in a community, and 
focus on household level rather than on local institutions and their dynamics. House-
holds or individual people are often categorized as farmers, women, landless, elderly, 
disabled and so on, without much analysis about institutional relations between the 
various groups – both vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups.  
 
The next chapter zooms into the CBDRR practice of several local aid agencies in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia, how they select, enter and search for the most vulnera-
ble households. It deals with the difficulties  and dilemmas community organisers 
and field staff face, and what it means to recognize power dynamics and diverse risk 
perceptions.   
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6.                   The politics of selecting, entering and 
organising the community 
“Relationship building is a way of looking at the world—not just a strategy” 
Putnam, 2003: 18 
 
 
INGOs like CARE, IFRC, Tearfund and Cordaid developed their own organisation’s 
CBDRR-handbooks to explain the CBDRR process by means of a step-by-step model 
indicating where to start and where to go following a particular trajectory. Central in 
these steps are the notions of ‘participation’ and ‘strengthening people’s existing 
capacities’, which are promoted as the key elements of CBDRR-approaches to 
achieve resilient communities. Appropriately involving community people,  
capitalizing on local knowledge and existing structures, is believed to contribute to 
effective and sustainable risk reduction measures and to processes of empowerment. 
In this light, NGOs develop community organising and mobilization models to apply 
these principles in practice and to guide their CBDRR interventions. Funding agencies 
and (I)NGOs choose words like ‘participation’, ‘local ownership’ and ‘empowerment’ 
to express the transformative aspect of CBDRR in policy documents and proposals. 
Given the large amount of published success stories and ‘best practices’ by aid agen-
cies, it is not yet fully acknowledged that CBDRR interventions face many operational 
challenges. Most of these ‘best practices’ are superficial descriptions of short-term 
projects or public relations exercises, focusing on the strengths of the CBDRR  
approach and little on its limitations (Twigg, 2005).  
 
In an actor-oriented approach, interventions are viewed as ‘on-going, socially con-
structed and negotiated processes that take place in arenas of struggle where actors 
from different life-worlds with different worldviews meet (Long and van der Ploeg, 
1989). Therefore I want to open the ‘black box’ of how NGOs make their CBDRR 
policy operational, and to go beyond simply measuring CBDRR performance against 
some set of formulated objectives. I focus on the everyday practices of how NGOs 
select communities, how NGO field staff enter villages, with whom they engage, how 
they mobilize and organise local people for CBDRR efforts and for what purpose. 
Local NGO field staff play – in my view - a prominent role in CBDRR interventions: 
they are the front-line workers tasked to translate policy into practice through their 
interaction with villagers, and who deal with local power dynamics and politics - 
issues that are neglected in ‘best practices’ cases as these are often divisive and 
obstructive.  
 
Not only NGOs, also villagers have their motives, projects and understandings that 
may interfere with the NGO-desired organising process (Hilhorst, 2003: 103). My 
experience in the Philippines taught me that ‘local knowledge’, and ‘strengthening 
people’s existing capacities’ are subject to various interpretations, values and agen-
das. Therefore, CBDRR-interventions cannot be isolated from the on-going relations 
that evolve between the various social actors including […] the manifold ways in 
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which local actors (both on- and off stage) interact with the implementing officials 
and organisations” (Long, 2003: 50). Planned CBDRR-interventions should therefore 
be viewed as a complex set of historically unfolding social encounters and battles 
over resources and meaning in which spatial and temporal dimensions play a role” 
(ibid: 51). Findings show how space- and time-bound interventions clash with local 
realities, causing debate and tensions among the different actors who are – directly 
and indirectly – involved in the intervention. Therefore, this chapter further revisits 
the notions of ‘community’, ‘community-based’, ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’, 
terms commonly used in CBDRR interventions. 
 
The previous chapter analysed the non-project nature of people’s lives, how people 
deal with disaster risks and conflict, how they are engaged in various social  
interactions, and how they solve and cope with their problems, irrespective of 
outside aid interventions. This chapter aims to explore and understand the dynamics 
and interactions between the local populations and NGO field staff. It looks behind 
the ideal-typical, time- and space-bound, step-by-step models that guide CBDRR pro-
cesses in the field. I am interested to know what happens in practice when NGO field 
staff acknowledges that local knowledge and subsequent risk perspectives are 
differentiated, partial, not community-owned but embedded in social and political 
power relations (previous chapter). Together with NGO field staff and local people I 
made sense of their practical knowledge and organising capacities that emerged and 
developed among them and of their implicit assumptions, dilemmas, and pressures 
impinging on them while doing CBDRR. The chapter reveals the paradoxical nature of 
CDRRR approaches promoting ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ which in practice 
opens up space for negotiation and initiative for some groups while closing options, 
ambitions and political agency of others (Long, 2003; Cleaver, 1999). Despite the 
conscious efforts of the CBDRR pilot projects to reach the most vulnerable groups in 
a village through creative, flexible and context-specific approaches, the benefits still 
seem to drift towards elites. This means that the elite forces are strong, and that 
withstanding these pressures is difficult for Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) 
and NGOs. Why this happens, is seldom subject of the documentation of CBDRR 
‘best practices’ or lessons learned literature. Hence, this chapter. 
 
6.1. Structure of the chapter 
The chapter starts with an actor-oriented perspective on the CBDRR step-by-step 
model to explain how I analysed the nature of relationships and interactions during 
the stages of community selection, entering a community and community organising 
(section 6.2). I argue that community selection, organising and strengthening is 
essentially political: community organising and empowerment are in fact local con-
tested arenas in which actors’ understandings, interests and values are pitched 
against each other (Long, 2003, 47) and where social relations are reworked. The 
first section ends with the methodology I applied to analyse the process of how 
NGOs put the community organising models in practice, and their interaction with 
villagers. Through action-reflection cycles (Chapter 2) NGO field staff and villagers, 
together with the researcher, made sense of their interaction, gained new insights 
which they then integrated in the on-going practice. The second part of the chapter 
(section 6.3) narrates about the events, stories, dilemmas and feedback of field staff 
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and villagers on concrete processes of CBDRR community organising in their respec-
tive villages in Afghanistan and Indonesia. These stories were collected during 
sequential field visits. Each field visit ended with sessions of reflection and sense-
making of past actions followed by the identification of future CBDRR action.  
Although the NGOs in different countries used quite similar step-by-step community 
organising models, the process followed varied substantially due to varying local con-
texts in terms of entry-points used, prevailing ideas around participation, gender, 
authority in the village, and how NGO field staff translated the NGOs’ policy and 
principles regarding ‘participation’, ‘community’, and ‘vulnerable groups’ in practice. 
These varying practices and conditions impact on the outcomes of CBDRR organising 
processes in terms of whose risk reduction measures are implemented, who resists, 
and who benefits. The last section brings together the insights of community 
organising experiences in different contexts and draws conclusions regarding the 
meaning of ‘community’, ‘community-based’, ‘participation’, and ‘empowerment’.  
 
6.2 Concepts and methodology 
 
6.2.1 The CBDRR step-by step model 
The INGOs CBDRR-handbooks are basically inspired or partly copied from the CBDRR 
field practitioners’ handbook developed by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre 
(ADPC) (2004). As written in Chapter 4, many of the ideas and tools documented in 
ADPC’s handbook originate from the Philippines, including CDRC’s experience, since 
quite some former CDRC staff got positions in the Training and Education Unit of 
ADPC or were hired as consultants - including myself – and tasked to develop a 
CBDRR curriculum and course materials. Local NGOs in Indonesia and Afghanistan 
sent staff to attend ADPC’s CBDRR courses, received the handbook via their donors 
or through this CBDRR pilot. Recognizing ADPC as a prominent training centre on 
CBDRR throughout Asia, I used its Handbook for Field Practitioners as a reference 
point for the CBDRR step-by-step model presented in Box 6.1 below.  
 
Box  6.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Process (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004) 
 
“The CBDRR process has seven sequential steps which can be executed before the occurrence of a disaster or 
after one has happened to reduce future risks. Each stage grows out of the preceding stage and leads to further 
action. Together, the sequence can build up a planning and implementation system, which can become a 
powerful disaster risk management tool” (ibid: 15). 
 
(1) Selecting the community 
This is the process of choosing the most vulnerable communities for possible assistance on risk reduction using 
a set of criteria like the organisation’s mandate, cost-benefit-analysis, profiling and the need to be seen, 
personal interests, ideology (ibid: 16, 22-25) 
 
(2) Rapport building and understanding the community,  
“After selection of the community the next step is to build rapport and trust. A relationship of trust, friendship 
and rapport is key to facilitation of appropriate participation.  If community members have trust in the outsiders 
who are working with them, then open sharing about issues, problems, concerns and solutions can take place. 
In addition to gaining the trust of local people, rapport building will also lead to a greater understanding of the 
local culture, another essential component of the CBDRR process” (ibid: 26).  
 
(3) Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA) 
“This is a diagnostic process to identify the risks that the community faces and how people overcome those 
risks. The process involves hazard assessment, vulnerability assessment and capacity assessment. In doing the 
assessments, people’s perception of risk is considered” (ibid: 16). 
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(4) Participatory Disaster Risk Management Planning 
“This follows after the analysis of the results of participatory risk assessment. People themselves identify risk 
reduction measures that will reduce vulnerabilities and enhance capacities” (ibid: 16). 
 
(5) Building and Training a Community Disaster Risk Management Organisation (CBDRRO) 
“Disaster risks are better managed by a community organisation that will ensure that risks are reduced through 
the implementation of the plan. Therefore it is imperative to build a community organisation, if there is none 
yet or strengthen the current one, if there is any. Training the leaders and members of the organisation to build 
their capacity is important” (ibid: 16). 
 
(6) Community-Managed Implementation 
“The CBDRRO should lead to the implementation of the community plan and motivate the other members of 
the community to support the activities in the plan” (ibid: 16). 
 
(7) Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation 
“This is a communication system in which information flows among all the people involved in the project: the 
community, the implementing staff and the support agency, concerned government agencies and donors” (ibid: 
17). 
 
This step-by-step model projects a kind of road map indicating where to start and 
where to go following a particular trajectory. Although it was based on the Philippine 
experience, the model got de-contextualized, and divested of its political meaning 
and practices. CDRN does not implement isolated CBDRR projects, but views projects 
instrumental to contribute to a long term organising process of the most vulnerable 
sectors into People’s Organisations and alliances, to build a broader mass base (see 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). Hilhorst (2003: 104), who analysed a community organising 
model in the Philippines, argues that such models may be more important for pro-
cesses of sense-making within NGOs and for managing relationships, than for 
steering the community organising process through sequential steps. Her observa-
tion is valid for the NGOs in this pilot as well. Only one Afghan NGO showed me at 
the start of the pilot a reworked step-by-step CBDRR model, completed with 
indicators to measure progress. After a while, the project manager concluded that 
the step-by-step model did not match local realities since the steps do not follow a 
linear process. He and his field staff had to find their own way in dealing with local 
power dynamics between influential leaders, government officials and villagers. The 
model was kept in the office as a tool for reflection and sense-making. As researcher, 
I used the model as a kind of checklist of issues to observe, discuss, and reflect on 
during the CBDRR process with villagers and NGO field staff. Since the seven steps 
are assumed to lay the foundation for a resilient community, I refer to these steps as 
the process of ‘community organising’. This chapter zooms into the first five steps of 
the model: (1) Selecting the community; (2) Rapport building and understanding the 
community; (3) Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA); (4) Participatory 
Disaster Risk Management Planning; and (5) Building and Training a Community 
Disaster Risk Management Organisation1. I pay explicit attention to ‘entering the 
community’, an activity that happens before step 2 and highly determines the 
process of rapport building, but which is omitted in ADPC’s Handbook. Step 6 till 7 of 
the step-by-step model are dealt with in Chapter 7, although it is impossible – as this 
chapter will demonstrate – to distinguish the separate steps in a linear sequence.  
                                               
1
  For a complete description of the model, ADPC’s Field Practitioners’ Handbook provides detailed 
resourcepacks for each step explaining how to do things and how to behave as a fieldworker.  
 
181 
 
6.2.2 Concepts to analyse the nature of relationships and interactions 
CBDRR concepts like ‘community’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘strengthening 
people’s existing capacities’, and ‘local ownership’ are notions that implicitly refer to 
relationships between actors, for instance between NGO field staff and local people, 
between insiders and outsiders, or among villagers. The ADPC handbook divides 
CBDRR actors into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’: it refers to ’insiders’ as those individuals, 
organisations and stakeholders who are located within the community like a 
Community-Based Organisation (CBO), whereas ‘outsiders’ are those sectors and 
agencies located outside the community and who want to reduce community 
vulnerability and enhance its capacities for disaster risk management (Abarquez and 
Murshed, 2004: 18). Such division reflects a simplified view on reality where actors 
are categorized according to a geographical location, demarcated by project-
boundaries that ignore the broader context. Similar to my conclusion that ‘local 
knowledge’ is not so local in a globalised world (previous chapter), also the term 
‘insiders’ or ‘local people’ can no longer refer to some geographical area. The way 
people organise their lives and with whom they identify may not correspond with 
village or community settlements, and also out-migration stretches community 
boundaries creating part-time insiders (Guijt and Shah, 1998). Afghan refugees who 
received education in Iran or Pakistan and returned with new ideas (previous chapter) 
may feel themselves both insider and outsider. According to Anderson and Olson 
(2003), insider-outsider refers to proximity and directness of impact. Here ‘insiders’ 
are those people vulnerable to conflict and disasters because they are from the area 
and live there, and they personally experience and have to deal with the conse-
quences of conflict and disasters. ‘Outsiders’ are those who choose to become 
involved in contexts of conflict and disasters and who have personally little to lose 
(ibid: 36). Reich (2006) specifies that some people within the conflict or disaster 
affected areas could also be considered ‘outsiders’, if they cannot be counted as 
affected by conflict or disaster either as a result of the geographical distance – for 
instance through the rural-urban divide - or because of their social and political 
position in society (ibid: 21).  
 
In my view, dynamic community boundaries and compositions highlight the limited 
value of the insider/outsider divide and of the notion of ‘community’. ‘Insiders’ are 
not a homogeneous group of individuals, and also the category of ‘outsiders’ consists 
of a wide range of actors, with different intentions and interests. Therefore, what 
matters is that assumptions about homogeneity and harmony need to be replaced 
by recognizing conflicting interests within communities and imbalanced power 
relations between NGO staff and villagers, despite the rhetoric of ‘participation’ and 
creating ‘local ownership’(Guijt and Shah, 1998; Reich, 2006; previous chapter). The 
step-by-step model in Box 6.1 shows this basic intrinsic contradiction: on one hand it 
uses the rhetoric of ‘bottom-up’ planning and the involvement of the community in 
every step, while on the other hand, the concrete activities per step reflect the 
externally driven nature of the CBDRR approach, particularly step 1 to decide on 
community selection where the organisation’s motivations and interests play a 
dominant role. In the Philippines we called this facipulation, a contraction of 
facilitation and manipulation, recognizing the paradoxical nature of how outsiders 
relate to local people (Constantino-David, 1982).  
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The model is framed in terms of a project, an external intervention, where the steps 
reflect the stages of a project-cycle: situational analysis, risk assessment, identifica-
tion of specific activities, making a plan, a budget, identify people who do things 
according to the plan assuming that everybody agrees on the plan, and develop a 
monitoring and evaluation system. This implies a time, and possibly, a space-bound 
intervention following a linear logic between activities and outcomes as in the 
idealistic logframe model. In everyday practice, such logic has little relation with the 
on-going processes in which the intervention is brought in, and with processes of 
negotiation and struggle as a result of differing opinions, norms, values, motives and 
goals of the actors involved (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989; Quarles van Ufford, 1993; 
Leeuwis, 1995). Therefore I use the ‘political arena model’ (Long, 2001) to analyse 
this step-by-step organising model, an approach that focuses on the nature of 
relationships and interactions between the local NGOs, villagers and other actors 
that play a direct or indirect role. It views the CBDRR intervention as an arena in 
which actors socially negotiate the policy and practice of CBDRR. The realities and 
outcomes of CBDRR depend on how actors at points during the process interpret the 
context, their needs, their own roles and each other, and how they use their dif-
ferent forms of power (after Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). This includes the actors’ 
interpretation of ‘community’, ‘participation’, and ‘empowerment’.  
 
6.2.3 The politics of selecting, entering and organising communities 
Viewing CBDRR interventions as an arena in which actors socially negotiate CBDRR 
policy and practice, means that actors also negotiate ‘community-organising models’ 
since they are part of the NGOs’ policy. CBDRR policy on community organising 
explains and legitimizes what NGO staff is doing and how they shape their actions. 
This implies that I study and analyse community organising as a process, not only as 
an outcome. The concept of ‘policy’ further implies that there are alternatives 
(Colebatch, 1998: 12). The ‘politics of selecting, entering and organising’ - as I used in 
the title - refers to ‘policy as a process’, to a continuing struggle between the various 
actors involved over alternative models, ideas and differing ways of doing things. 
NGO field staff put policy into practice, they engage with (certain) community people, 
and enter an unpredictable process of  discussing intentions, negotiating values and 
norms, debating programs and solutions (Leeuwis, 1995). In this process community 
people get an opportunity to get (limited) access to resources to shape interventions 
according to their interests which do not necessarily coincide with the preconceived 
ideas and assumptions of the NGO.  
 
This chapter analyses the interactions between local actors and local field staff of 
NGOs with a particular focus on what meaning is given to community, participation, 
and empowerment. Together with NGO field staff I aimed to better understand the 
dynamics of how interventions get shaped. With whom does the NGO field staff 
engage and why? How does NGO field staff legitimize its presence? How do they deal 
with the complex political life in the selected localities? What is it that they want to 
strengthen? Do they reach the most vulnerable groups in a community, and what 
makes that so difficult? Which other actors interfere in the community organising 
process? These are among the questions that guided the initial phase of the CBDRR 
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pilots and the evolving process. The discussions around these questions were 
compared with my observations during field visits. Reflections and sense-making 
continued in case of deviating opinions, complex issues or when dilemmas remained 
unresolved. All discussions were documented in field reports which were fed back to 
both local NGOs and the headquarters in the Netherlands. My intention is not to 
criticize the efforts of the field staff, but to stress some of the significant insights that 
we gained, and which we then adapted in consequent practice.  
 
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, NGOs attach different meaning and objectives 
to CBDRR and community organising, as did the Dutch funding agencies. In the 
Philippines, CDRC aims to strengthen the social and political resources of People’s 
Organisations and views CBDRR as a long term political process to change patterns of 
authority and relations with the Philippine government in favour of disaster and 
conflict affected populations (Chapter 3). It has a clear political agenda. NGOs in 
Central Java, Indonesia, interpret ‘community organising’ differently. They see 
themselves as bridge-builders between villagers and local government officials. They 
explore ways to both strengthen community-based organisations and institutions in 
flood-prone villages, and simultaneously support village and district government 
officials to do what they promise to do in DRR policies. In Afghanistan, ‘community 
organising’ is in itself not new, but in the context of CBDRR it is. Afghan NGOs see 
CBDRR as an approach to break through aid dependency and to rework aid relation-
ships between communities and NGOs to enable communities to become self-reliant. 
I&K regard CBDRR as an approach to rework aid relations with their church partners 
in Maluku, whereas in Afghanistan, I&K use CBDRR as an instrument to legitimize 
their new country programme. 
 
The NGOs participating in this pilot programme do not have a particular step-by-step 
model at hand, but allow their strategies for community organising to emerge from 
the realities locally. For any outside agency it is a challenge to find actors locally with 
whom to engage considering competing political, tribal or ethnic affiliations. In both 
countries the NGOs recognize that the context in which they bring in a CBDRR 
intervention are in fact political arenas, and are very consciousness about with 
whom to engage, how to deal with authorities and how to best manoeuvre in and 
between villages. In 6.3.1 I briefly describe the countries’ history and institutional 
context in which the process of community organising got its shape.  
 
6.2.4 The NGO field staff or community organisers: who are they? 
I followed and worked with NGO field staff in Indonesia and Afghanistan. But who 
are they and what are their motivations?  
 
“We dreamt about being Che Guevara like in the movie Motorbike Diaries. We 
also drove our motorbikes [they just graduated from college, AH] exploring rivers 
and villages around Muria Mountain in search of people to help. We got 
fascinated by the river system and decided to map it. It was 2006 when we 
suddenly noticed an older man along the road, covered with mud and dirt crying 
at the foot of the mountain. He was from Tempur and narrated about the flash 
flood, the noise, the damage. We went together with the man back to his village, 
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by foot because most bridges collapsed and roads had become inaccessible for 
motorbikes or cars. When we reached Tempur after two days – located within the 
caldera of the Muria volcano - we witnessed the destruction by the flash floods. 
We decided to help and organised a spontaneous relief operation with friends. We 
stayed in touch with the people in Tempur, encouraging them to make temporary 
bridges and to save and collect materials that could be re-used during reconstruc-
tion.” - Makhali and Masyuri, community organisers in Jepara district, Central Java.  
 
          
 
          
Figure 6.1 Damages after the flash flood in Tempur in 2006 and the construction of a temporary bridge 
(Makhali) 
 
Field staff of the Indonesian NGOs is idealistic, highly motivated to serve marginal-
ized people, and to stay and live in the villages for a long time. They all have their 
roots in the area, speak the local dialects and the national language, but no or little 
English. In Central Java they are all young people, former student activists like 
Makhali and Masyuri, some just graduated from college or university, while a few are 
farmers who got interested in NGO work, particularly as community organiser. In 
Halmahera the field staff is older, in their thirties and forties, and most are trained as 
agriculture extension workers. They have many years of experience in organising 
farmer associations which together form the farmers’ network in Halmahera, and in 
educating farmers in sustainable agriculture. In Halmahera they are all male Chris-
tians, while in Central Java, field staff is a mixed group of Christians and Muslims, 
mostly male. Only SHEEP has a few female community organisers. It is remarkable 
that during the six years of the CBDRR pilot, the group of field staff hardly changed, 
which facilitated a close cooperation among them through exchange monitoring and 
reflection workshops. 
 
In Afghanistan, field staff involved in the CBDRR pilot are predominantly educated 
men who received their education in Iran or Pakistan after they fled Afghanistan as 
teenagers during the war against the Russians. Some of them still have their families 
living abroad. One field staff told me how he spent fourteen years in a refugee camp 
in Peshawar, how he attended a school run by NGOs, how he learned about human 
rights, first aid, health issues and journalism. He never received formal education, 
and when he returned to Afghanistan in 2002 he knew a little of many things and 
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decided to look for work with an NGO active in Bamyan province since he has his 
roots there, and because the NGO staff belong to the same ethnic group2.  Most field 
staff joins a NGO to earn a living for their family; serving people in need has a second 
priority. NGOs find it hard to hire female community organisers. Women are not 
supposed to travel and move alone in public spaces without a mahram, a male 
relative. In one instance, a father and his daughter were hired as community 
organisers for the same villages to overcome this problem. In other instances, the 
few female staff is allowed by her family to travel together with male colleagues – 
who often are her trusted relatives. But then these women are burdened with tasks 
in several projects simultaneously which they cannot attend all. As a result 
organising women in Afghan villages remains a challenge. Only one Afghan NGO 
chooses to work with community organisers who are selected from among the 
villagers, both men and women. This is a strategy to develop leadership within the 
villages to sustain CBDRR efforts in times of worsening security when the NGO shifts 
to ‘distant assistance’ through mobile phone. To avoid favouritism, the NGO 
considers ethnic and kinship diversity among the selected community organisers.  
 
The majority of Afghan field staff live in their local offices and travel up and down to 
the villages. They hold the lowest rank in the NGO hierarchy, and have to implement 
what the management decides. A NGO management staff at Kabul-headquarters, 
frequently visiting field offices, expressed: 
 
“Staff at the headquarters in Kabul is quite busy, and has limited time to train 
field staff and community organisers to develop their competencies to enhance 
participation of community people. It is simply not a priority. The culture is to tell 
‘lower‘ people what to do, which is in fact ethically incorrect. We should change 
our organisational culture and practice since I now realize that this hierarchical 
attitude has its repercussions on how field staff interacts with community people ” 
(CBDRR workshop Kabul, April 2007). 
 
This remark set the trend to critically reflect on the work of community organisers in 
the selected Afghan villages and to become more conscious about their crucial role 
in community development. The remark shows how NGO directors and managers as 
off-stage actors, influence the interactions at village level. Not just in Afghanistan. 
Field workers everywhere are in a specific location or interface within the aid chain, 
and their work creates varying levels of demands, for instance, achieving CBDRR 
outcomes within a particular project time frame, NGO procedures, they have to 
comply with the NGO’s monitoring and evaluation needs, which causes stress among 
the field workers.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
  Many Afghan NGOs have an ethnic face; they are run by family-members, friends or fellow students because 
they do not easily trust people they do not know. The director of ACBAR once mentioned that running a NGO in 
Afghanistan is merely a coping strategy for the own staff than an idealistic choice to serve Afghan people and to 
build a strong civil society in the country. 
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6.3 Selecting, entering and organising communities: experiences from the field 
 
This section focuses on the everyday practices of selecting and entering communities, 
building rapport, risk assessment and community organising. The context in which 
CBDRR interventions are brought in and the reasons behind vary substantially. 
Chapter 3 concluded to give importance to the broader political and institutional 
context in which disasters and conflict happen, and in which CBDRR actors interact 
with one another. Therefore I start to briefly describe the particularities of each 
country context that influence the CBDRR process and outcomes.  
 
6.3.1 The broader political and institutional context of Afghanistan 
After the Taliban were defeated in 2001, the international community emphasized – 
in successive strategic frameworks for reconstruction and development in 
Afghanistan, the need to improve governance across the country and at all levels of 
the state. However, the externally driven state-building project largely failed (Donini, 
2009). The Afghan political context is characterized by a formal central government 
in Kabul which interacts with formal institutions at provincial and district level, and 
with the actual power-holders at these levels. There is a divergence between a de 
jure and de facto state (Nixon, 2008; Rasuli, 2007)3. The formal sub-national govern-
ment structures lack the capacity and resources to perform well, resulting in an 
eroding legitimacy. The vacuum is then filled by local commanders and powerful 
elite who undermine local governance, service delivery, security and human rights.  
 
Formally, Afghanistan has 34 provinces which are divided into 398 rural districts, 
which are currently the lowest level of formally recognized administration in the 
country headed by a district governor or woleswal. If you visit a District Governor’s 
office, you will usually meet residents waiting to see the governor. The District 
Governor’s office is the first point of contact for ordinary people who have requests 
or petitions for formal government support, especially after disaster or crisis events. 
The woleswal is the interlocutor between the state and society. In practice, the 
woleswal can extend the “government of relationships” to the local levels – he can 
call for a shura to gather advise - , or he himself can access resources and influence 
through corruption, illegal detention or narcotics business (Nixon, 2008: 25). Com-
munity or village governance remains largely informal and varies widely across the 
country. In villages I visited in Afghanistan I met with shuras that presented them-
selves as collective decision-making bodies or councils consisting of male elders who 
gather when there are important issues to be solved like damages as a result of 
floods. In some places local governance is in the hands of one or more powerful 
commanders who extended their influence beyond their own group to build a wider 
base (Johnson and Leslie, 2004). Variations are inherited from the past where 
different actors were seeking a kind of engagement with local actors. For instance 
during the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs operating from Pakistan established local shuras 
within Afghanistan aimed to manage rehabilitation projects, while simultaneously, 
the Peshawar-based mujahidin parties also introduced varying changes to local 
governance institutions, either along the lines of shuras, or through more hierarchal 
                                               
3
  Interview with Mohammed Arif Rasuli, a Social Specialist of the World Bank in Kabul, tasked to review the 
National Solidarity Program, April 2007.  
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party or commander-based structures (DACAAR, 2005; Nixon, 2008). NGOs operating 
in Afghanistan before the Taliban came into power in 1995 experienced that shuras 
are very fragile forms of organisations not equipped with skills to manage project 
activities. Too often, NGO assistance became a source of tension among rival groups 
which resulted in the exclusion of one group or another from the shura. Traditionally, 
shuras were never meant to run or manage projects; Afghans approach shuras when 
they need arbitration on issues that cannot be handled by individuals. (I)NGOs and 
the international community as a whole tend to view shuras as a local government 
structure responsible, among others, to provide services and strive for “equal 
representation” in village councils, whereas Afghans view shuras as “an assembly” 
where selected bodies of local decision-makers gather when need arises (Larson, 
2009; Johnson & Leslie, 2004).  
 
Various interpretations of shura continue to exist even after the implementation of 
the National Solidarity Program (NSP), a nation-wide program aimed to create 
functional, legitimate and sustainable governance institutions at the local level, 
initiated by the central state in 2002 with support of the World Bank. Implementing 
agencies – a mix of (I)NGOs and one UN agency - transformed traditional shuras into 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) or created ‘new shuras’ according to 
procedures laid down in the NSP Operations Manual (MRRD, 2004; Boesen, 2004). 
The NSP provided local communities with block grants of up to US$20,000 for 
development projects chosen and implemented by the CDCs, bypassing a dysfunc-
tional administrative structure. The programme was appreciated by local villages 
because of the delivery of much needed projects at the local level, but it has not led 
to any major institutional change (Rubin, 2009).  
 
I found it quite ambiguous that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
contracted (I)NGOs to implement a subnational state-building programme. It raised 
the question about the role of (I)NGOs in Afghanistan and their positioning towards 
the Afghan state. When I started my fieldwork in Afghanistan in January 2006, I 
noticed confusion among Afghan NGOs about their future role to play in society: 
being contracted by the central government to provide basic services to rural 
communities, or being a critical monitor of the unfolding Afghan history. During the 
civil war and Taliban regime, NGOs functioned rather as parallel government 
institutions offering emergency relief, rehabilitation and basic services, and in fact 
they still do. However, the way NGOs are perceived by Afghans has changed con-
siderably over the past few years from appreciated basic service providers to being 
part of the political and military agendas of the international community. The 
reasons are that Afghans see most aid channelled to Kabul and urban centres, and 
not to rural areas where more than 75% of the population lives. On top of this, most 
of the aid went to the most insecure and war-affected provinces in the south instead 
of to secure areas for reconstruction purposes (ACBAR, 2008). Additionally, many 
(I)NGOs were pressured by donors to work with Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) causing Afghans – and the Taliban – to view humanitarian aid as linked to 
political and military agendas. Afghan people increasingly feel wronged. And this 
narrows the humanitarian space since “the social contract of acceptability between 
humanitarian agencies, affected communities, and belligerents is rapidly breaking 
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down” (Donini, 2009: 8). Still, NGOs working in remote rural, less insecure areas are 
appreciated by the local population, since they fill the gap of basic service delivery.  
 
In 2003, the Department of Disaster Preparedness (DDP)4, which is part of the MRRD, 
produced a National Disaster Management Plan in cooperation with UNAMA and 
SEEDS-India. The plan is quite comprehensive on paper, but unfortunately in practice, 
the DPP faces many limitations like lack of human capacity, financial resources, 
equipment for early warning, search and rescue equipment, relief stockpiles and 
absence of good coordination5. At the provincial level, government officials com-
plained about the absence of resources for relief, preparedness or recovery. They 
depend on (I)NGOs’ resources to respond to emergencies. The National Disaster 
Management Plan espouses to initiate a programme for community based pro-
gramming for disasters, using the CDCs as the appropriate channel for participatory 
preparation of village disaster management plans. In the villages selected for the 
CBDRR pilots, this did not happen. What MRRD/DDP did do is producing provincial 
Vulnerability and Risk Assessments which contain valuable data for aid programming. 
 
6.3.2 The broader political and institutional context of Indonesia 
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the fall of President Suharto in 1998, 
Indonesia started political reforms creating new opportunities for a revised 
relationship between the state and community. The New Order’s centralistic and 
uniform framework was replaced by a new legal framework for the democratisation 
of local-level politics and village institutions (Antlöv, 2003). During the New Order, 
Suharto’s central government was in full control in supervising village governance, 
where the village head was in fact an instrument to the central government. Village 
heads were directly accountable to the sub-district head, not to the villagers. Village 
administrations – usually consisting of religious teachers, and local elite like 
landlords - enforced policies and decrees formulated in Jakarta. Since they had to be 
loyal to the state party, Golkar, they were forced to maintain good relations with 
higher authorities, at the expense of relations with the local populations who were 
their neighbours (Antlöv, 2010: 196).  
 
According to the new Law 22/1999, the village is no longer under the authority of 
the sub-district, but became an autonomous level of government. This means that a 
village can formulate and pass its own village regulations and budgets without the 
approval from higher authorities. The village administration now consists of a village 
head, his staff and the Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD), the village parliament, which is 
elected from and by the villagers. The village head is no longer oriented to the 
upward government structures, but is accountable to the villagers and to the BPD. 
The law provides the framework for what is legally possible, but we have to look at 
how the law gets implemented to know whether the possibilities are realised. Many 
village governments are not yet aware about the space for own initiatives while in 
other villages, the local elite is not yet willing to fundamentally change existing 
power relations as the cases in this chapter will show.  
 
                                               
4
 The DPP was established in 1971. 
5
 Based on interviews with MRRD and DDP representatives Mr. Ghulam Haider and Mr. Ajmai Karimi, May 2006. 
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Aside from democratization, the central government produced a new framework for 
decentralisation, devolving responsibilities and power to the district levels of govern-
ment, with widely varying effects in different regions. In Maluku, for instance, decen-
tralisation resulted in communal violence (Chapter 5) due to renegotiating admini-
strative boundaries and to who gets the authority over environmental resources. In 
Central Java, decentralisation of powers to the district level made it more difficult for 
flood affected communities to address environmental issues taking a watershed per-
spective, which covers three districts. The new governance system does not function 
uncontested, since lack of knowledge and understanding of the new responsibilities 
lead to gaps in planning and implementation among government levels and depart-
ments (de Hauwere and van der Zouwen, 2010).  
 
In 2007, in light of the Hyogo Declaration, the Indonesian House of People’s Repre-
sentatives approved a new Disaster Management Law, stating that the State of the 
Republic of Indonesia has the responsibility to protect all people of Indonesia and 
their entire native land against disasters, both life and livelihoods. This implies a shift 
from emergency relief to a pro-active approach to reducing disaster risks. However, 
most government officials at the various levels do not know what this entails. The 
national disaster management framework still contains crucial ambiguities in terms 
of concepts (exact meaning of disaster management), organisational structure 
(National and Regional Disaster Management Body), process and procedures (Muria 
Coalition, 2008). These ambiguities affect regional government’s adoption of the 
framework and its translation into regional policies and instruments.  A critical issue 
in the targeted districts for the CBDRR pilots is the apparent reluctance of district 
governments to enact District Regulation on Disaster Management, to establish 
District Disaster Management Body, and formulate a 5-year Disaster Management 
Plan using these legal ambiguities as primary justification (ibid). Local communities 
and local NGOs in Central Java make use of this ambiguity which provides room for 
negotiating how government from the village to district level could translate disaster 
risk reduction policy into practice. 
 
6.3.3 The politics of selecting communities 
Selecting communities for aid programmes is always a crucial exercise for NGOs 
since it involves multiple considerations and pressures to do something in a certain 
locality and not in another. NGOs need to maintain multiple relationships with 
various actors which put pressure on the selection process. NGOs need to show 
positive results to donors to stay eligible for funding, and they need to prove that 
their efforts are legitimate by serving those most in need. These two obligations are 
not always compatible, and in case the resources are scarce, the selection tends to 
accommodate donor conditions. The need to profile the organisation, the NGOs’ 
broader agenda and values, personal interests of staff, accessibility and security 
issues are other factors that at times get priority over criteria like severity of 
community’s exposure to risk and its vulnerable conditions.   
 
In this section I reconstruct the process of community selection in Afghanistan and 
Indonesia by focusing on who was involved and whose interests, values and motives 
played a role in the final decision. Some researchers argued that NGOs implement 
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their programmes in so-called ‘safe areas of intervention’ with more chances for 
success, instead of areas where their support is most needed (Derksen and Verhallen, 
2008; Koch et al, 2009). They attribute such choices to distorting funding policies of 
the donors’ back-donors who insist on ‘results’ and whose preferences influence the 
geographical choices of NGOs. In this pilot we tried to eliminate such pressures by 
allowing flexible time-frames, allowing failures to happen to learn from, and to value 
processes equally to outcomes.  
 
The divide into ‘needs-based’ and ‘result-oriented’ criteria also slipped into the crite-
ria that the Steering Group formulated as guidelines for the local partners to deter-
mine the locations for their CBDRR pilots. These criteria, presented in Box 6.2, are a 
result of a negotiating process among the members of the Steering Group of which I 
was part. The criteria are based on assumptions and prepositions, and reflect an 
ideal image of the communities we wanted to engage with during the CBDRR pilot. 
These criteria – the first three - stem from a sub-research question “what are local 
people’s perspectives on risk stemming from disasters and conflict, and how do they 
respond?”, assuming that communities are not homogenous entities, and that gen-
der, ethnicity, religious belief, political affiliation, or other discriminatory characteris-
tics play a role in risk perceptions and responses. However, pressured by the limited 
timeframe of this PhD research project, result-oriented criteria were added as 
‘preferable’, based on the preposition that if local NGOs have a long-standing 
relationship with the community, if community-based organisations exist, and if 
communities are secure enough, the conditions for doing the CBDRR pilot would be 
favourable. These preferred criteria made sense for Afghanistan but were not so 
relevant for Indonesia since most selected villages there did not qualify these result-
oriented criteria. 
 
Box 6.2: Criteria for selecting communities to take part in the CBDRR pilot in Indonesia and Afghanistan 
               (formulated early 2006 by Steering Group) 
 
Needs-based criteria: 
 High-risk areas: communities that are regularly hit by small-scale disasters 
 Communities are affected by situation of chronic conflict (vulnerable groups like Internally Displaced 
People, returning refugees, female-/disabled headed household, ex-combatants)  
 Communities or segments of community belong to certain groups which are marginalised or excluded due 
to their gender, ethnicity, religious belief, political affiliation, or other discriminatory characteristic  
 
Result-oriented criteria: 
 Preferably, the existence of community-based organisations or local governance structure 
 Preferably, partner organisations have long-term relationship with these communities and intend to 
continue working there, including religious community based organisations 
 Practically, communities should be secure enough despite the conflict situation  
 
 
The Steering Group assumed that local partners in Afghanistan and Indonesia would 
select the communities before the end of 2006. However, ‘community selection’ 
turned out to be a recurrent topic for discussion, even during 2010 towards the end 
of the CBDRR pilot, particularly in Halmahera, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. 
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6.3.3.1 Selecting communities for piloting CBDRR: experiences from the field  
 
Community selection in Afghanistan  
I&K categorized Afghanistan as part of its ‘Democratization and Peace building’ 
(D&P) programme, which still needed to be formulated at the start of 2007. Sjoerd, 
who became programme coordinator of the D&P program in Asia, promoted CBDRR 
as a methodology. He espoused CBDRR as a participatory, programmatic, bottom-up 
approach aimed to formulate a new Afghanistan program, which recognizes local 
people's perspectives on any aspect of life in general, and on peace building and 
reducing risk in particular. During informal talks in Kabul, CBDRR was further framed 
as a "cure" for top-down oriented management styles of many Afghan NGOs. During 
a workshop in Kabul in May 2007, attended by about ten local NGOs, two regions 
were selected for the country programme where both conflicts and disasters occur 
and where partners operate – Hazarajat region and Herat province. Although the 
CBDRR pilots were supposed to be implemented under the umbrella of I&K’s Conflict 
Transformation programme, in practice, the CBDRR pilot developed independently 
from I&K’s country programme.  
 
The Afghan NGOs participating in the CBDRR pilot had no prior experience with 
CBDRR and developed their own selection criteria for communities using the ones in 
box 6.2 as a guideline. Asking about the process of selecting communities, all NGOs, 
except one, mentioned their prior relationship with the selected communities as key 
criterion. One NGO selected villages abandoned by other NGOs or which hardly 
received assistance from government or NGOs. They all selected communities where 
they, and in few instances other NGOs, had previously implemented the NSP or re-
lated programmes like education, peace building, relief and rehabilitation. Knowing 
the leaders, the functioning of a shura, the level of integrity of the leadership, the 
acceptance of NGOs in their locality, were the most important elements for con-
sideration. NGOs applied an additional criterion, namely that communities should 
not request the NGO to pay for their participation in this intervention. The NGOs 
viewed CBDRR as an instrument to reduce aid dependency, and expected that in 
these localities, local institutions would be more democratic, transparent and 
accepting participatory processes in the hope that CBDRR would be a legitimate 
intervention. These motivations support the argument of Derksen and Verhallen 
(2008) and Koch et al (2009), that NGOs tend to select ‘safe areas for intervention’ 
with more chance of positive results. 
 
However, several NGOs explained their choices in a slightly different way, arguing 
that they apply the ‘do no harm’ approach6, meaning that they select those areas 
where the chance that their intervention would support warring parties is minimal. 
This is how some Afghan NGOs developed ways to deal with uncertainty and inse-
curity. A local partner of Oxfam-Novib selected communities in Tarinkwot district, 
Uruzgan, where villages were affected by both natural disasters and violent conflict 
involving ISAF troops and Taliban. The NGO has been implementing development 
programs in Uruzgan since 1993, is accepted by local communities, has implemented 
                                               
6
 This refers to Anderson, M.B. 1999, Do no harm, how aid can support peace or war, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder 
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the NSP there, and the villages are situated close to each other. It viewed the CBDRR 
pilot as an opportunity to improve its aid practice in highly insecure areas. Although 
the selection met most criteria mentioned in Box 6.2, the donor’s field staff in Kabul 
raised some concerns and dilemmas regarding implementing a CBDRR pilot in 
Uruzgan, particularly the impossibility for the Dutch donor staff and the researcher 
to visit the villages. It then decided to move the CBDRR pilot to Baghlan province, 
and selected communities where it recently implemented an education programme, 
and which belong to the most vulnerable and most neglected villages in terms of 
government and NGO support, according to MRRD data (MRRD, 2007).  
 
Indonesia – Central Java 
I&K does not regard Central Java as an area where the most vulnerable, marginalized 
or poor people live compared to other regions in Indonesia, and therefore several 
staff within I&K were not in favour to start the pilot here. In-depth research in one of 
the CBDRR pilot villages by de Hauwere and van der Zouwen (2010: 88) confirmed 
that people’s vulnerability decreased over the past fifty years despite the more fre-
quent floods in the area. However, allowing SHEEP to implement its CBDRR pilot in 
Central Java is based on the assumption that this is a locality where the pilot could 
generate a lot of lessons and insights that are useful for I&K’s other partners in 
Indonesia. I reluctantly agreed to include Central Java as a pilot area, although I 
recognized that SHEEP could be a role-model. Selecting Aceh as the pilot area was 
preferred and considered, but most of the local I&K partners were then still involved 
in the tsunami response and the Steering Group found it inappropriate to burden 
those partners with a pilot project7. The decision to include SHEEP in the pilot 
programme was a pragmatic one.  
 
SHEEP selected Pati district for its CBDRR pilot programme, because many of SHEEP’s 
staff are from this area, they grew up there and feel strongly connected to people’s 
lives, their livelihoods and to the environment. Secondly, the area along the 60 km 
Juwana river experiences floods every 8 to 10 years, but since 2005 floods occurred 
more frequently. SHEEP viewed these floods as a disaster, and submitted several 
times emergency appeals to I&K to support flood-affected households. I&K wanted 
SHEEP - through the CBDRR pilot - to change this reactive response into a proactive 
structural approach to reduce flood risks. SHEEP was open for the pilot, and initially 
selected four villages in Sukolilo sub-district that were recommended by Serikat 
Petani Pati (SPP), the Pati Farmers Union. SHEEP and SPP worked together in 
providing relief to flood affected people, either generated locally or through inter-
national donors. At a first glance, selecting villages in an area where NGO staff has its 
roots and relationships with villages through SPP supports the argument that NGOs 
tend to select ‘easy areas’ for their programmes. SHEEP however rejected this 
argument by stressing that its mandate is transformative in nature, aimed to hold 
the Indonesian government responsible to implement its policies to reduce disaster 
risk. SHEEP considered this as a challenging task which goes beyond its project work. 
SHEEP expanded the CBDRR pilot in 2008 by selecting eight new villages along 
Juwana river, after it realized that not only farmers, but also landless and fisher folk, 
living closer to the river mouth, were negatively affected by the floods. The selection 
                                               
7
 After the CBDRR-pilot SHEEP plans to start CBDRR-interventions in Aceh.  
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of these villages was not only based on people’s needs to mitigate floods, but also 
for strategic reasons to mobilize villagers from along the 60 km Juwana river to build 
an alliance of CBOs to lobby the district government to mitigate floods. SPP nor I&K 
played a role in selecting these eight communities. 
 
In 2007, I&K started to encourage local partners to transform their projects work 
into a programmatic way of working focusing on one issue with other NGOs. The 
CBDRR pilot in Central Java was regarded by I&K as an opportunity to put their new 
policy into practice. ICCO learned from SHEEP that the floods in Pati are partly 
related to inappropriate land use on Muria Mountain, where logging, mining and 
corn production on steep deforested slopes takes place causing massive flash-floods 
and landslides since 2006. To mitigate floods, I&K envisioned that their local partners 
in Muria region – covering the three districts of Pati, Kuduz and Jepara – could be 
eligible for new funding if they would cooperate as a coalition in a CBDRR pilot. 
Although CBDRR was a new field for these local partners, except for SHEEP, and 
although operating as a coalition was perceived with some reservation, the Muria 
Coalition was formed in 2008 consisting of four local Indonesian NGOs – SHEEP, 
YLSKAR, YPL and YAPHI.  
 
The Muria Coalition decided to strategically select both upstream and downstream 
villages situated along the main rivers running from Muria Mountain to the sea and 
which were badly affected by flash floods, landslides or flooding in 2006. The selec-
tion of communities was done as part of the community organising strategy taking a 
‘watershed approach’: i.e. selecting villages situated upstream and downstream of 
main rivers that run down Muria Mountain. The Muria Coalition aims to strengthen 
the bargaining capacity of communities at risk in Muria Region to influence 
government policies to create a safer environment. A total of nine villages were 
selected. Three of them belonged to communities where the NGOs had contacts or 
rendered relief in the past, like Tempur. All the other villages were new, and the 
community organisers faced many challenges and even resistance from local actors.  
 
Indonesia - Halmahera 
When the pilot programme started in 2006, the local partners of I&K in Halmahera 
were still implementing their Rehabilitation Programme for Returning Refugees in 
Weda and Gane, located in the south of Halmahera. The programme would officially 
end in March 2007, and everybody involved in exploring the options for a CBDRR 
pilot in Halmahera agreed to continue in Weda and Gane. The villages met all the 
criteria and there was a lot to learn. Suddenly in 2007, the on-going discussions on 
how to proceed with the CBDRR pilot got distorted due to unsettled problems from 
the past, related to problematic aid relations between the protestant churches in the 
Netherlands and Indonesia (Chapter 2, Box 2.1), aggravated by reorganisations and 
staff changes.  After a period of silence, I&K carefully resumed communication, and 
discussed with its partners where to pilot CBDRR. The staff of I&K proposed to select 
villages not too far from Tobelo in northern Halmahera to “save on project budget 
considering the limited capacity of the NGO and the remoteness of Weda and Gane”.  
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Budgets, or more precisely whose budget within I&K, to minimize financial risks, 
became a decisive factor in community selection rather than people’s vulnerability 
or needs. The donor pushed for a geographical area nearby the local partners’ offices 
where indeed three villages were selected, although the GMIH included one village 
in Buli, located in the eastern part of Halmahera, a six hours drive from Tobelo. Buli 
was suggested to the GMIH through its church structure and local reverends. They 
reported about plans of a mining company to start its exploration activities in Buli to 
search for gold and nickel. Reverends are part of the village authorities and proposed 
to utilize the CBDRR pilot to increase people’s awareness about mining, and about 
how people could accept and spend the compensations offered by the mining 
company wisely to reduce poverty. From a former local partner staff, I heard that 
some GMIH board members have relatives in Buli with economic interests in the 
intervention. Although I&K staff and I were puzzled about the intentions of the local 
partners in Buli, ICCO agreed to include Buli in the pilot.  
 
The four selected communities did not meet all criteria, while the door to Weda and 
Gane was not completely closed either. I&K remained open to expand the CBDRR-
pilots to Weda and Gana at a later stage, particularly because SANRO field staff could 
not let go of the villages where they have been working for several years. I strongly 
supported their case both as former NGO worker, being critical about the ease with 
which NGOs abandon and replace communities, and as a researcher concerned with 
selecting proper places to have optimal learning. On the other hand, as a researcher I 
stepped back by accepting that such decisions are taken, and considered it my task 
to document and analyse the evolving process of the consequence of this decision. 
 
Reviewing the choices and arguments of NGOs in selecting communities, I conclude 
that these differ a lot. The argument that NGOs tend to select ‘safe areas for their 
interventions’ using mostly result-oriented criteria, is not as univocal as suggested 
(Derksen and Verhallen, 2008; Koch et al, 2009). It is true that donors push and pull 
aid relations with local partners to influence the geographical choice of NGOs and 
the selection of particular villages while excluding others, and that local NGOs have 
their affinities with specific communities and localities. The case of Halmahera 
illustrates this best. 
 
In Central Java, the donor influenced – and from the perspective of local partners – 
pushed the NGOs to form the Muria Coalition to comply with its new funding policies 
to apply a programmatic approach. This was in the interest of the donor, whereas 
this did not obstruct the Muria Coalition to formulate their own selection criteria 
using geographical, needs-based and strategic criteria. The Muria Coalition selected 
communities by thinking ahead of how their community organising strategies could 
build people’s alliances across three districts to be able to influence government 
policies. This was a strategy the Coalition borrowed from SHEEP’s experience along 
Juwana River in Pati district.  
 
In Afghanistan, the NGOs selected those villages where they expected the least 
trouble with warlords, commanders or corrupt village leaders. This is not because 
Afghan NGOs want to avoid working in insecure areas, but because they intend to 
195 
 
adhere to the ‘do no harm’ principle. Indirectly this is a way to reduce the chances to 
be co-opted and to have more chance of success. People’s vulnerability, risk and 
poverty are criteria they used as well to select communities. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, the arguments and criteria for community selection did not auto-
matically guarantee success. Community organisers who entered villages, whether 
they were familiar with the people or not, faced many dilemmas and challenges to 
deal with resistance and local power dynamics within the village and beyond.   
 
6.3.3.2 Entering the village  
Whereas selecting communities is mainly an office-based exercise involving different 
NGO staff, entering a village is often assigned to community organisers or field staff. 
The Field Practitioners’ Handbook of ADPC describes this step as building trust and 
understanding the community. It prescribes how a field officer should behave to 
become accepted by the community using Chambers’ guidelines (1997). The Hand-
book does not elaborate on how local people may view or react to NGO visitors. 
Even when previous relationships existed between the NGO and community, new 
staff and new reasons for entering the village may not be automatically accepted.  
 
Stories from field staff about entering villages reveal that they have to deal with lots 
of questions, prejudices and resistance from community people. “Are you here to 
convert us to Christianity?” was a recurrent question to Christian field staff in 
Indonesia. Instead of focusing on CBDRR, field staff then decided to spend ample 
time with religious groups and with village officials to build trust. A female com-
munity organiser in Indonesia shared how she spent every Saturday teaching at the 
elementary Islamic school, and organised contests on reading from the Koran, 
singing the best praying call, or a quiz about religious issues. Often villagers took a 
reserved attitude and had many questions: What do you really want? Or what do 
you give to us? especially when people are used to receive aid after disasters.  
 
“Sometimes the perception of the villagers is that we [NGO field staff] look for issues 
to be solved so we get projects”, according to one community organiser, “and that 
most of the money goes to the NGO, not to the community”. Village officials can be 
suspicious towards NGO staff, viewing them as trouble makers, as being critical to 
government officials. In Central Java, a village head ordered the military to intimi-
date a community organiser, pushing him to get official permission from sub-district 
government to enter his village, while officially there is no need to have official per-
mission and documents before entering a village. Even after the community  
organiser got official permission, the military kept on attending community meetings 
to monitor the activities of NGO staff. “If you often meet with the same persons, 
people start gossiping. Be conscious where you stay and meet a diversity of people”, 
is an often used strategy of community organisers to avoid that they are perceived 
as being affiliated with specific actors in the village and labelled as trouble-makers. 
 
Entering villages usually happens through contact persons who have relatives in the 
village or live there themselves. A few stories of field staff illustrate how they 
entered the village, how they explored who is who, and the dilemmas they 
encountered.  
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Box 6.3: Entering Sambiroto village, Pati district, Central Java  
 
Sambiroto – located down-stream along Tahu river which runs from Muria Mountain to the sea - 
was selected because it experienced a severe and destructive flood in 2006. Floods happen regularly. 
 
Agung, the field staff, knew a person in Sambiroto who works in the fish market. Through him Agung 
got in touch with Elistiono, the head of the fishermen’s group in the village. This fishermen’s group is 
member of the sub-district’s fishermen’s group headed by Seroto. To explore the situation in 
Sambiroto and to introduce the NGO, Agung also contacted the village officials and the village 
midwife Annie. He further met with vendors in the market, religious groups, the youth and with 
Mohammed Matun, who is a legislative member of the district government and advisor of the 
fishermen’s group. 75% of the total 3900 households in Sambiroto are traditional fishermen, 20% 
are involved in aquaculture and 5% are farmers.  
 
Through discussions with these various actors, Agung learned that the floods in Sambiroto affects 
aqua-culturists and rice-farmers. A few times the dike collapsed causing damage to rice-fields, 
houses and fish floated away. Aqua-culturists and farmers attribute the floods to deforestation 
upstream, while the fishermen frame their problem as ‘sedimentation’ which causes the river to 
overflow the embankments, but more importantly, sedimentation hinders their access to the sea 
during low tide to go fishing. Due to sedimentation they have to push their boats through the sand 
to the sea. This is heavy work, requiring many people and it take hours before the boats are brought 
from the small ‘harbour’ in the river to the sea. Their fishing equipment does not allow them to fish 
during night or to wait for high tide to leave the harbour. They usually fish from 4:00 am to 4:00 pm. 
They catch shrimps and crabs, not big fish. In 2004, the government once took out the sand from the 
river, and the fishermen want that the government does this yearly. In 2005, the fishermen 
themselves dug with the help of a contractor who had the right equipment. However this was 
expensive and the fishermen cannot afford to do this yearly.  
 
Based on an initial assessment, Agung - supported by the NGO field office -concluded that the 
fishermen form the most vulnerable group in the community. The basis for his conclusion is that 
sedimentation leads to less income for a large marginalized group, and they are the ones in the 
village most neglected by government officials considering other urgent issues, like lack of 
enforcement of fishing zones causing intrusion of commercial fishing boats into the waters of 
traditional fishermen. 
 
The fishermen attributed sedimentation to deforestation 20 km upstream, which triggers a huge 
impact in a short time. They have been trying to put their problem on the government’s agenda, 
assuming that river management is the responsibility of the infrastructure department but that was 
not correct. They know that flooding and sedimentation is also a concern of the farmers and aqua-
culturists, but these groups regard the fishermen as trouble-makers, and are unwilling to cooperate.  
While farmers received government’s support after flooding, the fishermen did not receive anything. 
The relationship between the fishermen and the other sectors in the village is not so smooth.  
 
The story of Agung shows how the steps of the CBDRR-model happen simultaneously: 
Agung built a relationship with different actors, got an understanding of who is who 
in the community, particularly how the various groups frame their problem and how 
they position themselves vis-à-vis each other. At the same time he assessed who is 
most at risk – in his view the traditional fishermen who make up the majority of the 
villagers - and how they try to strengthen their social and political resources. He 
identified the following key-actors: an active fishermen group, a village government 
which ignores fishermen’s issues, rice farmers and aqua-culturists with different risk 
perspectives, and linkages between the local fishermen’s group with both the sub-
district fishermen group and the district government through Mohammed Matun. 
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These actors and their positioning formed the starting points for his community 
organising strategies. As a community organiser, Agung had to manoeuvre between 
the different parties to get them understand each other’s perspectives. It is the 
NGO’s principle to not take sides, but to be a bridge-builder between different 
parties to establish and maintain his legitimacy in the village. Later in this chapter I 
will elaborate how he succeeded in this. 
 
Whereas in Central Java, field staff enters villages through informal contacts, 
entering villages in Afghanistan requires formal courtesy calls. The NGO field staff in 
Khulm, Balkh province, first had to visit the district governor, the woleswal, to get 
official permission to work in the selected villages along a 10 km long irrigation canal. 
The woleswal recommended three villages which, in his view, were the most 
affected by floods. The NGO was aware though that it also needed permission from 
more powerful, influential actors than the woleswal, namely a former mujahidin 
commander and several religious leaders. The male NGO field staff told me that 
“once they agreed, no one else would oppose” meaning that his presence and the 
NGO intervention were legitimized through the approval of influential people. The 
field staff focused its organising work entirely on the three upstream villages as 
recommended by the district governor with the aim to reduce the risk for floods. 
Two years after the destructive flash flood, the physical impact in these villages was 
still visible. However, the NGO’s dominant focus on the exposure to flood risks in 
three villages turned itself blind to the fact that these people were not necessarily 
the ones most vulnerable in terms of their social, economic and political affiliations. 
The NGO had not questioned the recommendation of the district governor or 
commander by looking beyond the three villages. 
 
Only later, the NGO found out that the irrigation canal is shared by a total of eight 
villages, and that the rules for water distribution changed in 2001 to the dis-
advantage of the five downstream villages. The field staff had affiliated itself with 
the most powerful actors in the area, the commander and his affiliates in the three 
upstream villages who control the water allocation. The NSP and the creation of 
CDCs in the villages have not resulted in democratic and transparent institutions as 
assumed by the NGO. When the NGO learned about this disparity and the negative 
consequences for the downstream villages, it was quite late to change its role into 
one of a mediator between both parties encouraging the powerful men to assume 
responsibility for the more vulnerable groups in their communities. The relationship 
between up- and downstream villagers got tense during a prolonged drought period 
in 2008, but the NGO lacked the capacity – number of staff and mediation skills – to 
take up such role. Such experiences feed Afghan people’s belief that aid is distri-
buted unfairly based on personal relationship and reinforcing existing power 
relations. When the NGO staff reflected on the first year of its CBDRR pilot, it 
realized the importance to take a broader risk perspective and wider view on social 
relationships to include all villages dependent on the water resources, to understand 
the history of water distribution among the villages, and of people’s livelihood 
strategies as a way to understand people’s vulnerability. ‘Community-based’ in this 
context means following the relationships between social actors and local institu-
tions that matter, i.e. a ‘community’ of eight villages that rely on the same irrigation 
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canal and water resources for their livelihoods considering power differentials. This 
was an important learning during the pilot, but unfortunately too late for the 
villagers in Khulm. The NGO decided to withdraw from the area. 
 
There are various creative ways to deal or to bypass influential actors in a village 
with varying results. I describe two experiences from Indonesia. The first case is from 
an uphill community on Muria Mountain experiencing landslides and flash floods 
caused by illegal mining that involve the village officials with the protection of the 
district government (Box 6.4). The entry-point into the village circumvents sensitive 
issues by talking and mobilizing various actors around issues that do not immediately 
challenge power differentials.  
 
Box 6.4: Entering Bungu village, Jepara district 
 
Bungu is situated on the slopes of Muria Mountain, where, like in surrounding villages, the practice 
of illegally mining stones for road construction takes place since 2002. One staff member of the NGO 
is from Bungu. His father was once village head in Bungu, and many of his relatives are involved in 
illegal mining till today but he himself opposes this practice. For security reasons he is not involved in 
the CBDRR pilot. Most villagers are afraid to openly oppose or even talk about illegal mining despite 
the negative consequences of their immediate environment and livelihoods. They are intimidated by 
the miners who threatened them, beat them and even destroyed paddy fields. In Bungu, two 
farmers’ groups exist which are not very active, because village officials control and suppress 
farmers to not oppose illegal mining. The two groups do not cooperate causing fragmentation 
among villagers. The social relations are not harmonious. Village authorities deny that disasters 
occur in their area or downstream. The village head, a woman, however, is willing to openly discuss 
the mining threats with the NGO field staff since she herself is marginalized by the male village 
officials and not taken seriously. She expects that the NGO will support her, and the villagers, in 
opposing the illegal miners.    
 
The NGO field staff insisted on getting permission to work in the village from the village officials to 
not raise suspicion, and he explained to them that the NGO promotes sustainable agriculture. The 
permission was given. The government has agriculture programs but these are not implemented in 
Bungu because the district officials do not reach Bungu. Farmers do not get access to seeds and 
inputs and information because the village government sets other priorities. The community 
organiser fills this gap, and used agriculture as a mobilizing topic to enhance interaction between 
village officials, district government officials and farmers’ groups. He lives and moves from one sub-
village to another (Bungu consists of 12 sub-villages) to avoid that he will be associated with one 
faction of the village officials. Instead of talking about illegal mining, he focused the discussion on 
water issues, farming practices, and food security issues, topics which were non-threatening and had 
the potential to re-activate the two farmers groups and encourage interaction with village officials. 
In these discussions the NGO field staff did not totally avoid DRR issues when he asked about 
immediate daily problems like water. He asked, for instance, what was the situation in Bungu before, 
and how is the situation now? And then people discussed the reasons for changes. The NGO 
assumed that the issue of illegal mining will be raised once confidence and trust have been built 
among the farmers groups. Secondly, this approach aimed to increase the commitment of 
government to support people’s livelihoods in Bungu.  
 
His strategy worked. He established good relationships with the village head, the village administra-
tor, the village water manager, and with the leader from one farmers’ group. Together they pro-
duced a risk map with about 20 illegal mining points within the village borders. In July 2010, they 
discussed this map with all members of the farmers group while using ‘food security’ as main theme. 
The community organiser assumed they could make a plan on how to discuss the risk map with 
village authorities supportive to illegal mining. However, he noticed that landslides and mining are 
still not regarded as threats, and that people keep silent about mining. In September 2010 he 
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organised a community exchange visit to Tempur, an upland community badly affected by flash 
floods in February 2006, where villagers, particularly the youth group, initiated community forest 
management practices to reduce landslides. There, the Bungu representatives dared to speak about 
illegal mining in their village. “Mining brings benefits for the miners, but has negative effects on our 
irrigation system - eroding canals and drying up of water sources - and big trucks damage the asphalt 
road” according to the village water manager. In October 2010, this small group of village officials 
organised a village dialogue, and invited six miners and the farmers group from Bungu as well as the 
sub-district governor. During the dialogue, the sub-district governor declared the closure of all 
mining sites in Bungu. The media reported about the mining closure, while farmers constructed a 
steel road blockade to prevent trucks to enter Bungu. The illegal miners, backed by powerful 
authorities in the district and province, did not give up, but through the process Illegal mining is now 
openly questioned by the majority of the villagers. This is a major outcome in terms of reworked 
relationships.  
 
The community organiser consciously built relationships with all crucial actors in a 
non-threatening way by focusing on food security and people’s livelihoods. It took 
him nine months before the farmers and village head dared to speak out about 
illegal mining practices and to publicly confront the miners during a dialogue and 
through the media. The community organiser manoeuvred between the various 
social groups to maintain his legitimacy. 
 
The second example (Box 6.5) is from Halmahera where villagers attacked each other 
during the communal violence in 1999-2000, resulting in the temporal evacuation of 
the whole Muslim community of Togoliua. The NGO took the role of mediator 
between Christian and Muslim villagers when it entered the communities with the 
aim to solve land disputes. Field staff also moved among the various actors and 
villages, but with less success promising results compared to Bungu. 
 
Box 6.5: Entering and mediating between a Christian and Muslim village in Halmahera 
 
In Chapter 5, I narrated about the events in northern Halmahera in 1999 leading to the violence in 
Togoliua and Birinoa. The main issue deals with land disputes, not religion. Even today, violent 
incidents happen in the forests between the two villages.  
 
The NGO, linked to the Protestant Church in Tobelo – perceived as playing a partial role during the 
violence against Muslims, consciously tried to take an impartial stance by playing the role of 
mediator and facilitator. The NGO field staff moved between the two adjacent villages to encourage 
village leaders to retrieve the official transmigration documents of the establishment of Togoliua in 
1973 which were burnt in 1999 during the violence, and to search for the living witnesses who know 
about the adat arrangements regarding the ancestral lands of Birinoa and the surrounding villages. A 
durable solution could only be reached when all five villages surrounding Togoliua would be involved 
in clarifying the land boundaries. All these villages were visited separately by the NGO field staff to 
get a village-specific perspective and positioning on the land issue. This approach - to involve all 
actors who have a stake in the issue - was based on the lessons learned in Khulm, in Afghanistan, to 
construct a representation of the NGO as being an impartial legitimate actor in the area.  
 
When gathering historical, social, institutional and spatial data, involving community people varying 
from village authorities to farmers, youth and voluntary Gotong Royong groups, they found that 
people’s stories remain inconsistent. Most people repeated the official stories about traditional adat 
regulations and the current government law. Early 2010, a few individuals in Birinoa however, dared 
to speak about some people’s practice to sell land to newcomers for personal gains. “The first group 
of newcomers has left Birinoa, but they probably sold their land to other newcomers, and here the 
problem started”. The government determined that it is no longer allowed to sell land which - 
according to adat – is regarded as communal land. According to the village secretary in Birinoa “A 
200 
 
newcomer gets 1 ha of hutan (forest garden) for free; when the person leaves the village, the land is 
supposed to be returned to the community”. The government argues that all land is state-owned, 
and cannot be sold to third parties. It seems though that some people got land in use when they 
arrived in Birinoa, but that they unofficially bought the land from the previous ‘dusun head’
8
, who 
may have pressured these people in need for money. The whole village of Birinoa is actually misled 
by the previous dusun head.  In the same way, land has been unofficially sold to people from 
Togoliua, to about 20 to 30 households. When they leave, they will sell the land. Officially, the 
current village leaders of Birinoa are against such practices, however the tokoh adat has no authority 
anymore to end this practice due to new government‘s law. The village leaders in Togoliua saw no 
reason to join the NGO meetings, since they actually benefit from unclear regulations despite their 
narratives of being victims (see chapter 5). The CBDRR intervention outcome may reverse their ‘land 
rights’.  
 
The issue here is that three different types of local institutions are entangled: government laws 
regarding land ownership (state-owned), adat rules (land belongs to the community), and backdoor 
practices for personal benefits. Since adat rules have no longer authority, and the sub-district 
government does not want to interfere (only when conflict turns violent), the illegal selling of land 
will continue. Some people complaining about the intrusion of Togoliua people in Birinoa territory 
are themselves involved in illegally selling of land. I suspect that these people use the presence of 
the NGO to get their practice legalized. The village secretary of Birinoa uses the presence of the NGO 
and the involvement of a master’s student of Disaster Studies to reinforce his claim against the 
military, who got 100 ha from Togoliua in return for protection during the communal violence, which 
is the same 100 ha in which 20 to 30 households from Togoliua bought land. Politics influences how 
the local institutions function and the way how they are viewed by local people and by the NGO, and 
these institutions cannot be isolated from the wider processes of decentralization and the political 
history in Halmahera that have led to the violence. 
 
The village authorities in Togoliua were not pleased with the discovery of illegal land 
deals, and suddenly avoided any contact with the NGO staff. They passively opposed 
the NGO’s efforts to engage them in a dialogue through the tactic of withdrawal, 
thereby delegitimizing and undermining the NGO’s plans. Also the sub-district 
government did not want to get involved in settling disputes, because it wanted to 
escape politics. As concluded in the previous chapter, local actors who compete over 
resources, construct their history, their interpretation of local realities, which do not 
necessarily match with the historical facts once unravelled. They use their discursive 
and institutional powers in the interaction with NGOs, and construct images of local 
realities with omissions and hidden intentions resulting in differentiated or 
competing views.    
 
The NGO put itself in a difficult position, not precisely sure how to proceed with the 
pilot project. It questioned whether the land disputes were a concern between 
villages or between individuals from different villages. After further investigation the 
NGO concluded that the disputes were between specific groups from the villages 
which had the potential to turn violent. The NGO decided to no longer focus on 
groups that were willing to participate, but on who should participate to reduce the 
risk for violence and to renegotiate village boundaries and policies regarding land 
ownership. This meant a shift in the CBDRR-process from exploring actors and their 
interrelationships that matter towards looking for those who have authority and 
should take responsibility. The latter consisted of the village heads, tokoh 
masyarakat, tokoh adat and several members of the village parliament, from the 
                                               
8
 Dusun is a sub-village 
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various villages and at a later stage the government department for land registration. 
By the end of 2010 negotiations were still on-going. The CBDRR-process did not 
evolve as expected, and the NGO found itself increasingly caught into the web of 
local politics.  
 
Although the NGO field staff was still motivated to continue its work in these villages 
after one year, especially in Togoliua, an influential board member found these kinds 
of community processes too slow, too time-consuming with little output, and strong-
ly argued that the NGO should change its focus towards Corporate Social Responsibi-
lity (CSR) programmes of mining and palm oil companies9. He believed that CSR 
could be more relevant for people in Halmahera to support people’s economic needs, 
and, more importantly, to make the NGO a more visible actor. I&K staff reacted con-
cerned, arguing that it is the NGO’s responsibility to monitor environmental impacts 
and legality of the companies’ operations. This view was dismissed with the argu-
ment that the NGO should not go into lobby activities against corporate business.  
 
The various experiences from Central Java, Khulm, and Halmahera generate two im-
portant insights. The first deals with the legitimacy and representations of NGO field 
staff when entering the village. In all the villages, field staff encountered frictions and 
tensions among social actors. Whether NGO field staff could deal with competing 
views and risk perceptions, seems to be related to their ability to act in an impartial 
manner without losing sight of those groups in the village that are marginalized. In 
Sambiroto and Bungu, field staff were perceived as credible and reliable actors after 
their efforts to meet with the various groups and understanding local dynamics. In 
Khulm however, NGO staff affiliated itself too much with the powerful elite and 
thereby losing its credibility and legitimacy in the downstream villages. The NGO 
field staff in Halmahera did recognize all perspectives and views of the varying actors, 
and engaged with them to uncover hidden practices. It consciously intended to per-
form an impartial role being aware of the different interests of the various actors. 
And yet the field staff was not able to become a legitimate mediator who could posi-
tion itself above the parties. Initially, I attributed the NGO’s difficulties to its Christian 
background, and its perceived partial role during the conflict. Later I realized that the 
direct interactions between local authorities, individual households, and sub-district-
government were very minimal and that it seemed that nobody could or wanted to 
find room for manoeuvre in the visible CBDRR process to settle land disputes. 
Despite people’s complaints about tensions and violent incidents, they, including 
individual village officials, were involved in more invisible interactions of illegal land 
deals. Disengagement from the CBDRR process provided some village authorities 
from Togoliua room for manoeuvre in the more hidden interactions with military, 
with some villagers from Birinoa and with officials from the sub-district government. 
The NGO did not know how to deal with the multiple realities of village authorities, 
or to effect power relations to bring the multiple realities together. 
 
The second insight relates to NGOs’ assumptions that communities and local 
institutions have clear and definable spatial boundaries. This assumption turned out 
to be incorrect. The examples from Khulm and Halmahera reveal that local institu-
                                               
9
 This occurred in March 2010 during a reflection meeting with local NGO staff and two board members. 
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tions are not necessarily organised according to spatial boundaries but rather 
according to social units which change over time. It is the political history of land 
boundaries, water uses and access to natural resources that represents the key 
factor in problematizing a bounded view of community. Community as a defined 
space is contested here. In this phase of the CBDRR process, ‘community’ referred 
more to the social interactions within and beyond village boundaries, in the past and 
possible future. The fishermen in Sambiroto, for instance, feel more connected to its 
sub-district’s fishermen network, with which they share the same concerns, than to 
the other villagers who viewed them as trouble-makers. They are aware, though, 
that they should engage with these villagers, the village authorities and upstream 
villages if they want to address their flooding and sedimentation problems.  
 
6.3.3.3 Searching for the most vulnerable and participation in framing risk 
problems 
“Reaching the most vulnerable groups in the community” is the most rhetoric sen-
tence in CBDRR policy documents and proposals, because this is what the NGO will 
need to accomplish to claim its success to donors. It took some effort to deconstruct 
staff’s success stories about their interventions, taking away their fear to discuss 
dilemmas and failures, and to encourage them to reflect on local realities. They 
admitted that this is the hardest part of the CBDRR-process because as community 
organiser they need to manoeuvre between the various actors with different, in 
some cases opposing, interests and agendas, while maintaining their legitimacy.  
 
Initially, NGOs and donors viewed social differentiation mainly through the categori-
zation of general social or occupational roles like ‘women’, ‘farmers’, ‘fishermen’, 
‘youth’, ‘leaders’ and the ‘poor’ (Cleaver, 1999). In Afghanistan ‘widows’ and 
‘disabled’ are added to the list. Labelling people as such hides their relationships 
with their institutional context, ignores power differentials, differing risk perceptions 
and how conflict impacts on them. The need to negotiate and accommodate these 
differences is therefore not always explicitly recognized by the NGO management, 
while it is the daily concern of the field staff. A community organiser in Afghanistan 
felt uncomfortable with openly categorizing people because he felt that these labels 
disrespect people, ignore their dignity and agency. However, in practice these 
categories do steer the process of community organising, in particularly Indonesia, 
and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan.  
 
In Central Java, community organisers work with the traditional Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) like farmers’ groups (kelompok tani), fishermen’s groups 
(kelompok nelayan), women’s groups (Pembinatin Kesejahteraan Keluarga - PKK) 
and youth groups (Karang Taruna - KT). These CBOs are old institutions, established 
during Suharto’s administration, used to channel top-down government program-
mes under strict military supervision. These CBOs were the major instrument to con-
form these groups to the central government (Antlöv, 2003). Often the leaders of 
these CBOs are relatives of the village head or other village elite. The NGOs in 
Central Java engage with these CBOs because people are familiar with these institu-
tions - although most of them are inactive –, because CBO leaders are crucial 
contacts between NGOs and villagers, like Erning, and because of the opportunities 
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the new decentralisation policies offer to rework the relationship between CBOs and 
the Indonesian government. Instead of viewing CBOs as an instrument to conform to 
government policies, the NGOs in Central Java view CBOs in the new context as an 
instrument to challenge policies and to hold government accountable.  
 
This particular institutional history of CBOs, however, still influences the attitude, 
routines and practices of CBOs, village authorities and of the NGOs, at times contra-
dicting the NGOs’ espoused values and intentions. It influences how the community 
organiser engages with village government officials and village elite – whether (s)he 
cooperates with the village authorities or not – and who participates in framing risk 
and who does not. It is regarded as relatively easier to engage with CBOs than with 
village authorities. “Village authorities are often corrupt, intimidating, have 
traditional norms and values, and refuse to talk about disasters, or do not want to 
frame these events as disasters” – according to NGO field staff during a reflection 
workshop. Working with both village authorities and CBOs costs a lot of energy, and 
therefore field staff tends to focus on engaging CBOs in risk assessments and district 
government officials who are more open and interested in disaster risk reduction.   
 
Box 6.6 Process of exclusion and inclusion of vulnerable subgroups in framing risk problems 
 
Central Java, Indonesia: The NGOs – stressing that they do not want to support only the most vulnerable and to 
be labelled as anti-government – see their role in bringing together local government officials and CBOs. After 
successive visits, I noticed that one NGO engages particularly with local peasant organisations representing 
small and middle-class farmers in the district and with village leaders to formulate local level disaster manage-
ment legislation. Landless labourers’ views were not represented despite their vulnerable position. This sub-
group could not get access to village institutions and resources. The NGO’s multi-stakeholder approach involves 
stakeholders who either are responsible for relief and risk reduction efforts like local government, or those who 
visibly suffer from the floods like peasants. Groups like landless labourers and migrants were ignored. The NGO 
staff affiliated themselves with the peasants who frame their risk as ‘crop failure due to floods caused by 
sedimentation of the river’. Landless labourers and migrants framed their risk problem as ‘loss of livelihood’. 
 
Later, the NGO realized that also fishermen, living closer to the sea, experience negative effects from flooding, 
who frame their risk problem differently: it is not sedimentation that they view as main problem, but the big 
waves from the sea and the chaotic parking of boats in the harbour near the river mouth that obstruct water to 
flow to the sea. The NGO facilitated the interaction between the fishermen and the peasants. The latter had 
frequent inter-village peasant group meetings where the idea was born to form a broad network of people 
concerned about the flooding in Pati district aimed to be more influential during negotiations with the district 
government. To mobilize the fishermen groups and other concerned citizens into the broader network, the risk 
problem should be framed in such a way to mobilize a larger constituency. After lengthy discussions peasants 
and fishermen agreed to frame the problem as ‘Juwana river is in a bad condition’ referring to the problems of 
sedimentation and boat parking. On May 20, 2009, they officially established their network Jampi Sawan - 
Jaringan Masyarakat Peduli Sungai Juwana, meaning People’s Network that cares for the Juwana River. In 
addition Jampi Sawan refers to an herbal medicine to cure diseases; it also symbolizes ‘solution’. All villagers 
living along Juwana river or who are affected by floods indirectly – like labourers – can become a member of 
Jampi Sawan. 
 
This example from Pati district shows how the NGO started its community organising 
through traditional CBOs, ignoring those subgroups that did not qualify for CBO 
membership, while later on, Jampi Sawan opens up to include any concerned citizen 
for mobilizing purposes, to create leverage and legitimacy as it aims to negotiate and 
lobby with district government. It does not address the specific interests of sub-
groups which are subsumed to a “common good” agenda. Jampi Sawan does exclude 
civil servants and village government officials to become board member because of 
the experience that they tend to control information and play a dominant role.  The 
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process of organising and mobilizing people for flood risk reduction goes beyond 
community level, building alliances among villages along Juwana river between the 
most vulnerable and less vulnerable groups aimed to influence and change policy 
and power relations with Indonesian government departments at district level and 
higher.  
 
Again the meaning of ‘community’ in CBDRR brings up the dilemma of ‘community’ 
as territory, and of defining project boundaries, which rather flow from a social pro-
cess of mobilizing peasants, fishermen and citizens along Juwana river which evolved 
over three to four years starting in a few villages in one sub-district towards 
including all sub-districts bordering the river. In its interaction with responsible 
government departments, it by-passes village authorities and engages directly with 
district government, because this is found easier than mobilizing village authorities 
and because the district is the appropriate authority to negotiate flood mitigation 
measures.  
 
Whereas this shared agenda of flood mitigation addresses the structural causes of 
flood, it hides the diversity of short term needs of each specific group. The NGO did 
pay attention to these needs in varying ways. It supported farmers, women, landless, 
fishermen with several health and livelihood related activities, and in one instance 
with the construction of an evacuation centre10 requested by landless settlers. These 
activities served as entry-points for community organising and were followed up by 
linking a particular CBO to its (sub)-district occupational network of farmers or 
fishermen. Combining issue-based networking through Jampi Sawan, with sectoral 
networking is a way to address both people’s practical immediate needs with long 
term strategic interests.  
 
Only in a few villages in Pati district, community organisers were able to act as 
bridge-builders between CBOs, non-CBO members and village authorities. In these 
villages, the authorities were open to perform their new role in disaster risk reduc-
tion and included safety and protection arrangements in its village regulations, like a 
definition of disaster, a joined disaster management taskforce to coordinate relief 
distribution, emergency health, access to preparedness equipment like boats, coor-
dination of farming experiments in relation to climate change, and mobilization of 
people for rehabilitation efforts. In these village regulations the views and interests 
of the most vulnerable groups were included. A community organiser reflected on 
this particular CBDRR outcome, as a step towards community resilience, particularly 
in combination with Jampi Sawan’s lobby efforts for flood mitigation. He referred to 
the importance of village institutions and how they function as element of resilience. 
 
In the majority of the other villages the attitude of village authorities remained 
problematic. These villages have a long history of oppositional local politics related 
to village head elections. For instance, a village head belongs to a big influential 
family, and the cleavage in the village is between this family and the rest of the 
community, and distrust is high. He bribes people to become re-elected and 
threatens to use violence. Many people are still ignorant towards village politics and 
                                               
10
 See Chapter 7 for the whole story 
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are easily manipulated, according to SHEEP field staff. In one village the cleavage has 
an economic dimension as well: whereas the CBO consists of traditional fishermen, 
the village head is involved in commercial fishing and these two compete over fishing 
zones. In some other villages, the level of interaction and trust between CBOs and 
village authorities is low. This occurs in villages where people are relatively poor and 
come from different places due to past transmigration, and where as a result many 
people migrate. Community organisers find it difficult to get people’s commitment 
for CBO work or to attend meetings.   
 
The NGO viewed CBO leaders, next to village authorities, as its principal contact, and 
who function as a bridge between the NGO and the so-called ‘vulnerable’ groups in 
the village. Being a CBO leader is a demanding task: (s)he is supposed to understand 
and articulate the NGO’s values, concepts, strategy, and vision; needs to be willing 
and able to translate this to CBO members and to involve ordinary villagers; under-
stands the conditions of villagers within and outside the CBO, and provide feedback 
to the NGO. Very few CBO leaders can fulfil these tasks or sustain them for a longer 
time. And this makes reaching the most vulnerable groups in communities quite a 
challenge.  
 
In Afghanistan, community organisers mainly engage with the CDCs and religious 
leaders to identify who should be involved in the risk assessment and how, therefore 
setting the boundaries for who is included and who is not.  
 
Box 6.7 Inclusion and exclusion of most vulnerable subgroups in Khulm, Northern Afghanistan 
 
Women, particularly widows and female-headed households, prioritized an early warning system for food 
shortages resulting from drought, floods, price hikes and conflict dynamics. Their priority differed from the men 
who prioritized repair of irrigation canals and flood protection. I met these women through so-called ‘women 
shuras’, a village institution introduced by the international community in 2003 aimed to enhance women’s 
participation in community decision-making. These women shuras never existed before, and were created as 
parallel structures to the male shura, but without authority. No mechanism exists to allow both men and 
women to validate each other’s risk assessment results, and to frame risk priorities together. The female and 
male community organisers exchanged among themselves the assessment results of both the women and men, 
and concluded that these are similar. Male NGO staff ensured me that women’s interests are looked after 
through the responses identified by the men “since these serve the common good”.  
 
While acknowledging heterogeneity in communities and gender differences, the 
community organisers focused in the end on shared values, common interests and 
avoiding open conflict. As rightly mentioned by Allen (2006), particular subgroups in 
the community, like landless workers, migrants, women, or minority ethnic groups 
have distinct priorities or competing interests, which tend to be subsumed by 
decision-making processes that are ‘consensus-based’ and framed as serving ‘the 
common good’. In this way the CBDRR-interventions got de-politicized in favour of 
those involved in decision-making. In Afghanistan, the ones mobilized for decision-
making are prominent community people like local leaders, local elites and their 
kinship networks, not the most vulnerable segments.  
 
‘Participation’ is practiced here in an instrumental way based on procedures and 
techniques: people are approached in groups to hear about CBDRR, and asked to 
provide information about their locality through exercises from toolboxes – 
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information they already know. Particularly women were quite critical about the 
manner the participatory risk assessment was conducted. “We provided information 
to the community organiser and she gave advice, but most of it we already knew and 
do! There were some new tips, like sandbagging in the doors of our houses, and to be 
alert during the night”. Only the men, and particularly CDC members and religious 
leaders participated in setting the agenda of what they expect from the NGO, namely 
providing financial resources and a technical design for a protection structure against 
floods. Men tolerated, with some reluctance, that their women attended NGO 
meetings, because men considered this as a NGO condition for getting resources, but 
it is culturally not acceptable to involve women in community decision-making and 
to take their views seriously. ‘Women’s participation’ is subject to discussion and 
debate between male community leaders, community organisers, NGO staff and 
donors, where in this case, the community leaders set the boundaries for when 
women can participate and when not. Additionally, the male community leaders 
framed ‘flood protection’ as the solution, and thereby they created another 
boundary of action by excluding five downstream villages to participate in the risk 
assessment, who would have opposed this solution. In this way, the CBDRR 
intervention maintained the status quo of the upstream, male and powerful actors. 
 
Figure 6.2: Khulm, Balkh province 
    
Risk maps made by women           Female community organisers 
 
   
 Male shura meeting                                           The intake fails to protect villages against floods 
  
Two Afghan NGOs approached the process of community mobilization and risk 
assessment differently, recognizing social and power differentials within and among 
communities. Based on previous experiences with community development in 
southern provinces of Afghanistan, and being familiar with the “do no harm” 
approach, field staff first looked through a conflict lens, exploring interactions and 
relationships among ethnic groups in the area from a historical perspective. In 
Ghoryan, Herat province, the NGO field staff spent energy in understanding the 
history and nature of the disputes in the area, and discussed with the shura how it 
could settle disputes with adjacent villages differently, f.i. through mediation or 
renegotiating institutional arrangements of natural resources, replacing the 
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traditional and at times violent ways of settling disputes. The NGOs invested in 
creating peace shura to enhance mediation skills before the CBDRR intervention 
started, and they were aware of how the CBDRR intervention could be a way to 
lower tensions between social groups. This approach had surprisingly positive and 
promising results, which I discuss in the next chapter. The CBDRR pilot in Ghoryan 
differs from the other pilots in Afghanistan, because the NGO and local leadership 
recognized the broader institutional context of norms, judicial system, governance 
structure and institutions related to allocation of resources. It approached CBDRR 
beyond the village level and was concerned with embedding the risk reduction 
measures in the institutional setting of a weak functioning government. 
 
The NGO operating in Nahreen consciously selected field staff for the CBDRR pilot 
from the communities and not from the NGO. It believed that in this way the skills, 
new insights and experiences remain in the communities after the NGO leaves for 
whatever reason11. The CBDRR pilot-supervisor lives in Nahreen and is a much 
respected person. Several men in the communities allow him to talk and meet with 
their women. The boundaries for women’s participation in community issues are a 
little bit more flexible. Widows and educated women go out in public, but always in 
groups. “We always hide ourselves carefully in burqas to not be recognized easily. We 
are still afraid. Not all men allow their women to go out in public or to attend 
meetings”. The project supervisor, together with the CDC, selected the community 
organisers from the eight sub-villages, representing the three ethnic groups to avoid 
favouritism and internal conflicts. They selected eight men and eight women who 
have a certain degree of education and who are respected by the villagers. They 
received training in CBDRR particularly on disaster preparedness, facilitation and 
mediation skills. These community organisers were supposed to assist the shura in 
disaster risk reduction issues and settling disputes, and additionally to fulfil the role 
of informal leaders to support their fellow community people when needed. The 
community organisers were further tasked to make ordinary men and women in 
their sub-village aware of what to do to reduce disaster risks. When I asked if they 
consciously searched for the most vulnerable households, some women community 
organisers replied that they usually only approach those households in the village 
through the line of kinship and friends, and not necessarily the most vulnerable, 
while a few others told me that they knock on doors of the most vulnerable people 
based on the hazard maps. The initial risk assessment was limited to identifying 
households exposed to flood risk, while an assessment of the broader risk landscape 
needed follow up.  
 
In 2009, Nahreen experienced severe floods after a long period of drought, and the 
community people anticipated the floods by sandbagging and storing valuables, 
while the community organisers applied their early warning and evacuation proce-
dures. When this resulted in no casualties, the people were surprised and realized 
how a systematic ‘software’ approach12 by creating task forces and proper coordina-
                                               
11
 For instance when the security situation worsens like in Uruzgan causing NGO staff to travel undercover, or to 
switch to the ‘distant assistance’ mode.  
12
 In Afghanistan local people and NGOS distinguish ’hardware’ and ‘software’ interventions, referring to 
respectively physical structures and training or organising people. 
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tion could make such a difference. Consequently, these community organisers were 
asked to train shuras in adjacent villages. 
 
Women’s views in Nahreen are taken to the decision-table through the female com-
munity organisers to the project supervisor and their husbands. During one big shura 
meeting I attended, the views and ideas of the women were indeed articulated by 
the men, and put on the agenda for action. Ordinary men and women however, sub-
ordinated to shura members, participated as receivers of information – a warning, 
and what they can do to anticipate floods or earthquakes, but not as active partici-
pants from the start. The nature of participation is shaped by the prevailing norms 
and structures in the locality and differs throughout Afghanistan. 
 
I often asked myself how problematic this is. First of all, it is simply impossible that 
everybody always participates in all activities. Secondly, people may find it unneces-
sary to participate in meetings or groups, when they have other ways to get benefits 
from an intervention. Husseini, field staff in Pati, Central Java, helped me to further 
this topic. After being involved in the CBDRR pilot for five years, he concluded that 
“community-based does not mean that all people in the village need to be involved in 
all the decision-making or attend all meetings. What matters is that the views of the 
different social groups in a village are represented in the village institutions and 
regulations, and beyond”. The women in Nahreen do not visibly participate in the 
male shura meetings but channel their views and ideas through male relatives and 
trusted persons who acknowledge women perspectives. This reminded me of the 
research I did in Nepal (Bruins and Heijmans, 1993), where female household heads 
could not become a member of the water users association, which was based on the 
assumption that women in Nepal do not irrigate. However, they arranged their 
access to irrigation water informally through their sons or directly through the water 
distributor when they met him in their fields. They even found this more convenient 
than wasting their scarce time in meetings.  
 
This implies that the assumption that participation depends on a mobilization pro-
cess, and on a high level involvement of people for their own benefit, does not 
necessarily hold true. What matters more is to recognize that ‘participation’ is 
shaped by the prevailing social norms and values through particular power relations 
which find their expression in village institutions. Village institutions refer to struc-
tures, rules, norms that include/protect/secure the interests of marginalized people 
or not. However, ‘participation’ should always be an issue for discussion, debate, and 
negotiation between shura members, village authorities, marginalized groups and 
NGO field staff to possibly stretch the boundaries for participation and to rework 
social relationships. Especially for widows in Afghanistan without male relatives who 
lack the mechanisms to communicate their interests to decision-makers, and to 
those groups in Indonesia that are excluded from the traditional CBOs like landless 
labourers.  
 
Conducting participatory risk assessments 
Whereas ADPC’s Handbook identifies Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment as a 
distinct step of the CBDRR process, evidence from the field reveals that it is not. 
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Assessing risk became part of the community organiser’s rapport building efforts and 
evolving interactions with different groups in the village. The community organisers 
accumulated risk views and knowledge from different social actors. At a certain 
moment they facilitated an initial risk mapping exercise with one specific CBO to 
allow them to map their risk perspective, without being constrained by other social 
actors. Only in Khulm, risk mapping was done as an explicit step in the CBDRR 
process with as much people as possible, men separately from the women.  
 
Whereas the women in Khulm commented that a risk map was a visualisation of 
what they already knew, in many other localities risk maps were used for very dif-
ferent purposes and were instrumental in community dialogues and mobilizing: (1) 
to present and exchange risk perspectives between different social actors within the 
village to bridge differences and overcome stereotyping like in Sambiroto, (2) to 
enable CBOs to express their risk conditions to authorities, (3) a tool or entry-point 
to engage with local government authorities, (4) to make other communities aware 
(upstream-downstream, adjacent communities) about their specific disaster risk 
conditions; and (4) for planning purposes.  
 
Risk maps – mostly produced by one group - were instrumental in creating under-
standing for differing risk positions, to raise awareness about interconnectedness of 
risk problems in various villages, in the creation of CBO alliances, and to enter 
dialogues and negotiations like in Halmahera. However, the outcomes of dialogues 
and negotiations varied. 
 
      
Figure 6.3 Risk maps made and explained by villagers in various CBDRR-pilot areas 
 
Reviewing the various approaches to participation and involving community people 
in discussions about risk, defining risk and deciding on what to do, it becomes clear 
that in most cases, the most vulnerable groups are not immediately targeted or 
involved, or when they are, like women in Afghanistan, they are not necessarily 
involved in the final risk decision-making. Institutional settings like histories of CBO-
structures, functioning of village organisations and prevailing norms about participa-
tion set the boundaries for who is included and who are excluded in risk assessments, 
risk prioritization and decision-making. Field staff work through these traditional 
structures and institutions for reasons of convenience, routine, or with the intention 
to change institutions and rework power relations in favour of vulnerable, 
marginalized groups.  
 
6.3.3 Community organising and empowerment: with what perspective? 
The fundamental idea behind community organising is to cultivate a sense of poten-
cy and effectiveness in people and in whole villages. Local people are made to be-
lieve that they must actively define their own destiny, and develop their capacity to 
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assert their rights. NGOs frame the purpose of community organising in the field of 
CBDRR differently (Table 6.1), and as a consequence also their organising strategies 
differ. “What do we want to strengthen through the CBDRR approach?” was a 
recurrent question I posed to allow field workers and project staff to reflect on their 
organising process. And “What do we mean by empowerment?”. 
 
Table 6.1 Purpose of CBDRR community organising and empowerment 
Afghanistan Enhance people’s capacity to reduce risks, to make people believe in their own resources to 
become self-reliant, and to overcome aid dependency. 
Central Java, 
Indonesia 
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce immediate risks, to make people conscious about why 
they are at risk and enhance their skills to enter political spaces to negotiate, influence or 
oppose government policies, and to rework government institutions from village to national 
level to make them responsible actors so they seriously implement DRR policies  
Halmahera, 
Indonesia 
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce immediate risks and tensions, and to improve people’s 
livelihoods and economic resources. 
CDRC, 
Philippines 
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce immediate risks, to make people conscious about why 
they are at risk, and enable people to gain access to social and political resources to obtain 
safety and protection from the local to the national level. NGO organises people’s 
organisations and facilitates alliance building between vulnerable and less vulnerable sectors  
 
‘Empowerment’ hides many different meanings and worldviews. ‘Adding power’ and 
‘gaining the ability to undertake activities, to mobilize resources, set one’s agenda, 
and change events’ are among the most common definitions, and are based on the 
traditional interpretation of ‘power’ as an asset (Guijt and Shah, 1998). This way of 
articulating ‘empowerment’ prevailed among most of the NGOs involved in the pilot, 
while in practice they consciously or unconsciously tried to rework institutions and 
facilitate political and social linkages from the grassroots to the national level. Only 
in Afghanistan, CBDRR efforts did not go beyond the district or provincial level. 
 
NGO field staff in Afghanistan organised communities assuming that after the NSP, 
there were no serious attempts anymore to develop the country. They observe a 
declining aid influx, and also the World Bank indicated to no longer invest in the NSP. 
After decades of emergency and charity aid, and currently facing a corrupt, incapable 
government, lack of justice, and a decrease in international aid in secure areas, 
Afghan NGOs view CBDRR as a promising strategy to counteract the ‘aid dependency 
mentality’ through promoting self-reliance.  
 
The NGOs’ narrative on people’s ‘aid dependency mentality’ is very dominant among 
Afghan NGOs referring to the undesirable social behaviour of local people in 
response to aid (Harrell-Bond, 1986). Although individual field staff acknowledged 
that local people have agency, and actively find ways to cope and survive, they start 
talking about their aid dependency mentality, as soon as the NGO starts discussing 
the nature of interventions. NGOs then portray local people as being passive , non-
cooperative and lacking the initiative to solve community problems voluntarily 
without outside support, and therefore local people expect NGOs to provide every-
thing they need. The existence of people’s aid dependency mentality has been 
proven to be a myth based on various research and publications (Harvey and Lind, 
2005; van Dijkhorst, 2011). Referring to the trend of decreasing foreign aid, criticizing 
‘aid dependency’ has become a justification for NGOs to shift from ‘cash for work’ to 
reviving ashar and to view shuras as project managers. 
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The CBDRR agenda aims to revive, rework or systematize traditional local institutions 
like those for dispute settlement, early warning, evacuation, reviving ashar,  
restoring and protecting natural resources, and the functioning of shuras. In a sense, 
NGOs are actually reworking their aid relations with communities, since these NGOs 
will no longer hand-out aid without any contribution from the community in return. 
Ashar should replace ‘cash for work’ or ‘food for work’ for instance, which saves on 
donor funds, but may not always be a realistic option from the community’s perspec-
tive. This has been a hot issue during reflection sessions, and touched on the dilem-
ma of balancing short-term needs versus long-term development strategies. One 
villager in Ghoryan, Herat province, mentioned that he is willing to spend one day of 
community voluntary work, ashar, to support the reforestation effort against sand 
storms, if he can also work one or two days for the World Food Programme which 
pays for his labour in road construction.  
 
Whereas the Afghan NGOs promoted the idea of self-reliance to the selected villages, 
local leaders often resisted this idea. Their interest was getting cash or food for work 
as a short-term gain, even if interventions were not their priority. NGOs tried to con-
vince shuras to invest their labour and resources in activities that are their priority 
and that will last. One field staff in Herat summarized: paying cash for work solves 
the hunger for one day; while using and investing resources in a more structural 
manner will result in durable solutions. These were negotiations that sometimes 
took six to twelve months before CBDRR was accepted by shuras as a legitimate 
intervention. Often shuras agreed with the field staff to revive ashar to invest in 
structural protection measures, but it were the villagers who resisted. Shura mem-
bers were sometimes accused of being corrupt, because villagers argued that all 
NGOs pay, so why not this time? 
 
In Indonesia, community organisers from particularly the NGOs in Central Java, 
proceed from the perspective that the Indonesian government should take its 
responsibility to implement its DRR policy because it signed the Hyogo Framework 
for Action in 2005. Community organising strategies take therefore multiple strate-
gies to rework relations and interactions between different actors for various goals.  
 
The experience from Sambiroto for instance, reveals how community organising 
strategies rework relationships between (1) the fishermen’s group and other 
villagers to improve its image and to enrol more villagers in its efforts to address 
floods, sedimentation and other village problems; (2) between the fishermen group 
and the government at village and district level to address problems of enforcement 
of zoning laws for fishing, sedimentation, and retribution; (3) and most remarkably, 
between Sambiroto as a downstream village and Jrahi, an upland village, blamed by 
Sambiroto for causing flooding and sedimentation.  
 
Box 6.8 Community organising process in Sambiroto to rework relationships with various actors to reduce risk 
 
Inspired by the participatory village mapping practices in barangay Banabe in the Philippines (Box 3.3) – a village 
visited during the CBDRR exchange visit in November 2008 by field staff of NGOs involved in the CBDRR pilot - 
SHEEP’s community organiser Agung facilitated a process of participatory risk mapping in Sambiroto. He 
encouraged fishermen and their wives to look critically at their environment. Priority issues were identified like 
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sedimentation, coastal erosion, enforcement of zoning laws for fishing, garbage disposal, flooding and 
retribution. Then they discussed which issues they can address themselves, and which require government’s 
response at and beyond the village level. They further distinguished between specific fishermen’s problems 
(enforcement of zoning laws for fishing, sedimentation, retribution), and community problems (garbage 
disposal, flooding, coastal erosion).  
 
Reworking relationships at village level 
The fishermen planned a workshop with the village government to present the risk map and to discuss their 
problems, but this workshop never took place because the village authorities were not responsive. Instead the 
fishermen presented their map at different moments to different groups in the village and as a result informa-
tion was added and the analysis improved. The aqua-culturists for instance, experience negative impact from 
river flooding from January till March, and from seawater intrusion due to high waves in May. Additionally, 
villagers adjusted their opinion about the fishermen’s group, since its efforts no longer focused on only ‘fish’ but 
on community concerns as well. Fishermen told me that they are less regarded as ‘trouble makers’. Majority of 
people agreed that flooding and garbage disposal, particularly lots of plastic and glass, are major problems that 
require action. The village leaders remained irresponsive however, despite media coverage about the garbage 
problem. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Reworking relationships with district and provincial government 
Meanwhile, the fishermen’s group tried to get the attention of district and provincial government to get pro-
tection against intruders – large commercial fishing boats - in their fishing zone, to address coastal erosion and 
the issue of retribution. In the past they tried to link up with government departments through the liaison of 
Mohammed Matun or Seroto, but SHEEP encouraged the fishermen to become less dependent on local brokers 
and to link up with other organised fishermen groups in adjacent coastal villages. They joined a fishermen net-
work “Janusapati” with fishermen groups from coastal villages facing similar problems. Through this fishermen 
network they assumed to increase their bargaining capacity to deal with the government. Regarding the retri-
bution issues, the network was successful. Since 2010 the government resumed to pay social funds to fisher-
men in Sambiroto in emergency cases like illness, funeral or accidents. Government’s support to control coastal 
erosion is still very minimal; it provided limited funds to restore mangroves while the fishermen protect and 
monitor the replanted area. The law enforcement regarding fishing zones is still very weak. 
 
Reworking relationships between Sambiroto, a downstream village, and Jrahi, an upstream village 
In 2006 there was a big flash flood along the Tayu river, causing severe damage and some deaths downstream 
in Sambiroto. The villagers from Jrahi went down to offer their help in clearing debris and cleaning roads, but 
what they got were negative comments. They were blamed for irresponsibly cutting trees and mining stones 
from the riverbanks causing landslides, flash floods and sedimentation downstream. Although both 
communities have a history of disliking each other, the people from Jrahi were dazed by these negative 
reactions and accusations.  
 
Like in Sambiroto, SHEEP has a community organiser working with the peasant group in Jrahi. Initially people 
found it either funny to talk about ‘disasters’ because “there are no disasters occurring in Jrahi” or did not want 
to talk about disasters, despite the occurrence of landslides. ‘Disaster language’ was new and the community 
organiser together with some peasant group leaders had to collect comprehensive historical and current data 
on changes in land use, water management and environmental conditions to convince community people and 
authorities about potential disaster risks and the need to address environmental degradation. The risk 
assessment and maps were presented, discussed, corrected, and through discussions and debates, people’s 
awareness about the occurrence, recognition and causes of landslides and floods increased over time.  
 
SHEEP organised a forum inviting both upland and downstream villages including Jrahi and Sambiroto. While 
CBO leaders from Jrahi presented their risk map and explained the condition of the forest, likewise people from 
Sambiroto presented the conditions of the Tayu river downstream and the impact on their livelihoods. Through 
recurrent meetings and discussing causes of vulnerable conditions along the Tayu river from its source to the 
river month, the ‘blaming’ attitude of the fishermen in Sambiroto shifted towards an attitude of understanding 
and respecting the arguments of Jrahi people. Deforestation and mining could not be solely attributed to the 
Jrahi villagers. When people from Jrahi cleared and sold land to farmers from Tayu, near Sambiroto, for casava 
production, also people from other places came to the uplands to illegally cut trees during the financial crisis at 
the end of the 1990s. Risk maps were instrumental in awareness raising, improving and reworking relationships 
among upland and downstream villages, and in creating effective agency for lobby purposes to enhance law 
enforcement against deforestation and c-type mining
13
. 
 
An early warning system has been set-up. When it rains more than two hours in Jrahi, the CBO sends text-
                                               
13
 C-type mining refers to the size of stones that are being mined for construction purposes, i.e. gravel. 
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messages to the CBO in Sambiroto that flood could be expected within three hours. The warning is sent to all 
villagers. Fishermen, when not at sea, evacuate their boats from the parking lot and go to the sea where their 
boats cannot be damaged by the flash floods, while women go with children and belongings to higher places, 
away from the river. Formation of a network of upland and downstream villages along the major rivers running 
from Muria Mountain aims to have a community-based network which can negotiate and lobby government to 
enforce proper land use planning and environmental protection. Particularly the youth is motivated and active. 
 
The Muria Coalition aims to strengthen the bargaining capacity of communities at 
risk in Mount Muria Region. It takes a multi-track approach as practiced in Sambiroto. 
Given the history of CBOs, they cannot be expected to easily perform countervailing 
power within the village and beyond. Yet, ‘strengthening’ here means that communi-
ty organisers use the changing political environment in Indonesia to transform the 
CBOs’ role and to allow them to critically assess their reality that they have taken for 
granted or adjusted to, and act upon their grievances. The community organiser 
evokes from the people their frustrations, their dreams, their needs and limitations. 
It is a way to determine levels of consciousness, to spot potential leaders, to identify 
issues, social relationships and power differences within the village. Then the com-
munity organisers provoke people into thinking and acting upon their reality in direc-
tions they had not previously thought of, they did not feel confident to do this, like in 
Bungu, or they did not know to whom to channel their grievances, like in Sambiroto.  
 
Additionally, NGOs in Central Java have staff that analyse government’s policies and 
regulations affecting DRR including spatial planning, and identify which government 
departments are responsible for the implementation of the respective policies at the 
various institutional levels. This knowledge is used to set out community organising 
strategies – lobby and advocacy - within and beyond village level. In this context, the 
community organiser balances evocative and provocative organising, what I earlier 
called ‘facipulation’ which is manipulation only in the sense that the community 
organiser consciously directs the efforts of the community towards an objectively 
desirable goal that is beneficial to the people (Constatino-David, 1982: 194). 
Community organisers also engage with village government officials and raise their 
awareness on DRR policy and what they should do. In the regular process of govern-
ment’s policy formulation, ordinary people are never involved. The NGOs explore the 
spaces and boundaries of the new political and institutional environment in the 
country supporting CBOs, their alliances and local village government in entering 
new arenas for disaster risk reduction at district, provincial and national level, 
mobilizing people’s effective agency14.  
 
An important precondition for reworking institutions and challenging power 
relations within the village seems to be the ability of field staff to deal with com-
peting risk perceptions, with the silencing of disasters and with opposing village 
authorities. The experiences in Central Java show how relationships between various 
social actors within the village changed from opponents, enemies towards engage-
ment, agony, and even cooperation. These power dynamics illustrated that power is 
actually ‘relational’ and the result of the working of multiple, intertwined institutions 
(Nuijten, 2005). Power has to be constantly performed rather than being possessed 
                                               
14
 Chapter 7 will elaborate on how CBOs, their alliances and local village government in entering new arenas for 
disaster risk reduction at district, provincial and national level.  
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(Foucault, 1980). Consequently ‘empowerment’ could be articulated as ‘a reworking 
of social relationships and institutions in a way that favours the vulnerable segments 
of society’. Reworking social relations occurs among various actors at different levels: 
between men and women, among ethnic groups, between village elite and 
marginalized sectors, or between villagers and aid providers. Based on evidence from 
the field, the assumption that ‘strengthening people’s existing capacities’ contributes 
to sustainable risk reduction and to processes of empowerment – as stated at the 
beginning of this chapter – is questionable. Social relations and institutions continu-
ously change, people migrate, CBO and village leaders come and go, and the inter-
actions between them remain a constant power-play. Therefore I would replace 
‘strengthening people’s existing capacities’ with‘ reworking people’s existing social 
relationships and institutions’.  
 
For this purpose, community organisers need to deal with both vulnerable groups 
and village elite and authorities. It is impossible to take a ‘neutral’ stance - like NGO 
managers often espouse vis-a-vis donors, to construct the image of not being part of 
local politics. Evidence from the field shows that it is crucial for field staff to take an 
‘impartial’ position. Impartiality means, that field staff recognizes and acknowledges 
the different and competing risk perceptions in the community taking a historical, 
social and institutional perspective, and that (s)he facipulates the CBDRR process to-
wards a desirable goal that is beneficial to at least the most vulnerable social actors.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
The distinct steps of the CBDRR step by step model seldom happen in a sequential 
order, but run simultaneously, back-and-forth, or they never reach a next step. Doing 
CBDRR and its consequent process is rather unpredictable and can be viewed as an 
arena in which actors socially negotiate over access to resources, positions and 
power. Local people resist, hesitate, ignore or take advantage of the presence of an 
outsider in a way that was not intended. It happened that selected communities 
were abandoned and replaced by others in case conflict occurred, the CBDRR 
process did not proceed as expected, or when available financial resources were 
reduced. The step-by-step model rather reminds practitioners to be conscious about 
the nature of relationships and interactions among the various actors involved in 
CBDRR than that it steers the process of community organising to reach the intended 
CBDRR objectives.  
 
All field staff agrees that local realities require a creative and flexible approach to 
community organising, but certain elements or patterns do keep coming back in how 
NGOs select, enter and organise communities: “organising is about routinization – 
developing known and predictable ways of dealing with events” (Colebatch, 1998: 
46). The Afghan NGOs developed their own CBDRR step-by-step model to be more 
conscious about the nature of relationships and interactions among actors (Box 6.9). 
Since CBDRR-practice is new for these NGOs I view the eagerness to develop their 
context specific CBDRR-models as part of their sense-making process of new 
experiences, and to be able to share these experiences with others. The CBDRR step-
by-step model in Box 6.9 is the result of a reflection workshop with the local partners 
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of Oxfam-Novib15, and which largely resonates with the approach followed by the 
ICCO-partner in Herat province16. 
 
Box 6.9:  CBDRR step by step model developed  by NGOs in Afghanistan 
 
(1) Review provincial data on frequency of hazards, localities of high vulnerabilities, and least aid provisions. 
(2) Apply the Do no Harm approach during the process of selecting communities before strategizing 
interventions. It is crucial to know who and what the connectors or dividers are, with the aim to estimate 
the risk for being co-opted by dividers. 
(3) Use appropriate channels to enter the community. Usually the CDC or shura. Courtesy calls to powerful 
persons in the area are crucial, but getting their permission alone will not be sufficient to rule out power 
dynamics. Hence, next point.  
(4) Since local contexts are complex and interests among groups differ, it is important to first understand these 
contexts in terms of history, power dynamics, past and current conflicts. Initial mediation among diversity of 
groups and transferring these skills to local authorities is important before talking about disaster risks. This 
will minimize obstruction and accusations of providing aid in a biased way.  
(5) Depending on issue and whether disaster cause tensions/conflict, relationships that matter are identified 
and institutions renegotiated through special created groups/councils or committees that are related to 
male shura, or cluster-CDCs (depending on the level of where authority is required).  
(6)  Start confidence building process through risk assessment process and with identifying possible solutions 
which benefit the majority of people (balance short-term benefits with long-term structural development 
efforts). There are a variety of ways to involve people in this process. 
(7)  Use Koran texts and mullahs to enhance cooperation among diverse social groups, and to 
influence/challenge prevailing gender norms.   
(8)  Gather or approach ordinary people individually, to raise and increase their awareness on the issues at 
stake and that are of common interest. 
 
In Central Java, similar attempts happened to articulate its context-specific multi-
track approach to community organising: (1) selecting high risk upstream and 
downstream villages taking a watershed approach; (2) exploring social relationships 
and interactions within the villages and beyond (3) strengthening the CBO and 
facilitate interaction among opposing groups using risk maps as an instrument for 
dialogues, (4) facilitation of sectoral CBO networking, (5) issue-based networking 
among CBOs facing same or related risks (6) enabling village, district, provincial 
government to draw regulations that represent the interests of the CBO/vulnerable 
groups. 
 
The process of selecting, entering and organising communities is by its very nature 
an externally driven process. The community organiser has own ambitions, motiva-
tions, preferences and affiliations with certain groups in the community and with the 
larger NGO agenda. The organised part of the community – CBO or shura - can play 
an instrumental role in this agenda. It depends on the actors entering the arena - 
joining, opposing, co-opting or changing the NGOs’ agenda - how the CBDRR-inter-
vention gets shape and whose agenda will be met. Some cases showed how CBDRR-
interventions – promoting ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ - opened space for 
influential actors to get their plans realised while it closed down options, ambitions 
and political agency of others (Long, 2003; Cleaver, 1999).  
 
Conclusions on selecting communities 
The experiences in community selection show that looking for the most vulnerable, 
marginalized, and at risk communities is not the only concern of NGOs and donors. 
                                               
15
 Reflection and sense-making occurred from 16 April – 2 May, 2008 
16
 An exchange between local partners of ICCO and Oxfam-Novib occurred in May 2009. 
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Strategic arguments – geographically, accessibility, feasibility – both financially and in 
terms of political gains - play a big role in the selection. Even in Afghanistan, the 
NGOs select those villages where they expect the least trouble with warlords, 
commanders or corrupt village leaders. This is not because Afghan NGOs want to 
avoid working in insecure areas, but because they intend to adhere to the ‘do no 
harm’ principle. That is why they choose so-called ‘safe areas of intervention’ with 
fewer chances to be co-opted and more chance of success. CBDRR practice shows 
however, that this mode of selection does not guarantee this success. Once field 
staff enter the villages, many of the assumptions turn out to be wrong.  
 
In terms of who decides which community to select for the CBDRR pilots, I conclude 
that this varied. Local partners selected the majority of the communities, while in 
Halmahera the arguments of I&K were decisive. I&K further played a prominent role 
in determining the provinces or regions in Afghanistan where local partners could 
select communities. The selection criteria were set by the Steering Group, and it 
checked whether the selected villages complied with the criteria. In this sense, I&K’s 
role was influential. 
 
Conclusion on entering the community 
Entering villages either happens through informal contacts that have relatives in a 
village or through formal courtesy visits to authorities. How a community organiser 
enters the village and with whom (s)he engages is steered by the NGO’s agenda and 
assumptions about how change happens. When community organisers are aware of 
local power dynamics like in Bungu, creative ways to engage and mobilize people 
become a strategy to address power differentials. However, when this awareness is 
low, community organisers may become an instrument of local elite to fulfil their 
agenda, like in Khulm and Birinoa. In these instances, the CBDRR process did not 
evolve as expected, and the NGO found itself increasingly caught in the web of local 
politics. NGOs and community organisers tend to assume that a ‘community’ has a 
defined space with clear boundaries, that it is heterogeneous but undivided. The 
cases suggest that we should approach ‘community-based’ as looking for social 
interactions first, followed later by drawing territorial boundaries and reworking 
local institutional arrangements for dispute settlement, protection and risk reduction 
within and beyond village level. This is only possible when the community organiser 
took an impartial position to maintain credibility and legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion on community organising and conducting risk assessments 
Awareness raising of disaster risks and identification of disaster preparedness 
measures is often a first step before community organisers go into deeper risk 
analysis and more structural long-term strategizing. Reasons are manifold. Focusing 
on disaster risk is concrete, most people can relate to the topic, have negative 
experiences with disasters, and therefore disaster preparedness often makes a big 
impact without lots of financial investments. For NGO field staff that are not familiar 
with CBDRR, a focus on disaster preparedness seems the first step to grasp the 
approach and to have a legitimate presence in the village.  
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Later on, through progressive on-going risk analysis and reflections, NGO staff, com-
munity organisers and CBO leaders realized, that to address issues concerned with 
watershed management, flood mitigation, land rights, water rights or spatial plan-
ning, village institutions do not operate at the appropriate scale. They recognized the 
importance of consciously entering the ‘political arena’ to negotiate and struggle for 
their risk solutions with the government who is expected to create enabling political 
and legislative environments. However, only in Central Java and in Herat the local 
NGOs acted accordingly, while local partners elsewhere did not.  
 
Entering the political arena requires the mobilization of CBOs of other villages facing 
similar challenges, and the support of other civil society organisations like NGOs, 
lawyers, human rights groups, or environmentalist. Jampi Sawan is such an alliance 
in Central Java - like UGNAYAN is in Central Luzon, Philippines (Chapter 3). Such 
alliances aim to benefit local communities, but they also serve NGO agendas to 
strengthen and expand a political support base to influence and challenge govern-
ment policies and practices. In Herat, Afghanistan, such alliances did not emerge. 
Ordinary people and shura leaders instead focused on the reworking and revival of 
social and institutional arrangements to encourage forms of cooperation, to manage 
common resources and solving disputes aimed to strengthen livelihoods and their 
ability to respond promptly and flexibly to local-specific circumstances and stresses. 
The cases of Central Java and Herat are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, which 
focuses on the everyday politics of CBDRR practice. 
 
Most NGOs assumed that the process of entering and organising the community 
would take six months to one year, followed by implementation of risk reduction 
measures. However, this assumption turned out to be wrong. Community organising 
turned out to be a continuing effort. Most community organisers needed to find a 
balance between enabling local vulnerable people to affect change towards reducing 
risk and creating safer communities, while simultaneously trying to avoid open con-
flict, and resisting the reproduction of structures and practices that serve to oppress 
subgroups in the community (Allen, 2006). The community organisers found them-
selves in a continuous struggle between the various actors involved in CBDRR over 
alternative ideas, solutions, ways of doing things, and values, to which I refer as the 
everyday politics. The community organising process is unpredictable, time-con-
suming, often beyond the project time-boundaries, and highly political. Despite the 
conscious efforts of this CBDRR pilot to reach the most vulnerable groups in a village 
through creative, flexible and context-specific approaches, the benefits still seem to 
drift towards elites. This means that the elite forces are strong, and that it is difficult 
for CBOs and NGOs to withstand these pressures, unless NGOs and CBOs decide to 
expand their view of the political arena beyond village level.  
 
6.5 What do these experiences and practices mean for CBDRR concepts? 
In this section I will revisit some of the definitions and meanings of concepts that 
make up CBDRR like community, community-based, participation and empowerment. 
I set out the  meaning of these concepts as they emerged from the experiences in 
the field and from the sense-making process afterwards.  
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A social, territorial and institutional conceptualization of community 
Community is a term that has many meanings ranging from a specific geographic 
area or administrative unit to a collective with common socio-cultural or even econo-
mic bonds and relations (Marsh and Buckle, 2001). ‘Community’ as the prefix in the 
CBDRR approach promoted by the UNISDR refers the lowest administrative unit of 
the government17 (UNISDR, 2004), whereas ‘community’ used by CDRN in the 
Philippines refers to a social entity: the most vulnerable groups within a village 
(Chapter 3). However, communities are not necessarily clearly bounded social or 
geographic units, nor do they solely refer to homogeneous groups with shared 
interests. There is no universally shared concept of ‘community’, only particular 
specifications that overlap, complement or contradict (Young, 1990). What the 
definitions have in common is that all use some combinations of space, people and 
social interactions (Kumar, 2005). When NGOs in Afghanistan and Indonesia selected 
communities, they assumed that they function politically, are socially heterogeneous 
but undivided, and have clear geographic boundaries. These assumptions turned out 
being problematic. A key problem was identifying the boundaries of the community: 
where do they begin and end, what form do boundaries take – spatial, social, ethnic, 
authority? Who is inside and who is outside ‘community’ boundaries? (Guijt and 
Shah, 1998: 8; Kumar, 2005: 282). “The term ‘community’ hides a great deal of 
complexity” (Coombes, 2007: 62). 
 
Evidence from the field shows the overlapping, shifting and subjective nature of 
‘communities’ and the permeability of boundaries. Local people view ‘community’ 
first of all as social entities, political and religious affiliations, or descendants of 
particular ancestors which put social boundaries. Secondly, people refer to ‘com-
munity’ as the specific community structures and regulations like shura, ashar, 
gotong royong, adat, or BPD which have to do with managing and regulating how 
different social entities relate to one another, what their community responsibilities 
are and the management of resources like land, forests and water setting geographi-
cally and territorial boundaries. These two views together link people and their 
interactions with space.     
 
Experiences from the CBDRR pilot areas reveal the need to take a multi-dimensional 
approach to the notion of ‘community’. When entering the community, the NGOs 
discovered the importance to first look into the relationships and interactions be-
tween social actors that matter, taking a systemic approach within and beyond 
village level. These interactions, relationships and power differentials are shaped by 
the prevailing local institutions and their histories, like gender norms, regulations for 
water distribution, access to land and forest resources, how space can be used and 
by whom, the handling of disputes, or efforts for social protection against disaster 
risks. These institutions are not static but can change as a result of conflict or 
disasters outcomes, and how people respond to these changes. In sum, community is 
a social construction that links social actors to local institutions and their histories, 
with authority and space. 
 
 
                                               
17
 See Chapter 4. 
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‘Community-based’ 
In line with the revisited definition of ‘community’, the notion of ‘Community-based’ 
refers to the efforts of field staff to acknowledge the risk perspectives and interests 
of different social groups and their power-plays in a community, and to get these 
represented or included in village institutions and regulations within the village and 
beyond - through negotiation, debate and struggle - taking a multi-dimensional 
approach to ‘community’. Local institutions cannot be isolated from the broader 
institutional context. ‘Community’ in community-based is complex because social 
systems are multi-scale, and therefore CBDRR interventions should not be limited to 
the pragmatic territorial boundaries of singular villages as often practiced by NGOs 
but be expanded to the multiple institutional levels in society. ‘Community-based’ 
refers to a multi-scale, social and institutional system beyond the village level to 
negotiate and demand risk solutions steered by disaster and conflict affected people. 
 
‘Participation’ as a negotiated value 
Community-based approaches are often labelled as being participatory without a 
clear description of what ‘participatory’ means. It is often used in a normative way, 
meaning that participation is assumed to be ‘good’ and ‘empowering’. However, 
‘participation’ means various things for various actors and conceals divergent views 
on its aim and practice (Guijt and Shah, 1998). Pretty’s typology of participation 
identifies different types of participation in terms of varying degrees of people’s role 
or ability to influence decision-making over an intervention and resources offered by 
‘initiators’ like project staff, planners or researchers (Pretty et all, 1995). Discussions 
on the participation typology with field staff concluded that most of their practices 
of participation tend to be instrumental – they interpret participation in terms of 
providing data, consultation, providing labour as mechanisms for reducing financial 
costs or prolonging sustainability to generate local ownership. Alternative practices 
of participation aimed to develop people’s self-confidence and ability to mobilize 
others to challenge prevailing power differentials were practiced at a later stage 
particularly in Central Java.  
 
Discussions on the participation typology with field staff in Afghanistan revealed that 
the local political context and the prevailing norms around ‘participation’ influence 
what form and intensity of participation is feasible or acceptable, and who is allowed 
to participate and who isn’t. Participation is ultimately about power and control 
(Cornwall, 2008). Pretty’s typology is a useful tool to uncover conflicting ideas among 
actors about why ‘participation’ is used and who should be involved. In Afghanistan, 
the notion of ‘participation’, involving ‘common village people’ in discussing commu-
nity matters, or listening to what women have to say, is in many places considered 
irrelevant, not accepted, since community decisions are usually taken by the elders, 
those with some education, religious leaders, or the elite, but all male. I realised that 
‘participation’ therefore is a negotiated value, subject for discussion and debate 
among actors involved in CBDRR. This is not restricted to the Afghan context, but 
actually applicable in any context. ‘Participation’ constitutes a terrain of contestation, 
“in which relations of power between different actors, each with their own ‘projects’, 
shape and reshape boundaries of action” (Cornwall, 2008: 276).  
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‘Empowerment’- the transformative aspect of CBDRR 
Disasters, conflicts, their impact and responses create opportunities for social 
change. For whom and in what way depend on many factors. In Chapter 1, I pre-
sented a prevailing definition of ‘empowerment’ as ‘changing power relations in 
favour of marginalized excluded groups in society’. This is a very general definition. 
The empirical findings showed that the extent to which risk reduction measures 
benefitted the marginalized, vulnerable groups related to the ability of field staff to 
remain a legitimate and credible actor in the eyes of different social actors, and to 
look beyond the existing institutions around which people organise themselves, like 
shura and CBOs. These field staff interacted with a diversity of actors involving 
relationships varying from harmonious, cooperative to antagonistic and intimidation. 
Through tactical and strategic approaches to community organising, oppositional or 
antagonistic relationships among villagers, between authorities and villagers, 
between civil-society groups and government, and between men and women, 
changed and in several instances improved. Instead of targeting, searching and 
working with the most vulnerable groups – as often espoused in CBDRR literature - 
field staff engaged with the vulnerable groups, and with village elite, and with village 
authorities. I have been referring to this as ‘impartiality’. 
 
‘Impartiality’ has various meanings. In the field of humanitarian aid ‘impartiality’ 
means that response should be guided by human needs alone, rather than political 
or any other criteria (Leader, 2000). This implies that aid providers do not interfere in 
a conflict but provide assistance to those people most in need. In the field of peace 
building ‘impartiality’ refers to the performance of a mediator or peace builder in 
order to build trust. It is found crucial that all parties feel fully respected as equal 
human beings, and that one group does not receive more attention than another 
(Patfoort, 2001: 462). In the context of the CBDRR pilots, the interventions aimed to 
respond to people’s needs before, during and after disasters, to reduce risks and 
tensions. In this context I prefer a politically sensitive meaning of ‘impartiality’: the 
ability of field staff to bring opposing actors together without having personal 
prejudices or preconceptions of the actors, in order to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the actors’ needs (Vaux, 2001: 5). This means understanding the 
actors’ needs within their full social and political context, and seeing the connections 
and power relationships between them. “Impartiality means distinguishing one 
person from the next, and being aware that many people have an interest in the 
vulnerability of others” (Vaux, 2001: 20). The community organisers in Sambiroto and 
Bungu, for instance, focused on connections and interests of the various actors, and 
carefully managed to bring opposing groups on speaking terms, without explicitly 
taking a preconceived position. 
 
Acknowledging competing risk perspectives, seeing connections and understanding 
power relations between actors, between villages, CBOs and with the government, 
matters to rework social relations aimed to reduce risk and people’s vulnerability. I 
therefore define ‘empowerment’ here as ‘challenging and reworking of social 
relationships among differing social actors and institutions in a way that risk 
solutions favour the marginalized vulnerable segments of society’.  
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7.                     The everyday politics of CBDRR practice 
 
“The simplistic assumption that better access to local perspectives will ensure that program decisions 
are more participatory is only too obviously blind to the institutional realities” 
 Mosse, 2005: 99 
 
 
Many aid organizations operate with limited interpretations of CBDRR. They focus on 
addressing problems at ‘the local level’, and address ‘risk reduction’ in aspects that are sus-
ceptible to technical solutions (Cannon, 2000). The social, economic and political origins of 
disaster vulnerability and the political nature of disaster risk reduction are often ignored 
(Bender, 1999; Blaikie et al, 1994). CBDRR aims to build resilient communities and to im-
prove the position of vulnerable, marginalized people. The preceding chapter concluded 
that despite the conscious efforts of the CBDRR pilot to reach the most vulnerable groups in 
a village through creative, flexible and context-specific approaches, the benefits still seem to 
drift towards village elites. This means that elite forces are strong, and that withstanding 
these pressures is difficult for CBOs and vulnerable groups, and for the NGOs which claim to 
support the latter. I further concluded that for addressing people’s vulnerabilities, - parti-
cularly people’s social and political vulnerability - village institutions do not operate at the 
appropriate scale to address issues concerned with flood mitigation, watershed manage-
ment to reduce flash flood and drought, land and water rights, or spatial planning. There-
fore, local people and NGOs realize that they need to engage – in one way or another - with 
the broader institutional context of norms, traditions, the judiciary system and policies, the 
governance structure and institutions related to the allocation of resources, and understand 
how these play out locally through village institutions (Jütting, 2003). Local people and 
NGOs need to consciously enter the ‘political arena’ to negotiate and struggle for their risk 
solutions. How to do this is not part of ADPC’s CBDRR step-by-step model, which views 
CBDRR as a project isolated from its broader institutional context. 
 
This chapter examines how local people and NGOs implement their CBDRR plans – step 6 
and 7 of the CBDRR step-by-step model - by entering ‘the political arena’ to realize their risk 
solutions in conflict settings. The political arena of disaster risk reduction considers the 
many conceptualizations of politics, ranging from state politics to the everyday politics of all 
human interaction (Kerkvliet, 1991). Evidence from Afghanistan and Indonesia shows that 
risk reduction measures locally are not just shaped and decided upon by local actors. Rules, 
decisions and policies are made at every level in society and in all organizations, and there-
fore politics is not limited to those officially elected in governments and parliaments 
(Kerkvliet, 1991). Olson (2000) refers to politics as how actors frame and explain disaster 
events, questioning who can be held responsible, and how resources are allocated to whom, 
where and for what after disasters hit. Many disaster risk reduction measures - like for in-
stance construction of evacuation centres and dikes, river normalization and reforestation – 
generate resource contests and land claims, and require spatial re-ordering. This makes 
disaster risk reduction political. 
 
A CBDRR intervention is not just a negotiated outcome of social practices and political 
struggles about critical resources. People’s motives, interests, norms and views on how 
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change happens are also contested and debated, which influences how risk reduction 
measures are put into practice, and determines who benefits and who does not (after Long 
and van der Ploeg, 1989). Research findings show how local villagers struggle to put their 
risk-problem on the government’s agenda, and how government officials try to get support 
for their definition of reality. The broader institutional context in which district governors, 
line departments, civil society organisations, and (I)NGOs push their agendas as well, play 
their role in determining which risk reduction measures are implemented where and how, 
and whose risks are not. Risk is often not reduced but redistributed to poorer, marginalized 
and socially excluded segments of society (Lebel et al, 2006). By looking for politics in the 
everyday life of disaster and conflict affected people, I aim to uncover some of the com-
plexities and the political nature of disaster risk reduction practice. The implication for aid 
agencies is that they should invest considerable time and effort to find out who cooperates 
and who opposes particular risk reduction measures and why, and to deal with these power 
plays in such a way that marginal groups could succeed in their demands for protection and 
safety.   
 
Interventions as distinct entities do not exist, since they are always part of a chain of events 
in the broader institutional environment, which influences current intervention dynamics 
(Long, 2001: 32). I discuss several cases of intervention processes in Central Java beyond the 
time-bound CBDRR projects through analysing the everyday politics of DRR from the per-
spective of villagers, civil society organisations, village authorities and district government. 
They all struggle to get support for their definition of reality. I visited the area once or twice 
a year during a time-span of five years from 2006 until 2011 and followed the different 
actors to discover certain patterns, interactions and contradictions between them. Two MSc 
students spent four months in the area during 2010 to conduct in-depth research into nego-
tiation processes of two DRR interventions. Reflecting on CBDRR-interventions as a political 
arena, released a lot of energy and recognition among NGO staff, and reduced the tempta-
tion to construct success stories to me. Additionally, I briefly discuss intervention processes 
in Herat province, Western Afghanistan, where local people successfully got cooperation 
and legitimacy from district and provincial authorities for their efforts to reduce the nega-
tive impact of sandstorms, while the risk priorities set by their women – drug addiction and 
health problems - faced a lot of obstacles locally and were even denied by government 
authorities. Due to increased security problems, I could not visit these villages myself and 
relied on discussions with villagers whom I met in Herat city, on critical reflection sessions 
with representatives of the CBDRR committees from the villages and the NGO project team, 
and on research papers of others to validate my interpretations and to fill the gaps1. The 
reason to include this case, is to make sense of the meaning of CBDRR approaches in conflict 
settings and in contexts where government is weak, contested or absent, but where despite 
these constraints, local people succeeded in creating new governance arrangements to get 
(limited) access to social and political resources. It is the aim of this CBDRR-pilot to enhance 
the aid responsiveness to communities, and this includes communities that have become 
inaccessible for foreigners due to ISAF-Taliban encounters, but that are still, although with 
security risk, accessible for Afghan aid workers. 
                                               
1  Doing research in a ‘remote sense’ mode faces lots of weaknesses like limited triangulation, the danger of promoting the 
stories of the shura while suppressing others, no access to observe local dynamics and interactions, and high reliance on 
second hand data. Yet, this is also the reality of aid practice of Afghan NGOs and their donors. 
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7.1. Prioritizing risk: whose risk? 
Previous chapters concluded that a diversity of risk perceptions exists about the same risk 
event. Field cases revealed that specific actors are in a better position to articulate their risk 
constructs and mobilize people and organizations than others, which closely relates to local 
institutional settings. These local institutional settings largely determine how social and po-
litical vulnerability to disasters and conflict plays out locally: two communities in Bamyan 
with apparently similar environmental conditions and exposure to floods and avalanches, 
experience the impact of these disasters very differently which can be largely attributed to a 
variation in the functioning of shuras, rivalry between commanders, practice of ashar, rules 
and practice of water and land allocation, and social protection. The previous chapter 
revealed that even when NGO field staff explores the divergent risk perceptions of different 
social groups in a village, that this is not a guarantee that these perceptions are brought to 
the decision-table where people will decide about which and whose risk to prioritize. Risk 
perceptions of women, landless people, and migrants tend to evaporate in the risk assess-
ment process as community organizers, sometimes pushed by village authorities, frame risk 
problems in terms of ‘serving the common good’ focussing on shared values and common 
interests to avoid conflict.  
 
There are exceptions, though, where CSOs try to influence processes of ‘risk’ negotiation 
between social actors to get a risk-problem of marginalized groups recognized or to resist 
elite capture. This happened in Kasiyan, Central Java, where particularly landless settlers 
experience negative impact of floods. They wanted a proper evacuation site within the 
village, instead of traveling and staying far away with their relatives. Their risk problem was 
initially ignored by the NGO, because landless settlers and migrant workers are not orga-
nized in the traditional CBOs, and therefore remained invisible for the NGO. It was the 
Serikat Petani Pati (SPP), the Pati Farmers Union, which brought this forgotten group’s risk 
problem to the attention of the NGO, and simultaneously integrated this group in its own 
political agenda to negotiate with the government flood mitigation measures and to resist 
the land claim of a cement factory in the area for limestone mining. While the case of the 
evacuation centre in Kasiyan is central to the analysis, it should be seen in a broader frame-
work of former and existing chains of events and negotiation processes between villagers, 
CBOs, CSO alliances and government officials.  
 
The case from Herat province focuses on how district and provincial government recognize 
and support the male-defined risk problem of sandstorms, while it completely denied the 
women’s interrelated risk problems of opium addiction, health and domestic violence. The 
women wanted a safe house, a place to find social protection. Although women in 
Afghanistan have limited access to the state, markets and civil society organizations, their 
exposure to education, health and other social welfare services while staying in refugee 
camps abroad, made some of them decide to take on civil society work and to support 
disadvantaged women in their villages of origin. This background, in combination with the 
presence of an active female NGO field staff, improved their bargaining position towards 
men. Initially, they got the support from the male shuras until a piece of land had to be 
allocated for the ‘women’s resource centre’ as they framed it to get it accepted. The start of 
the construction work occurred at a time of increasing Taliban influence in the province, and 
that NGO staff received death threats probably related to the NGO’s promotion of saffron 
production to replace poppy. A women’s resource centre could become a target as well. 
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Despite all these constraints, two women resource centres were constructed and 
inaugurated in November 2011. 
 
7.1.1 The construction of a permanent evacuation centre in Kasiyan, Sukolilo subdistrict 
In February 2006 Juwana River overflowed and inundated 36 villages in 7 sub-districts in Pati 
district including 5,657 hectares of ready-to-harvest paddy fields. The harvest failed since 
the rice was submerged for several months. The Pati Farmers Union (SPP) submitted an 
emergency appeal through SHEEP to Kerkinactie, despite local risk narratives that people 
are used to live with the floods which occur frequently. “Floods are part of our normal life” 
as one SPP leader told me when I met him for the first time in September 2006. People in 
the area have developed coping strategies to deal with floods combining farming with fish-
ing. In the lower parts of the area, where houses get flooded, people lift their belongings, 
make a floating kitchen of banana stems or move to the first floor if possible. When water 
levels rise further, they practice family-wise evacuation strategies using boats, and stay with 
relatives on higher grounds. Since 2003 people who can afford it, started to elevate their 
houses, and also mosques or community halls are assigned as evacuation centre when 
needs arise. People help each other to evacuate livestock. So, when floods are part of 
people’s normal life, why then did SPP-SHEEP submit an emergency and recovery appeal to 
a Dutch donor?  
 
SPP-SHEEP uses emergency relief as an entry-point for community organizing. SPP views 
disasters as a political opportunity to rework CBOs’ orientation to become critical monitors 
of government’s performance and policies. SPP is a farmers’ organization consisting of small 
and middle farmers who own their land (88% has less than 1 ha)2. SPP is a so-called new 
farmers’ movement where farmers as producers are trapped in global markets which are 
beyond their control in contrast to traditional peasant movements which are based on a 
struggle for land rights and land reforms (Chasan3, 2005). SPP initially challenged the 
national government’s policies like the rice market liberalization – pushed by the IMF and 
the World Bank - that lowered rice prices, raising problems for the farmers in Pati. But in-
creasingly, they face failed harvests due to floods which they attribute to sedimentation of 
Juwana River, and therefore SPP included flood mitigation in its lobby and advocacy agenda. 
SPP focuses on policy advocacy activities through demonstrations, alliance building, opinion 
building and negotiation. It aims to build a broad support base to have a better bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the government regarding farmer’s concerns like the demand for flood 
mitigation through river normalization.  
 
SPP selected six villages, among others, Kasiyan for emergency assistance because it was 
worst affected by floods due to its low location causing floodwater to stay for four months. 
SPP has only five members here out of 98 households which is very few. 70% of the 
inhabitants are not even farmers but settlers from various districts, who came to Kasiyan in 
1985 through a government resettlement programme. They mainly work as day-labourers 
on farms of others, like for SPP members. During floods, they lose these livelihood options 
and particularly the youth leave the village in search for work, while others rely on humani-
tarian aid or they borrow money to buy food. Women told me they feel ashamed to rely on 
humanitarian aid and to evacuate to stay with relatives. The local mosque serves as evacua-
                                               
2
 Source is Agriculture Census BPS Pati 2003 presented in Chasan’s report (2005: 21) 
3 Chasan is a former staff of SHEEP who completed his masters on SPP at the ISS in The Hague in 2005. 
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tion centre as well, but it is small, crowded and people find the combination of evacuation 
with praying not very appropriate. However, when floods suddenly occur during the night, 
the mosque is the first place to go for safety. This group of landless day-labourers and their 
families do not view SPP as an immediately relevant organization for them, but appreciate 
the food support. SHEEP did not identify these landless migrants as target for relief or the 
CBDRR-pilot, since they are not the usual members of SSP or of the traditional CBOs who are 
predominantly farmers, and as a result remained invisible. 
 
A motive for SPP to render support to Kasiyan beyond this emergency period is related to a 
decision of the government to allow a cement factory in Sukolilo to convert 1400 ha of 
paddy fields and villages into a mining area (limestone and clay) without the consultation 
and consent of 8500 households in affected villages, including part of Kasiyan. The most 
active supporters and members of SPP are from Sukolilo, and they regard this threat of dis-
placement as an attack on their roots and identity. Nobody has an official land certificate to 
prove landownership, but they share the understanding that land cannot be sold to 
outsiders. Many SPP members from Sukolilo belong to the Samin community4, who share a 
strong collective identity of farm workers, rice producers and have a sense of “we-ness” 
because of a feeling of being excluded by the political system (Chasan, 2005 and own inter-
views). “The “we-ness” feeling”, according to one SPP leader, “can be traced back to colonial 
times, when our ancestors resisted paying tax to the Dutch colonizers”. “Sukolilo people are 
known as tough people”, “village heads label us as rebels” – according to some female SPP 
members. These women became active since 2008 during the protests against the lime-
stone mining and arrival of a cement factory, to provide SPP with a friendlier image to 
government officials, particularly to ease negotiations with the district governor who is a 
woman5. It is possible that this shared identity is rather a construction of an ‘imagined 
community’ of people being excluded, than that it is based on actual historical facts. Also 
the settlers felt deceived and excluded when the government did not provide them farm 
land in 1985 but just a housing lot in Kasiyan. SPP, in its organizing work, effectively con-
structed a collective identity and collective enemy to mobilize and organize social action and 
resistance to government’s decisions and policies that are framed as unjust. Most probably, 
SPP supported Kasiyan with the construction of the evacuation centre since it hoped to gain 
political support in negotiation processes to oppose the cement factory and limestone 
mining. Agus, a landless settler from Demak and youth leader, became SPP member during 
the construction of the evacuation centre because he regarded SPP as “people who think 
with you how to best solve your problems”. SPP emphasizes and convinces people that 
despite their marginalization they have agency, a role to play in their own ‘inclusion’, 
referring to social solidarity, cohesion or moral bonds of rights and obligations that knit 
them together (Daly and Silver, 2008). 
 
Early 2006, SPP leaders observed the poor quality of the evacuation site at the mosque, and 
thought that this could be improved. SPP approached SHEEP to meet with those people in 
Kasiyan who need to evacuate during flood seasons, and to discuss their priorities. People 
prioritized a proper spacious evacuation site and clean drinking water on short term, while 
                                               
4
  Samin community is an indigenous community living in some places in East and Central Java. They practice their own 
belief inherited from their leader Samin Surosentiko.  
5
  Interview with women in secret location in Pati district in March 2009 when protests against the cement factory turned 
violent. 
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mentioning ‘river normalization’ as the structural solution to flooding. The latter is however 
a slow and long-term effort, while floods occur again early next year. An evacuation shelter 
has immediate benefits and could be used for multiple purposes. No clear plan existed and 
hardly resources – it wasn’t included in the emergency and recovery appeal nor in the first 
CBDRR intervention -, but given the urgency, it was decided to start with the construction of 
an elevated floor of 2 meters and a surface of 10 x 20 m². People offered labour through 
gotong royong, voluntary community labour, food for the workers, sand and stones, while 
SHEEP provided cement.  
 
Construction was not yet completed when floods occurred again early 2007. 74 people fled 
to the unfinished construction site using plastic sheets to protect them from wind and rain. 
By the end of 2007 the evacuation centre got a roof of iron sheets provided by the district 
vice-governor who visited Kasiyan on the invitation of SHEEP, and after seeing the floor she 
decided to donate 20 million Rupiah6. That time sanitation facilities were still lacking. During 
the floods of early 2009, the evacuation centre was full again with families, but to stay there 
was still not comfortable. People approached SHEEP to correct the construction to make the 
roof safer, to build walls to replace the plastic sheets and to finish the latrines. This time 
SHEEP included the materials and a few skilled labour into the CBDRR pilot budget, enabling 
the completion of the evacuation centre, which is currently called Balai Rakyat or Communi-
ty Hall because the place is also used for health services, education and for meeting 
purposes.  
 
Figure 7.1: Construction of evacuation centre in Kasiyan, Pati district, Indonesia 
         
December 2006 (SHEEP)        May 2007 (SHEEP)  November 2007 (AH)           March 2009 (AH)                     November 2009 (SHEEP) 
 
The evacuation centre in Kasiyan is not the outcome of a well-planned CBDRR intervention 
that supports and consciously targets the most vulnerable group in a village. On the 
contrary, it is the result of the everyday practice of local people, SPP and SHEEP who inter-
acted in a spontaneous, complex and unpredictable process that took place in the margins 
of a planned CBDRR intervention in Kasiyan, that focused on the farmers’ CBO instead, who 
benefitted from water pumps and a livestock programme. It further happened in a context 
of historical and contemporary dynamics beyond the occurrence of annual flooding in which 
SPP needed to position itself by broadening its support-base, negotiation with government 
on flood mitigation and rice prices, and resisting new risks caused by the cement factory’s 
claim. While the evacuation centre was relevant for Kasiyan, for SPP and SHEEP it was a by-
product of their long-term organizing work. In 2009 Pati’s district governor suddenly called 
the evacuation centre in Kasiyan a model for flood preparedness, and promised to allocate 
funds to build similar structures in five other flood-affected villages along Juwana River. The 
plans were approved in 2009, including technical specifications for each village, however 
without clear implementation deadlines (BAPPEDA, 2009). The governor, knowing the com-
plaints and the discontent of flood-affected villagers, hoped to take political advantage 
during the coming elections. She promoted the implementation of evacuation centres, 
                                               
6
 20 million Indonesian Rupiah amounts about € 2000,- 
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thereby ignoring the demand of flood-affected villagers for river normalization as I will 
explain in the following section. 
 
7.1.2 Engaging in the political arena of DRR beyond Kasiyan 
In Chapter 1 I explained how I will analyse disaster politics and how responses are handled 
by combining the official and the everyday politics perspective, asking Olson’s three ques-
tions to all actors involved in DRR. These three questions refer to processes of how disasters 
are framed and explained by various actors differently – why they happen, and who can be 
held responsible - about what should be done and how to allocate resources (Olson, 2000; 
Kerkvliet, 1991). All actors in Pati agree that DRR is important to address floods, but behind 
this apparent consensus, a decisive power play takes place about who has the discursive 
power to frame the flood-risk problem and the related solution, and who decides whose risk 
reduction measures are taken seriously and whose ideas and proposals are left out. The 
case of flood and water management in Pati deserves special attention as it illustrates, 
amongst others, that a government and the private sector are not always a winning team.  
 
Whereas local risk narratives stress that floods are part of people’s normal lives, and people 
take their precautions to prepare for and mitigate floods, more structural solutions to deal 
with flooding cannot be developed independently from the political arena of DRR actors in 
Pati and beyond. Local villagers know that their own measures fall short, as they lack the 
means to tackle the underlying reasons of flooding: sedimentation of the Juwana River, de-
forestation of surrounding mountains and lack of coordination between government offi-
cials and the upstream dam authorities about the release of excess water into Juwana River. 
The watershed lines of Juwana River do not correspond with political and administrative 
boundaries, and neither does the web of power relations that influence DRR decisions and 
resource allocation. The new governance system in Indonesia, introduced after the fall of 
Suharto, is ambiguous in terms of where authority is situated, and the lack of knowledge 
and understanding of the new responsibilities lead to gaps in planning and implementation 
among government levels and departments (de Hauwere and van der Zouwen, 2010).   
 
In 2007, in light of the Hyogo Declaration, the Indonesian House of People’s Representatives 
approved a new Disaster Management Law, stating that the State of the Republic of 
Indonesia has the responsibility to protect all people of Indonesia and their entire native 
land against disasters, both life and livelihoods. This implies a shift from emergency relief to 
a pro-active approach to reducing disaster risks. However, most government officials at the 
various levels have little idea what this entails (SHEEP, 2010). Local communities and local 
NGOs in Central Java make use of this ambiguity which provides room for negotiating how 
government from the village to district level could translate disaster risk reduction policy 
into practice. From the villagers living along Juwana River to the governmental officials at 
the district level, they all monitor the world around them and strategize accordingly. To 
make this political arena explicit, I will analyse the negotiation processes around two con-
crete DRR measures –the normalization of Juwana River and the construction of five evacu-
ation centres. I will discuss how the various actors use their discursive power, their institu-
tional power and how in the end resources for DRR are allocated linked to Olson’s questions 
for analysing the politics of disaster response (2000) and to the institutional context as pro-
posed in Table 1.2 (Chapter 1). Aside from my own fieldwork, details are taken from the in-
depth research of de Hauwere and van der Zouwen (2010), two MSc students I supervised 
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and who received assistance from SHEEP, and on studies of two SHEEP research staff into 
the institutional context in which disaster risk reduction gets shaped.  
 
7.1.3 Negotiating DRR interventions: the case of normalization of Juwana River 
The first demands for normalization originate from the 1990s. Year after year, villagers living 
alongside the river, supported by SPP, SHEEP and later Jampi Sawan, lobbied with govern-
ment officials to make the river deeper and wider as they considered the sedimentation of 
the river as one of the main causes of flooding in their villages. Nevertheless, after a decade 
of dialogue and pressure, river normalization became a recurrent element in political cam-
paigns. This implies that the CBDRR-pilot did not start on a ‘blank page’ but became part of a 
chain of events in the broader institutional context where villagers, civil society organisa-
tions, village authorities and district government interacted and shaped the CBDRR process 
and outcomes. This section describes how local people together with civil society organiza-
tions interacted with government departments to demand river normalization in a time of 
decentralization. One of the outcomes of these interactions was that five bulldozers started 
to lift sedimentation from Juwana River near Karangrowo village in September 2010. Con-
tractors told me that they received budget from the district government that was just 
enough to dig and widen 10 km of the river, instead of the needed 60 km. The widening and 
deepening of this 10 km would take until September 2011. 
 
Using discursive power to frame flooding: Why does the government resist normalization?  
Asking government officials why floods happen in Muria region, including Pati district, the 
majority responds that “disaster is an act of God” or due to climate extremes (SHEEP, 2010). 
Only a few attribute the flooding to sedimentation of Juwana River. The government tends 
to view disasters as external events for which they cannot be held responsible. Asked about 
DRR, they start talking about relief operations. Contrary to the Philippine experience, where 
the government favours engineering and physical projects to mitigate flooding7, govern-
ment officials in Pati try to elude discussions about river normalization, which is a big 
engineering project, by constructing narratives that flooding is not an urgent issue and the 
situation is not getting worse (de Hauwere en van der Zouwen, 2010). River normalization 
involves more than just technically increasing the capacity of the river by making it deeper, 
wider and straight; it also has a social dimension. River widening has a consequence for 
people whose land and houses are situated within 20 meters from the river, which will be 
excavated, and for this loss of land they are entitled to receive compensation.  
 
Over the years however, politicians discovered the political perspective that disasters offer, 
especially during election time. The promise to build five evacuation centres should be seen 
in this light. An evacuation centre is easy to implement, it is a small project, very visible in 
the village, and showing its benefits before the next elections. This is not the case with river 
normalization, which is costly and involves a complex long-term process involving many 
other government institutions before the benefits will become clear. Through Jampi Sawan’s 
lobby and critical media coverage, which target the district governor to be responsible for 
implementing flood mitigation, election candidates promise to support river normalization, 
but they do not deliver after elections. There is hardly an incentive for them to approve such 
an expensive and complex project. Instead, quick-win projects like relief and the planned 
                                               
7
 See Chapter 3 
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evacuation centres were believed to sufficiently keep critical voices silent (de Hauwere and 
van der Zouwen, 2010).  
 
To legitimize government’s resistance to normalization, district officials further argue that 
they do not always implement what citizens demand, because they have incorrect ideas and 
views. A district government official explained this: “For instance on the radio, when the 
topic is about normalization, there are many phone calls from people who urge that 
normalization should start immediately. However, normalization requires calculations, how 
deep it should be, as the depth can differ for different areas. If they dig too deep, it is will 
result in intrusion of salty water, the water would not be able to flow back to the sea and the 
people cannot irrigate their fields. So people’s needs can differ from wants. If people’s needs 
are not fulfilled, it will trouble them. But if they want something, it does not mean that the 
government has to fulfil it” (Hauwere and van der Zouwen, 2010: 149). It is true that citizens 
are not always aware of the technical implications of interventions, and that government 
cannot fulfil all suggestions of its citizens. Nevertheless, deviating opinions are always sub-
ject to competing discourses, and what counts as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ depends on the 
actor’s interests. While the flooding in Pati is real, there is room for the DRR actors to 
socially construct its urgency and the extent to which the flooding is worth an intervention 
(Slovic, 2003). Further, framing the villagers’ demands either as ‘needs’ or ‘wants’, the risk 
involved in flooding is subsequently prioritized or minimized.  
 
For a long time local people did not view flooding as a disaster, as these were considered 
part of normal life or to be in the hands of God. People continuously adapted their liveli-
hood strategies to the changing environment combining farming with fishing. Over the last 
few years, however, this narrative altered. People expressed that they increasingly face 
difficulties to adhere to their seasonal cropping calendar because floods occur earlier – 
during harvest time - and stay longer hampering planting a second crop. The reasons to alter 
local narratives could be attributed to the factual increase in flood events, but also to 
SHEEP’s engagement with these villagers, because SHEEP regard the “floods are part of 
normal life” narrative as problematic.  SHEEP and the other NGOs in Central Java construct a 
disaster narrative that aims to convince both grassroots people and government authorities 
that disasters are not natural, but a matter of vulnerability for which the Indonesian govern-
ment can be held responsible. Although the government is held most responsible, the NGOs 
advocate a multi-actor approach to DRR involving communities, media, CSOs, business and 
government institutions. SHEEP uses the Hyogo Framework for Action to mobilize all actors 
including government with the difference that the NGOs regard the DRR multi-stakeholder 
approach not as harmonious, but as a political arena.  Like CDRC, also the NGO-CSO net-
works in Pati district, and in Muria region, use disasters as an entry point for making people 
more conscious about injustices in society. However, while CDRC aims to transform social 
and political structures and institutions that generate poverty and injustice, the NGO-CSO 
network in Muria region project their strategies in a framework of environmental protection 
or restoring the environment by promoting appropriate land use planning.  
 
Institutional power plays: villagers and NGOs in search of support and justice  
To understand why floods happen in Pati and in Muria region in general, one needs not only 
to know the geography of rivers and dams in the area, but also the national institutional 
history in which DRR policy is currently evolving. In the preceding chapter I explained that 
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the New Order’s centralistic framework has been replaced by a new legal framework for the 
democratisation of local-level politics and village institutions. According to the new Law, 
1999, the village is no longer under the authority of the sub-district, but became an autono-
mous level of government. This means that a village can formulate and pass its own village 
regulations and budgets without the approval from higher authorities. This includes DRR 
regulations. Most village authorities know the new DM law 24, 2007, but are not yet aware 
of the opportunity to make regulations and policies independent from higher administrative 
levels. This is a policy gap which NGOs aim to address through their CBO organizing work to 
hold village authorities accountable for DRR. 
 
In January 2005 the Government of Indonesia signed the Hyogo Declaration shortly after the 
December 2004 tsunami. The Hyogo Framework for Action provided a push for reform, 
which coincided with lobby efforts of UNDP and the Indonesian Society for Disaster 
Management, known as MPBI (Lassa, 2011). MPBI is an association and comprises UN staff, 
government officials, NGO activists and academics. It successfully advocated and lobbied for 
a more proactive DM law to reduce the immense losses like experienced during recent 
major disasters in the country stressing to look into causes of disasters and not only into 
impact. This new DM law 24, enacted in July 2007, is integrated in the decentralization 
policies, meaning that power to formulate DRR policies for its respective territory is 
delegated to the district and village government levels – dismantling  the provincial level in 
terms of decision-making authority (Schulte-Nordholt, 2003). The law prescribes that DRR 
policies should be in line with development policies, and include disaster management 
cooperation policies with other districts, provinces or cities. In practice this does not happen 
because the authority of government institutions that should play a crucial role in disaster 
risk reduction, operate at different administrative levels: provinces still have autonomy in 
spatial planning, public works, environmental issues, mid-term development planning, while 
the district level has autonomy on DRR, and the national level keeps the responsibility for 
natural resources, fiscal and monetary matters, and justice, among others. There are many 
contradictions within the government system between elected bodies that take decisions, 
and administrative functions.  
 
Land-use planning and watershed management are issues being decided at higher levels, 
and therefore it is difficult for flood affected communities to address environmental issues 
through a watershed perspective, which involves three districts. Whereas Pati district has a 
DRR plan and policy since July 2010, the adjacent districts of Kudus and Jepara lack any DRR 
policy or structure. Aside of the lack of knowledge and understanding of the new responsibi-
lities among government levels and departments, the decentralization did not result in the 
decentralization of revenues. This implies that provinces can set their priorities but are not 
sure whether they will have the funding for implementation. This is another constraint for 
the district government to not invest in big projects like normalization. In the end, it remains 
unclear what exactly has been decentralised (Schulte-Nordholt, 2003). This institutional 
context of unclear responsibilities between administrative levels and departments, together 
with a democratization process, offers opportunities for civil society groups to find space to 
manoeuvre aimed to make their lobby for structural DRR measures successful.  
 
Whereas during Suharto’s time, civil-society organizations had to operate under heavy 
regulations and repression, preventing labourers and farmers to organize themselves to 
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oppose government policies (Antlöv, 2003), they now are less afraid to speak out their con-
cerns or dissatisfaction. Flood affected communities increasingly complain to village authori-
ties that relief should not be the only answer, but that government should keep its promises 
like implementing normalization. Initially SPP and SHEEP were instrumental in the conscien-
tization of farmers and fishermen by challenging their conventional thinking on hierarchy in 
Indonesian society. The official statements on decentralization and bottom-up approaches 
will not happen automatically, unless concerned citizens enter and use the opening of politi-
cal spaces to engage with government to influence institutions to further their interests. 
However from 2008 onwards, SPP increasingly focused its energy and campaign on resisting 
the arrival of the cement factory and to reverse the decision to allow limestone mining, 
which required multiple strategies and tactics like getting media attention, open demonstra-
tions, negotiations and many court cases up to the Supreme Court in Jakarta. As a result SPP 
lacked the capacity to also advocate for river normalization to address floods. Besides, the 
lobby for river normalization also involves fishermen and concerned citizens, while SPP is a 
farmers organization. In consultation with SHEEP, SPP made a strategic choice to focus on 
farmers’ interest, and that it would be more effective to mobilize farmers, fishermen and 
other citizens into an issue-based alliance. 
 
Since then SHEEP facilitated the formation of an alliance among farmers and fishermen 
living along Juwana River but who were organized in separate CBOs. The purpose of the 
alliance  was to lobby and pressure the district government to implement river normaliza-
tion. After lengthy discussions fishermen and farmers – with each different risk problems 
and diverting priorities - decided to combine forces by establishing the CSO ‘Jampi Sawan’ 
(see box 6.6 chapter 6). Considering the relatively little means SHEEP and Jampi Sawan have 
to foster government’s accountability, they brought in multiple, creative strategies to 
engage both with government and concerned citizens. They engaged with village authori-
ties, the districts governor and line departments, politicians and with provincial level 
authorities to better grasp policies, responsibilities and where to find potential support for 
normalization. To bring the political debate into the village, members of Jampi Sawan for 
instance took their camera and boat to map all kind of issues and problems encountered 
along Juwana River, and discussed their observations with villagers living there. They 
intended to particularly mobilize the village heads to raise their voices, since this group still 
tends to await instructions from district level, not yet used to the possibility to deviate from 
the district’s plans, or they simply refuse to cooperate. Through media like local newspapers 
and radio, SHEEP and Jampi Sawan raised the issue of normalization as frequent as possible 
bringing the political debate both into the village and the district government. “When we 
publish an article today, tomorrow there will be a reply from the government using their 
media – an indicator that government take us seriously” – according to SHEEP field staff. 
Getting stories published is not always self-evident, as the media has an interest in high-
lighting the issues of the day, and not necessarily in background articles on why floods 
happen or about unfulfilled promises of politicians. But since the media in Indonesia are 
sensitive to the occurrence of disasters, SHEEP and Jampi Sawan constantly strategize how 
they can best use these opportunities to bring out the structural shortcomings in govern-
mental policy and to pressure government to take its responsibilities. At the same time, 
politicians use their media to create an image of goodwill and responsibility.  
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In addition to media, SHEEP and CSOs in the other districts organized meetings to bring 
together district government, village officials, and CBOs to discuss DRR. During these 
meetings all actors manoeuvre to frame their concerns in culturally accepted ways and 
avoid direct political confrontations. Village officials attend these meetings in their 
professional capacity, and since respect for people higher in the hierarchy is still considered 
important, directly blaming government officials for their failures will jeopardize their par-
ticipation in such meetings on the long run. Besides, for the NGOs, to be able to influence 
the government, it is important to have some government officials on board. In the end, 
these meetings rather serve to stay on speaking terms and maintain relationships, than to 
actually negotiate policies and plans. SHEEP, Jampi Sawan and village officials need to know 
what happens behind this façade, to make their lobby for normalization and pressure on the 
district governor effective. So, social investigation and research into the institutional rela-
tionships is an important activity of their DRR-work. 
 
The political arena behind the façade  
So far, the district government showed little interest in the normalization project. The 
Indonesian government, however, is not a monolithic organization and through the 
engagement of SHEEP and Jampi Sawan with government officials and departments at 
different levels, internal contradictions and hidden agendas behind resisting the normaliza-
tion project became clearer. Before going further into the everyday politics of river normali-
zation, one needs to understand the technical and social side of this intervention. As said 
earlier, normalization refers to the process of increasing the capacity of a river by making it 
deeper and wider. It is part of a broader package of planned river management, such as 
diversion channels, flood-ways and dam reparations. River widening has the consequence 
that people whose land situated within 20 meters from the river will have to move, and are 
entitled to receive a compensation. The government department responsible for the techni-
cal part of normalization is Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Pemali Juana, the head office in 
charge of the management of Juwana River, authorized by the Ministry of Public Works at 
national level, and which will tender several contractors to take care of the implementation. 
Balai Besar reserved a budget of 7.2 billion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)8, good for normalizing 
10 km of the river according to a local contractor we met in one of the villages. This amount 
includes 900 million IDR for the district government which is responsible for informing the 
people who are entitled to receive a compensation for the land that they will lose when the 
normalization is implemented, and to actually pay the compensations9. Balai Besar is not 
entitled to buy land. Balai Besar informed SHEEP and Jampi Sawan that the funds were 
available but that the district government was not willing to invest. Why not, and who was 
blocking the intervention? 
 
A regulation exists to prevent people to own land or to build houses within a range of 20 
meters from the river, but this regulation has never been enforced. Jampi Sawan mapped 
the land ownership along the river to make people aware that they are entitled to receive 
compensation and started to link the opposition of the district governor to the buildings and 
                                               
8
  7.2 billion IDR = €622.395, -- (1 EUR = 11,568.22 IDR). Exchange rate retrieved August 18, 2010, from 
http://www.exchange-rates.org/converter/EUR/IDR/1/Y  
9
  The district government – department of public works – got a budget of 900 million IDR ( €77.799,--): 150 million IDR to 
inform the people, and 750 million IDR for compensation  
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factories along the river and the financial interests behind them. The governor seemed to 
protect Chinese factory owners to the disadvantage of the farmers and fishermen who 
struggle to secure their livelihoods in a flood prone area. In one village along the river, 
where several parliament members live, a wealthy family built a dike to protect the village 
against floods directing the water to flood the opposite riverbanks. In case the normaliza-
tion would push through, it means that this whole village would need to be re-allocated. 
Aside from the technical and social dimension of the intervention, a political debate exists 
about who should be protected by whom at whose sacrifice (Warner, 2008). 
 
Once it became common knowledge that the governor was blocking the project, and that 
the district government turned out to be the major obstacle to implement normalization, 
tensions between the departments escalated into a conflict. In a meeting of the district 
parliament in the first week of March 2010, SHEEP and Jampi Sawan took another chance to 
advocate for normalization by emphasizing that budget is already made available and that 
Balai Besar is looking for ways to start normalization. According to the village head of 
Karangrowo, the district governor still tried to block the project, and to save his face by 
offering an alternative location to park big ships that now prevent excess water to flow into 
the sea, but there was no way out anymore for him. In preparation for this meeting, Jampi 
Sawan and SHEEP had gone to Balai Besar to inquire about the proper procedures to realize 
normalization and requested to see the correspondence between the two departments. 
Balai Besar provided all the letters. These letters were presented during the district parlia-
ment meeting. The district governor was shocked and surprised by the fact that ordinary 
citizens could possess this information. The village head of Karangrowo formulated the posi-
tion of the governor as follows: “He felt reluctant, but his position was in gamble. It made 
him angry. SHEEP and Jampi Sawan kept on asking questions about the normalization”. By 
uncovering the internal conflicts within the governmental opposition in a public meeting, 
and the interests of the different actors, the CSOs and village officials leveraged their posi-
tion as negotiators. From all the actors present in the meeting at the district parliament, no 
one wanted to be blamed for not taking action. Balai Besar, by linking up with CSOs and 
village officials, could position itself as the hero within the government. SHEEP and Jampi 
Sawan could be portrayed as civil-society heroes, especially the latter which could establish 
itself as a legitimate party. “The official correspondence between Jampi Sawan and the 
district parliament on, amongst others, the funding of the project illustrate this” (Hauwere 
and van der Zouwen, 2010: 144). In sum, the way to influence DRR policy and interventions 
is not only about how to frame floods to one’s advantage, but additionally in finding allies 
within government and beyond who share an interest in the same outcomes, independent 
of their individual motivations. The successful cooperation between Balai Besar and CSOs 
was temporal, aimed to leverage their own bargaining position. Alliances are dynamic and 
develop over time according to the specific purposes they serve (Long, 2001). Alliance 
formation, enrolment, persuasion, manipulation, compromise and exclusion are tactics used 
by all actors to improve their negotiation position to achieve their objectives (Few, 2002: 
33).   
 
Publicly performed power: negotiations continue on resource allocation and new land claims 
The third form of how power operates among DRR actors refers to resources and decisions 
on how to use and allocate these resources. While the district government finally gave in to 
the demand of the CSOs and village authorities, the negotiation processes did not stop. It is 
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expected that the ‘first phase’ of normalizing 10 km will last till September 2011. Jampi 
Sawan is aware that the available budget is insufficient to normalize the whole river, and is 
afraid that the project will not result in flood mitigation. On the other hand, if Jampi Sawan 
would refuse to further cooperate with the government, it fears that the government will 
never look for additional funding. And this is not the only dilemma. The district government 
requested Jampi Sawan to take on the ‘socialization’ process, probably to legitimize the 
whole activity and because it has little capacity itself, while on the other hand, it rejects all 
kind of ideas and inputs from Jampi Sawan. For instance, Jampi Sawan uses art, theatre, and 
religion to inform people about what is going to happen with the river and the conse-
quences. Government does not like this and is not willing to provide financial resources to 
Jampi Sawan although there is 150 million IDR available for socialization purposes. But when 
there are problems with land issues, the government immediately asks the help of Jampi 
Sawan to mediate. People who have to move their house or had to sell their land, claim land 
elsewhere, and this causes frictions between villagers and the government. De Hauwere and 
van der Zouwen (2010) found that in the negotiations concerning the compensations, for 
instance, villagers influence each other not to settle for the proposed price offered by the 
government. Although it may not be possible to refuse to sell the land, people try to find out 
how far they can go.  Another problem is that many people have land but not an official land 
certificate. No certificate means no compensation. Jampi Sawan anticipates problems and 
advised each village to form a lobby committee to support such cases.   
 
It is expected that the case of river normalization in Pati district will still face many dilem-
mas, opposing interests and agendas. Besides difficulties to get the necessary funding, 
internal government politics are likely to cause further delays or to prove an obstacle to 
complete the normalization for the whole river. The actors involved all use their agency to 
perform their powers to create room to manoeuvre and to change structural elements to 
their own advantage.  
7.1.4 Negotiating DRR interventions: the case of the five evacuation centres  
While negotiations, debates and conflicts concerning the proposed normalization were 
played out, the district government proposed five evacuation centres like in Kasiyan. Those 
villagers who were aware of the plan for the evacuation centres expressed their disapproval. 
A farmer from Karangrowo put is as follows: “Even though there is flood, the people do not 
need to evacuate to an evacuation centre. They do not need an evacuation centre but 
normalization. But maybe from the perspective of the government, maybe making an 
evacuation centre is essential because they basically do not know how the people in the 
village live”. Villagers expressed that they feel as if the district government is forcing this 
plan upon them. They explain the eagerness of the district government to build five evacua-
tion centres as quick win interventions: in a relatively short time, it is possible to construct 
technically simple and with little financial resources from the district’s budget a visible 
measure. This is more rewarding for politicians than getting involved in a complex interven-
tion like river normalization. An evacuation centre like in Kasiyan is a perceived need by the 
government, but not recognized by local people in other villages. The social context in 
Kasiyan differs from elsewhere, where people can evacuate to relatives close by, whereas 
Kasiyan is populated by settlers whose relatives live in another district. Neither SHEEP nor 
Jampi Sawan were involved in the idea of the five evacuation centres, since they prioritized 
lobby and advocacy for normalization. 
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De Hauwere and van der Zouwen (2010) – while living in one of the villages where an 
evacuation centre would be built – discovered that people’s perception regarding the 
planned evacuation centre changed. Whereas people initially narrated that they would stay 
at home or move by boat or ranggon – bamboo raft - to higher grounds to stay with 
relatives, they started to become more positive about the new building. One village official 
even expressed that the evacuation centre has priority at this point over the process of 
normalization. Why? The villagers started to realize that it would be impossible to convince 
government officials to spend budget on more urgent matters in the village, and started to 
brainstorm how they could use the building for other purposes, and how to influence its 
design. The village head had this idea: “We will use the evacuation centre to dry rice, for 
meetings of the farmer groups, or for the parents to take a rest while the children go to 
school as the evacuation centre will be in front of the school. There are 313 families in the 
village, if they get relief however, it is usually too little, like for 200 families, so we need to 
stock goods till there is enough before we distribute it. We now use the village office for this 
purpose but the evacuation centre would be better”. When they found an alternative 
purpose to use the building, they stopped protests against the plan, and decided to just 
allow it to happen. Once construction materials will arrive, they believed, the new purpose 
of the intervention could still be negotiated locally, although they could not predict how the 
initiative will be shaped in the actual implementation since the technical specifications are 
fixed. It is further not sure how government officials will react to the reinterpretation of the 
project, and whether the alternative usage will still provide them with political benefits. 
 
In sum, by focusing on two concrete DRR interventions, the interactions between the 
different actors revealed that differences in actors’ views and priorities in DRR, for instance 
between villagers and the government, are related to more hidden interests and agendas. 
Government constructs an ‘urgent need’ or ‘perceived risk’ to legitimize its plan for five 
evacuation centres, while resisting normalization which is felt by a large population as the 
real need. Often-heard statements like ‘governments lack political will’ or ‘lack of trust 
between government and citizens’ get a more concrete  interpretation through these case 
studies. What the villagers together with the CSO did, is tracing ways in which power creates 
webs of relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space (Nuijten, 
2004). As the cases show, the government is not a monolithic organization, and organized 
citizens search with whom in the government they can collaborate and who are their 
opponents and why. Collaboration with a wide range of actors at multiple levels was 
necessary to make normalization possible, since village authorities cannot mitigate flood in 
their respective village alone. It is however, not self-evident that CBOs and CSOs can 
endlessly carry on with their struggle, negotiations, searching for new opportunities, and 
stay alert for new challenges, as everyone is busy with their own daily activities. Lot of 
pressure is put on particularly CBO leaders, and NGOs invest in them without having the 
guarantee that leaders will stay for ever. SPP came up as a strong social movement in the 
beginning of the 2000s, but decided to stay focused on farmers’ issues, instead of taking on 
the broader lobby work for normalization. Then Jampi Sawan emerged to take the lead in 
the lobby for normalization since 2008, and increasingly gained support and legitimacy. 
However, it is constantly in need of new local leaders at sub-district level. Expecting CBDRR 
leadership and their committees to be sustainable is an illusion.  
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Following the processes of disaster risk reduction – and CBDRR in particular - in Central Java 
for almost six years, I observed that the NGOs emphasized lobby and advocacy. Risk reduc-
tion measures are usually material or technical in nature, like seed dispersal, livestock 
dispersal, or installing water pumps to enhance irrigation to strengthen people’s livelihoods 
and coping strategies. In the CBDRR-pilot areas in Central Java relatively little effort went 
into such activities. Support to strengthening livelihoods were mostly meant as entry-point 
activities to start community organizing and raising awareness about DRR and environmen-
tal concerns. Also the typical disaster preparedness activities were missing. Instead, SPP 
focused on lobbying for better rice price policies and a secure selling market; on getting 
justice by resisting the arrival of the cement factory and limestone mining affecting their 
core-membership. Jampi Sawan spends its energy on negotiating river normalization which 
is believed to solve a big portion of people’s livelihoods problems, and more effective than 
small livelihood projects for individual households. Particularly when taking people’s remit-
tances into account, which are an important resource for the majority of the flood affected 
people to cope with crop failure, illness and other emergencies. Discussions with community 
people in diverse villages in Muria Region revealed that remittances involve larger financial 
flows than the earnings through small livelihoods projects10. This was one of the insights the 
NGOs discovered during the CBDRR-pilot and their motivation to address local problems 
through CBDRR beyond the village level.   
 
7.2  Reducing sandstorms and opium addiction in Ghoryan district, Herat province, 
Afghanistan 
Ghoryan district is a flat arid area in western Afghanistan which boarders Iran. Years of 
conflict, social disruption and drought have resulted in the almost disappearance of vegeta-
tion due to uncontrolled grazing and pressures for firewood (Virgo, Aslami & Ahmed, 2006). 
The Afghan NGO SDO selected Ghoryan district for its CBDRR pilot because of the high 
frequency and severity of sandstorms occurring annually from June till October, and its 
proneness to drought, flooding and an increasing opium addiction, among particularly 
women. Ghoryan is located along a drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Iran. 
Progressively, men force their wives to use opium to silence their protests, according to the 
women. SDO has a running peace building program in the district which created 10 informal 
village level peace shuras – six male peace shuras, and four women peace shuras - and one 
at district level. Their aim is to settle urgent conflicts related to natural resources, tribal 
issues and domestic violence related to drugs trade and opium addiction.  
 
SDO promoted saffron production and marketing in the district to replace poppy cultivation. 
The CBDRR intervention is not an isolated intervention but linked to SDO’s other on-going 
programmes in the area. Because of limited staff capacity of SDO for the CBDRR initiative, 
SDO highly relies on the female organizer involved in SDO’s peace building programme, who 
attempts to involve the women in the CBDRR initiative, while an engineer managing the 
saffron enterprise programme, lends his skills and knowledge particularly on measures to 
reduce the negative impact of sandstorms. Dehran and Roshnan villages were selected for 
the CBDRR pilot from all SDO supported villages in the province, because they experience 
the most frequent and severe sandstorms, which villagers label as problematic. They have 
been exploring the option to leave the area again, and to rebuild or create their livelihoods 
                                               
10
 Exact financial figures to make a comparison were not collected, but this statement is based on qualitative research on 
coping strategies by the local NGOs.  
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elsewhere. A study by Formoli (1995) suggests that the destruction of trees (forest, planted 
and fruit) was probably the largest environmental disaster that occurred during the war 
years, followed by a long drought period of 2000-2004. It is however not easy to find agricul-
tural lands elsewhere, and the people decided to find a solution to reduce the impact of 
sandstorms. 
 
During the civil war, many villagers fled to Iran leaving their land unattended and unpro-
tected. Bushes disappeared due to firewood and fodder needs of outsiders. When people 
returned from Iran, they expanded the area for rain-fed agriculture, particularly for cumin 
cultivation which they brought from Iran. This is one of the reasons why the Kuchi 
pastoralists who also fled to Iran, could not reassert their traditional access to pastureland 
when they returned due to changed political-ethnic powers (Alden Wily, 2004). They now 
work as agricultural labourers or in the drugs trade. The selected villages Dehran and 
Roshnan along the Hari Rud River faced competing claims over these deteriorating grazing 
areas with villagers at the other side of the river who regularly enter the area to cut and 
even uproot the scarce bushes for fodder and firewood. Sandstorms do occur because of 
degradation of large pastures surrounding the villages. Northern villages do not experience 
the negative impact of sandstorms, and do not share the interest to protect pastures. The 
northern wind blows most sand from the dry riverbed – and dried clay that covers land after 
floods - in the direction of the villages south of the river. Sand and dust enter the residential 
area and inside houses, fills irrigation canals, and covers agricultural fields with sand dunes 
resulting in crop failure and economic losses.  
 
Using discursive power to frame risk problems  
When SDO was exploring people’s interest to get involved in the CBDRR pilot, it initially 
faced resistance. SDO explained CBDRR as an approach to reduce existing or potential risks 
by mobilizing community’s available resources. The shuras, led by a former commander, 
were highly motivated to talk about the various disasters they face and identified sand 
storms as the most disturbing one, but rejected the idea to shoulder all expenses since they 
expected the NGO to provide projects and the necessary resources. I&K staff repeatedly 
stressed that Afghan NGOs shouldn’t expect funding for their CBDRR activities, but should 
search for resources locally instead11. SDO wasn’t pleased with the restraining attitude of 
I&K because this hampered the community organizing process. The community leaders 
were highly motivated to join efforts to reduce the impact of sandstorms by reforesting 50 
ha of land along the river, but not alone. In 2006, they already had initiated planting trees 
near the Hari Rud River to reduce the impact, but these plants were destroyed by recurrent 
flooding during spring. SDO turned to the provincial and district government with whom 
they have a routine “and somehow obligatory coordination practice” (SDO, 2009: 2) when 
planning new activities in their areas of responsibility. However the department responsible 
for disaster risk reduction was not proactive and lacked the resources for reducing sand-
storm’s impact. SDO found out that when framing ‘reducing sandstorms by reforestation’ as  
an ‘environmental protection’ effort, that the provincial line departments of agriculture and 
environmental protection were interested in SDO’s plan. Although the provincial govern-
ment lacked the financial resources, they were willing to provide technical and institutional 
                                               
11
 This approach differs from how Indonesian partners implemented CBDRR-pilots: they received programme funding from 
I&K and Kerkinactie. This contrasts to the restraint of I&K staff regarding Afghan partners: they encouraged creativity in 
local resource generation while fearing corruption of donor funds. This fear is based on past experiences.  
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support for SDO’s CBDRR initiative in Ghoryan. I assumed that kinship relations and 
favouritism played a role here, since requests for government support in Afghanistan for 
community concerns usually falls on deaf ears or require endless negotiations. Later I 
learned that the provincial governor has an NGO background12. I observed that in more 
instances during the pilot programme, former NGO staff took on government positions, 
including an engineer from the CBDRR team in Ghoryan who became district governor of 
another district in Herat province in 2010. Previous NGO staff on crucial government 
positions opens space for communities to get access to government support, in this case 
particularly institutional support and political resources to turn their reforestation initiative 
into a legitimate one. This is important in a context of competing claims, especially when the 
distinction between land accessed and land owned seems to be unclear for the pastures 
targeted for reforestation. The reforestation initiative in Ghoryan was identified as a struc-
tural solution to reduce sandstorms on the long term, but in order to succeed, the local 
shuras needed an arrangement with the neighbouring villages that their reforested area 
would be protected, preferably with support from authorities, in the short term to avoid 
that planted trees would be cut. 
  
Institutional power plays: what is the status of the land? How to protect the reforested area? 
Like the normalization effort in Central Java, also the reforestation in Ghoryan is an initiative 
which village authorities alone cannot solve. In April 2009 when I met with several shura 
members from Dehran and Roshnan in Herat town, they told me that ideally an area of 200 
ha should be protected, but that they intend to start with 50 ha on land close to the 
residential area and most degraded. “We could regard this area as communal land, there is 
a shrine in this area; the person who takes care of the shrine could probably look after the 
forest as well; all farmers could pay the guard for looking after the trees”. They further 
thought of establishing a village nursery that can produce seedlings for future expansion of 
the ‘forest’ area. Currently there are no trees left, just low bushes and sand, and therefore 
talking about ‘re-vegetation’ instead of ‘reforestation’ would be more appropriate, I 
thought. However, SDO considered the lessons learned from a community-based watershed 
management program east of Herat city13, namely that villagers should be encouraged to 
plant trees for firewood or fruits to give the additional motivation for protection (Virgo, 
Aslami and Ahmed, 2006).  
 
From the moment the technical staff of the provincial agricultural department and 
directorate of environmental protection visited Dehran and Roshnan to conduct an envi-
ronmental assessment, discussions about the status of the land emerged. Was it indeed 
communal land, as the villagers thought, or was it public land? The government classified 
75% of the land as public land, and therefore government-owned land, and 25 % as com-
munal land. The shuras did not object to this classification since their most important 
motive was to get the area reforested. Also the boundaries between agricultural and 
pastureland – targeted for reforestation – had to be clarified. In the past, disputes over 
accessing pastureland between villages at both sides of the river regularly happened in 
which a common trigger was violating seasonal agreements for cutting bushes. Simmering 
tensions still exist among the surrounding villages. To settle these tensions for the future, 
and to protect the newly planted trees, the question how to protect the reforested area 
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 Joseph Nurestani 
13
 Implemented by DACAAR, an Afghan NGO  
239 
 
against intruders, became a crucial question. The CBDRR groups from Dehran and Roshnan 
wanted to secure their investments in the reforestation effort. 
 
In Afghanistan, land law and policies on pastures are ambivalent. I refer to Alden Wily’s 
extensive study (2004) on land relations and pastures in Afghanistan to understand the 
status of pastures from an historical perspective. According to the 1965 registration law, 
pasture land was considered ‘common land’, “open to the public” for use, but controlled by 
the government. Pasture was then excluded from the description of ‘government land’ (ibid: 
45). Alden Wily analysed how the distinction between public and government property 
increasingly got blurred (2004: 46). While in 1978 public land was defined as land owned by 
the people, but administered by the state on their behalf, in 1987 pasture and forest simply 
became state property. The Karzai decree in 2003 made these state properties available for 
lease, and “those who have established occupancy in pastures during the last 37 years [since 
1965, AH] will be the rightful leaseholder – if they can pay “(ibid: 47). This applies to Dehran 
and Roshnan.  
 
After the conduct of the feasibility study and technical plan, funds for purchasing seedlings 
had to be found. As I will elaborate later, the district and provincial government lacked the 
financial resources to support the communities, and no other (I)NGOs in Afghanistan were 
able or willing to support. Therefore SDO turned to I&K again and started a long negotiation 
process, supported by community representatives who met with I&K staff twice, until I&K 
was willing to fund the trees in fall 2009. Then a contract was signed by SDO, the village 
shuras and the District Governor, witnessed by the Herat provincial agricultural department. 
The contract stipulates the roles and responsibilities of each party: village committees are 
responsible for forestry management and ‘social fencing’, the district government enforces 
protection violations when outsiders enter the protected area, whereas the NGO would 
provide further technical advice and training. ‘Social fencing’ as opposite to a real fence 
made of wood, bushes or barbed wire, refers to a fundamental prerequisite to protect the 
area, as there is a clear demarcation of community user rights and the formal recognition of 
these rights by government and other land users, while community people assign guards 
who monitor and report protection violations. SDO views the contract signing as an added 
value to its program since it believes that it will end contestation about landownership and 
access. This will allow the newly planted trees to grow, and on the long run the impact of 
sand storms will be mitigated. The shuras developed a ‘protection and environmental 
conservation statement’ which the district governor signed and was distributed to 40 
surrounding villages. The statement explains the importance of protecting the environment 
and resource management, encourages other villages to do the same, and explains punish-
ments enforced by the government in case people cause damage to the environment. 
Community people contribute resources to two guards who monitor the replanted area. 
Several signboards to keep people with their cattle out of the reforested area were placed 
around the 50 ha: 18 ha newly reforested and 32 ha protected.   
 
Who is actually gaining from this process? Although the contract should actually be a lease 
contract according to the new law, the government does not insist to receive an income, 
since it regards this as a public benefit project. The communities, economically motivated to 
protect their area against sand storms, obtained a more legitimate access to their pastures 
through their role as environmental protectors. Both the sandstorms and scarce resources 
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Figure 7.2: Reforestation efforts in Ghoryan district, Herat, Afghanistan 
                                                                                    
 Through ashar community people  prepare the land for planting the trees 
 
    
The trees after six months                                                      Sign boards around protected area (pictures by SDO) 
 
like energy and fodder are problems that affect both the village head, and the poorest 
households, although in different ways. When sand stops entering agricultural fields and 
crop failures are reduced, it is most likely that landowners with irrigated fields will benefit 
most, because they expect an increase in production due to a higher return from irrigation 
facilities. But also sharecroppers benefit from the reforestation since sharecropping 
arrangements put the burden of failed harvests on their shoulders. This may explain the 
high motivation of a large number of people – about 2000 people - who voluntarily 
contributed to land preparation and reforesting deteriorated pastures during a period of 25 
days. On the other hand, firewood and fodder collection are usually managed by children 
and landless men, who now have to go further away beyond their villages to collect these 
resources, at least during the duration of the first contract. Fortunately, in early 2011 
electricity arrived in Ghoryan from Iran. People use electricity for cooking and rely less on 
firewood. Because electricity is cheap, even the poorer households consider to use 
electricity, and instead of collecting firewood, spend their time as wage labourer. This new 
development helps in protecting the reforested area.   
 
It is still too early to assess the outcomes of this effort, but the study done about the 
reforestation initiative east of Herat reveals that the impact for local communities is good; 
“after four years the sand intrusion problem has ceased” (Virgo, Aslami and Ahmed, 2006: 
74). However, pressures on pastures elsewhere may increase until the protected area would 
be sufficiently recovered and can be re-opened for controlled access. Disputes about natural 
resources are therefore transferred to other areas.  
 
Publicly performed power: what will happen? 
During 2009, SDO and the community people from Dehran and Roshnan villages had lengthy 
negotiation talks about mobilizing community resources, labour and material resources, for 
making the reforestation to happen. SDO viewed CBDRR as an approach to revive ‘ashar’ – a 
traditional form of voluntary community labour -, while it assumed that seedlings could be 
produced locally or donated by the agricultural department in Herat. After negotiations with 
the CBDRR committees – these were formed in the meantime - the people expressed that 
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they are able to shoulder 60% of the expenses, but that they needed 40% outside support 
for particularly material support – like seedlings, rental of tractors for land preparation and 
fuel. When SDO learned that the provincial agricultural department only had resources to 
conduct the environmental assessment and to provide technical input on local tree species, 
distance of planting the seedlings, irrigation practices, but not for the seedlings, it 
approached I&K again. It still took months before I&K agreed to financially support the 
reforestation proposal of SDO. I&K’s programme officer raised many questions and concerns 
about land ownership, appropriateness of proposed tree species, feasibility and 
maintenance and protection policies, and SDO field staff responded to all. I&K also asked for 
my opinion on what it should do. I agreed with I&K that there were several dilemmas in this 
case compared to the other CBDRR pilot areas. Dehran and Roshnan are the only villages in 
the CBDRR pilot where the NGO advised us not to go because of security reasons. Therefore, 
we never visited the villages, but met with people in safe places, and consequently we did 
not fully understand the local social dynamics, the social differentiation among people and 
we were not able to appraise the proposed intervention well.  
 
On the other hand, the CBDRR pilot is meant to take on challenges: foreign aid agencies 
increasingly espouse their principle to continue to support local communities when it has 
become too insecure to go there themselves, and to channel assistance through local 
partners. It is a matter of commitment and trust as well. This is difficult, particularly when 
previous I&K staff were hesitant to provide financial support and who warned us for corrup-
tion. Aware of all these emotions, I advised I&K to fund the reforestation effort despite the 
fact it could become difficult to visit the area ourselves to monitor progress. I&K did provide 
funds to make the reforestation possible; it particularly provided funds to buy seedlings. In 
October 2010, a month before I&K staff – one foreign and one Afghan staff - would visit 
Ghoryan, there were violent incidents between ISAF and Taliban groups, who are slowly 
expanding their area of control in the province. Also DACAAR, another I&K partner 
operating in Herat, observed a worsening security situation in areas previously considered 
more peaceful. Instead of visiting the communities, SDO proposed that shura members 
came to SDO’s office in Herat to meet with I&K staff, which indeed happened. I increasingly 
started to link SDO’s cautious security policy for foreigners and Afghan I&K staff to its active 
promotion of saffron production in the province to replace poppy. A signal that alerted me 
for this was the sabbatical leave of SDO’s director, who – I later found out – received death 
threats for promoting saffron as an alternative to poppy production.  
 
Concerning the reforestation, as soon as the funds were released, the CBDRR committees 
mobilized a total of 2000 people to join in ‘ashar’ to prepare the land, making rows, and to 
plant and irrigate 18 ha of trees. The ‘ashar’ took almost a month during the winter of 2009-
2010. This is an appropriate time to plant trees, and the ‘ashar’ did not compete with other 
farming activities. It did compete, however with the World Food Program, which pays 
people from the same area for their labour to clean irrigation canals, which are also used to 
irrigate the reforestation areas. One farmer reasoned that he works one day to plant trees, 
and the next day for the WFP. This is understandable from the perspective of the farmer, 
and a challenge for the NGO. Even the CBDRR committees risk every day to be accused of 
corruption: “everyone else pays villagers through food or cash for work schemes, so why not 
in the case of reforestation?”- as villagers reacted.  
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The case shows that ‘reforestation’ is more than a technical measure to reduce the risk of 
sandstorms; it has the potential to settle disputes over natural resources when access and 
control to land and firewood gets legitimized and accepted by various parties. The 
‘reforestation’ is embedded in a history of competing claims of natural resources between 
rival tribes, between pastoralists (Kuchis) and agriculturists, in a history of war and 
displacement, and recently of returning refugees in search of new livelihood opportunities. 
Village institutions like the (peace) shura, ashar, a forest management plan, and ‘social 
fencing’ are supported by formal institutions beyond the village level: a signed contract to 
legitimize landownership and usage of the natural resources endorsed by the district 
governor, who has the authority to punish those who violate the protection regulations. In 
this context, 40 neighbouring villages were made aware of these regulations and are 
expected to adhere to them. Measures are taken to both reduce sandstorms, and provisions 
are installed to avoid or discourage conflicts among the adjacent 40 villages. The strength of 
such a contract is that roles and responsibilities of each party are stipulated and that actors 
can be held accountable. The contract has an initial duration of four years. Then the actors 
have to re-negotiate their rights and mutual obligations. In the context of a weak Afghan 
state, such an arrangement among communities, the NGO and district governor is in fact a 
simple accountability mechanism which may increase the political resources of ordinary 
citizens. It has a potential to improve the credibility of NGOs and the government. Still, it is 
quite unique. 
 
The CBDRR pilot for the women in Roshnan and Dehran went quite differently. The women’s 
CBDRR plans which were initially welcomed and supported by the male shuras, and finan-
cially by I&K, did take off very slowly for several reasons. Some reasons I base on the discus-
sions with the women and the women organizer of SDO, while some other reasons I deduct 
by linking different events and ‘reading’ the context. I expand on this process in the next 
section. 
 
7.2.1 The politics of gender in constructing risk narratives and social protection 
The politics of gender refers to a process in which men and  women use their discursive 
power to frame and contest socially sanctioned gender relations and women’s rights 
(Kandioyoti, 2007) within evolving institutional contexts and links between the local and the 
global. I first delve into how the women used their discursive power to frame their risk 
problem in such a way that is was initially acceptable for the men. 
 
Using discursive power to convince the men to support a women resource centre 
While the men were negotiating for the reforestation intervention, the female field staff of 
SDO together with several women leaders active in the peace shuras14 started to mobilize 
the women in both villages with the intention to get their risk perspectives. A total of 50 
women were mobilized in the two villages and they appointed eight women in each village 
to compose a women’s CBDRR-group. The women were positive about the reforestation 
and hoped that sandstorms would indeed be mitigated, resulting in decreasing incidents of 
irritated eyes, respiratory diseases and contaminated grain stocks. But their priorities were 
actually elsewhere. Their first priority was literacy, and secondly addressing the problem of 
opium addiction. In chapter 5, I elaborated on the background of these risk priorities. Young 
women, while in refugee in Iran, received education and after returning to Afghanistan they 
                                               
14
 Their stories can be read in Chapter 5 
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carefully tried to create opportunities to allow girls and women to attend literacy class at 
village level. They volunteer as teachers. In Roshnan only two girls graduated from high 
school, while most of the girls leave school at an early age. The women leaders viewed 
literacy classes instrumental in raising women’s awareness about health and opium 
addiction which are related issues, since opium is often used as a painkiller, also for 
children.  
 
As these women leaders are also active in the peace shuras, they know many cases of 
domestic violence. Their role is to settle disputes within the family and to support the 
women. Many cases of domestic violence are related to the husband’s involvement in drugs 
trade or his opium addiction, which costs money. The problem of opium addiction is closely 
linked to criminal activities and prostitution through which women become a commodity to 
settle debts. The women were particularly frustrated that there is not a safe house or even a 
rehabilitation centre where female drug addicts could go. Their dream was a place, a 
women’s resource centre, in the village where women can gather to discuss their problems, 
to seek social protection, to attend literacy class and to get health services.  
 
One active woman leader, Khomari, is a professional health worker, and volunteered in the 
CBDRR-women’s group. As a respected woman she is invited to attend the male shura, 
bringing in the women’s views, opinions and ideas into the male shura. She presented the 
proposal for a women’s resource centre to the male shura framing it as “a place for literacy 
class, health and for taking Quran lessons”. Although it is here culturally accepted that 
women can meet in a separate place from men, other than in one’s home, as practiced in 
other parts of Afghanistan, the male shura was initially not very supportive. The men 
claimed that NGOs cannot provide good health services nor a community health worker: 
“for health problems you go to the government’s hospital”. The men are partly right. The 
women leaders told in November 2010 that indeed the maternity health services have 
improved in the province, and the number of mothers who die during child-birth has 
drastically decreased. However, women’s  health comprises of more than maternal care, 
and for even very common health complaints it is still difficult to find a female doctor or 
nurse nearby.  
 
Khormari was able to convince the men about the advantages of having a volunteer 
community health worker in the village. Convincing the predominantly Pasthun men about 
the need for women literacy was more challenging. The argument that teaching from the 
Quran will be part of literacy classes, helped in convincing the men to allow their women to 
go the women resource centre. Additionally it helped that female teachers – young women 
who got an education in Iran while staying in refugee camps – came from within the village 
and were not outsiders. The men gave their approval in fall 2010. While the resource centre 
was tactically framed as “a place for health and literacy class” towards the men, among 
women themselves, the resource centre meant primarily “a place to provide social protec-
tion for women in the village”, to discuss and stop domestic violence, while literacy and 
learning to read the Quran are rather a means to strengthen women’s self-confidence. The 
re-framing of their risk definition in order to increase the chance of male acceptance can be 
regarded as a form of women’s everyday politics practice, given their limited space to 
advance their interests in the public domains outside their households and village.  
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Institutional power plays 
The majority of women in Afghanistan hardly have contact with the state, markets or civil 
society organizations, and their options largely rely on local gender norms. In Dehran and 
Roshnan, the women, unlike the men, did not get support from governmental departments 
at the district nor from the provincial levels. The head of the district’s Education Depart-
ment told the women that “nobody can stop drug addiction, even the US government can-
not”, and is in fact denying the problem. Also the fact that prostitution would exist in the 
country is denied by the government in Kabul15. However, since the people returned from 
Iran, gender relations should no longer be viewed in a static cultural traditional or Islamic 
way. Exposure to education, health services and other social welfare services in refugee 
camps in Iran, made relatively young women decide to become civil society actors in their 
places of origin, like the women leaders in Dehran and Roshnan. The establishment of 
women peace shuras focusing on domestic violence and their role in the CBDRR groups illus-
trate this. And SDO is an important supporter through its female field staff.  
 
Given the indifferent institutional environment, SDO turned to I&K for financial support to 
construct the women’s resource centre in Fall 2009. I&K approved the proposal one year 
later. This lengthy appraisal could be attributed to the transfer of responsibilities from the 
head office in the Netherlands to the regional office in New Delhi as part of decentralizing 
aid programming to the regions. The Afghanistan portfolios were not immediately priori-
tized, and new staff had to be familiarized with the CBDRR-pilot programme before the 
women’s resource centre proposal was approved.  
 
Publicly performed power 
When visiting Herat in November 2010, we learned that disagreement arose about the 
location of the women’s resource centre in Dehran, and about who should provide the land. 
Somebody offered land in the outskirts of the village, which was neither regarded as ‘safe’ 
by the women nor as ‘appropriate’ by the men. Suddenly there was resistance again from 
within the village to accept the resource centre. Early 2011, the local peace shuras engaged 
in the process with the intent to reach consent and to search for a solution. In the end, the 
local commander donated part of his land within the village, and the construction started. 
The women resource centres were inaugurated in November 2011.  
 
So while the male CBDRR groups and shuras in Dehran, and Roshnan could settle land 
issues, seasonal access to pasture resources, and legitimize 50 ha of reforested land, 
involving 40 villages, it took a much longer time to settle debates involving a few square 
meters for a women resource centre. It is hard for Afghan women to access male dominated 
institutions at the local level and beyond. I presume that women who currently are opium 
addicted and seek protection belong to the poorest part of the villages. “In Afghanistan, 
men are not considered vulnerable, even poor men not” – according to the female field staff 
of SDO. “Afghan women and children are”. They highly rely on their everyday politics prac-
tice, breaking through taboos. Older women and widows in Dehran and Roshnan, for in-
stance provide shelter and safety in their own house to women who are victims of domestic 
violence. In the future, the women’s resource centres will provide space and opportunities 
for women to practice their everyday politics in a more institutionalized and visible manner, 
                                               
15
 According to a female staff of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, attending I&K’s workshop in May 
2007. 
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and may slowly modify gender and social norms, stretching the boundaries for community 
participation. 
 
Kandiyoti (2007) points out that instead of viewing gender in Afghanistan only through the 
lens of an indigenous culture and Islam, attention is needed to recognize the effects of con-
flict, poverty and displacement on gender relations and norms, because it is against this 
background of new challenges, that the politics of gender is being played out” (Kandiyoti, 
2007: 176). It is a challenge for SDO and I&K to solve the dilemma of colluding with the men 
and consolidating existing gender relations, or continue the support the brave women 
leaders who try to challenge the existing norms, eliciting resistance from within the village. 
The availability of a female NGO field staff and active respected women leaders is an ad-
vantage, and they need above all time and perseverance. A plausible cause of men’s hesi-
tance to allow the women resource centre to be built, could come from outside the villages, 
and be linked to the worsening security situation, fears for Taliban and criminal activities 
targeting their villages. This angle requires, however, further exploration and validation. 
 
7.3 Discussion and conclusions 
The various cases show that CBDRR-interventions are not isolated, distinct entities, but very 
much intertwined with the broader institutional environment. Few international organiza-
tions start to realize that interpreting CBDRR as a village level intervention has its limita-
tions, and that looking beyond the community is a must16. Flood mitigation, watershed man-
agement, reforestation, regulating access to pasture lands and firewood involves decisions 
about people, space and their interactions. This makes risk reduction highly political. Local 
people, NGOs and CSO groups turn to governments who are expected to create enabling 
political and legislative environments. But as the cases show, many governments do not 
prioritize, or are reluctant to change policies or legislation which favour vulnerable commu-
nities.  
 
Therefore, local people and NGOs realize that they need to engage – in one way or another - 
with the broader institutional context of norms, traditions, the judiciary system and policies, 
the governance structure and institutions related to allocation of resources, and understand 
how these play out locally through village institutions. Local people and NGOs need to enter 
the ‘political arena’ to negotiate and struggle for their risk solutions. While in Central Java, 
the mobilization of effective agency was required and ‘strategic games’ of NGOs and CSO 
groups, in Herat the interaction between the shuras, NGO and district governor was 
smoother, at least for the men. This kind of interaction and government support is rare in 
the country, where in most instances people rely on their own kinship networks or on more 
exclusive forms of ‘warlordism’ to deal with adversary, like in Khulm. While the terms 
‘commander’ and ‘warlord’ have a negative connotation, they should be judged by how they 
use their power and the benefits they might bring for their constituents (Johnson and Leslie, 
2004), which also applies for district governors. The two cases further reveal how ‘official 
politics’ is very much intertwined with and influenced by the ‘everyday politics’ and ‘advo-
cacy politics ‘of citizens and civil society groups who oppose or modify government policies 
and practice.  
 
                                               
16
 Christian Aid, for instance, developed a toolkit for communities to monitor government policies (Moss, 2007). 
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One limitation of this research, however, is that the impact of the two structural risk reduc-
tion measures highlighted in this chapter – reforestation in Herat, and river normalization in 
Pati -  could not fully be assessed. The trees need at least four years to grow before some 
change can be noticed in the quantity of sand coming into the villages and covering agricul-
tural land (Virgo et al, 2006). The normalization of the 60 km long Juwana river started in 
September 2010 and was still going on at the time of this writing. There are however some 
tangible outcomes: through local level lobby and advocacy, civil-society organizations could 
access national level financial resources for disaster risk reduction. Considering that 90% of 
the financial resources for DRR are being kept by the government at the national level 
(chapter 4), it is quite an achievement that civil-society organisations at district level could 
access these resources for a structural risk reduction measure. A second important outcome 
is the change in civil society-government relationship from antagonistic towards agonic, in 
the sense that the district government views Jampi Sawan as a legitimate actor in the politi-
cal arena. They do not share the same views on disaster risk reduction, but they realize they 
need to engage with one another to address floods.  
 
It is crucial to recognize that multi-actor, multi-level interactions in the field of DRR are a 
political arena in which each actor tries to challenge or defend institutional arrangements. 
For aid agencies seeking to support local communities, it is crucial to understand the gov-
ernance context, in the different ways in which power and authority relations are structured 
in a specific context of state –civil-society relationships (Nuijten, 2004:109). I took an actor-
oriented approach as an analytical framework to study the policy-implementation-outcome 
problematic concerning CBDRR. I attached importance to take the perspectives of local 
people and NGO field staff without ignoring the broader social, institutional context and its 
history. The strength of the actor-orientation is its focus on ‘room for manoeuvre’, and 
viewing interventions as a ‘political arena’ where the various actors negotiate, debate and 
try to advance their risk agendas which is demonstrated in the cases from Herat and Central 
Java. However, by focusing on ‘room for manoeuvre’, the outcomes and findings attached 
to these two cases may get more significance than when I had focused on the constraining 
structures. I raised the limitation of the time-frame to assess the impact of the reforestation 
in Herat, but what will happen if the district governor of Ghoryan will not be re-elected. Also 
in Central Java, government’s resources were released after tactical negotiations of Jampi 
Sawan, but only good for 10 km river normalization, not yet for the complete 60 km long 
river system. An analysis of the constraining structures would have put the research findings 
in a more realistic perspective.  
 
Aside from the two cases highlighted in this chapter, also the CBDRR-pilots in the other 
localities revealed that the kind of risk reduction measures identified and implemented, 
dealt mostly with engaging authorities beyond village level, for either tapping resources 
(Bamyan and Nahreen), or reworking relationships and institutions that would benefit 
people’s livelihoods and safety. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the risk reduction 
measures that were implemented based on risk mapping: tapping government resources, 
influencing and revising policies and regulations, and getting the legal support from govern-
ment authorities to sustain risk reduction measures like reforestation, address the dynamic 
pressures and root causes of people’s vulnerability to disasters and conflict (Blaikie et al, 
1994). These strategies aim to push and change institutional arrangements to become 
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‘enabling’. The strategies illustrate how one can arrive at an enabling environment as listed 
by Twigg (2007).  
 
Table 7.1: Risk reduction measures implemented in the CBDRR pilots 
Locality Risk prioritization Risk reduction measures implemented 
Ghoryan, Herat, 
Afghanistan 
Sandstorms, domestic 
violence, drug addiction, 
disputes with adjacent 
villages 
Reforestation of 20 hectares pastureland and legitimizing ‘social 
fencing’ of 50 hectares with district government authority; Con-
struction of two women resource centres. Literacy class started 
before centres were finished. 
Bamyan, 
Afghanistan 
Rocks, avalanches, floods Removal of rocks. Tree planting on high risk slopes. Reconstruction 
of damaged bridge. Vaccination of livestock that serves as safety-
net. 
Nahreen, Baghlan, 
Afghanistan 
Floods, drought, food 
shortage 
Early warning system and evacuation, making and installing gabion 
constructions to protect crops, livestock and houses; expanding 
early warning system to whole district; Lobby provincial govern-
ment to demand national level resources for DRR and climate 
change adaptation 
Pati, Central Java, 
Indonesia 
Floods - sedimentation Evacuation centre in one village; goat dispersal; training of com-
munity health workers; establishing fish ponds; sectoral CBO net-
working and issue-based alliance building (Jampi Sawan); lobby 
government institutions for river normalization; revised village 
regulations to include DRR measures 
Muria region, Cen-
tral java, 
Indonesia 
Landslides, flash floods, 
floods – sedimentation, 
garbage blocking drainage 
Tapping government resources for reforestation activities; facili-
tating dialogues between villagers and village authorities; facilitat-
ing networking among sectoral CBOs across villages; facilitating 
dialogue between upstream and downstream villages;  
Revised village regulations to include DRR measures to manage 
natural resources in two villages 
Halmahera, 
Northern Maluku, 
Indonesia 
Land disputes, coastal ero-
sion, floods, pollution 
Facilitating dialogues between adjacent villages; lobby with 
relevant government departments to provide clarity about land 
issues 
 
The Afghanistan cases – both the reforestation and the women’s safe house - show that a 
prerequisite for success is that one should deal with the past and current conflict contexts in 
which the CBDRR intervention operates. Competing claims on natural resources, a change in 
ethnic-political power relations after refugees returned from Iran, and changes in govern-
ment’s land policies are crucial to be considered before entering negotiation processes 
among the various stakeholders. The reforestation intervention is not simply planting wind-
breaks to mitigate or prevent sandstorms, but a complex negotiation process involving 40 
villages and government officials to achieve ‘social fencing’ and legitimate access to land 
and resources for a specific timeframe, after which the terms for lease will need to be re-
negotiated. The contract and ‘social fencing’ are further meant to reduce tensions and con-
flict among the villages and ethnic groups. These arrangements may work on the short term 
and for the villages under lease contract. But closure of pastures in Dehran and Roshnan 
may cause negative impacts elsewhere.  
 
The women from Ghoryan faced more obstacles to get their risk problem recognized and 
implemented. Drug addiction and prostitution are realities that the Afghan government 
prefers to be non-existent. Goodhand (2008) suggests that provincial formal politics are 
deeply integrated with informal structures and networks engaged in the drugs economy. 
Their power is closely linked to the capacity to generate money and patronage through the 
drugs economy (ibid: 411). How these linkages work out in the case of Ghoryan wasn’t part 
of my research, but it is likely that the lack of institutional support for the women’s risk 
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priorities are related to the government’s ‘remote control’ engagement with the drugs 
economy.  
 
Politics is omnipresent in the everyday-CBDRR practices. Policy-makers, donors and practi-
tioners should start to accept that CBDRR is not a series of short-term local interventions, 
but a long term political process. This means that we make the social, institutional and po-
litical context visible in the risk analysis. Each actor produces a ‘risk construct’ according to 
their interests, interpretations, and values, that may be hidden for others involved in the 
process. Although these underlying values and views are in itself political in nature, it will be 
a challenge to bring them to the open from the start. If not, they will probably become evi-
dent during the process of shaping, implementing and evaluating risk reduction measures 
together, like the Central Java case of normalization shows, and the case of the women’s 
safe house in Ghoryan. Evidence-based research into CBDRR interventions, where power 
dynamics, different values, worldviews, trust, negotiation outcomes, skills and knowledge 
play a role, could hopefully contribute to the shift mentioned by Christoplos (2001) – a shift 
from a focus on which technical solution works, towards a concentration on the political 
process of how these choices are made and their impact.  
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8.                                                        What is CBDRR really?  
 
 
Conclusions, conceptual reflections and implications for aid programming 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapters reflect my efforts to meaningfully rethink Community-Based  
approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction by opening the ‘black box’ of CBDRR policy and 
practice. I wished to critically reflect on the workings of the aid chain to identify constraints 
that cause a mismatch between humanitarian aid programming and local realities of 
disaster and conflict-affected people. ICCO and Kerkinactie (I&K), the two aid agencies 
involved, assumed that Community-Based approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) 
could link relief to development, generate structural risk solutions, and therefore better 
attune to local needs. Together with them, I explored the ‘political arena’ of disaster risk 
reduction in different local settings to understand the political and institutional perspectives 
on CBDRR. Like Oxfam-Novib I was further interested in exploring whether CBDRR 
approaches have the potential to implement disaster risk reduction measures in a way that 
they also address divisions and grievances leading to violent conflict.  This research project 
can be characterized as a critical transformative engagement with CBDRR thinking and 
practice. CBDRR approaches should not be romanticized and neither are top-down 
approaches to disaster management irrelevant. 
 
The research focused on local level responses to recurrent small-scale disasters and conflict 
in Afghanistan and Indonesia. A total of four Afghan NGOs and five Indonesian NGOs joined 
the interactive research through so-called CBDRR-pilots in a total of 44 villages. These pilots 
consisted of testing a new approach to respond to recurrent disasters in conflict settings 
beyond emergency relief, by actually ‘doing CBDRR’, and to reflect on the intervention 
processes and outcomes. In addition, I reflected on my own CBDRR experience in the 
Philippines from 1993 till 2001. The research had a particular interest in the social, political 
and institutional relations between the social actors involved when responding to recurrent 
disasters and conflict, and how CBDRR interventions took shape in a certain institutional 
context taking a historical perspective. This interest found its way into the following 
research question: “What are the reasons for the differing outcomes of CBDRR interventions 
in disaster and conflict affected contexts in Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines?”. 
Outcomes refer to whose risk and vulnerability is reduced with special attention for the 
most vulnerable and marginalised groups in the village.  
 
I view disasters and conflict both as political events and as opportunities for social change as 
opposite to viewing these phenomena as external events. Disaster politics and the interplay 
between disasters and conflict are areas long neglected by many researchers and practi-
tioners (Olson, 2000; Christoplos et al, 2001; Pelling and Dill, 2009). Disasters and conflict 
are both understood as the product of a cumulative set of changing institutional arrange-
ments and policy decisions over a long period of time (Comfort et al, 1999). Vice versa, 
disasters and conflict affect institutional arrangements and re-order power relations. 
Recovery efforts and addressing the underlying risk factors involve debates, negotiations, 
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and struggles over prevailing risk narratives, over maintaining, adapting or creating institu-
tions, and how to use and allocate resources. I use Olson’s three questions to investigate 
the politics of disaster risk reduction in conflict settings: (1) What happened? (2) Why were 
the losses so high/low? and (3) What will happen now? An institutional and political analysis 
is often the missing link in most risk and vulnerability assessments to explain people’ 
vulnerability, and for strategizing actions to create resilient communities (Twigg, 2009; 
2007). This approach challenges the simplistic dichotomies between governments’ top-
down disaster management approaches and bottom-up CBDRR approaches, since – as this 
research has shown - CBDRR interventions are not isolated distinct entities, but very much 
intertwined with the broader institutional environment of risk reduction.  
 
This concluding chapter starts with drawing together the conceptual insights based on the 
findings of this research. In section 8.1 I will set out what CBDRR is and means in disaster 
and conflict-affected contexts with their particular institutional and political settings. 
Section 8.2 concludes on the potential and nature of CBDRR in conflict settings. The various 
concepts that make up CBDRR will be revisited in section 8.3. In section 8.4 I will answer the 
research question explaining the reasons for differing outcomes of CBDRR-interventions, 
followed by the implications for aid programming in section 8.5.  
 
8.1 What is CBDRR really? – an approach of which meanings and intentions are contested 
Numerous abbreviations exist to express the nature of interventions that intend to support 
disaster and conflict affected people. Andrew Maskrey (1989) started to use Community-
Based Disaster Mitigation, whereas CDRC chose to use Citizenry-Based and Development-
Oriented Disaster Response, purposely avoiding the term ‘community-based’ as this had a 
political connotation of ‘anti-government’ during the time of Martial Law installed by 
President Marcos (Chapter 3). Towards the end of the 1990s, policy-makers and the inter-
national NGOs rapidly adopted and promoted CBDRR as an alternative to top-down 
approaches in disaster management which often failed to recognize local needs and 
realities. Since then, CBDRR became a fashionable notion among policy-makers, donors, 
governments and (I)NGOs. However, behind their shared CBDRR language, I found divergent 
interpretations and practices. Although the UN recognized the importance to involve local 
communities in disaster risk reduction in its Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), its CBDRR 
tradition, laid down in the HFA, still resonates with top-down, short-term and isolated 
responses, portraying local people as ignorant, un-informed, and un-prepared (Chapter 4). 
The interactions between the Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster 
Reduction (GNDR) - which critically monitors the governments’ progress  in disaster risk 
reduction - and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 
since 2007, revealed how the UN negate politics in policy language and texts, subordinate 
local perspectives to expert knowledge and authorities, and channel DRR resources to 
mainly national governments. These resources are primarily utilized for scientific fore-
casting, platform meetings, infrastructure, and public awareness – seldom for local level 
structural risk solutions. On the other hand, civil-society organizations tend to romanticize 
CBDRR approaches, assuming that CBDRR is inherently ‘good’ because  of its ‘participatory’ 
and ‘empowering’ features. Problematizing and recognizing the political nature of CBDRR 
policy and practice is still new, and how to engage with government without being co-opted 
remains a challenge. Civil-society groups implementing CBDRR like in Central Java, 
Indonesia, and Herat, Afghanistan, played a significant role in challenging the various 
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political sub-systems to improve the government’s performance in disaster risk reduction. 
These experiences in very different state-society configurations could be inspiring for the 
GNDR members to move the ‘Views from the Frontline’ initiative towards national action-
agendas. 
 
Empirical evidence from the CBDRR pilots revealed that local people, local NGOs, funding 
agencies and government officials, attached different meanings and objectives to CBDRR. 
These variations arise because actors have divergent interpretations of their experienced 
history of disaster events, about people’s needs, of their own role and each other, and the 
institutional environment in which CBDRR interventions were made. At the start, the CBDRR 
pilots took a hazard-focused viewpoint dealing with systematizing early-warning systems, 
evacuation shelter, search and rescue, and enabling access to safe drinking water. Strength-
ening livelihoods was part of the NGO’s entry-points strategy. However, as it turned out, 
these concerns were already largely dealt with through people’s kinship relations and social 
networks within and beyond the community (Chapter 5). As a consequence local people, 
through risk assessments with village authorities and CBOs, requested little support for life-
saving disaster preparedness measures, except the landless labourers in Kasiyan, Indonesia, 
and the shuras (customary village councils) in Nahreen, Afghanistan. This is in itself an 
important research finding, since a lot of humanitarian assistance is still based on the 
assumption that life-saving measures should be the priority in CBDRR policy and practice.  
 
In many localities, people give priority to addressing the underlying risk factors to find 
structural solutions to achieve safety and to secure their livelihoods. They refer to cases 
where achieving safety and security requires the involvement of multi-level institutions and 
authority like the reforestation initiative in Herat and the flood mitigation lobby in Central 
Java, or to cases where they face antagonistic social relations around access to resources 
like in Khulm, Afghanistan, and Halmahera, Indonesia. “Better to have secure access to land, 
than a newly built house” – according to a village head in Halmahera whose house burnt 
down during the violence. These kinds of safety and security are related to people’s rights to 
be respected, but which in practice are often denied or ignored by humanitarian aid agen-
cies (Berry and Reddy, 2010). Reasons for this ignorance relate to organizational structures 
of aid agencies which separate humanitarian emergency aid from development program-
mes. CBDRR projects are often implemented by humanitarian units. Secondly, hazard-
focused, short term interventions easily overlook underlying risk factors. ADPC’s CBDRR field 
practitioner’s handbook, for instance, remains silent about lobbying and advocacy processes 
to find durable risk solutions.  
 
Interventions like CBDRR are embedded in a broader institutional context of state-civil 
society relationships, which constrain or enable local actors to advance their risk-solutions, 
are linked to previous interventions and experiences, and have consequences for future 
ones. This explains why NGOs in Afghanistan attach a very different meaning to CBDRR than 
in Indonesia, or in the Philippines. Table 8.1 shows the meaning local NGOs attach to CBDRR 
in different contexts, and these differ from the meaning which their funding agencies attach 
to CBDRR. These meanings are based on discussions, reflection and sense-making sessions 
with NGO staff of the respective agencies, during the implementation of the CBDRR-pilot 
and towards the end of the research. These different meanings imply that there is no such 
thing as the CBDRR approach.  
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Table 8.1: Meanings attached to CBDRR in different institutional settings by local NGOs and funding agencies 
Afghan 
NGOs  
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce risks, to make people believe in their own resources to become 
self-reliant, and to overcome aid dependency. CBDRR is viewed as an approach to re-order aid 
relations between NGOs and aid recipients. CBDRR considers past and current conflicts over 
resources, and seeks for the appropriate authority and institutional arrangements to legitimize 
interventions and outcomes.  
Indonesian 
NGOs in 
Central Java 
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce immediate risks, to make people conscious about why they are 
at risk and enhance their skills to enter political spaces to negotiate, influence or oppose government 
policies, and to re-order government institutions from village to national level to make them 
responsible actors so they seriously implement DRR policies. In Central Java, CBDRR takes a 
watershed approach connecting upstream with downstream villages through CBO alliances. 
Indonesian 
NGO in 
Halmahera 
Enhance people’s motivational and attitudinal capacities to reduce immediate risks and tensions, 
and to improve people’s livelihoods and economic resources 
CDRC in the 
Philippines 
Enhance people’s capacity to reduce immediate vulnerable conditions, to make people conscious 
about why they are vulnerable, and enable people to gain access to social and political resources to 
obtain safety and protection from the local to the national level. CDRC organizes people’s 
organizations and facilitates alliance building between vulnerable and less vulnerable sectors. They 
enter the political arena through various democratic institutions to negotiate, debate, and challenge 
power inequalities, holding the government accountable to address the root causes of people’s 
vulnerability and struggle for justice, peace and responsible governance.  
ICCO & 
Kerkinactie 
CBDRR as a methodology; a participatory, bottom-up approach aimed to formulate humanitarian 
and development aid programmes that recognize local people's risk perspectives. CBDRR aims to 
rework hierarchical, top-down oriented management styles of local partners to enhance downward 
accountability
1
. 
Oxfam-
Novib 
CBDRR as part of the road map to contribute to the improvement of local humanitarian capacities in 
times of major disasters through community contingency planning. In 2009, it viewed CBDRR as an 
approach to promote resilience of communities and strengthen their capacities for self-reliance. 
 
In Chapter 4, I presented two CBDRR traditions: (1) the CBDRR tradition promoted by the 
international community, and (2) the home-grown CBDRR traditions, both visualised again 
in Figure 8.1. This Figure regards the two CBDRR-traditions as extremes on both sides of 
various continua, whereas empirical findings reveal that both CBDRR traditions actually 
interact and are intertwined in practice through their particular adherents. The significance 
of this research is that it shows the need to look beyond the binaries of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to reduce risks, and to understand how in the political arena of 
disaster risk reduction, adherents of the different CBDRR traditions negotiate the principles 
and features of their CBDRR-tradition, resulting in varying CBDRR-practices, outcomes and 
meanings.  
 
Figure 8.1: Nature of CBDRR traditions expressed through their primary features on the continua 
 
Origin 
 
 
View on disasters 
 
 
Purpose 
 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor-driven,                                                                       Home-grown, locally negotiated 
Internationally negotiated                                                 
 
External event                                                                     Matter of vulnerability -   
                                                                                               Opportunity for social change 
 
Reduces people’s physical                                                Social transformation 
exposure to hazards 
 
Natural hazards                                                                   Integrates everyday livelihoods, 
restoring normalcy                                                              security concerns with preparing for 
disruption/disaster/conflict  
 
 
                                                 
1
  This was a dominant meaning from 2006 till 2009 in the Steering Group of I&K. After internal debates, this meaning was 
replaced with the meaning that best resonates with the one in Central Java. 
 
 
253 
 
Priority in 
intervention 
 
 
Participation 
 
Levels involved 
 
 
Community 
 
 
 
Resources 
 
 
 
Longevity 
Physical measures, early                                                    Strengthening community  
warning, awareness raising                                               institutions, mobilizing collective action 
life-saving actions                                                                 
 
Consultation, project-focus                                               Empowering, process-focus 
 
Multi-level partnerships,                                                    Multi-level, multi actor collaboration 
harmonious cooperation                                                    in power force field 
 
Administrative unit of local                                                Most vulnerable groups, recognizing  
government, “common good”                                           local elite  
approach 
 
External funds                                                                      Locally generated resources, 
voluntarism, political commitment, 
external funds 
 
On-off through platforms                                                  Dynamic and adaptive to changing 
institutional context 
 
Politicization and de-politicization of CBDRR interventions 
Flood mitigation, watershed management, reforestation, regulating access to natural 
resources, settling disputes, and construction of evacuation and women resource centres, 
involve decisions about people, spaces and their interactions. This makes risk reduction 
highly political. Local people, NGOs and civil society organizations turn to governments who 
are expected to create enabling political and legislative environments. But as the cases 
show, many governments do not prioritize, or are reluctant to change policies or legislation 
which favours vulnerable communities. The various actors deal with ‘the political’ ranging 
from confronting it, denying it, or escaping it.  
 
The local NGOs in this research attach a particular meaning to CBDRR which points to the 
(ideological) background of each NGO, how they interpret local circumstances, and which 
largely determine the nature of the organization’s responses. Whereas the Steering Group 
from I&K explicitly take a political perspective on CBDRR, Oxfam-Novib views CBDRR as a 
non-political intervention. Oxfam-Novib and its Afghan partners aim to improve local  com-
munities’ contingency planning like early warning, evacuation and other disaster prepared-
ness measures. Although these measures look a-political in nature, they can lead to social 
divisions and unstable livelihoods like in Khulm, when NGOs focus on the techniques of 
CBDRR-practice rather than on its politics. In Nahreen, the local NGO is aware of the 
differences among local people and applies the ‘do no harm’ approach as part of risk 
assessments, thereby applying the techniques in a political and conflict sensitive manner.  
 
The local partners of I&K mostly attach a political meaning to CBDRR with the exception of 
the local partners in Halmahera. Because of the long history of these partners that stem 
from the colonial past, they prefer non-political interventions and are reluctant to engage in 
activities that are labelled as political, like lobby and advocacy against the mining company 
in Buli. The field staff further experiences constraints and reluctance from the local partner’s 
board to support them in solving the land disputes affecting the selected villages. The board 
prefers economic activities to improve people’s livelihoods with quick and tangible results, 
since this is a way to show the organization’s effectiveness. In contrast to most local NGOs, 
international aid agencies tend to portray their interventions as a-political and neutral, to 
avoid suspicion of back-donors and the broader public of choosing sides in a conflict or 
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supporting local party politics. Also governments escape politics in DRR by casting problems 
and solutions in technical terms.  
 
Hence, there are different processes through which organizations – local NGOs, civil society 
organizations, funding agencies, government – arrive at a specific framing of local realities 
and their responses in the context they live and work. These are related to their histories, 
current state - civil society relationships, and their mandate on how they legitimize their 
interventions. So, NGOs either underscore the politics of their interventions or rather de-
politicize them. From the experiences of this research it is plausible to conclude that when 
one ignores to view CBDRR interventions in a political and institutional manner, the out-
comes of the interventions are likely to reproduce the status quo. This is one of the main 
explanations for the varying outcomes of the CBDRR-pilots. 
 
8.2 Potential of CBDRR approaches in conflict settings  
This PhD thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the interplay between disasters and 
conflict, and how to support communities that are affected by both disasters and conflict. 
Disasters increasingly happen in contexts of conflict and political instability (Buchanan-Smith 
and Christoplos, 2004; Spiegel et al, 2007; Nel and Righarts, 2008). A focus either on disaster 
risk reduction or conflict prevention simplifies local realities, making aid programming less 
effective. Aid programming is currently still organized according to a division in emergency 
relief, development work and conflict prevention or peace building. Research and bodies of 
literature on disasters and disaster risk reduction developed rather separate from those on 
war and peace. This research explores both local perspectives on disaster and conflict 
through collecting local people’s risk narratives (Chapter 5) and searches for conceptual 
commonalities to analyse what people do in times of crisis, what choices they make and 
why, and how aid programming could best support them.   
 
This research and other studies carried out in Afghanistan and Indonesia, show that people 
dealing with disasters and conflict survive mainly due to their social networks, informal insti-
tutions, and political connections to more influential people, and not because of outside aid 
(Bhatia, et al, 2003; Christoplos, 2004; Kantor and Pain, 2011). This raises questions like 
whether external aid should be simply stopped, since it has little impact. Or, should aid 
programming shift from an emphasis on basic service delivery, with a focus on individual 
households, towards more attention to reworking local institutional arrangements to 
address the underlying risk factors? I argue for the latter based on the experiences in 
particularly Herat, Baghlan and Central Java. 
 
Through reflection and sense-making efforts with NGO field staff, it became clear that the 
link between disasters and conflict is situated in institutional arrangements: mitigating the 
impact of sandstorms, will at the same time reduce tensions between adjacent villages, 
when community leaders, the NGO and the district governor all adhere to the ‘contract’ 
they signed. This ‘contract’ sets out the newly created institutional arrangements: roles and 
responsibilities of all parties, authority, imposing fines when violating rules concerning the 
‘social fencing’, among others.  Such a contract re-orders ‘the rules of the game’, the kind of 
‘players of the game’, and re-orders power relations. Efforts to reduce disaster risk and stop 
violence locally draw on social, organizational and political resources of villagers and their 
leaders, and their ability to engage with a wide range of actors. These include actors who 
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initiate risk reduction or peace efforts, those committing or potentially commit violence, 
and those whose responsibility it is to maintain law and order, and provide safety and 
protection (Heijmans et al, 2009). Local leaders and local NGOs played a facilitative role. 
 
When viewing CBDRR as a political and institutional approach to reduce risk, it has com-
monalities with the Do no Harm approach (Anderson, 1999) and conflict sensitive pro-
gramming2. These approaches explore who is who in the community, who are connectors 
and who are the dividers, what are their risk perspectives, how do institutions function, 
what are institutional histories, past and current conflicts and the forms of power per-
formed. The approaches further stress to understand the interaction between the inter-
vention and the context, and to act upon this  understanding, in order to avoid negative 
impacts. Chapter 5 concluded that local institutional arrangements largely determine how 
people’s social and political vulnerability to disasters and conflict work out locally. Empirical 
findings show that local institutions limit or support people’s options and survival strategies, 
since local institutions encompass both the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘players of the game’ 
involving power dynamics. The ‘players’ can decide to reduce risk or to resist such efforts, 
like in Khulm, Afghanistan; they can decide to stop violence or to ignore attempts to make 
peace, like in Halmahera, Indonesia. The notion of ‘institutions’ can therefore be used 
analytically to blur the demarcation between disaster and conflict theories and practice, 
since institutions regulate access to resources, the handling of disputes, the maintenance of 
social order, social protection, and livelihood security at the local level. In Chapter 1 I argued 
to view both conflict and disasters as processes and political events, and based on this 
research, I add that the creation of new multi-level institutional arrangements can regulate 
both disaster risk reduction and solving conflicts resulting in new kinds of power relations.  
 
From an NGO perspective, a focus on local institutional arrangements alone may create 
blind spots. The ’everyday politics’ practice of some groups may be overlooked, like for 
instance, Afghan women, landless migrants in Kasiyan, or ethnic groups in Halmahera who 
are socially excluded, and don’t engage with nor benefit from local institutions. Their 
invisibility for NGOs does not necessarily mean that these groups do not influence local 
institutions. Being aware of an ‘everyday politics’ perspective, makes their behaviour visible 
allowing it to matter, and give their practice political significance.  
 
Participation in times of violent conflict 
Aid agencies often argue that in times of war and disasters, ‘participation’ is not possible, 
because of people’s pressing needs that require immediate action. My experience in 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines in conflict-affected areas taught me that CBDRR 
interventions and preparedness support for better self-protection is possible through 
people’s participation, even while conflict is going on. Policy makers, donors and aid 
agencies tend to regard conflicts as something abnormal, as ‘human disasters’ or ‘complex 
political emergencies’, and therefore they respond in an emergency mode (Korf, 2004b, 
2005). Conflict contexts like Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines can be characterized 
by “no peace no war” situations, where periods of relative calmness are interrupted by 
occasional eruptions of violence, followed by another period of relative stability. I explained 
in Chapter 6 that CBDRR interventions should not be isolated from the broader context, and 
this broader context covers a “no peace no war” situation as well (Richards, 2005), where 
                                                 
2 http://www.conflictsensitivity.org 
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one cannot separate disaster risk reduction from security. It is important to stress that a 
political and institutional approach to CBDRR implies that CBDRR practice is not a one-time, 
short-term intervention to reduce people’s risks. I view CBDRR as an approach to encourage 
local initiatives and to support groups of people before, during and after disasters and 
conflict occur, to establish alliances, networks, or governance arrangements that function 
whether local people stay in their villages, get displaced or become inaccessible for aid 
workers. What matters is that the relationship between NGOs and villagers continues, and 
takes on flexible forms. NGOs and villagers enter network-support relations beyond the 
traditional project and funding relationships. 
 
Barrs (2009) documented manifold ways how local communities protect themselves and 
survive amid conflict and how NGOs could further strengthen these self-protection tactics. 
Afghan NGOs continue support to conflict and disaster affected communities in Uruzgan, 
Baghlan and Herat, through ‘distant assistance’, thanks to its long-standing relationship with 
these communities. This approach raises questions of accountability, and how warring 
parties influence the process and outcomes of interventions. However, if the relationship 
between local NGOs and local people is long-standing and a trusted one, ‘distant assistance’ 
is an appropriate mode of supporting local people in need, particularly when institutional 
arrangements are known by the NGO. These distant forms of CBDRR practice have potential 
as a strategy to follow up on the frequently heard recommendations in evaluation reports 
after major emergencies, namely “to strengthen local capacities” for humanitarian assis-
tance. Shuras, CBOs, village authorities, and POs can conduct damage needs assessments in 
their locality or in adjacent villages to reduce favouritism – as applied in Uruzgan - and relay 
the results to the local NGO or the government department which can check the plausibility 
of the data submitted. Participation in areas of no war and no peace may be ambivalent, but 
not a priori impossible (Korf, 2005). The steps that local Afghan NGOs developed to put 
CBDRR into practice (Box 6.9) are supposed to reduce the risk of being co-opted. 
 
8.3 Re-examining the prevailing definitions of CBDRR concepts 
One of the aims of this interactive research is to generate new knowledge and to theorize 
on what CBDRR is, - specifically on the concepts that make up CBDRR like ‘community’, 
‘community-based’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘risk’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘resilience’. In the following section I review the current definitions of the various 
CBDRR-concepts which I define in Chapter 1 using prominent reference sources like ADPC’s 
Field Practitioners’ Handbook on Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (Abarquez 
and Murshed, 2004), UNISDR publications ‘Living with Risk’ (2004) and ‘Indigenous 
Knowledge for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2008). Many concepts hide different meanings and 
dimensions, and below I will elicit these meanings as they appear in a specific cultural and 
political historic context. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the prevailing and re-examined 
definitions of CBDRR-concepts.  
 
Disaster: from an external to a political event 
‘The serious disruption of the functioning of society causing widespread human, 
material or environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected commu-
nities to cope with using their own resources. Disasters occur when the negative 
effects of the hazards are not well managed’ (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6).   
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Olson’s first question ‘What happened?’ generates many different answers and interpreta-
tions of the same event. Floods in Khulm, for instance, are regarded a ‘disaster’ by the up-
stream villagers, but are a ‘blessing’ for the downstream villagers. A ‘disaster’ is a political 
event, and its explanations and outcomes are embedded in a societal history which pro-
duced patterns of vulnerability, and to which political systems must respond. Disasters are 
an opportunity for social change.  
 
Community: from a social and territorial towards an institutional conceptualization 
‘People living in one geographical area, who are exposed to common hazards due to 
their location. They may have common experience in responding to hazards and 
disasters. However, they may have different perceptions and exposure of risk. 
Groups within the locality will have a stake in risk reduction measures – either in 
favour or against’ (ibid: 8). 
 
The NGOs selected disaster-affected villages, but soon they could not clearly identify the 
boundaries of the community: “where do they begin and end, what form do boundaries 
take – spatial, social, ethnic, authority?”. Evidence from the field shows the overlapping, 
shifting and subjective nature of ‘communities’ and the permeability of boundaries. ADPC’s 
definition acknowledges people’s different perceptions and exposure of risk, but the 
research findings reveal that people do not have a common experience in responding to 
disasters. Their ways of dealing with adversity differ, and these are embedded in social 
positions and the historical, institutional context. Consequently the notion of ‘community’ is 
socially constructed, and is instrumental in mobilizing one’s social, political or religious 
affiliations to achieve certain goals such as defending access to resources like the stories 
from Halmahera, Khulm and Tempur reveal. 
 
In a second instance, people’s view on ‘community’ referred to specific community struc-
tures and regulations, like shura, ashar, gotong royong and adat, which have to do with 
managing and regulating how different social entities relate to one another, what their 
community responsibilities are and the management of resources like land, forests and 
water. These two views together link people and their interactions with spaces and 
resources, and bring a political dimension into the conceptualization of ‘community’. 
Consequently, I arrive at a multi-dimensional approach to the notion of ‘community’: 
‘community’ is socially constructed, and links social actors to local institutions and their 
histories. ‘Community’ is not restricted to the village administrative boundaries3.  
 
Community-based as a multi-scale, social and institutional system 
‘At risk communities are actively engaged in the identification, analysis, treatment, 
monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks. People are at the heart of decision-
making and implementation of disaster risk reduction activities. The involvement of 
the most vulnerable is paramount and the support of the less vulnerable is  
necessary. In CBDRR, local and national governments are involved and supportive’ 
(ibid: 9). 
 
                                                 
3 In this research project, ‘community boundaries’ seldom corresponded with the administrative boundaries of the villages 
initially targeted for the CBDRR pilots.  
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ADPC’s definition of ‘community-based’ is project management-oriented, and views govern-
ment as a supportive actor. Field findings reveal that the CBDRR-process of organizing the 
community, conduct of risk assessments, prioritizing risk, identification of risk reduction 
measures, and resource allocation involves power plays, negotiation, debate and lobby 
among actors with different, and at times competing risk perspectives and interests. Getting 
risk solutions implemented, and addressing underlying risk factors require the engagement 
with and support from institutions and authorities higher in the hierarchy. ‘Community-
based’ refers to a multi-scale, social and institutional system beyond the village level to 
negotiate and demand risk solutions steered by disaster and conflict-affected people.  
 
The CBDRR pilots demonstrate that disaster risks can be reduced by by-passing village 
authorities and influencing institutional arrangements beyond the local level. ‘Community-
based’ means in Khulm the involvement of eight villages depending on the same water 
source, in Herat 40 villages using fodder and firewood in pasturelands and the authority of 
the district governor, while in Central Java, community-based is being stretched to the 
meaning of flood-affected villages along the 60-kilometer long Juwana River organized 
through Jampi Sawan, and involving government authorities like Balai Besar at the national 
level.   
 
Local knowledge is not collectively owned but differentiated and partial 
‘Practices developed by a group of people from an advanced understanding of the 
local environment, which has been formed over numerous generations of habitation’ 
(UNISDR, 2008: vii).  
 
The UNISDR distinguishes local knowledge from other types of knowledge in that it origi-
nates from the community, that it is disseminated through informal means, it is collectively 
owned, subject to adaptation, and embedded in a community’s way of life as a means of 
survival’. The UNISDR assumes that the use of local knowledge improves disaster risk 
reduction practice.  
 
The multiple and contesting risk narratives studied during this interactive research uncover 
that local knowledge is not just ‘out there’ or collectively owned by a community, but 
differentiated, conflictive and partial. Instead of one container of local knowledge, different 
bodies of knowledge exist embedded in a social, cultural and institutional context. These 
different bodies of knowledge are socially constructed and embedded in power relations: 
whose risk, whose knowledge counts, and whose ideas are suppressed, depends on who is 
in the best social position to use his/her discursive power to gain support for his/her risk 
construct. Risk constructs and people’s options to articulate these, get listened to, and 
mobilize support, are further closely related to local institutional settings. For instance, 
people’s views in Muria region that landslides and flash floods occur due to mining, logging 
or intensive corn production on steep slopes, are suppressed by village authorities, who 
effectively silenced ‘disaster talk’.  
 
I redefine ‘local knowledge’ as consisting of different bodies of knowledge which are socially 
constructed and embedded in a social, cultural and institutional context. Local knowledge is 
differentiated, partial or conflictive and reflects local power relations.  
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Risk as a social construct 
‘The probability that negative consequences may arise when hazards interact with 
vulnerable areas, people, property and environment’ (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 
6). 
 
Research findings reveal that multiple and contesting risk narratives exist concerning the 
same disaster or conflict event. Because different risk perspectives exist, politics emerges in 
analysing who is in the best social position to get support for his risk construct, and whose 
risk perspectives get suppressed. NGO staff needs to be conscious about whose risk per-
spective is considered, and who decides on which risk reduction measure where to imple-
ment. Power differentials determine which risk reduction measure will be selected, and who 
benefits from this. Therefore, defining risk is not just an analysis of probabilities, using so-
called objective mathematical calculations. Risk is socially constructed and involves politics: 
whoever controls the definition of risk controls the solution at hand (Slovic, 1999: 699).  
 
Vulnerability in contrast to people’s everyday politics practice 
‘A concept which describes factors or constraints of an economic, social, physical or 
geographic nature, which reduce the ability of a community to prepare for and cope 
with risks’ (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6). 
 
In the context of recurrent disasters and conflict, local risk narratives are primarily about 
social networks, searching for justice, survival, breaking through the prevailing gender 
norms, and getting people’s rights respected by authorities. People do not talk about their 
vulnerability or that they rely on outside aid. Even if the formal institutional context is un-
clear or weak, people create new rules, adjust traditions, re-order power relations and try to 
change the local institutional arrangements so that these benefit them, while sometimes 
excluding others. Although people do not use the notion of ‘vulnerability’ to describe their 
worsening situation, they feel the stress, face difficulties, talk about ‘risks’ and make risk-
taking or risk-avoiding decisions. Although these decisions may be individually taken, the 
options people have to deal with risks are embedded in local institutional settings (Chapter 
5). People comply with these institutional settings, adjust them, contest norms and rules, or 
evade them by doing this in quiet and subtle ways, to which Kerkvliet (2009) refers as 
‘everyday politics’ practice. People are neither passive nor powerless.  
 
The concept of vulnerability is problematic when viewing disaster and conflict realities from 
the perspectives of local people and their everyday politics practice. ‘Vulnerability’ is not a 
real-time condition in which people live, but rather a social construct of aid providers to 
legitimate their actions. Consequently I regard the notion of ‘vulnerability’ as an analytical 
tool and an instrument for conscientization purposes to unravel institutional arrangements 
and power relations taking a historical perspective, shifting away from routinely categorizing 
women, children, refugees, elderly, widows, indigenous peoples and others as ‘most 
vulnerable’.  
 
Participation - constrained by local norms or stretched by ‘everyday politics’ practices 
‘The community takes responsibility for all stages of the program – from risk 
assessments, analysis, action-planning and decision-making’ (Abarquez and 
Murshed, 2004: 12-13). 
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Appropriately involving community and capitalizing on existing structures is believed to 
contribute to effective and sustainable risk reduction measures. Evidence from the field 
shows that ‘participation’ is related to local norms about decision-making and representa-
tion. The local political context and the prevailing norms around ‘participation’ influence 
who participates, and what form and intensity of participation is feasible or acceptable. On 
the other hand, the everyday politics practice of actors stretches the boundaries for partici-
pation like, for instance, Afghan women entering public spaces, farmers in Bungu construct-
ing a steel road blockade to stop mining, and Jampi Sawan, which gets access to the official 
politics of government’s decision-making. ‘Participation’ constitutes a terrain of contesta-
tion, “in which relations of power between different actors, each with their own ‘projects’, 
shape and reshape boundaries of action” (Cornwall, 2008: 276). Participation is a negotiated 
value, subject for debate among actors involved in CBDRR. This is an important reason that 
explains the policy-practice discrepancy in CBDRR.  
 
Empowerment – the transformative aspect of CBDRR  
‘Empowerment’ refers to changing power relations in favour of marginalized, 
excluded groups in society’ (ICCO Alliantie, 2006: 16).  
 
Although ‘empowerment’ is no longer part of ADPC’s Handbook, and absent in UNISDR 
publications, implicitly it is assumed that ‘strengthening people’s existing capacities’ and 
‘involving the most vulnerable groups‘ contribute to processes of empowerment. Power is 
perceived here as a property, which can be enlarged like suggested by the notion of 
‘empowerment’. I conceive ‘power’ as relational, which needs to be performed rather than 
achieved. Power relationships vary from being harmonious, cooperative to antagonistic and 
intimidating. Research findings demonstrate that antagonistic and intimidating relationships 
can change when institutions are adapted or new ones created through which local people 
expand their relationships outside their innate social networks. These include changing 
prevailing norms, values but also ‘frames of realities’ that legitimated previous relationships 
and arrangements. Local people use their social, organizational, motivational and political 
resources for this purpose, which turns out to be applicable in different contexts. What 
differs in the various contexts, are the strategies and options available to local actors which 
depend on the broader institutional context and state-civil society relationships. People’s 
options vary from ‘everyday politics’ to access resources, mobilizing effective agency for 
‘advocacy politics’, or entering the political arena with authorities and government and 
become a legitimate actor in ‘official politics’ to obtain safety and protection. Community 
organizers play a crucial role in facilitating this process, particularly their ability to bring 
opposing actors together while understanding the actors’ needs within their full social and 
political context. I define ‘empowerment’ as strategies and options, that arise from the local 
institutional context, to expand relationships outside people’s innate social networks, 
building on people’s social, organizational, motivational and political resources to create 
effective agency and to change antagonistic relationships’.  
 
Resilience -  ability to rework institutions through effective agency  
‘The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach or maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social 
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system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past 
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures’ 
(UNISDR, 2004: 6 volume II). 
 
Whereas ‘resilience’ is a concept that appears in policy documents of funding agencies like 
Oxfam-Novib, national governments (UNISDR, 2004) and discussed in the Steering Group of 
I&K, it is hardly referred to by local people, local NGO staff or government officials. Towards 
the end of this research project, when discussing the notion of ‘resilience’ with the NGOs, 
they raised questions about the proper scale to look at resilience, - a community, a water-
shed, nation-wide or globally-, and in whose interest has the concept been introduced in the 
field of CBDRR. ‘Resilience’ as a term represents good intentions and has a more positive 
image than ‘vulnerability’, but it hides the various ideologies and views of different actors 
on how to achieve resilience, and consequently it does not offer one set of concrete handles 
to operationalize it in practice. Not every adaptation is beneficial to all social groups and 
ecosystems, and some responses may increase the vulnerabilities of others. 
 
The NGOs equate ‘resilience’ with coping capacity and becoming self-reliant. Instead of 
using the notion of ‘resilience’, they focus on components of resilience as listed in Twigg’s 
Characteristics of a disaster-resilient community (2009), and adapt and prioritize these to 
their local contexts. These components set out steps to achieve safer conditions locally and 
to rework institutions beyond the village level, which is referred to as ‘the enabling environ-
ment’ in Twigg’s document (2009): 
 
(1)   Considering institutional arrangements for safety and protection at multiple levels 
taking a historical perspective;  
(2)   Risk assessments as a multi-purpose tool, particularly for facilitating negotiations to 
bridge differing risk perspectives; 
(3)   Combining a focus on people’s immediate safe conditions, with their practical livelihood 
needs, and long-term strategic needs;  
(4)   Engaging with relevant government departments;  
(5)   Mobilizing effective agency, either through alliance building, or ashar for community 
work.  
 
In the course of this research project, the notion of ‘resilience’ increasingly gained policy 
recognition among aid agencies dealing with disaster risk reduction, climate change or 
environmental protection. Although local NGOs and local authorities do not use the concept 
– which is a finding in itself – I wish to redefine the notion of ‘resilience’ in line with a 
political and institutional approach to CBDRR and recognizing the five components of 
resilience mentioned above. I redefine ‘resilience’ as: ‘People’s ability to use their social and 
political resources to engage in the political arena of DRR to uncover, debate and negotiate 
the different views and agendas of recovery and adaptation, and to strategize through 
effective agency how to re-order institutional arrangements that generate risk solutions in 
favour of vulnerable segments of society, their livelihoods and the environment’. 
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Table 8.2 Overview of the prevailing and re-examined definitions of CBDRR-concepts 
Concept Prevailing definition Definition re-examined 
Disaster ‘The serious disruption of the functioning of 
society causing widespread human, material or 
environmental losses, which exceed the ability of 
the affected communities to cope with using their 
own resources’ (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6) 
‘A disaster is a political event and its explanations 
and outcomes are embedded in a societal history 
which produced patterns of vulnerability, and to 
which political systems must respond. Disasters 
are an opportunity for social change’.  
Community ‘People living in one geographical area, who have 
common experience in responding to hazards, 
who have support networks, but who may have 
different risk perceptions and stakes in risk 
reduction’ (ibid: 8). 
‘Community’ is socially constructed, and links 
social actors to local institutions and their 
histories. Community is not restricted to the 
village administrative boundaries. 
Community-
based 
‘At risk communities are actively engaged in the 
identification, analysis, treatment, monitoring and 
evaluation of disaster risks. People are at the heart 
of decision-making and implementation of disaster 
risk reduction activities. The involvement of the 
most vulnerable is paramount and the support of 
the less vulnerable is necessary. In CBDRR, local 
and national governments are involved and 
supportive (ibid: 9). 
‘Community-based’ refers to a multi-scale, social 
and institutional system beyond the village level 
to negotiate and demand risk solutions steered by 
disaster and conflict-affected people.  
 
Local 
knowledge 
‘Practices developed by a group of people from an 
advanced understanding of the local environment, 
which has been formed over numerous 
generations of habitation’ (UNISDR, 2008: vii). 
Local knowledge consists of different bodies of 
knowledge which are socially constructed and 
embedded in a social, cultural and institutional 
context.  Local knowledge is differentiated, partial 
or conflictive and reflects local power relations.  
Risk ‘The probability that negative consequences may 
arise when hazards interact with vulnerable areas, 
people, property and environment’ resources’ 
(Abarquez and Murshed, 2004: 6) 
Risk is socially constructed and involves politics: 
“Whoever controls the definition of risk, controls 
the solution to the problem” (Slovic, 1999: 699).  
Vulnerability ‘A concept which describes factors or constraints 
of an economic, social, physical or geographic 
nature, which reduce the ability of a community to 
prepare for and cope with risks’ (ibid: 6) 
‘An analytical tool to unravel institutional 
arrangements and power relations taking a 
historical perspective, and for conscientization 
purposes, shifting away from routinely 
categorizing women, children, elderly, refugees, 
widows , migrants, etc.’. 
Participation ‘The community takes responsibility for all stages 
of the program – from risk assessments, analysis, 
action-planning and decision-making’ (ibid: 12-13). 
‘Participation constitutes a terrain of 
contestation.  Participation is set by local norms 
and values, but its boundaries can be stretched by 
people’s everyday politics practices’.  
Empowerment ‘Changing power relations in favour of 
marginalized, excluded groups in society’ (ICCO 
Alliantie, 2006: 16).  
‘Strategies and options that arise from the local 
institutional context, to expand relationships 
outside people’s innate social networks, building 
on people’s social, organizational, motivational 
and political resources to create effective agency 
and change antagonistic relationships’.  
Resilience ‘The capacity of a system, community or society 
potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by 
resisting or changing in order to reach or maintain 
an acceptable level of functioning and structure. 
This is determined by the degree to which the 
social system is capable of organizing itself to 
increase its capacity for learning from past 
disasters for better future protection and to 
improve risk reduction measures’ (UNISDR, 2004: 
6, Volume II).  
‘People’s ability to use their social and political 
resources to engage in the political arena of DRR 
to uncover, debate and negotiate the different 
views and agendas of recovery and adaptation, 
and to strategize through effective agency how to 
re-order institutional arrangements that generate 
risk solutions in favour of vulnerable segments of 
society, their livelihoods and the environment’. 
 
 
8.4  Answering the research questions 
In the preceding chapters I have outlined how local NGOs in the three countries and their 
funding agencies arrive at a specific framing of local realities and their responses, and con-
sequently attached a particular meaning to CBDRR. Based on the findings I re-examined the 
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prevailing definitions of CBDRR related concepts in policy documents. I arrived at the 
particular meaning and revisited definitions of CBDRR concepts, by studying the processes 
and outcomes of the CBDRR pilots in different contexts, searching for the answers on the 
research questions. The main research question was:  
“What are the reasons for the differing outcomes of CBDRR  interventions in disaster and 
conflict affected contexts in Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines?”.  
 
More specifically the research set out to answer the following three questions: 
1. How is CBDRR defined by different actors, and operationalized in practice?  
2. How do the various actors perform their different forms of power to shape CBDRR 
interventions?   
3. How does CBDRR enable disaster and conflict affected people to influence and change 
institutions that constrained them in reducing their vulnerability? 
 
Table 8.3 provides an overview of the outcomes of the CBDRR pilots in the different 
localities. CBDRR approaches aim to reduce people’s immediate and long-term vulnerability 
to disasters, at often stated in policy documents. I assessed the outcomes in terms of whose 
risk and vulnerability is reduced with special attention for marginalized and vulnerable 
groups: were they able to rework institutional arrangements and power relations to 
demand safety and protection?  
 
Table8.3: CBDRR pilot outcomes  
Locality Risk prioritization Whose risk and vulnerability is being reduced? 
Ghoryan, Herat, 
Afghanistan 
Sandstorms, domestic 
violence, drug addiction, 
disputes with adjacent 
villages 
A ‘social contract’ and ‘social fencing’ are new institutional 
arrangements to mitigate sandstorms and disputes, which benefit 
the various groups in Ghoryan. However long-term outcomes 
cannot yet be assessed. Women resource centres offer space to 
seek protection, health care and to possibly transform women’s 
everyday politics practice into more institutionalised efforts to 
further their protection agenda. The women resource centres are 
accepted by the male shuras at community level. 
Bamyan, 
Afghanistan 
Rocks, avalanches, floods In Ghulistan, people’s immediate exposure to falling rocks, ava-
lanches and floods was reduced benefitting the whole community. 
In two other villages no major changes occurred because the 
functioning of shuras was not questioned or challenged. 
Nahreen, 
Baghlan, 
Afghanistan 
Floods, drought, food 
shortage 
People’s safety concerning floods improved. Flood risk is pre-
dominantly a male concern. The NGO did not consider people’s risk 
problem of drought and food shortage as prioritized by women/ 
widows. Underlying risk factors were not addressed leaving people’s 
vulnerable conditions unchanged. 
Pati, Central 
Java, Indonesia 
Floods - sedimentation Through Jampi Sawan, progress was made to mitigate flood risks 
along Juwana River benefitting farmers, fishermen, and landless 
households. The relationship between civil society groups and 
government authorities improved. However, negotiations to 
complete river normalization have to continue. 
 
In Muria Region, risks are not yet reduced, but antagonistic 
relationships and intimidation are slowly being transformed into 
more agonic relationships and cooperation between upstream and 
downstream villages, between village authorities and CBOs, and 
between CBOs and district government.  
 
Muria region, 
Central java, 
Indonesia 
Landslides, flash floods, 
floods – sedimentation, 
garbage blocking 
drainage 
Halmahera, 
Northern 
Maluku, 
Indonesia 
Land disputes, coastal 
erosion, floods, pollution 
Land disputes remained unresolved; coastal erosion and floods were 
not reduced, while the NGO withdrew from Buli leaving the pollu-
tion caused by mining problem unresolved. Status quo was main-
tained 
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After the discussion of findings throughout this thesis the following points represent briefly 
the answers to the research questions posed above: 
 
 Actors involved in CBDRR have different interpretations of disaster and conflict events 
Local people, village authorities, NGOs, government officials, and funding agencies view 
and explain disaster and conflict events differently. Their views are based on past 
experiences, values, ideologies, interests, their position in society, affiliations, and all 
perform their various forms of power to get support for their risk explanations. CBDRR 
interventions and their outcomes are shaped by those who can best mobilize support for 
their risk problem and solution.  
 
 Mixture of a-political and political meanings attached to CBDRR interventions  
Some local NGOs conceived CBDRR as an a-political intervention aimed at improving 
disaster preparedness or individual households’ livelihoods, whereas other NGOs attach 
a political meaning to CBDRR from its inception. The NGOs use their discursive power to 
articulate their values and ideas about how change happens, which change should 
happen, and for whom. This influences the nature and purpose of community organizing 
strategies, the type of interventions, which institutions to involve, and hence the CBDRR 
outcomes.  
 
 Translating CBDRR policy into practice doesn’t follow a linear step-by-step model 
CBDRR interventions are continuously re-defined and re-shaped, and seldom comply with 
pre-set time-frames and localities. The discrepancy between CBDRR policy and practice is 
the result of how meaning and implementation are negotiated and transformed in the 
political arena that consist of the multi-level institutional context including the relation-
ships between funding agencies and local partners. Actors involved in CBDRR locally 
resist, pursue, negotiate and struggle for their interests and agendas beyond the moment 
of decision-making on resource allocation.  These political arenas cannot have similar 
outcomes. CBDRR is not a prescribed recipe nor does it follow a linear step-by-step 
model.   
 
 Selecting ‘safe areas for intervention’ are not a guarantee for meeting the intended 
results 
Funding agencies push and pull aid relations to influence the geographical choice of local 
NGOs that match best with their programme objectives. Local aid agencies, on their turn, 
need to maintain multiple relationships with various actors which put pressure on the 
community selection process. They need to show positive results to (back-)donors to stay 
eligible for funding, and they need to prove that their efforts are legitimate by serving 
those most in need. The majority of local NGOs had prior relationships with the selected 
communities and assumed a smooth implementation process. Despite efforts to run less 
risk during implementation, CBDRR outcomes varied due to local power dynamics that 
were not foreseen, but had to be dealt with. 
 
 Differing values and norms about people’s participation in CBDRR 
The local political and institutional context, its histories and the prevailing norms and 
values about ‘participation’ influence what form and intensity of participation is 
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acceptable, and who is allowed to participate and who is not. ‘Participation’ has to be 
negotiated and debated to stretch the boundaries set for participation to include views 
from those, who can’t be reached through the existing institutional structures. This 
requires extra efforts and time. 
 
 Varying engagement of NGOs with vulnerable groups, and village authorities, and 
village elite  
Community organizers interacted with a diversity of actors involving power relations that 
could be labelled as harmonious, cooperative, to antagonistic and intimidation. Those 
NGO staff who recognized the differentiated nature of local knowledge, the histories of 
institutions and the power dynamics involved, and acted in an impartial manner without 
losing sight of the needs of the most vulnerable groups, did perform better in the 
political arena to achieve and support marginalized people’s agendas, backed up by a 
new DRR laws or supportive government officials.   
 
 Mobilization of effective agency can be linked positively to reducing risks  
Village institutions do not operate at the appropriate scale to address underlying risk 
factors. Therefore local people need to engage with the broader institutional context. 
Horizontal linkages among CBOs are instrumental for early warning, sharing the lobbying 
workload, portraying shared concerns and greater legitimacy as local representatives, 
and it supports in settling disputes and reducing tensions between villages. Vertical 
connections with authorities and power-holders make it possible for local voices to be 
heard at district, provincial and national level, and to access national level financial 
resources for disaster risk reduction. In Herat and Central Java, local people did not wait 
for the government to create an enabling environment or to change its social contract.  
 
 Negative outcomes relate to inexperience or ignoring the institutional and political 
context  
Low level of community organization, opposing views and interests, lack of formal inter-
actions between key-actors, escaping sensitive political issues at stake by authorities did 
not lead to a change in the status quo, because the local NGOs involved were either not 
aware of local power dynamics, or were not able to transform antagonistic relationships 
into agonic ones, meaning they could not bring opponents on speaking terms. Instead, 
opposing actors disengaged from the CBDRR process, and found room for manoeuvre in 
more hidden realities like in Halmahera.  
 
 Linking CBDRR to ‘Do no Harm’ practice has potential to respond to both disasters and 
conflict 
When viewing CBDRR as political and institutional approach to reduce risk, it has 
commonalities with the Do no Harm approach. Both approaches explore who is who in 
the community, their risk perceptions, power dynamics, the histories of institutions, and 
past and current conflicts. Both approaches apply community organizing strategies to 
bring the differing actors together to negotiate, debate, contest and mediate their risk 
constructs. The combination of the two approaches has potential for both reducing 
disaster risks and settling (violent) disputes. 
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 Local people’s social, organizational, motivational and political resources are essential 
to change prevailing norms, values and ‘frames of realities’ to advance risk solutions 
CBDRR practices can transform institutions and constraints into new institutional 
arrangements which mitigate risks, disputes and violence, when people’s social, organisa-
tional, motivational and political resources are used, recognized and eventually mobilized 
into effective agency. This is a feature of CBDRR practice I observed in the Philippines, 
but which turns out to be applicable in other contexts. What differs in the various 
contexts, are the strategies and options available to local actors which depend on the 
broader institutional context and state-civil society relations. 
 
 Organizational structures of aid agencies and mandates influence the nature of CBDRR 
practices 
CBDRR was steered through humanitarian units of funding agencies separated from 
development desks and peace building units. Consequently, some local NGOs took a 
hazard-focused viewpoint to disasters resulting in disaster preparedness measures, while 
other NGOs, with a development mandate, took on addressing underlying risk factors.  
 
In sum, the outcomes of the various CBDRR interventions in Afghanistan, Indonesia and the 
Philippines differ because of differing institutional arrangements locally in which the CBDRR 
interventions were introduced. Institutional arrangements refer, a.o. to differing values and 
norms about people’s participation, to the history of village institutions like POs, CBOs, 
shuras and adat, to village regulations concerning early warning, access to and control of 
natural resources, dispute resolution, and the way village authorities support CBOs’ 
demands for safety and protection or resist change. Additionally, the aid agencies attach 
different meaning to CBDRR which influences the objectives and type of CBDRR inter-
ventions. Some NGOs focus on village level interventions to reduce people’s immediate 
exposure to risk – like the removal of rocks in Ghulistan – while others engage with the 
broader institutional context to re-order power relations and create new institutional 
arrangements, like the social fencing and contract in Herat, and the flood mitigation lobby 
and collaboration between Jampi Sawan and the district government in Pati, Central Java. 
Through CBDRR interventions, actors defend and mobilize around CBDRR practices that are 
meaningful to them, or resist institutions and practices that carry meanings they find 
disagreeable. This results in the manifold manifestations of CBDRR practices and outcomes. 
 
8.5 Implications of findings for CBDRR practitioners and policy-makers 
Aid agencies increasingly want to understand what kind of assistance is relevant and 
appropriate to reduce the negative impact of disasters and conflict. They are interested in 
the potential of CBDRR approaches in conflict settings. This research reveals that CBDRR has 
very different meanings, and therefore practitioners and policy-makers have to be aware of 
how CBDRR interventions are based on various assumptions, perceptions, ideologies, simpli-
fications and experiences, when they engage with other actors in the political arena of risk 
reduction. This research focuses on the level in the aid chain where local NGOs interact with 
local communities and government officials. Therefore my findings generate implications for 
particularly the CBDRR-practitioners of local NGOs and for the funding agency’s policy 
makers and programme staff, who support the local partners.  
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Differing values and norms about people’s participation, histories of traditional local 
institutions, differentiated local knowledge and varying risk constructs all contribute to the 
discrepancy between the idealized policy models of funding agencies and the political 
arena-model of CBDRR-practice. The policy-practice gap will always be there, and the 
following implications for aid programming aim to support CBDRR practitioners and policy-
makers with how to move and to operate in the force fields of policy and politics.  
 
 Become aware of one’s assumptions, perceptions, ideologies and simplifications of local 
realities 
Be conscious about the organization’s values and principles, what is written in policy 
documents and proposals, and regularly reflect with field and management staff on why 
(CB)DRR policy and principles do not always tally with its practice. This implies looking 
beyond the logframe model’s and result-oriented management systems, and requires 
questioning why there exists a gap between policy and practice. This refers particularly to 
questioning the organization’s assumptions about local realities and how social change 
happens. Questions to field staff, like ‘What went different than expected, and why?’, 
‘Which achievement you feel most proud of?’, ‘What strategy works for whom in what 
way?’, ‘What surprised you (positively and negatively)?’ may bring out assumptions and 
presuppositions and their (in)validity.  
 
 Be aware of the different conceptualizations of ‘community’ and ‘community-based’ 
Instead of viewing a community according to its village administrative boundaries, the 
term ‘community’ hides different meanings and these become visible when taking a 
multi-dimensional approach to ‘community’. This means that field staff studies the social 
inter-relationships among people within and beyond village level around a risk concern, 
and how local institutions govern people’s relations, behaviour and their views on this 
risk concern, with the aim to better understand whose vulnerability to disasters and 
conflict increases, reduces or does not change.  
 
 Be aware of the use of local knowledge and differing risk perceptions 
Since local knowledge is not just available in the community in the form of facts, tech-
niques and tips, but is differentiated, contested and partial, it is crucial for field staff to 
understand and acknowledge the different risk perspectives of specific groups by taking 
into account the notion of ‘impartiality’. The examination of risk perspectives allows one 
to analyse how different actors frame their risk problems (discursive means), to under-
stand the history of institutions and possible shifts in risk perspectives. Consequently, 
field staff defines which particular institutions matter, who is excluded from these 
institutions, and which actors are crucial to engage with in terms of authority and 
territory. Meanwhile it is a challenge to acknowledge the everyday politics practices of 
those actors who are not represented in the traditional community organizations or 
institutions. Determining whose knowledge and whose risk constructs count, is an 
important step or moment for the field staff to decide its positioning and organizing 
strategies to enter the political arena to rework antagonistic relationships.  
 
 Reconsider ‘vulnerability’ as an analytical tool to unravel institutional arrangements 
Local people do not regard themselves as vulnerable, except when it is strategic to do so, 
and labelling them as ‘vulnerable’ has a disempowering impact. ‘Vulnerability’ is not a 
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real-time condition in which people live, but rather a description of aid practitioners to 
legitimate their interventions. I argue that instead of focusing on individual households 
and their vulnerability categories (farmers, urban poor, fishermen, landless, women, 
elderly, among others), consider how institutional arrangements and their histories 
reduce, produce, or reproduce people’s vulnerability to understand power relations and 
how households interrelate. ‘Vulnerability’ with a focus on institutions and power 
relations can be used as an analytical tool to unravel people’s interactions in disaster and 
conflict settings. In the PAR-model of Blaikie et al (1994), ‘institutions’ seem to be the 
missing link to explain how ‘root causes’ can generate ‘unsafe conditions’ locally through 
‘dynamic pressures’. When analysing people’s vulnerabilities, I suggest to particularly 
study people’s ‘political vulnerability’ to which I refer as people’s inability to access 
resources, positions and power to demand safety and protection outside their innate 
social support networks due to power differentials and political exclusion from decision-
making processes from the local to national level. 
 
 Explore the institutional context beyond village level 
The CBDRR-pilots reveal the importance for NGO field staff together with local actors, to  
explore the institutional context: what are relevant (new) laws, which agency or 
department is responsible, what are trends in spatial planning processes within 
government to anticipate new risks; explore the institutional bureaucracies to discover 
who in the bureaucracy is supporting the people’s agenda, and who is opposing. Likewise 
NGOs and community people make themselves understand the positions of actors in a 
conflict context: who are the connectors and who are dividers? When they decide to 
enter the political arena, NGOs may help in how to best use discursive power and how to 
(re-)frame risk problems to convince other parties. When community organizers and local 
people are aware of the institutional context, they are more conscious of how these 
actors perform their powers in the arena where social actors negotiate, debate and 
struggle for safety, protection and secure livelihoods. Because of an increased 
awareness, the NGO will run less risk of getting entangled in local power-plays.  
 
 View ‘participation’ as a negotiated value  
To improve CBDRR practice, an understanding is needed of local norms of decision-
making and representation and institutional histories. How do these change, and are 
different values  concerning participation negotiated between aid agencies and 
community institutions? How do people indirectly affect intervention outcomes without 
direct participation referring to their everyday politics practice? This view on participa-
tion differs from how ‘participation’ is defined in ADPC’s field practitioners handbook 
which promotes an instrumental view on participation where people are involved in all 
steps of the CBDRR-process without problematizing the prevailing norms on who 
participates and who does not. 
 
 Empowerment through establishing horizontal and vertical connections 
CBDRR-practices in the Philippines, Indonesia and Afghanistan actively seek horizontal 
support and engagement with other citizens and communities, and vertical engagement 
– lobby, cooperation, confrontation, and resistance - with the broader but country-
specific institutional context beyond the village level. They aim to tackle the underlying 
causes of disaster risks, to reduce tensions, to address environmental issues, and to 
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generate financial resources from the responsible government institutions locally and 
nationally. Alliances offer opportunities to share lobby workloads, portray shared con-
cerns and therefore a greater legitimacy as community representatives (Few, 2002: 37). 
 
 View CBDRR as a long-term political process with district, provincial and national level 
results 
When taking the potential transformative nature of CBDRR seriously, it means that 
CBDRR practitioners will engage in re-ordering social relationships and institutions within 
and beyond village level. Addressing root causes of people’s vulnerabilities means that 
one has to deal with creating, adapting, or opposing policies, laws, norms, values, struc-
tures and decisions about resource allocation – that not only deal with reducing disaster 
risk or violence, but rather entails institutions dealing with spatial planning, natural re-
sources management, and often the judicial system. These processes of social change 
usually require more time than the usual project duration of two to four years. In the 
case of Central Java, the support from I&K consisted of three subsequent CBDRR projects 
of two years each, which built on each other. Within the total of six years the efforts 
resulted in the initial release of financial resources from the Indonesian government’s 
national budget – although still insufficient - and a change in the attitude of government 
officials towards civil-society organizations. Reflecting on this experience, the CBDRR 
efforts should explicitly envision changes in institutions at multiple levels with the 
ultimate aim to reduce people’s vulnerability locally. Therefore CBDRR interventions have 
to think ahead of objectives to be achieved at institutional levels beyond the village. 
Rather than simply aiming for isolated village-level project objectives, results have to be 
achieved at provincial and even national level. For example, formulating CBDRR objec-
tives in terms of national DRR budgets spent locally could become an appropriate 
strategy for ‘up-scaling CBDRR’, a term repeatedly mentioned by INGOs and governments 
(Moss, 2007).   
 
 CBDRR has potential for remote humanitarian action 
In local realities where the security situation constraints the interaction between NGO 
field staff and local people to render humanitarian assistance, the village authorities and 
community based organizations who have been engaged in CBDRR for a while, have most 
likely the appropriate institutional arrangements in place to organize and mobilize 
resources for relief and recovery as demonstrated in Nahreen and Ghoryan districts, 
Afghanistan. NGOs can provide ‘distant assistance’ provided it is based on longstanding 
relationships with the community, and intimate knowledge of local settings.   
 
 Reconsider the emergency relief – development dichotomy 
The current organizational set-up of the funding agencies that participated in this 
research portrays a reality where basically only major disasters occur which disrupt 
development, and which require outside emergency aid.  And they implement develop-
ment programmes without considering local people’s increasing vulnerability to small 
disasters or conflict. Recognizing the occurrence of recurrent small scale disasters and 
conflict in development programmes is still a policy gap. Recurrent small disasters and 
conflict are seasonal and for many people these have become ‘normal’. CBDRR as an 
approach has the potential to reduce risks in a structural manner, and the kind of CBDRR 
activities better match with the funding agencies’ other programmes dealing with food 
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security, democratization, human rights, and environmental protection, than its 
humanitarian aid procedures. It is easier to insert a CBDRR-lens into development 
programmes implemented by local partners, than in humanitarian aid policies steered 
from the headquarters in the Netherlands.   
 
 Invest in improving skills and knowledge of NGO field staff to make context analysis  
The local NGOs recommend investing more in improving skills and knowledge of their 
staff to conduct a context analysis, to view interventions as a political arena model, to 
explore the institutional context, and understand the different forms of power that 
actors perform. It are usually the management and programme staff who are involved in 
conceptual discussions, if they happen at all, not the field staff whereas they are the 
front-workers, the ones interacting with local people who needs these skills and 
knowledge most.  
 
Table 8.4 provides an overview of the key-concepts used in this research: social actors, 
institutions, questions to analyse the political arena, and forms of power that actors 
perform in relationships. Olson’s questions can be asked to any actor to uncover their 
views, assumptions and positioning in the political arena. The table should be read 
according to columns; there are no direct horizontal linkages. 
 
       Table 8.4 Overview concepts:  social actors, institutions, political arena, and forms of power  
Social 
relationships/ 
Social actors 
Institutions (Jütting, 
2003) 
Olson’s questions to analyse 
political arena of responding 
to disasters and conflict 
Forms of power performed by 
actors in the political arena 
Citizens (differ 
due to gender, 
wealth, ethnicity, 
religion, etc) 
CBOs 
NGOs 
Funding agency 
Church, mosque 
Media 
Civil-society 
organizations 
Government 
officials / 
departments 
Politicians 
Warlord 
Military 
Other actors 
 
Ideology, social norms, 
values, traditions, gender 
norms 
(level 1) 
1.What happened? 
How do actors define and explain 
the disaster event, the violence, 
conflicts, or crisis? Social 
construction of meaning, which has 
implications for goals of responses  
Discursive power, domination, structural 
power relations 
Construction of meaning, framing, and 
about what is acceptable.  
Shapes people’s beliefs, sense of self,  
and acceptance of status quo. 
Institutions related to 
access to resources, 
property rights and 
judiciary system (level2).  
2.Why were losses so high and 
responses so (in)adequate?  
What are existing policies, laws and 
regulations to reduce risks? Who 
can be held accountable for the 
losses? These questions refer to 
why people are affected and 
vulnerable. 
Institutional power 
Construction of power relations takes 
place through institutions like policies, 
laws, regulations which regulate 
people’s behaviour. Refers to 
administrative practices, authority, 
procedures, and discursive rituals. 
Institutions defining 
governance arrangements, 
authority, contractual 
relationships (level 3) 
Institutions related to 
allocation mechanisms 
(level 4) 
 
 
3.What happens now? 
Recovery efforts involves resources 
and decisions on how to use and 
where to allocate these resources 
Publicly performed power, strategic 
games 
Refers to the arena of negotiations, 
debates, struggles to influence decision-
making and resource allocation. 
 
 Listening to people in times of emergencies and insecurity 
This research happens at a time when more researchers, aid practitioners and their 
agencies acknowledged the need to review the international aid practice with the aim to 
improve aid effectiveness in future emergencies. Oxfam-International conducted its 
“Listening to disaster-affected communities” research program after the Asian Tsunami 
(2008), whereas CDA Collaborative Learning Projects implemented its ‘Listening Project’ 
(2008), asking people in the recipient societies how they understand the successes and 
failures of these international assistance efforts. One of Oxfam International conclusions 
is that people’s local knowledge, capacity and priorities are often overlooked and that aid 
agencies should train themselves to listen. This is a remarkable conclusion. ‘Listening to 
 
 
271 
 
people’ - what does it mean? One of the respondents summarized his critique as: 
“Instead of understanding contexts and identities, INGO staff only cares for numbers and 
statistics in their needs assessments” (CDA, 2008: 2). Local people don’t feel heard. Aside 
of collecting numbers and statistics for needs assessments, it is fruitful allowing people to 
tell their life stories, to listen to their concerns, to understand the difficulties and 
complexities, in order to ensure more relevant assistance. ‘Listening to people’ means 
moreover to act upon an understanding of people’s priorities in finding structural 
solutions, as opposed to asking questions that match preconceived plans. 
 
Final remarks 
This research involved crossing boundaries between academic and policy-oriented research 
through an interactive research methodology. This interaction produced revisited CBDRR 
concepts and theories, and insights for aid programming that are found ‘relevant’ and 
‘meaningful’ by aid agencies4. Secondly, this research involved crossing boundaries between 
the fields of ‘disaster studies’ and ‘conflict studies’. I increasingly felt that an interactive 
research methodology supported me to deal with both the practical constraints and security 
risks involved in this research, and with the ethical issues of doing field work in disaster and 
conflict settings. Through the interaction with local NGOs, I not only got access to disaster 
and conflict settings and affected populations, I also felt that being part of the joint sense-
making and solving humanitarian aid puzzles, addresses the concerns about ethics and 
accountability through contributing to ‘relevant interventions for local settings’. This is 
another important research product, aside of ‘new knowledge’ and ‘insights for aid 
programming’. Of course, there are many challenges and dangers inherent in doing 
interactive research in complex settings, but when researchers wait till ‘normalcy’ has 
returned, action has got ahead of understanding.  
  
                                                 
4
 See Chapter 2 for a complete reflection on the interactive research methodology. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
 
Over the last few decades, the frequency and intensity of disaster events has increased 
alarmingly, which particularly affected the livelihoods of poor people. Towards the end of 
the 1990s, policy-makers and practitioners in response rapidly adopted Community-Based 
Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) as an alternative to top-down approaches in disaster 
management. CBDRR refers to a variety of interventions aimed at reducing people’s 
immediate and long-term vulnerability to disasters by strengthening their capacities to 
better deal with the negative impact of disasters. Emphasis is placed on people’s 
participation and on the recognition of people’s own capacities and knowledge. Though 
CBDRR is on the rise in international policy circles, there are a number of important 
conceptual and practical questions that have not yet been adequately addressed. Serious 
and critical analysis of how agencies put CBDRR into practice is still lacking. Does CBDRR 
indeed result in safer communities? Why does it fail to benefit the most vulnerable people? 
This thesis focuses on local level responses to recurrent small scale disasters and conflict in 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines, where the impact of disasters and conflict does 
not trigger (inter)national media attention nor financial resources. Affected people then 
largely rely on their own resources to cope with adversity. 
 
The research was conceived together with staff from three Dutch aid agencies: Oxfam-
Novib, ICCO and Kerkinactie. They formulated multiple questions, triggered by experiences 
and dilemmas they felt they could not address themselves. The first set of questions relate 
to the observed problematic relationship between aid policy and prescriptions at donor 
level, and the practices they are supposed to generate at grassroots level: aid programmes 
often fail to match people’s needs in crisis situations. The second set of questions deals with 
how aid agencies depict local populations and portray local realities, when and why aid 
agencies tend to leave ‘the political’ out of their aid interventions, ignore ‘politics’, or when 
do they selectively put it in. The third set of questions stem from the trend that disasters 
increasingly happen in situations of conflict or chronic instability. Dynamics of conflict, the 
interplay with disasters and their specific impact on people’s livelihoods are poorly 
understood by aid practitioners and their donors. Most aid agencies treat disasters and 
conflict as distinct fields of operation thus simplifying reality.  
 
The three aid agencies viewed CBDRR to be a promising approach to better match aid with 
the needs of disaster and conflict-affected populations, and wished to explore the potential 
of CBDRR approaches in implementing disaster risk reduction measures that at the same 
could address divisions and grievances leading to violent conflict. Whereas Afghanistan and 
Indonesia were selected beforehand, the selection of local partners and CBDRR pilot areas 
became part of the discussions and negotiations of this interactive research. In Indonesia 
five local partner NGOs joined, and in Afghanistan four local NGOs. The CBDRR pilots 
consisted of ‘doing CBDRR’ in a total of 44 villages, meaning testing a new approach to 
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respond to recurrent small scale disasters in conflict settings beyond relief, to reflect on the 
intervention processes, and to understanding the reasons for the varying outcomes.  
 
I used an actor-orientation since it offers an analytical framework for clarifying how policies 
and interventions are shaped by the various actors involved in the CBDRR pilots. It further 
offers a framework to study both the specificities of particular local settings, and the broader 
forces and processes of institutional and societal change. The actor-oriented approach starts 
from the premise that each actor has ‘agency’, meaning that people use their knowledge, 
skills, influence, aspirations, and organizing capacities in their problem-solving, survival and 
development strategies. Although people have alternative options to shape their coping 
strategies, these strategies have their limitations because of people’s structural position in 
society. I’m particularly interested in how people can mobilize and organize ‘effective 
agency’ to find room for manoeuvre, and to affect change towards safer communities. I 
equally want to understand the constraints put upon ‘effective agency’ that may emerge, 
and to understand the larger structures in society, which is needed to put the CBDRR-
outcomes in the proper perspective. I therefore use the notions of ‘institutions’, ‘power’, 
and ‘political arena’. Different actors pursue, negotiate and struggle for their interests and 
agendas to deal with multiple realities. I critically reflect on CBDRR approaches to 
understand the gap between CBDRR policy and actual outcomes, considering the multi-level 
institutions through which meaning and implementation of CBDRR policy are negotiated and 
transformed, from the conceptual policy design stage until the arena where decisions on risk 
solutions and resource allocation are made.  
 
Chapter 2 critically reflects on the interactive research methodology. It deals with processes 
of knowledge construction and how I dealt with partiality and multiple perspectives in 
disaster and conflict settings. Some research encounters led to tensions and conflict among 
the actors involved which needed to be constantly managed to maintain reciprocal 
relationships with the research subjects. These tensions however, led to deeper analysis of 
the workings of the aid chain, and the nature of relationships among actors. I further reflect 
on the relevance, appropriateness and ethics of doing interactive research in real-time 
disaster and conflict settings, and how to secure valid data. The general academic argument 
is that insecurity makes it impossible to secure validity of findings, and that serious research 
has to wait till the fighting stops. I argue that research in disaster and conflict settings is 
possible through the right contacts, access through local NGOs and flexibility and creativity 
in research methods. I reflect on the ‘interactive’ part of interactive research explaining how 
the interactive research got shaped through the involvement of very different stakeholders, 
considering issues like inter-subjectivity, evolving reciprocal relationships, and positioning 
and roles of the researcher. I regard this research as a continuous negotiation process, and 
its findings as negotiated outcomes. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the politics of disaster response in the Philippines. It reviews the history 
of a Philippine NGO which strategically framed and re-framed its CBDRR policy in the socio-
political context of the Philippines since Martial Law in 1972. It illustrates how the elite and 
powerful few who make up the government either neglect disaster response or take 
advantage of recurrent disaster events. The majority of poor and marginalized sectors rely 
particularly on their social, motivational and political resources. Both the NGOs and the 
Philippine government attach their specific meaning to disaster and vulnerability and 
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construct their paradigms of reality of whom to blame and about what causes the damages. 
All actors search for explanations that suit their beliefs and political interests and use 
discursive means to win others for their cause. As a consequence, responses to disasters 
vary according to their political visions. This chapter further makes sense of what constitutes 
‘political vulnerability’, and how this contradicts to people’s agency and the notion of 
‘everyday politics’. I conclude that ‘vulnerability’ is rather an analytical tool to uncover 
institutional arrangements and power relations, not a real-time condition in which people 
live. ‘Vulnerability’ is a social construct of aid providers to legitimize their actions. The 
chapter concludes that disasters can be viewed as an opportunity for social change, but for 
whom and in what way is contextual, time-bound and contested in local and national arenas.  
 
Chapter 4 is a historical account of various other ‘home-grown’ CBDRR approaches like 
promoted by La Red in Latin America, and Duryog Nivaran in South Asia. These home-grown 
CBDRR approaches already existed before the UN declared the International Decade of 
Natural Disaster Reduction from 1989 to 1999. By the end of the 1990s, the international 
community started to promote community-based approaches as a complementary strategy 
to national and international efforts to reduce risk. However, the meaning governments 
attach to CBDRR rather refers to efficiency, than to genuinely addressing social injustices 
underlying people’s vulnerability. The chapter reveals how the various strands of thinking 
about CBDRR got increasingly intertwined since the Hyogo Declaration in 2005.  
The interactions between civil society organizations and the UN in the area of (CB)DRR 
reveal some insights about why the political perspective and concrete changes towards local 
level actions to reduce disaster impact are being subordinated, resulting in the maintenance 
of the status quo. The first insight refers to the dynamics between the UN as an institution, 
and its state-level actors and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR). The UNISDR seems to be limited in its ability to be critical of member 
states, and their interactions should be viewed as ‘saying the right things without provoking 
its members’. A second reason is that the UN still regard the knowledge and opinions of 
experts, scientists and authorities more accurate, relevant and privileged over local opinions 
and knowledge, thereby ignoring – read neutralizing – the views of civil society actors. The 
third insight is related to resource allocation, and how governments allocate about 90% of 
DRR resources to the national level without transfers to local levels. (CB)DRR appears to be a 
contested approach: beyond its relevance to reduce risks of affected populations, CBDRR is 
also a political and ideological construct, with its discursive interpretations and justifications. 
 
Chapter 5 explores local people’s perspectives on risks stemming from disasters and conflict, 
the notion of ‘local knowledge’, and how people deal with uncertainty and crisis in 
Afghanistan and Indonesia. CBDRR-literature assumes that the use of local knowledge will 
improve disaster risk reduction policies and project implementation. However, the many 
stories from men and women in Afghanistan and Indonesia reveal that local knowledge is 
differentiated, partial, contested and sometimes dangerous like in Maluku, where local 
beliefs justify the use of violence. When outsiders, like CBDRR-practitioners, say they aim to 
recognize local knowledge in their interventions locally, they should be aware and 
acknowledge the differentiated nature of local knowledge, the diversity in risk constructs 
and the local institutional arrangements that influence them. How this raises problems and 
dilemmas in practice is subject of the next two chapters.  
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Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on how CBDRR approaches get shape and meaning in new 
contexts like Afghanistan and Indonesia. Through sequential case analysis and regular 
action-reflection cycles, I encouraged local NGO staff to reflect on their routines that have 
been taken for granted, and to uncover assumptions, norms, values, skills and systems. 
Chapter 6 particularly focuses on the NGOs’ assumptions and values applied when selecting, 
entering and organizing communities and the reasons behind. Despite conscious efforts to 
reach the most vulnerable groups in a village through creative, flexible and context-specific 
approaches, the benefits still seem to drift towards village elites, unless community 
organizers are able to understand the various actors’ needs within their full social and 
political context, and see the connections and power relations between them. I refer to this 
ability as ‘impartiality’. In this way community organizers can bring opposing groups on 
speaking terms in order to negotiate risk problems and solutions, and reduce tensions. Elite 
forces are still strong however, and withstanding these pressures is difficult for CBOs, 
vulnerable groups, and for the NGOs that claim to support the latter. The chapters reveal the 
mechanisms in the CBDRR process that reduce, produce, or reproduce people’s vulnerability.    
 
Chapter 7 deals with two cases, flood mitigation in Central Java, Indonesia, and reducing 
conflict and the impact of sandstorms in Herat province, western Afghanistan. In these two 
cases, local people and NGOs mobilized and organized ‘effective agency’ and entered the 
‘political arena’ to negotiate and struggle successfully for their risk solutions beyond 
community level. The cases show that CBDRR-interventions are not isolated, distinct entities, 
but very much intertwined with the broader institutional environment. Flood mitigation, 
watershed management, reforestation, regulating access to pasture lands involve decisions 
about people, space and their interactions. This makes risk reduction highly political. Local 
people, NGOs and CSO groups turn to governments who are expected to create enabling 
political and legislative environments. But as the cases show, many governments do not 
prioritize, or are reluctant to change policies or legislation which favour vulnerable 
communities. The Afghanistan case shows that a prerequisite for success is that one should 
deal with the past and current conflict contexts in which the CBDRR intervention operates. 
Competing claims on natural resources, a change in ethnic-political power relations after 
refugees returned from Iran, and changes in government’s land policies are crucial to be 
considered before entering negotiation processes among the various stakeholders. The 
reforestation intervention is not simply planting windbreaks to mitigate or prevent 
sandstorms, but a complex negotiation process involving 40 villages and government officials 
to achieve ‘social fencing’ and legitimate access to land and resources for a specific 
timeframe, laid down in a contract between village representatives, the NGO and district 
governor. The contract and ‘social fencing’ are meant to reduce both tensions and conflict 
among the villages and ethnic groups and the negative effects of sandstorms. 
 
The final chapter brings together the conceptual insights and conclusions. It discusses what 
CBDRR actually is and means in the various disaster and conflict contexts, and re-examines 
the definitions of the key CBDRR concepts. Empirical findings show that there are different 
processes through which organizations – CBOs, local NGOs, funding agencies, government in 
Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines – arrive at a specific framing of local realities and 
their responses in the context they live and work. These are related to their histories, 
current state-society relations, and how they legitimize their interventions. Actors either 
underscore the politics of their interventions or rather de-politicize them. From the 
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experiences of this research it is plausible to conclude that when one ignores to view CBDRR 
interventions in a political and institutional manner, the outcomes of the interventions are 
likely to reproduce the status quo. This is one of the main explanations for the varying 
outcomes of the CBDRR pilots. 
 
This chapter further reflects on the potential of CBDRR in conflict settings. The case from 
Herat offers valuable prospects for how to support disaster and conflict affected 
communities in a context where government is weak or contested. I argue to regard both 
disasters and conflict as processes and political events, and based on this research, I add that 
the notion of ‘institutions’ can be used analytically to blur the demarcation between disaster 
and conflict theories and practice, since institutions regulate safety, protection, access to 
resources, and gain authority to settle disputes.  
 
By looking for the political in responding to disaster and conflict, I uncover some of the 
complexities and the political nature of disaster risk reduction practices. The implication for 
aid agencies is that they should invest considerable time and effort to find out who 
cooperates and who opposes particular risk reduction measures and why, and to deal with 
these power plays in such a way that marginal groups can succeed in their demands for 
protection and safety. This practice substantially deviates from most current CBDRR 
practices. The significance of this research is that it shows the need to look beyond the 
binaries of top-down and bottom-up approaches to reduce risks, and to understand how in 
the political arena of disaster risk reduction, adherents of the different CBDRR traditions 
negotiate the principles and features of their CBDRR-tradition, resulting in varying CBDRR-
practices, meanings and outcomes. There is no such thing as the CBDRR-approach. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
 
 
Het aantal natuurrampen is de afgelopen decennia schrikbarend toegenomen, wat de be-
staanszekerheid van vooral arme mensen in toenemende mate ondermijnt. In de jaren ne-
gentig vond er een kentering plaats van centraal gestuurde noodhulp, naar lokaal gestuurde 
benaderingen voor rampenbestrijding (Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR)). 
CBDRR staat voor de verschillende soorten interventies die tot doel hebben de kwetsbaar-
heid van door rampen getroffen bevolkingsgroepen te verminderen en hun weerbaarheid te 
vergroten, zodat ze de negatieve gevolgen van rampen beter kunnen doorstaan. De nadruk 
ligt binnen deze benaderingen op participatie en erkenning van bestaande lokale kennis, 
vaardigheden en overlevingsstrategieën die als uitgangspunt dienen voor rampenbestrijding. 
Ondanks de stijgende populariteit van CBDRR bij maatschappelijke organisaties en ook over-
heden, kan men toch een aantal kanttekeningen plaatsen bij de uitvoering ervan. Leidt 
CBDRR inderdaad tot veiligere lokale samenlevingen? Hoe komt het dat deze benadering 
vaak faalt in het bereiken van de meest kwetsbare doelgroepen? Dit onderzoek heeft lokale 
interventies onder de loep genomen in gebieden in Afghanistan, Indonesië en de Filippijnen 
die herhaaldelijk door kleinschalige natuurrampen en conflicten worden getroffen.  Klein-
schalige rampen en conflicten halen vaak niet de (inter)nationale media waardoor fondsen-
werving uitblijft. De getroffen bevolking is dan vooral op zichzelf aangewezen. 
 
Dit onderzoek is tot stand gekomen in samenwerking met drie Nederlandse hulporganisa-
ties: Oxfam-Novib, ICCO en Kerkinactie. Op grond van ervaringen, observaties en dilemma’s 
uit hun praktijk, formuleerden ze een aantal onderzoeksvragen. Een eerste set vragen had 
betrekking op de problematische relatie tussen het beleid en financieel-administratieve 
voorschriften van hulporganisaties aan de ene kant, en de resultaten die men in de praktijk 
beoogt te halen. Hulpprogramma’s sluiten vaak niet aan bij de behoeften van mensen in 
crisis situaties. De tweede set vragen richtte zich op hoe hulporganisaties een beeld schetsen 
van lokale crisis situaties en van wat lokale mensen nodig hebben. Waarom laten hulporga-
nisaties vaak het ‘politieke’ weg uit hun hulpinterventies, negeren het zelfs, of waarom ma-
ken ze er selectief wel melding van? De laatste vraag volgt op een trend dat steeds meer 
natuurrampen in conflict gebieden plaats vinden. In hoeverre verergeren rampen lokale 
conflicten, of bieden ze juist nieuwe kansen om conflicten te beslechten? Hulporganisaties 
en financieringsorganisaties missen de parate kennis over hoe het samenspel van rampen en 
conflict uitpakt voor de bestaanszekerheid van getroffen mensen. De meeste hulporganisa-
ties zien rampen en conflicten als verschillende en daardoor gescheiden disciplines, en als 
gevolg daarvan wordt ook de hulp operationeel gescheiden. De werkelijkheid wordt hier-
door sterk versimpeld. 
 
De drie hulporganisaties zagen in CBDRR een veelbelovende benadering om hulp beter te 
laten aansluiten bij de behoeften van door rampen en conflict getroffen bevolkingsgroepen. 
Ze wilden deze benadering graag uittesten in de praktijk en kijken in hoeverre CBDRR inter-
venties resulteren in een vergrootte weerbaarheid van lokale mensen tegen rampen, en te-
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vens in het wegnemen van spanningen en het reduceren van conflicten. Het uittesten van 
CBDRR vond plaats in Afghanistan en Indonesië, twee landen die de drie hulporganisaties al 
hadden geselecteerd voordat het onderzoek begon. De selectie van lokale partner organisa-
ties gebeurde in overleg met de partners zelf en de drie Nederlandse hulporganisaties. In 
totaal deden vijf lokale partners in Indonesië mee en vier in Afghanistan. De CBDRR benade-
ring werd uitgetest in 44 dorpen die herhaaldelijk getroffen worden door rampen en con-
flicten. Het doel van het uittesten van de CBDRR-benadering was om lokale bevolking te on-
dersteunen op een manier die verder reikt dan noodhulp, te reflecteren op CBDRR interven-
ties, en te begrijpen waarom er verschillen zijn in CBDRR processen en resultaten. Ik heb 
gebruik gemaakt van de ‘actor-benadering’, die handvaten biedt om de totstandkoming van 
beleid en interventies te analyseren vanuit het perspectief van de verschillende betrokken 
actoren. Het biedt verder mogelijkheden om lokale situaties – waarin interventies worden 
gepleegd – te bestuderen en ook hoe actoren hun macht gebruiken in institutionele en 
maatschappelijke processen. De actor-benadering gaat ervan uit dat elk persoon agency 
heeft, het vermogen om kennis, vaardigheden, invloed, en aspiraties in te zetten om pro-
blemen op te lossen en te kunnen overleven – alleen of samen met anderen. Ofschoon men-
sen verschillende opties hebben om nieuwe overlevingsstrategieën te ontwikkelingen, ken-
nen die strategieën ook hun beperkingen vanwege de sociale positie waarin mensen zich 
bevinden. Ik ben in het bijzonder geïnteresseerd in hoe mensen ‘effective agency’ mobilise-
ren en organiseren om hun speelruimte te vergroten om hun bestaansbronnen en leefom-
geving veilig te stellen tegen rampen en conflict. Tegelijkertijd wil ik begrijpen welke beper-
kingen en tegenwerking mensen ervaren, die voortkomen uit bepaalde maatschappelijke 
structuren. Dit om de CBDRR test-uitkomsten in een realistisch perspectief te kunnen plaat-
sen. Ik gebruik hiervoor concepten als ‘instituties’, ‘macht’ en ‘politieke arena’. De verschil-
lende actoren onderhandelen en staan voor hun belangen om te kunnen voldoen aan de 
eisen die de omgeving aan hen stelt: bijvoorbeeld, lokale mensen willen overleven en veilig-
heid, NGO staf wil goede resultaten kunnen tonen aan financiers, terwijl lokale overheden 
vooral hun positie willen veilig stellen. Ik neem de CBDRR-benadering kritisch onder de loep 
om beter het verschil tussen CBDRR-beleid en CBDRR-praktijk te begrijpen. Ik kijk naar hoe 
actoren betekenis geven aan CBDRR tijdens de onderhandelingen en uitvoering van CBDRR 
waarbij verschillende niveaus en soorten instituties worden betrokken – vanaf de conceptu-
alisering van de CBDRR interventie tot in de politieke arena waarin die actoren besluiten 
nemen over welke risico-verminderende maatregelen getroffen worden en hoe financiële en 
materiele middelen worden toegekend aan wie, en aan wie niet. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 reflecteert op de interactieve onderzoeksmethodologie. Het gaat in op hoe 
nieuwe kennis wordt gecreëerd en hoe ik om ben gegaan met partijdigheid en verschillende 
interpretaties over rampen en conflicten in specifieke lokale contexten. Sommige ont-
moetingen tussen actoren in het onderzoek leidden tot spanningen en conflict, en deze 
relaties moesten aldoor worden beheerst om reciprocal relationships tussen de onderzoeks-
actoren te waarborgen. Deze spanningen, echter, resulteerden in een verdergaande analyse 
van hoe de hulpketen functioneert en in de aard van de relaties tussen donor en lokale part-
ners. Verder reflecteert het hoofdstuk op de relevantie, geschiktheid en de ethiek van inter-
actief onderzoek doen in ramp- en conflict gebieden, en hoe je steekhoudende gegevens 
verzamelt. Het algemene wetenschappelijk argument is dat het onmogelijk is om in onveilige 
gebieden relevante en betrouwbare gegevens te verzamelen, en dat serieus onderzoek moet 
wachten totdat conflicten voorbij zijn. Ik pleit ervoor dat onderzoek in ramp- en conflictge-
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bieden mogelijk is mits de onderzoeker over betrouwbare contacten beschikt, toegang krijgt 
via lokale organisaties, en flexibele en creatieve onderzoeksmethoden hanteert. Het hoofd-
stuk reflecteert ook op het ‘interactieve’ deel van interactief onderzoek en legt uit hoe het 
onderzoek zijn vorm krijgt door de invloed van de verschillende deelnemers aan de hand van 
de begrippen ‘inter-subjectivity’, ‘reciprocal relationships’ en de positionering en verschil-
lende rollen van de onderzoeker. Ik beschouw dit onderzoek als een voortdurend onderhan-
delingsproces en de bevindingen als onderhandelde resultaten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op het politieke karakter van rampenbestrijding in de Filippijnen. Het 
kijkt terug op de geschiedenis van een Filipijnse NGO dat haar CBDRR-beleid strategisch 
aanpaste aan de veranderende sociaal-politieke context in het land sinds 1972 toen presi-
dent Marcos de staat van beleg afkondigde. Het illustreert hoe de elite, die de overheid 
vormde, rampenbestrijding verwaarloosde of juist zijn voordeel deed uit de herhaalde ram-
pen. De meerderheid van de bevolking is arm en is afhankelijk van vooral sociale en politieke 
vangnetten, en van mentale kracht. Zowel de Ngo’s als de Filipijnse overheid geven een 
specifieke betekenis aan rampen en kwetsbaarheid, en construeren hun paradigma’s over de 
werkelijkheid van wie is verantwoordelijk voor het leed en over wat de schade veroorzaakt 
heeft. Iedereen zoekt een verklaring die het best past bij de eigen opvattingen en politieke 
belangen, en probeert met argumenten en redeneringen de ander van hun gelijk te 
overtuigen. Vanwege verschil in politieke visie verschillen de wijzen waarop actoren op ram-
pen reageren. Het hoofdstuk geeft verder betekenis aan ‘politieke kwetsbaarheid’ (political 
vulnerability) van mensen en hoe dit begrip contrasteert met de ‘alledaagse politieke’ prak-
tijk (everyday politics). Ik concludeer dat ‘kwetsbaarheid’ eigenlijk meer een analytisch con-
cept en instrument is om institutionele regelingen en machtsrelaties te ontrafelen, en niet 
de reëele werkelijkheid waarin mensen leven. ‘Kwetsbaarheid’ is een constructie, een label 
die hulpverleners gebruiken om hun interventies te legitimeren. Het hoofdstuk concludeert 
dat rampen kunnen worden beschouwd als een kans voor sociale verandering, maar voor 
wie en hoe is contextueel en tijdsgebonden en wordt uitgevochten in lokale en nationale 
arena’s. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een historisch overzicht van het ontstaan van andere CBDRR tradities die 
onder bepaalde omstandigheden lokaal zijn ontstaan en gepromoot zoals door La Red in 
Latijns America en Duryog Nivaran in Zuid Azië. Deze lokaal gevormde CBDRR tradities be-
stonden al voordat de Verenigde Naties (VN) het ‘Internationale Decennium voor de Bestrij-
ding van Natuurrampen’ uitriepen van 1989 tot 1999. Tegen het eind van de negentiger ja-
ren begon ook de internationale gemeenschap de CBDRR benadering als zinvol te beschou-
wen en zag het als complementair aan de nationale en internationale inspanningen om ri-
sico’s op rampen te verminderen. Echter, overheden geven CBDRR een betekenis die zich 
meer richt op efficiëntie, dan op het aanpakken van de onderliggende structurele oorzaken 
van rampen. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de verschillende CBDRR-tradities in toenemende 
mate met elkaar verstrengeld zijn geraakt sinds de Hyogo Verklaring in 2005. De interacties 
tussen maatschappelijke organisaties en de VN op het gebied van rampenbestrijding geven 
inzicht in waarom het politieke karakter van rampen en concrete veranderingen ter bevor-
dering van lokale rampenbestrijding ondergeschikt blijven waardoor er niets verandert en 
schade niet vermindert. Het eerste inzicht heeft te maken met hoe de VN als instituut func-
tioneren, en de dynamieken tussen de afzonderlijke lidstaten en de VN Internationale Stra-
tegie voor Rampenbestrijding (UNISDR). De UNISDR lijkt beperkt in haar mogelijkheden om 
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zich kritisch uit te laten naar lidstaten, en hun interacties worden gekenmerkt door ‘de juiste 
dingen zeggen zonder lidstaten te provoceren’. Een tweede inzicht is dat de VN kennis en 
wetenschappers en autoriteiten hoger in het vaandel hebben dan kennis en meningen van 
lokale maatschappelijke organisaties over rampenbestrijding. Rapporten van deze laatste 
groep worden daarom keer op keer genegeerd. Een derde inzicht heeft te maken met het 
toekennen van financiële middelen aan rampenbestrijding, waarbij overheden ongeveer 
90% van die middelen toekennen aan nationale inspanningen en nauwelijks aan lokale ram-
penbestrijding. CBDRR lijkt een betwiste benadering: behalve haar relevantie om risico’s te 
verminderen voor kwetsbare gemeenschappen, is het bovenal een benadering die door ver-
schillende actoren politiek en ideologisch wordt ingezet in debatten om hun maatregelen te 
legitimeren. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert de perspectieven van lokale mensen die risico’s ervaren als gevolg 
van rampen en conflict, en hoe ze met onzekerheid omgaan in Afghanistan en Indonesië. Het 
verdiept zich in de vraag “wat is lokale kennis eigenlijk” die mensen gebruiken om te overle-
ven. CBDRR literatuur gaat ervan uit dat het gebruik van lokale kennis de effectiviteit van 
rampenbestrijding vergroot. De vele verhalen van mannen en vrouwen in Afghanistan en 
Indonesië in dit hoofdstuk, tonen aan dat lokale kennis gedifferentieerd, partijdig en betwist 
is en zelfs gevaarlijk kan zijn, zoals in de Molukken waar lokale kennis en geloof mensen juist 
aanspoorden tot geweld. Wanneer buitenstaanders, zoals CBDRR beoefenaars, zeggen dat 
ze lokale kennis erkennen in hun interventies, dan zullen ze zich bewust moeten zijn dat er 
niet zoiets bestaat als een container met lokale feiten en kennis die je kunt gebruiken, maar 
dat lokale kennis en risico percepties gedifferentieerd zijn als gevolg van lokale institutionele 
regels en spelers. Hoe dit problemen en dilemma’s oproept voor CBDRR beoefenaars, is on-
derwerp van het volgende hoofdstuk.  
 
Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 gaan uitvoerig in op hoe CBDRR een specifieke betekenis krijgt en 
wordt toegepast in nieuwe situaties in Afghanistan en Indonesië. Door middel van herhaalde 
bezoeken aan de CBDRR test-locaties en regelmatige actie-reflectie cyclussen, werden lokale 
NGO stafleden aangemoedigd te reflecteren op hun routines, onderliggende aannames, 
waarden en normen, vaardigheden en management systemen. Hoofdstuk 6 verdiept zich in 
de aannames die Ngo’s hanteren bij het selecteren van gemeenschappen, bij het vertrouwen 
winnen van de lokale bevolking en het organiseren van lokale gemeenschappen, en de 
achterliggende redenen. Ondanks bewuste strategieën om de meest kwetsbare groepen te 
bereiken door middel van flexibele, context-specifieke en creatieve benaderingen, lijken de 
niet-kwetsbaren het meeste voordeel te halen uit CBDRR interventies. Dit gebeurt niet wan-
neer veldstaf de behoeften van mensen vaststelt in de context van hun sociale en politieke 
positie, en zich bewust is van lokale machtsrelaties. Ik refereer naar deze vaardigheid als 
‘onpartijdigheid’ (impartiality). Op deze manier is veldstaf in staat om tegenover elkaar 
staande partijen ‘on speaking terms’ te brengen, en om ze te laten onderhandelen over op-
lossingen om veiligheidsrisico’s en spanningen te reduceren. De invloed van lokale elite is 
groot en moeilijk te weerstaan door lokale organisaties en kwetsbare groepen. Het hoofd-
stuk laat de mechanismes zien hoe gedurende het CBDRR interventie-proces kwetsbaarheid 
van mensen kan worden vergroot, verkleind of hetzelfde blijft.  
 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat in op twee specifieke CBDRR ervaringen: het bestrijden van overstromin-
gen in Centraal Java, Indonesië, en het verminderen van de effecten van zandstormen en 
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tevens reduceren van spanningen betreffende het gebruik van graasgebieden in Herat, west 
Afghanistan. Beide ervaringen laten het belang zien van ‘effective agency’, het mobiliseren 
en organiseren van lokale mensen in groepen, netwerken of allianties om zo hun kansen in 
de politieke arena op district en provinciaal niveau te vergroten om hun risico-oplossingen 
met succes te realiseren. De twee ervaringen laten zien dat CBDRR interventies geen geïso-
leerde projecten zijn, gescheiden van de lokale context, maar verweven zijn met de bredere 
maatschappelijke context en geschiedenis. Het bestrijden van overstromingen, het managen 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, herbebossing, en beheer van weidegrond vergen maatregelen 
omtrent mensen, ruimte en de interactie tussen beiden. Dit maakt rampenbestrijding uiter-
mate politiek. Lokale gemeenschappen, Ngo’s en andere maatschappelijke organisaties rich-
ten zich tot overheden van wie men verwacht dat ze de politieke en wetgevende voorwaar-
den scheppen voor veiligheid. Echter, beide ervaringen tonen dat de overheid geen prioriteit 
stelt aan rampenbestrijding, of dat ze onwillig is om beleid uit te voeren in het voordeel van 
kwetsbare groepen. De ervaring uit west Afghanistan leert dat men het verleden en het hui-
dige conflict ook moet oplossen wil de CBDRR interventie om de zandstormen tegen te gaan 
kans van slagen te geven op de lange termijn. Concurrerende claims op natuurlijke hulp-
bronnen, verandering in etnische-politieke verhoudingen nadat vluchtelingen terugkeerden 
uit Iran, en veranderingen in overheidsbeleid na 2001 aangaande landeigendom, moesten in 
acht worden genomen voordat onderhandelingen konden starten over herbebossing. Her-
bebossing is niet simpel bomen planten om te voorkomen dat zand landbouwvelden bedekt 
en huizen inwaait, maar het vergt onderhandelingen met 40 andere gemeenschappen en 
overheidsinstanties om afspraken te maken over legitiem toegang en beheer van de graas-
gronden en het herbebossingsgebied. Afspraken werden vastgelegd in een ‘sociaal contract’ 
getekend door de lokale volksvertegenwoordigers, de overheid en de NGO waarin ieders 
taak en verantwoordelijkheden zijn vastgesteld. Dit contract is ook bedoeld om spanningen 
en conflicten over het landgebruik te verminderen. 
 
Het laatste hoofdstuk brengt de conceptuele inzichten en conclusies van de verschillende 
hoofdstukken bijeen. Het bespreekt op de eerste plaats wat CBDRR nu eigenlijk is en bete-
kent in verschillende ramp- en conflictgebieden, en herziet de definities van gangbare 
CBDRR concepten zoals onder andere gemeenschap, participatie, lokale kennis, kwetsbaar-
heid en weerbaarheid. Empirische bevindingen laten zien hoe Ngo’s, lokale gemeenschap-
pen en overheden in Afghanistan, Indonesië en de Filippijnen op een heel verschillende ma-
nier lokale realiteiten interpreteren en betekenis geven aan rampenbestrijding in de speci-
fieke context waarin ze werken en leven. Die interpretaties worden beïnvloed door hun er-
varingen in het verleden, door huidige verhoudingen tussen overheid en maatschappelijke 
organisaties, en hoe actoren hun interventies legitimeren. Of actoren benadrukken dat hun 
interventies politiek zijn, of ze depolitiseren hun werk. Op basis van dit onderzoek is het 
plausibel te concluderen dat wanneer men CBDRR niet beschouwd op een politieke en insti-
tutionele manier, de resultaten van de CBDRR interventie niet ten goede komen aan de 
meest kwetsbare groepen. Dit is één van de redenen waarom de 44 CBDRR test-locaties ge-
varieerde resultaten toonden.  
 
Het laatste hoofdstuk reflecteert ook op de potentie van de CBDRR benadering in conflictge-
bieden. De ervaring uit Herat biedt een waardevol perspectief op hoe je gemeenschappen 
die door zowel rampen als conflict getroffen worden kunt ondersteunen in een context 
waarin de overheid zwak, afwezig of betwist wordt. Ik pleit ervoor om zowel rampen als 
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conflict, te beschouwen als politieke gebeurtenissen. Op basis van dit onderzoek voeg ik het 
begrip ‘instituties’ toe dat analytisch gezien de scheiding tussen rampen en conflict theo-
rieën kan opheffen, omdat ‘instituties’ veiligheid en bescherming kunnen reguleren alsook 
toegang tot hulpbronnen, besluitvorming en conflicthantering. 
 
Door het politieke karakter van CBDRR beleid en praktijk in verschillende gebieden te bestu-
deren, is het mogelijk om de complexiteit en het politieke karakter van rampenbestrijding en 
conflicthantering te ontrafelen. De implicaties voor hulporganisaties is dat ze actief moeten 
uitvinden wie bepaalde risico-beperkende maatregelen ondersteunt of tegenwerkt en 
waarom, en manieren moeten vinden om kwetsbare groepen met succes te kunnen laten 
onderhandelen voor meer veiligheid in hun gemeenschap en in die van anderen. Deze ma-
nier van CBDRR toepassen verschilt substantieel van hoe CBDRR vaak wordt toegepast. Het 
belang van dit onderzoek is dat men verder moet kijken dan de tegenstelling tussen top-
down en bottom-up benaderingen van risicovermindering, omdat in de politieke arena van 
rampenbestrijding beide partijen elkaar tegen komen en onderhandelen over de principes 
en kenmerken van CBDRR tradities, wat resulteert in zeer gevarieerde CBDRR-praktijken, 
betekenissen en resultaten. Dé CBDRR-benadering bestaat niet. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
 
 
ACT ALLIANCE ‘Action-of-Churches Together’ Alliance 
ADA  Afghan Development Association 
ADPC  Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre 
AFP  Armed Forces of the Philippines 
AIDMI  All India Disaster Mitigation Institute 
AREU  Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit 
BPD  Badan Perwalikan Desa / Village parliament 
BRAC  Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
CBDRM Community-based Disaster Risk Management 
CBDRR  Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction 
CBO  Community-based Organization 
CBDO-DR Citizenry-based Development-oriented Disaster Response 
CCA  Cooperation Centre for Afghanistan 
CDA  Collaborative for Development Action 
CDC  Community Development Council 
CDP  Centre for Disaster Preparedness 
CDRC  Citizens Disaster Response Centre 
CDRN  Citizens Disaster Response Network 
CHA  Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
CSBP  Community Seed Bank Programme 
CSO  Civil-Society Organizations 
DDP  Department of Disaster Preparedness 
DRR  Disaster Risk Reduction 
DRRNetPhil Disaster Risk Reduction Network Philippines 
DSWD  Department of Social Welfare and Development 
GAR  Global Assessment Review 
GMIH  Gereja Masehi Injil Halmahera/Protestant Church of Halmahera 
GNDR  Global Network of Civil-Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction 
GNFDR  Global Forum of NGOs for Disaster Reduction 
GRDO  Grassroots Disaster Response Organization 
HFA  Hyogo Framework for Action 
ICCO  Inter-church Organisation for Development Cooperation 
IDNDR  International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
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IDP  Internally Displaced People 
IDR  Indonesian Rupiah 
I&K  ICCO and Kerkinactie 
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organization 
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force 
ITDG  Intermediate Technology Development Group 
MMDA  Metro Manila Development Authority 
MRRD  Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
NDCC  National Disaster Coordination Committee 
NDRRMC National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NPA  New People’s Army 
NSP  National Solidarity Programme 
PGI  Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia / Council of Churches in Indonesia 
PKN  Protestant Churches in the Netherlands 
PO  People’s Organization 
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team 
SANRO  Saro Nifero, Tobelo dialect meaning  ‘Let us develop!’ 
SDO  Sanayee Development Organization 
SHEEP  Society for Health, Education, Environment and Peace 
SPP  Serikat Petani Pati / Pati Farmers Union 
UGNAYAN Alliance of People’s Organizations affected by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
VFL  Views from the Frontline 
WCDR  World Conference on Disaster reduction 
YAPHI Yayasan Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia/Legal Services Foundation of Indonesia 
YLSKAR  Yayasan Lingkar Studi Kesetaraan Aksi dan Refleksi/Social Foundation for 
Equality, Action and Reflection Studies 
YTBI  Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia/Foundation for Disaster Management-
Indonesia 
YPL  Yayasan Pamaerdi Luhur/Christian Welfare of Pamaerdi Luhur Foundation 
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Glossary 
 
 
 
adat 
ashar 
bahala na 
balai besar 
 
Balai Besar 
 
balai rakyat 
barangay 
bayanihan 
conflict 
 
 
damayan 
dehqan 
dusun 
gotong royong 
Hazara 
 
 
hutan 
Jampi Sawan 
kahon  
karang taruna  
kelompok nelayan 
kelompok tani  
kepala desa 
khan  
kuchi 
madiskarte 
mahram 
malik 
 
mazdoor 
mirab 
sharia  
shura  
tokoh adat 
tokoh masyarakat 
woleswal 
Set of cultural norms, values, customs, traditional laws and practices. 
Community cooperation (Afghanistan) 
Literally ‘leaving it to fate’. 
Literally ‘big house’ referring to the shared history and ancestors 
among the different ethnic and religious groups in Halmahera. 
Complete name is Balai Besar Wilayah Sungi Pemali Juana, the head 
office in charge of the Juwana River management. 
Community hall. 
Village as administrative unit in the Philippines. 
Community cooperation. 
A relationship between two or more parties who have, or think they 
have, incompatible goals that clash. This research refers to conflicts 
that intensify and escalate in tension and violence. 
Mutual support (Philippines). 
Sharecropper.  
Sub-village, hamlet. 
Mutual support, community cooperation (Indonesia). 
 Ethnic group which lives in predominantly in the central highlands of 
Afghanistan  including Bamiyan, Day Kundi and parts of Ghazni and 
Wardak.  
Forest garden.  
People’s Network that cares for Juwana River. 
Literally ‘box’, but refers here to rain-fed rice terrace. 
Youth group. 
Fishermen group. 
Farmers group. 
Village head. 
Large landowner. 
Afghan Pasthun nomads. 
Resourceful.  
Male accompaniment for women to enter public spaces. 
 Village leader; representative between community and government; 
can resolve disputes. 
Landless wage labourers. 
Customary water rights controller. 
Islamic law. 
Customary council / committee 
Leader/authority responsible for customary law 
Community leader 
District governor 
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Completed Training and Supervision Plan 
 
 
 
 
 Name of the activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
A) Project related competences 
 Collaborative research CoP/WUR 2007-
2008 
    1 
 Politics of interactive research ARALIG 2009      2 
 Oral histories and life stories 
 
Narrative Inquiry        
UvA 
 
Mansholt/CERES 
2007 
 
2008 
    1 
     
    1,4 
 Complexity and Innovation CDI/Disasters Studies 2009     0,6 
 Facilitated and attended workshops  
at Novib, ICCO, Kerkinactie, Cordaid, CARE and 
NRC 
Different aid agencies 2006-
2011 
    4 
          
B) General research related competences  
 Introduction course CERES 2006     5 
 Presentation tutorials CERES 2006     1,4 
 Summer School 
Summer School 
Information literacy course 
CERES 
CERES 
CERES 
2006 
2007 
2006 
    1 
    1 
    0,6 
 Guest lectures on CBDRR (‘Natural Hazards’ 
course) 
 
Guest lecture ‘Aid and security in Afghanistan’ 
(‘Humanitarian Aid’ course) 
 
Guest lecture ‘Interactive research in conflict 
settings’(Research methodology course ) 
 
Presentation of paper: ‘Making conflicts and 
disasters less dangerous’ 
 
 
Presentation of paper: ‘The social life of CBDRR’ 
 
 
 
Presentation of paper: ‘Making sense of political 
vulnerability’ 
 
Presentation Afghanistan case on the interplay of 
disasters and conflict 
 
 
Disaster Studies 
 
 
Disaster Studies 
 
 
Disaster Studies 
 
 
1st World Conference of 
Humanitarian Studies, 
Groningen 
 
1st World Conference of  
Humanitarian Studies,  
Groningen 
 
2nd World Conference of 
Humanitarian Studies, Boston 
 
Humanity House, Cordaid and 
Disaster studies 
2006-
2011 
 
2007 
 
 
2010 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 2009  
 
 
 
 2011 
 
 
 2011 
    2 
 
     
    0,5 
 
 
    0,5 
 
    
    1 
 
 
 
    1 
 
 
 
    2 
 
 
    2 
C) Career related competences/personal development    
 Art of Writing course 
 
Basic Safety & Security Course 
 
Teaching and supervision thesis students 
Language centre CENTA - WUR 
 
Centre for Safety and 
Development 
WUR 
 
2007 
 
2007 
 
2008 
   1,8 
 
   0,9 
 
   0,6 
 Science, the press and the general public 
 
Scientific Publishing 
CERES 
 
WUR 
2008 
 
2009 
    1 
 
    0,3 
 Total (minimum 30 ECTS)   32,6 
*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work 
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